Agreement on defense cooperation with the United States of America

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Madam Speaker! In my hand, I hold the joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence's report 1, in which it is proposed that the Riksdag approve the agreement on defense cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America, the so-called DCA agreement. I have had the privilege of being chairman during the joint committee's consideration of the bill in the Riksdag. I move for approval of the committee's proposed decision in the report and rejection of the reservations.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank the committee's deputed members for constructive preparatory meetings, where even substitute members have contributed to the majority's writings in some cases, despite differences of opinion. I consider the report to be an expression that the nation's elected representatives can unite around security and defense policy and realpolitik in the nation's interest, even in a time when a high and polarizing tone prevails in the public debate and whips up foaming waves.

About 400 years ago, the ship Kalmar Nyckel broke the waves across the Atlantic in its voyages between Sweden and the USA and became almost unique for its time by completing four transatlantic voyages. In Joe Biden's hometown of Wilmington, a replica of the ship lies moored today. With Carl Milles' statue in the background, the ship, its history, and the maritime transatlantic link are maintained with pride. On the city square, one also occasionally sees the Swedish flag flying. Here, the transatlantic link between just our two countries is tangible, as is the collective memory that the relationship was not developed yesterday but has been carved out over centuries.

Madam Speaker! We live in an era of unrest. During our time on earth, we are experiencing the worst security situation in Europe since the Second World War. A large-scale war is raging in our immediate vicinity. Our militarily most powerful neighbor, Russia, is an aggressor and is launching wildly, not only against Ukraine but also against the rules-based order. Russia, which is also the world's largest nuclear power, repeatedly threatens to use precisely these weapons. In our Baltic Sea region, we see how underwater warfare and GPS interference have become increasingly common and extensive. Russia also repeatedly violates Swedish territory. Just last week, another violation occurred in the air, and the Swedish incident readiness had to be activated to intercept Russian aircraft. The situation is, to say the least, serious. If this is the consensus among us elected representatives and among experts.

The dark clouds over the security situation also do not appear to be clearing. The brightening is delayed. Rather, the situation is worsening. We can discern a number of factors that could make the serious situation even more serious. If there is also consensus on this. It is against that background that I mean that one needs to read and understand the agreement on defense cooperation with the world's militarily most powerful democracy, USA, and see how it has been developed and tested by the referral bodies.

The need to quickly secure Sweden's security is very great, especially after decades of disarmament which mean that we today have a significantly weaker defense than at the end of the Cold War, even if it is on its way back. We are in the process of rearming, which is good and necessary. But the rearming is not keeping pace with the security policy developments. It takes a long time to rearm, while it goes quickly to disarm, which has always been known and which we have experienced in recent years. The Defence Preparedness, which recently in broad political agreement presented its report, plans for that Swedish rearming needs to continue well into the 2030s. What happens after that remains to be seen, but this shows the time it takes before we on our own reach an acceptable defense capability.

Madam Speaker! It is from these premises that it lies in Sweden's interest to enter into the DCA agreement with the USA. Critics have raised legitimate questions about why membership in Nato is not enough and why a separate agreement with the USA also needs to be entered into. Nato is admittedly the cornerstone of the military cooperation that Sweden has entered into, but Nato's basic treaty from 1949 is overarching. Nato also has no standing forces of its own. Therefore, agreements need to be concluded with states that can contribute actual capabilities to deter and to defend us and the defense alliance together with us. In that case, it is the USA that applies. Through the DCA agreement, we open up for being able to concretely host American forces on Swedish soil in order, in the long run, to deter Russian aggression against us and to be able to defend ourselves if we are attacked.

Madam Speaker! Another criticism directed at the DCA agreement is that it restricts Swedish sovereignty in various ways. It is obviously true that we delegate certain exercises of authority to another state, just as in many other international collaborations that Sweden has entered into. Even Sweden's entry into the UN restricted parts of Swedish sovereignty at the time, which was the subject of much debate then. Few claim today that Sweden should leave the United Nations.

It is also important to see the clear limitations that exist in the DCA agreement, which only concern defense cooperation and the possibilities to be able to station troops and store materiel and weapons systems in certain selected locations.

It is against the background of extensive respect for Sweden's sovereignty in all areas that there are no clauses that in any way affect how we freely design our foreign and security policy.

Madam Speaker! The people of Sweden and we Members of Parliament need to see how we can strengthen the defense of our country. Naivety regarding war and peace for our country is not an option. We should be prepared for the threats that exist today and the changing threats that we can discern on the horizon.

In the scouts, you learn to be ready, always ready. The DCA agreement is precisely part of being prepared and creating the conditions with the allies so that we are never forced to have Russian hostile troops in our lands again.

Let us not lose sight of what is at stake if we fail to strengthen the defense of our own country. Every day we can witness how Russia commits war crimes in Ukraine, how massacres against civilians are committed on occupied territory, how forced displacements are carried out, and how children are kidnapped in order to eradicate the Ukrainian nation, language, and identity.

It is also about how Ukraine is attacked across its entire territory where civil infrastructure is attacked and civilian targets are shelled in accordance with the rules. It is precisely that which we must prevent from also happening here.

Madam Speaker! In conclusion: We are experiencing a great deal of engagement regarding today's debate and decision. Names for signatures have been collected. Interest organizations are expressing themselves. Opinion polls have been published. Among this, we also see disinformation about the agreement orchestrated by the regime in the Kremlin.

To concerned citizens and genuine critics of the DCA agreement, I want to say that I understand your concern when decisions are made quickly. Many of you may certainly feel that we should have more time for debate and analysis.

I welcome discussion and debate. Some of it is taking place here today, in the nation's highest decision-making body. Some of it has been conducted in our country's free and independent media. Some of it has been conducted within industry organizations and through citizen initiatives.

Dialogue has been held with the municipalities concerned. Over a hundred referral bodies, as well as the Council on Legislation, have commented on the proposal. Study circles and seminars have been organized.

The joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence decided in May to give the Committee on the Constitution, the Committee on Justice, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Taxation, the Committee on Social Affairs and also the Committee on Transport the opportunity to comment on the proposal from their respective areas of competence. We have, of course, also obtained information from the Swedish Armed Forces.

Even though the time frame for analysis and preparation could have been longer, it must be taken into account that in the security situation we find ourselves in, failing to act in time is also a risk. It is a risk that we cannot afford to take when it concerns precisely war and peace.

The alternative to not deterring Russia and enabling mobility for our like-minded partners is to invite aggression. We have seen the outcome of that in other countries so many times before in both older and modern history.

To summarize: the DCA agreement concerns a defense cooperation that benefits Sweden's interests and respects Swedish sovereignty. It creates room for action and minimizes bureaucratic processes in the event of a serious or more serious development.

It implies changes that we are not used to. It also implies NATO membership. We can observe that our neighboring country Norway has a similar DCA agreement. Finland and Denmark are preparing or will shortly prepare similar agreements. Our Nordic neighboring countries are moving in step, and the cause of the Nordics is our cause. Therefore, we now adopt this intergovernmental agreement and strengthen Sweden's freedom of action and defense.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! Today we are debating a military agreement between Sweden and the USA, an agreement called the DCA agreement. It is an agreement that is more far-reaching than any other agreement that Sweden has previously signed. We are giving up our own territory and our own legislation for another country.

Regardless of what one thinks about the DCA agreement, for or against, it is important to remember that today's decision is of principal importance, differs from previously made decisions and changes Sweden's security policy position towards our surrounding world. I would not go so far as to say that it is more decisive than the Nato decision. But it has the same principal shift that historically has been unthinkable.

Madam Speaker! Vänsterpartiet intends today to vote against the government's proposition to approve the signing of the DCA agreement. We do so for several reasons, which I and my colleagues will present during today's long debate.

Let me start with the overarching principle. The DCA agreement is not part of the Swedish NATO membership, which was finalized just over three months ago. Instead of American soldiers following the same regulatory framework as all other states within NATO, we decide today that American soldiers shall have a special status, an extra-favorable agreement, with higher access and less Swedish control than other NATO countries in Sweden.

I can fundamentally think it is a questionable way to handle other Nato members. But I am not really surprised since the USA has a dominant position, which it exploits daily both within Nato and globally.

Madam Speaker! Vänsterpartiet has put forward fundamental criticism on two points regarding the agreement since it was signed. These concern the lack of provisions regarding nuclear weapons and that American legislation shall apply to American soldiers, relatives, and subcontractors. I will now dive deep into each respective issue.

In the 50s and 60s, within secret parts of our defense forces in Sweden, a development of a Swedish nuclear weapon was underway. Our physicists and experts were far ahead in their competence and knowledge in the nuclear physics field. After years of research and development parallel to the development of nuclear power, Sweden had good opportunities to develop nuclear weapons which at that time were otherwise only developed by the world's superpowers.

But Swedish politicians made a choice. They decided that Sweden and the world would be safer if Sweden did not develop nuclear weapons, but instead worked towards risk reduction and for détente between great powers in a time, like this one, where tensions were increasing.

Sweden decided to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, in 1968. It was a historical decision by the Swedish Riksdag that has served Sweden's security interests and its citizens well for over fifty years.

We fast-forward the tape to the present. Sweden has been a member of the military alliance Nato for just over three months. Nato is clear in its doctrines. They are based on deterrence, and ultimately with nuclear weapons.

Sweden is included for the first time in our history under a nuclear weapons umbrella. Nuclear weapons could, by another state, be used in our name. As recently as last week, Defense Minister Pål Jonsson participated in a meeting with NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.

Nuclear weapons are not just any weapon. They are a weapon of mass destruction. They are a weapon that, the two times it has been used, killed hundreds of thousands and for a long time destroyed the environment for human life. Japan will never forget Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and neither should we.

What does the Swedish DCA agreement say about nuclear weapons? Yes, Madam Speaker, the answer is frighteningly nothing. It is unlike the Norwegian agreement, the Danish agreement, and the Finnish agreement, which refer back to Finnish legislation prohibiting nuclear weapons on Finnish territory.

That makes Sweden the only country in the Nordic region that lacks contractual clauses providing protection against nuclear weapons. But you are exaggerating, Håkan, the USA does not want to place any nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, say the supporters of the agreement.

It is indeed true. Under the current American Biden administration, there are no signs of any such nuclear weapons issues. But Biden will not be president in the USA forever. It is him for a maximum of four more years, if his wavering health holds. But it is also the case that we already in November will know if Donald Trump will return as president in the USA, a president whose previous presidential term most Swedes remember as clearly shaky.

"My button is bigger than yours" is a tweet directed at North Korea's dictator that we must not forget. Agreements are not only written for days of sunshine. Agreements must also be written for days with clouds, rain, and even storms.

The government's handling of the agreement is not only naive, but directly reckless. Both Norway, Denmark, and Finland have been careful to include prohibitions against nuclear weapons. In Sweden, instead, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has opened up for the possibility that nuclear weapons on Swedish territory could be relevant in a war situation. It is a worrying development in a time when hybrid threats and the differences between war and peace are becoming increasingly blurred.

That makes the Social Democratic handshake on the formulations regarding nuclear weapons with the Moderates very weak, or as the Moderate Stefan Olsson expressed in the Swedish Riksdag two weeks ago: "My party stands behind the agreement with the Social Democrats as long as we have it."

It is an outrageous statement that goes completely against both what the Swedish people think and what Sweden has stood for for a long time.

Vänsterpartiet has long advocated that Sweden should introduce a law, similar to the Finnish one, which makes it clear that we do not accept nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

It is important to remember that it is not just about us and about what our view is. We know how we think and how we intend to act. But what does Russia believe, know, and understand? In which situations does Russia perceive Sweden incorrectly? Can we get our own Cuban Missile Crisis then?

Madam Speaker! The second part of our criticism of the DCA agreement concerns the American jurisdiction, i.e., the far-reaching change that American law shall apply in Sweden, as if Sweden were not a rule-of-law state. American soldiers, their relatives and subcontractors to the American army should, of course, be tried in Swedish court like everyone else.

With and by this agreement, the American forces were granted a similar immunity against Swedish law as that which only foreign diplomats have. The basic idea is that in the case of crimes, they shall be punished according to American military law. Problems arise, however, in cases where this law is weaker than the Swedish one. The view on sexualized crimes is a clear such example. American military criminal legislation prohibits absolute rape and prostitution, but the legislation is weaker than Sweden's.

The USA, for example, does not have a consent legislation, which means that a deployed American who commits rape could be acquitted in an American military court in cases where they would have been convicted under Swedish law. The same applies to sexual intercourse, which according to American military legislation is prohibited but where some form of solicitation or coercion is required for a person to be convicted. According to Swedish law, the sexual intercourse itself is sufficient. The agreement could therefore, in practice, lead to impunity for crimes such as certain rapes and sexual intercourse.

But there is a safety valve. It is about Sweden having to notify the USA within 30 days that one is taking the cases within the framework of Swedish law and jurisdiction instead of American law. Which cases does this apply to? Yes, the government is clear in its bill that there are indeed few exceptional cases where Swedish law shall apply. The government's bill also states: "A member of an American force will thus, as a starting point in cases of suspected sexual offenses, be tried under American military criminal legislation."

What does it mean for the crime victim? I am thinking about whether a pub brawl occurs at the Stadshotellet in Kristinehamn or a rape in Halmstad. What does it mean in the case of a sex purchase where the seller does not come from Sweden or when an American partner is subjected to sex without consent?

Yes, in the committee's processing this became a discussion, and the committee landed on partially new wordings, including the formulation: "Furthermore, the committee wishes to emphasize the importance of safeguarding the legal certainty for crime victims in Sweden."

It is a step in the right direction that can lead to future governments making assessments that can result in more cases ending up in a Swedish court, not an American one. We should agree that impunity should not prevail, nowhere in the world. But in my opinion, the best thing would have been to never surrender jurisdiction to the USA at all.

It is also important in this context to remember the impact that the agreement between Sweden and the USA can have for third countries. If not even we, who are one of the world's strongest democracies and rule-of-law states, can manage to stand up to the USA when it comes to judicial justice, how then will a developing country manage to do so?

On a global level, this leads to impunity for American soldiers. We have seen it many times, in many different wars. Afghanistan is what appears as a clear example in the recent past for me. When the International Criminal Court, ICC, tried to investigate potential crimes by American soldiers in Afghanistan, Trump introduced sanctions against the chief judge and her husband. If they traveled to the USA, they would be arrested. When the USA acts in this way, it leads to impunity and to victims of crimes not receiving redress.

Madam Speaker! I believe that we all, both proponents and opponents of this agreement, agree that it is a comprehensive agreement. Similar agreements have been signed with Norway, Denmark, and Finland. But the Swedish agreement is the agreement that contains the most bases for the Americans.

Both the bill and the committee's report state that it is not a matter of permanent American bases in Sweden, but rather that it concerns pre-positioning of American materiel for those cases where they would need to come to Sweden.

In the report from Stockholm University's Faculty of Law, a reasoning is presented regarding what constitutes a permanent base and what does not. The Faculty of Law states that the DCA agreement with the USA is contradictory and unclear.

The rights granted to the American force are far-reaching. The American force, its relatives and subcontractors are granted permission to build buildings without Swedish supervision, to drive with an American driver's license and to skip the vehicle inspection. American labor law shall apply. The children shall not be covered by Swedish compulsory schooling. They can even use American stamps. If the USA wants, they can without any problems build a parallel society to the Swedish one.

Is it a permanent base? Maybe, maybe not. Even if it is not a permanent American base that will be established in Sweden, the DCA agreement implies a permanent American presence in Sweden.

The Swedish government bases much of its argument on one word in Article 1 of the DCA agreement - consent. What the Americans are to do shall occur with Swedish consent. Even in this part, the Faculty of Law at Stockholm University has an interesting reasoning.

In the Norwegian agreement, it is verified that the USA must comply with Norwegian law and Norwegian international law obligations internationally. Nothing in the USA's actions may go against these Norwegian principles.

According to the legal faculty committee's conclusion, "the most reasonable interpretation of this vague wording is therefore not that it limits the USA regarding which activities should be carried out or how."

Even if the government is firm against the USA, consent can always be challenged. It can be done through practical action, that is, by acting first and apologizing afterwards. One can then say that the USA perceived that there was consent. More likely, especially if it becomes a presidency for Trump, is that they use all conceivable methods to pressure Sweden into consenting.

A better negotiated agreement from the government's side would have been based on clear limitations and boundaries for the American force, not consent.

I can feel a bit sorry for the Social Democrats in this. I am convinced that they are genuine in their belief that Sweden becomes safer without nuclear weapons on our territory and without foreign bases in Sweden. They negotiate and reach agreements with the government parties – the Moderates, Christian Democrats and Liberals – for a policy that holds over time, over several parliamentary terms, and they succeed. But then only days, weeks and months pass before one liberal and moderate after another expresses that they want both foreign bases and nuclear weapons in Sweden. The question then is what today's negotiations and handshakes will be worth in the future.

Vänsterpartiet requests in today's debate that the question of shelving shall be examined in accordance with the Instrument of Government Chapter 2, Section 22, which means that if one-sixth of the members of the Riksdag so request, a matter shall be declared dormant for one year before it is brought up for a vote again. In order for this legal provision to be usable, one of the fundamental freedoms in our constitution needs to be restricted as a consequence of the proposed legislative changes.

In this case, it concerns the freedom to move freely within Sweden for Swedish citizens, as established in the Instrument of Government Chapter 2, Section 8, the so-called freedom of movement.

The defense cooperation agreement with the USA gives, through Article 6, American forces the right, under exceptional circumstances, to take necessary and proportionate measures beyond the immediate vicinity of the agreed facilities, i.e., the 17 bases, to maintain and restore the security and defense of the American forces. Which circumstances these are are not described in further detail. It is a very far-reaching right we are giving to the American forces.

When another country is given the power to act without direct approval outside of the military bases, limit public access to previously open areas, and block off or fence in land, the freedom of movement of Swedish citizens is compromised. Such restrictions should be preceded by careful considerations regarding proportionality, effectiveness, and necessity. This has not been done in this case, we argue, and therefore the Committee on the Constitution and the Council of Legislation should be allowed to examine this issue more closely.

That is why ten members from Vänsterpartiet have requested that the Swedish Parliament also take a position on the laying of the bill at today's vote.

With that, Madam Speaker, I move for approval of reservations 1 and 2 from Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet, with the accompanying special statement 1 from Vänsterpartiet. I also move for approval of reservations 3, 5 and 7 from Vänsterpartiet as well as the received motion for shelving.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! Thank you, Håkan Svenneling, for the speech! It is still fascinating how one can read an agreement so differently and draw such different conclusions. But that is how it is in a democracy, and that is something we should be proud of. One can claim that the earth is flat - of course, one is allowed to do that, if we are joking around a bit here.

I would like to ask a question to Håkan Svenneling regarding the last thing he raised in his speech, namely the declaration of neutrality. This is how the Left Party also acted in 2016 when Sweden entered into the host nation agreement with Nato. That time, the Riksdag did not agree.

Since the Council on Legislation has reviewed the bill and has no objection to this point, one becomes very curious about how the Left Party has come to the conclusion that this is likely not correct. How have you reasoned? That is my honestly curious question.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! Thank you very much, Member Berglund, for a very good question!

I would say that it is based on two parts. The Council on Legislation has commented, while the Committee on the Constitution has chosen not to comment in connection with the processing of this report. On the other hand, it has been clear that many Swedish citizens have reached out. I do not know exactly what Jörgen Berglund's inbox looks like, but I know what my own looks like and I would guess that one email or another has arrived regarding today's debate and decision.

My perception as a representative for the second-largest opposition party in the Riksdag is that if there is a strong popular will to have the issue of table layout on the table because one desires more debate, it is important for me as a Member of Parliament and the people's primary representative to listen to those demands.

It was the basis for why I began to look at the issue of laying out and saw that we had acted in a similar manner regarding similar agreements with Nato and the USA at previous occasions. Even regarding the law on foreign espionage, this laying out discussion occurred. Therefore, I thought it was reasonable to place it under the bill.

We will have to see what the members of the Riksdag think. It actually only requires that a sixth of the members of the Riksdag stand behind the motion, and I think those members who are wondering whether there aren't still certain ambiguities in this agreement should take the chance and choose postponement today. That does not mean that one is against the agreement, but it means that we have a slower process and that we can wait until the American presidential election, which I think is quite decisive for how we view the implementation of this agreement - a question that we shall ask ourselves tomorrow.

I think, therefore, that there are good reasons to argue for a shelving today. Furthermore, I am glad to have learned that it was a liberal who once upon a time saw to it that this is included in our constitution.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! Thank you, Håkan Svenneling, for the reasoning regarding why this has been done!

I also think it is important to point out, so that it is clear for everyone and not misunderstood, that the KU chose not to comment. One had the possibility, but chose not to do so, and one can indeed wonder why. I interpret it as that they saw no reason to do so on this point. But as said, that is my opinion.

It is also important to remember that even though it is a so-called declaration of intent and one does not need to be against it, it would have quite large consequences for Sweden if we were to continue with this agreement for one more year.

I believe Håkan Svenneling himself pointed out that our neighboring countries and several other countries have signed such agreements. My other question is whether you have considered how this would go in conjunction with the other Nordic countries that have or will soon sign these agreements. Swedish NATO integration would probably also take a hit.

Risk and consequence analysis are usually popular words. I don't mean exactly that, but I assume that you have had some reasoning regarding this. It would be interesting to hear how that reasoning has gone.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! That was also a wise question from Member Berglund. Sweden is the newest member of Nato of all Nato members, and I believe we have quite a lot to do just with the Nato implementation that we are currently undertaking.

I went alone to my first meeting with NATO's parliamentary assembly, and it was well about what I expected. But it was still good to be in the room for the first time and understand how NATO works from the inside in a different way. I do not think the consequences will be so great, because we have very much other implementation to do as a result of the NATO decision, and I believe that we can deepen our Nordic cooperation with Denmark, Norway, and Finland in a good way even during a layout.

I also want to say that we warned the Chamber Office a few days before that we intended to do this, and some investigation has also been carried out regarding in which cases one can request a stay of proceedings. The Chamber Office has now reached a further assessment of in which cases the question of a stay of proceedings can become relevant, which is well something to have with us for future potential legislative changes linked to the Swedish NATO membership. It is, after all, fundamentally a very important principled change in Swedish security policy.

I accept that we lost that vote. I am fully aware of that, but I mean that an implementation of the Swedish Natobeslut needs to happen in a correct and good way. I foresee that the government that Jörgen Berglund represents as a member of the Riksdag will come forward with some propositions before we close here ahead of the 2026 election.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! I agree that one can read an agreement in very many different ways. But one thing is not surprising, Madam Speaker, and that is that Vänsterpartiet is trying to do everything to appear as the biggest opponent of the Nature Act of all in Sweden. Then, one naturally grabs at every straw and tries to make a feather into a chicken, to use an expression.

That is why they try to write in that we are opening up for nuclear weapons. But where does it say that in this agreement, Madam Speaker? I heard the member refer to the committee having improved the wording regarding impunity and consideration for crime victims. I wonder if the member has read what we have gathered in the committee regarding the fact that Sweden will not have nuclear weapons or permanent bases in peacetime on our territory. It is clear. It was clear in the Nato decision and the Nato ratification, and it is clear now.

At least I have heard everyone say that they fully respect this from NATO's side. I have not heard anyone who has knocked on the door and is interested. But now I hear, Madam Speaker, that the Left Party sees the opportunity to make Trump a new reason to say no, and therefore they want to declare a moratorium.

I must ask a curious question: Why is there nothing about the freedom of movement in the Left Party's reservations or special statements? I have not been able to read or find anything about the restricted freedom of movement. How did it come in at the end, Madam Speaker?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I honestly believe that there is no direct competition for being the biggest Nato opponent. I believe that title goes to me. I usually think about it those few times I have been at Nato's parliamentary assembly, that there probably isn't anyone in there who is as much against Nato as I am.

I am quite proud of that. I think it was an important debate to have in Swedish politics, and it led, in a decisive security policy phase for Sweden, to us having a broader discussion than one had, for example, in Finland.

In this report, one has copy and pasted, to use an English expression, from the NATO report that we dealt with in the Riksdag 15 months ago and once again reintroduced the writings one has regarding foreign bases and nuclear weapons to verify the agreement between Centerpartiet, Socialdemokraterna, the governing parties, and Sverigedemokraterna.

What I think is relevant here is not what is written but what is not written. That is why the comparison with the Norwegian agreement, the Danish agreement and the Finnish agreement is so relevant – because there it states something about nuclear weapons. It does not in the Swedish agreement, for some reason that no one has managed to explain to me yet.

What I also miss in that is an American verification that they do not intend to bring nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory.

There are also in the debate about this, and even in the text, clear statements that it only concerns peacetime. That means we completely lack regulations of what happens during states of war or in the type of gray zone issues we are moving in today with hybrid threats. That makes me think that the Prime Minister's statement is extremely worrying.

It is absolutely the case that freedom of movement came in at the end. It is about the fact that in order to table something in the Riksdag, one needs to refer to one of the constitutionally protected rights we as Swedish citizens have, and then we assess that it is movement that is hindered through the American access.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! I am sure that Håkan Svenneling and Vänsterpartiet can receive a medal as the biggest opponents of nature.

Let us then remember, Madam Speaker, that it is also about being the greatest opponent to Sweden's security, to security in our region, to our neighbors' security, and to being able to build the Nordic common defense cooperation.

I have noted that Vänsterpartiet at its congress has signaled that they want to find other defense collaborations in order to be able to leave Nato. I wonder where one seeks other defense collaborations. The Nordic countries and the EU countries around us are Nato members. We really have a security solution in place, and it is becoming better with this agreement. Vänsterpartiet obviously refuses to see that.

I heard something small about Russia, but it is the Russian nuclear weapons we must be careful with. It is the Russian nuclear weapons that we must ensure we find a countermeasure against so that they will never be used. That threat is real. That threat is being used against Ukraine and against us today and makes us a bit cautious and afraid of escalation in the support for Ukraine, so it is already evident in today's environment. It is clear that it is important to be clear that it is the Russian nuclear weapons that we must stand up against. It is not the American ones, not even if Trump sits as president.

Fundamentally, the resistance to NATO is a resistance against Swedish security and against our neighbors' security, and I think that one must acknowledge that.

Regarding the question of freedom of movement, it is interesting that neither the Committee on the Constitution (KU) nor the Council on Legislation, but obviously not even the Left Party, had discovered the issue until the processing was finished in the joint committee.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I actually think Kerstin Lundgren is making a completely incorrect interpretation of Sweden's security. I would say that every single member of this Riksdag stands up for Sweden's security and territorial integrity and for Sweden to be free from occupiers. This applies regardless of whether one is for or against NATO membership.

That is why all the parties in the Riksdag, in broad agreement, have reached an agreement in the Defence Committee to increase the appropriations for Sweden's military defense. It shows that we all take security seriously in troubled times.

Vänsterpartiet wants to see increased regionalization within Nato. We believe that we best defend ourselves together with our neighbors, who are more like-minded than, for example, Hungary and Turkey are. In the long run, we want to build a counterweight in order to be able to leave Nato, which has a strong element of USA dominance.

We must act to reduce risk and find ways forward toward what Kerstin is touching upon, which I agree with every word of. It is Russia that is the threat to us. It is Putin who has started a war in Ukraine. It is he who is raising the temperature in our immediate vicinity.

We need to find ways, and it is not entirely simple which ways they should be. Today you present a way that you believe in. I believe in another way.

I think it is good that you refer to the NPT, the non-proliferation treaty. It is a way to show that.

I believe that Sweden should sign the UN nuclear weapons convention and, together with other countries, globally increase the pressure on the nuclear-weapon states to disarm and work towards détente.

We should introduce nuclear-weapon-free zones both in our immediate vicinity and in other parts of the world. It would lead to a reduction in the effect of believing in nuclear weapons, the trust in them. We need to work on this both in relation to ourselves and in relation to Ukraine and the whole world globally. There we have an important task that we absolutely must not lose now that we are members of Nato and sign an agreement with the world's second-largest nuclear power. The largest is Russia.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! The situation we have in today's Europe is historically negative. The war in Ukraine is a violent assault on international law and justice. It is a violent assault on the Ukrainian people, and it constitutes a long-term threat to all of Europe.

This is, therefore, the greatest challenge we have faced since the Second World War, and the outcome of this war will be decisive for the living conditions of future generations. What it ultimately comes down to is whether they will get to live in a Europe where international law and the countries' sovereignty are respected.

That is what this is about at its core, and very few want to live in a shadow from Moscow. Very few in democratic Europe want to live with constantly taking into account what potential powers and totalitarian regime leaders in the Kremlin might think and the capriciousness that it entails.

Therefore, the democratic countries must stick together in the time we live in and with the great challenges we have. We must support each other. That must be the fundamental starting point, and we must build defense systems together that are both deterrent and stabilizing. That is what this is about.

The threat from Russia is a fact that is an everyday reality every single day for the people living at the front in Ukraine. What is happening is that an iron curtain is falling over Europe. Where it falls somewhere is decided in Ukraine, on the front line, and there the support and the help that we provide has a large and decisive influence.

One must see the DCA agreement in a larger picture, where it is about building maximum security in our part of Europe.

It was the government that I represented at one time that took this initiative, which initiated the discussions with the USA regarding a defense cooperation agreement. This was a consequence of the fact that we had previously made a so-called statement of intent with the USA – a number of points that deepened the cooperation between Sweden and the USA. This was followed up by a trilateral agreement, statement of intent, between Finland, Sweden and the USA.

In that context, Finland and Sweden agreed that we should try to develop a defense cooperation agreement. It was to make it easier to train together. It was to remove a lot of administrative bureaucracy and create conditions for faster help in a crisis or war situation. We wanted to achieve a situation where we could get the support as soon as possible because we know that the faster the support arrives, the greater the opportunity one has to influence the development in the crisis or the war. That was how it was. That was the harsh analysis we made, and I believe it was just as correct then as it is now.

We also did something else that was based on the same line of thinking: We joined the British-led task force Joint Expeditionary Force, which is not part of Nato but where a number of Nato countries are included and which can be deployed bilaterally and multilaterally quickly in connection with crisis or war in order to thereby influence the initial stage of the conflict. This was a defense and military policy thinking that aimed to be able to act as early as possible. It is also something that is deterrent in practice and which strengthens Swedish military capability and defense capability together with others.

I want to strongly warn against underestimating Russia's various ambitions and plans. We can, of course, largely set aside the time spent here discussing various details in different contexts, but it is these perspectives. This is what one must look at when considering what we should do to maximally strengthen our security in the time we live in. Therefore, we must not underestimate what Russia is engaged in or their will, in the event of a success in Ukraine, to also continue the war against other countries.

I just want to remind that we have a situation where tens of thousands of aircraft over the Baltic Sea have lost their GPS signal, that Russia some time ago removed 24 buoys from Estonian waters near the Narva River, and that they maneuvered around and wanted to move the border towards Finland and Lithuania to expand their own territorial waters. We also now have a common occurrence involving Russia having a shadow fleet outside Gotland, which of course can also serve as a platform for activities that we are not particularly interested in.

The agreement we are to handle in the decision-making process here regulates the legal status and conditions for American personnel, suppliers, and relatives. It is very clear that it is Swedish sovereignty, Swedish law, and international law that apply—that it is this we proceed from. It was implied here that there would be some specific country that has some kind of its own international law. I want to say that international law applies equally to everyone, and it is based on the UN Charter. It is therefore not correct to refer to any country having its own special variant of it.

This agreement provides the opportunity to plan the American presence and the conditions for quickly bringing in support in connection with a crisis or war. Then, one can of course discuss whether it concerns permanent bases or not. The spirit of the agreement and the discussions that have been held is that it concerns temporary presence that is linked to agreed military activity. This is, therefore, something that one plans together. It is not something that just arises from something decided somewhere else, but one plans this together.

Swedish consent is not a bad or incorrect formulation. It is a formulation that means that, in the end, we have the final word on what material is brought in, what storage takes place, and what activities are carried out.

This agreement is also not about the conditions for bringing nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory. No such requirements exist and have not existed.

I have been involved in defense policy since 2011, when I first became chairman of the Defense Committee. Since then, I had eight years as a minister, and now I am back in the role in the Defense Committee. During all these years, I have never participated in a conversation where anyone has demanded that Sweden should have nuclear weapons. I have never experienced this and do not believe that I will need to experience it either.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty applies, and Sweden and the USA are legally bound by it. Nuclear-weapon states may not spread nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, and non-nuclear-weapon states may not receive nuclear weapons. Sweden has all the prerequisites to continue to be a strong voice for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has not ceased to apply. It still applies and should not be reduced to some rounding error in the general debate, because it is not. The Stockholm Initiative, which Margot Wallström launched, was built precisely on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; I think one should remember this.

There may still be reason to remind that nuclear weapons do not need to be spread to other countries to fulfill their purpose. I absolutely do not want nuclear weapons to ever be used. It is exactly as has been said about weapons of mass destruction. But they can be fired from submarines or aircraft or directly from ground bases. They can therefore still fulfill their purpose, so I do not know if the debate we are having is actually particularly relevant.

I believe there are reasons to once again point out that it is Russia that is threatening with nuclear weapons. It is they who are practicing with them, and it is they who have an aggressive use of language. It is they who have initiated this entire crisis. They are trying to use nuclear weapons rhetoric to scare democratic countries into not supporting Ukraine. This is the major problem, and we must be clear about that. It is Russia's totalitarian regime that is waging war, violating international law and having imperialistic ambitions, and it in turn creates our need to upgrade the total defense, deepen our cooperation with other countries, be members of Nato and Joint Expeditionary Force and, via agreements such as DCA, contribute to increased security in our country.

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary thus have the DCA agreement. Iceland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have similar defense agreements. It is thus this type of countries that have this and which we – Sweden, Denmark and Norway – will now have similar agreements with.

This will facilitate cooperation in the Nordic region because we provide American forces with similar conditions in all countries. If the ambition is increased regionalization in the Nordic region within the framework of Nato, it is therefore an agreement that is in line with this. I am firmly in favor of deepened cooperation in the Nordic region and have been for many years. I believe that we now have an opportunity to do this in depth and in practice achieve an increasingly common defense power in the Nordic region, which is based on a distribution of resources between the Nordic countries that provides the greatest possible efficiency and can therefore also serve as a deterrent.

This agreement concerns 17 areas in Sweden, 15 in Finland and 14 in Norway - this is also worth noting.

The American presence is strictly regulated in the DCA agreement. I repeat that it is based on respect for sovereignty, international law, international law, and international obligations. The agreement is important and necessary in the difficult times we are living in now. The war in Ukraine will likely be long, and the state of tension in relation to Russia will be a fact for a long time to come. It could be decades that we have to deal with this totalitarian power. That is how the perspective looks. Therefore, this type of cooperation is necessary, and the DCA agreement is just one of several methods.

Even though other things have been said in the debate, I argue that this is fundamentally about a debate that follows in the footsteps of the NATO debate. When initiatives are taken regarding agreements and deepened cooperation, this will be met with criticism. Therefore, this debate is just one in a series of those we have ahead of us, even if the other debates will take place in different forms and have different political significance.

This is fundamentally about how we view how we should handle the greatest challenge we have faced since the Second World War. For me, it is clear that we democracies must stick together as far as we can, because the challenge is so immense and so great and requires so much long-term perspective. We will have to devote effort to this for decades. Therefore, it is also very reasonable to approve the committee's majority proposal today.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! As Peter Hultqvist, former Minister for Defence, noted, the negotiations with the USA began already during his time as Minister for Defence. That is why he is a staunch advocate of the DCA agreement without any major objections. I therefore have a couple of questions for Member Peter Hultqvist:

Why did the Social Democrats initiate the negotiations on the DCA agreement? Did it happen at Sweden's or the USA's initiative? Did it happen before or after Sweden's application for NATO membership?

Furthermore, it would be interesting to hear what the starting positions were from the Swedish side in the negotiations. What did Sweden want to achieve with the agreement? These questions are important when we read the DCA agreement. We can state that it is an agreement where the USA is the big winner. One gets great military access to Sweden at 17 locations from north to south. One gets to have its own laws and its own rules and does not need to worry about supervision from Swedish authorities.

In all the other Nordic agreements, there are provisions regarding nuclear weapons, but they are missing in the Swedish agreement. Why did you not raise the issue of nuclear weapons when you were Minister for Defence?

One must remember that Lars Løkke Rasmussen probably never imagined a discussion about selling Greenland. Hultqvist himself was very clear that he never intended to join Nato. I think one can expect a greater ability to see the unexpected around the corner from Sweden's members of parliament.

International law is the same for everyone, Hultqvist claims, even for the USA. I would still like to point out that the USA has not signed the convention on the prohibition of landmines or the convention that prohibits cluster munitions. One is many times clear about questioning international law in favor of one's own interests. We must remember that it is a superpower we are making agreements with.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! I am neither stubborn nor anything of the sort, but I am no less capable of changing my mind when reality changes. How Svenneling views those types of situations, I do not intend to comment on.

If the realities of reality become sufficiently strong and tangible and one must find new solutions, it is a sign of weakness if one cannot bear to bite the head off the shame.

Did we take this initiative before the application for NATO membership? Yes, of course we did. It was long before. I said that when we discussed statements of intent. I explained properly in my speech why we took this step. I don't know if I need to do it again.

This is therefore about Sweden's security and safety in a time that is extremely unpleasant where Russia is acting extremely aggressively. Then one must also be prepared to conclude new types of agreements, find new solutions and find the best way to build as much safety and security as possible in that situation.

Since it is the case that international law applies to everyone, regardless of who one considers oneself to be. A major problem in the world is that international law is not respected. We see this in many places around the world. It is no direct secret. But nations like Sweden have every reason to constantly assert the principles of international law.

I can only state that this agreement is based on the principles of international law. It does not lead to any new situation here.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, I have said that the non-proliferation treaty is signed by the USA, and Sweden is one of the countries that has joined this. That still applies. As far as I have understood, no one has spoken about terminating it. Nor has the USA done so. One is legally bound to this. They are bound not to spread nuclear weapons to other countries, and we are bound not to accept them.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! The abolished so-called Hultqvist doctrine was based on military agreements with as many countries as possible without joining Nato. Despite the fact that Peter Hultqvist claimed the opposite, the agreements became a springboard into Nato. With the entry into Nato, the Hultqvist doctrine collapsed.

Today we are to take a position on yet another military agreement. This time, unlike previous ones, it is a decision in the Riksdag that entails a number of legislative changes in Swedish laws. The DCA agreement is not Nato, but the agreement gives Nato's dominant country USA unique access to Swedish territory without obligations. Perhaps it is a mini-comeback for the Hultqvist doctrine, while at the same time it moves Sweden's foreign and security policy to a place we have not been before? We are giving up even our own territory.

It is interesting to hear Hultqvist say that this happened long before the Nato application. It means that we might have had a discussion today about DCA agreements without Nato membership. It would have been a completely different discussion than the one we have.

I agree with Peter Hultqvist that the NPT applies, i.e., the non-proliferation treaty. It would be absolutely best if that were the case in reality. But we see that Russia does not follow the NPT. We see that Russia places nuclear weapons ever closer to Sweden, in Belarus. And we see that the Swedish government has not objected to the Belarusian nuclear weapons because American nuclear weapons are stationed in Europe. It is argued that as long as the USA maintains control over its nuclear weapons and as long as Russia does the same in Belarus and maintains control over the nuclear weapons there, the non-proliferation treaty is not being violated. It is a worrying development that we should do much more to counter.

It is good that you have submitted some writings, but it does not kill any discussion on nuclear weapons. It will continue every day in this Riksdag.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! Not everyone has had a doctrine named after them. I must admit that I did not invent the word myself, but I still feel some pride that it turned out that way. It was a real stance in that sense that we did not want to escalate the tension or give Russia arguments to start with negative things at the Finnish border or in the Gulf of Finland. We did not want to give them that. But at the same time, we were not naive, so we reinforced Swedish defense and deepened all our collaborations.

When Russia then escalated the tension in Ukraine and created this great war, the situation became different. If one then does not have the strength to change a position to a new position, I do not know what one actually wants with politics. It is Sweden's security that is what is important, not which solution one sticks to, because that can change depending on the security situation. Then one actually, as I said, has to bite the bullet.

It is good, Håkan Svenneling, that you have an insight that Russia is the problem, but it would be better if you also drew a conclusion about what is required for democratic Europe to be able to hold together and act as a deterrent in relation to Russia and build maximum security. I do not believe that your opposition to Nato or the DCA agreement provides that. It creates a gap in the Nordic defense if it were to apply. It is good that your word does not apply here.

It was also good that I received an acknowledgment that the NPT applies. It means that we have a platform to discuss for the future from, when we are to take a stand on what initiatives we should take. Then we have something to refer to that is a fact. The NPT is not a bad thing, and it actually applies.

I thank you for allowing me to go over the time.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Today, the Riksdag must take a stand on the question of a defense cooperation agreement with the USA, a so-called defense cooperation agreement, also called DCA. It is a large, important and complex matter. The serious security policy situation that Sweden and Europe find themselves in, a little more than two years after Russia launched its horrific, violation of international law invasion of Ukraine, underscores the importance of a careful consideration of the consequences of security policy decisions.

The DCA agreement primarily deals with access for the American military to Swedish defense facilities, pre-positioning of materiel, tax issues, and criminal law issues. The agreement is actually a standard agreement, and very similar agreements have been concluded with our Nordic neighbors Denmark, Norway, and Finland. In addition to these, a number of other allied states also have DCA agreements. The agreement was signed by the government after a negotiation with the USA, but it is still a standard agreement. Only after the agreement was fully negotiated did we in the Riksdag have the opportunity to review the agreement in its entirety.

We in Miljöpartiet have thoroughly familiarized ourselves with the agreement. We believe that an agreement with the USA is needed to regulate the conditions for their troop presence in Sweden, but such an agreement shall be entered into after a proper public debate with clear information to the Swedish people about what applies on Swedish soil.

Miljöpartiet voted no to the Nato membership, but we have thereafter chosen to respect the decision made by a broad majority in Sweden's Riksdag. Sweden is a member of Nato, and that is what we must start from now when we build our security and defense policy.

We are now going to build Sweden's defense together with other allies. USA is the NATO member that has the greatest military capability, and therefore it is not strange that member states such as Sweden seek close cooperation with USA. At the same time, USA has weapons that we in Sweden should not under any circumstances accept on our territory. It is about nuclear weapons.

The Green Party stands firm that nuclear weapons must never be allowed on Swedish territory, neither in peacetime nor in wartime. We want to see legislation that prohibits the importation of nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory. Unfortunately, the government has chosen to sign an agreement that does not close the door to nuclear weapons, and therefore the Green Party will vote no to this agreement.

Mr. Speaker! Nuclear weapons have a devastating effect. A single detonation would have unmanageable consequences in the form of humanitarian suffering and destroyed environment, not least security consequences of a large and unimaginable scale. A larger war involving these weapons could destroy the conditions for human life.

Nuclear weapons on Swedish soil could constitute a target and increase the threat level against Sweden. Sweden has for a long time been proactive regarding nuclear disarmament, and Miljöpartiet wants Sweden to continue to have a clear and proactive role for a mutual nuclear disarmament in the world. It is something that we fear is hindered by the government's unclear stance on the nuclear weapons issue.

The government has deliberately chosen not to raise the issue of nuclear weapons in the DCA agreement. The agreement states that all Swedish legislation, including what concerns the storage of certain types of weapons on Swedish territory, shall be respected. But unlike our neighboring country Finland, which has the same wording in its agreement, Sweden has no legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on our territory. We also have no previous policy to refer to in the way that Norway and Denmark have done in their respective agreements, where it states that their policies are not changed by the agreement. In light of our neighboring countries' specifications, it is clear that the question of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory is left open in the agreement.

Mr. Speaker! The Government argues that nuclear weapons on Swedish soil is not relevant in peacetime, and the Government therefore considers that legislation or policy is not needed. Reference is also made in various contexts to the texts found, among others, in the report that there are no reasons to have permanent bases and nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime. This is, however, only a descriptive text and not a sharp formulation stating a clear position and direction. If the Government had wanted to be clear on the issue, it would have presented a law prohibiting nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

The concepts of peacetime and wartime are also not as clear in the serious security policy situation. The risks associated with allowing nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime would also be equally or even more relevant in the event of war. Ulf Kristersson, however, seems to think it is perfectly reasonable to have nuclear weapons in Sweden in the event of war.

We from Miljöpartiet believe that the question of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory should not be decided by which government Sweden has at the moment, but that it is ultimately a matter for the Swedish Riksdag. Legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peace and in war is a clear guarantee to the Swedish people and our allies.

Mr. Speaker! The DCA agreement has furthermore been signed without a broader public debate and anchoring, which is an additional criticism of the government's actions. There are questions regarding the agreement's content and implementation that should have been resolved before the agreement was signed, which several referral bodies have raised. Since the agreement became public, it has become clear that there are many misunderstandings and a great deal of disinformation being spread about what the agreement entails. A more thorough public debate and discussion could counteract these misunderstandings and incorrect perceptions. That being said, there are uncertainties in the agreement that remain, even for us who have had the opportunity to familiarize ourselves thoroughly with the agreement and have had access to legal expertise.

For example, it is unclear under what circumstances Sweden could take back jurisdiction in criminal cases. DCA does not imply any form of impunity but only determines which country's legislation shall apply in the first instance. With the agreement, it will be the general rule that it is the American force that shall be subject to American law. But if a crime is criminalized only in Sweden, it is however Swedish law that applies.

But there may still occur cases where our countries have different views on the nature of the crime and the severity of the punishment, even though the crime is criminalized in both countries' legislation. Sweden has for a number of years had a sexual offense legislation based on the principle of voluntariness, the so-called consent law. But still, the government argues that sexual offenses committed by someone from the American force should be judged according to American law. Miljöpartiet thinks that in those cases where an act can constitute a crime against the sexual offense legislation, Sweden should take back the jurisdiction to ensure that crimes are prosecuted in accordance with the consent law. The consent law shall apply to everyone in Sweden.

Mr. Speaker! How the agreement is used and complied with will also be decisive for how well the cooperation with the USA functions. The agreement is clear that all activities shall be conducted with full respect for Sweden's sovereignty, legislation, and international legal obligations. However, there are examples of when the USA has acted in a way that has violated other countries' international obligations. For example, the European Court of Justice has ruled against both Poland, Lithuania, and Romania because the CIA has practiced torture on American bases within the country's territory. Something such must never occur in Sweden.

Sweden is in a very serious security policy situation due to Russia's war in Ukraine. The Green Party wants to see a strengthened total defense, both civil and military, and supports the main direction in the Defense Commission's report which concerns strengthening the defense. We also believe that Sweden needs to build its security together with others, and therefore we agree on the need for Sweden to strengthen its ability to cooperate with our allies. The DCA agreement is, however, only an agreement that complements already existing agreements one has as a NATO member, and thus it is not a necessity for a functioning NATO membership.

Mr. Speaker! The agreement that the government has now signed leaves an all-too-decisive question open, namely the question of nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. Miljöpartiet stands firm that nuclear weapons must never be allowed within Swedish territory, neither in peacetime nor in wartime. Since the government has not in a clear way closed the door for nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, Miljöpartiet cannot consider voting yes to an agreement. Miljöpartiet will also support Vänsterpartiet's motion for a declaration of invalidity. We believe that it would give the government time to solve for us that all-too-decisive question of producing legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peacetime and in war.

With this said, Mr. Speaker, I would like to move for approval of reservation 1 under point 1, the agreement, reservation 2 under point 2, the laws that are changed as a result of the agreement, reservation 4 under point 3, the question of nuclear weapons, reservation 6 under point 5, work with disarmament, reservation 8 under point 6, regarding the court of justice and the withdrawal of criminal cases under Swedish legislation.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I note that in the Green Party's special statement, where they justify why they want to reserve themselves, nothing is mentioned about the restriction of free movement. On the other hand, I read a different tone than in the Left Party's special statement when it comes to the DCA agreement - that they would have wanted to see a broader discussion, anchoring, and so on.

It feels, however, as though Miljöpartiet has now nevertheless chosen to follow the Left Party's line of argumentation and say that the free movement for Swedish citizens would in some way be in danger. They are using that as the basis for a motion for a declaration of invalidity. That this has now appeared as a new tactic in the debate, I find strange because it has not been pointed out by the Council on Legislation, the Committee on the Constitution, or by the reserve members in the joint committee.

I therefore think it is worth a clearer explanation as to why you, from the Miljöpartiets side, are reaching for this Left Party straw man to be a clear opponent of Natomo, Emma Berginger.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I am glad that Member Kerstin Lundgren has noted that there is a difference between how Miljöpartiet and Vänsterpartiet express themselves in relation to the Nato agreement. We are two different parties with two different starting points, and we have also chosen different paths when it comes to how we relate to the decision that a broad majority of Sweden's Riksdag has made regarding that Sweden shall be a Nato member.

Miljöpartiet has chosen to respect the decision that has been made and will not push for a withdrawal from Nato. This has, of course, also shaped our view on the DCA agreement, but we enter as constructive critics. We have reviewed the agreement, and in our reservation to the proposal, we have, as mentioned, focused on that we want to see legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

With that said, we have also taken a position on the proposal for a suspension of proceedings that has come from Vänsterpartiet. We have discussed, reasoned, and nevertheless seen that there is an advantage in suspending the proceedings as it gives the government the opportunity to produce necessary legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. It is a crucial issue for Miljöpartiet, and therefore we have said that we will support the question of a suspension of proceedings.

I do not think, however, that it has affected our line of argument, rather we have the same line of argument. The fundamental issue for us in Miljöpartiet is that nuclear weapons must not enter Swedish territory, neither in peacetime nor in wartime.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I note the Green Party's position regarding NATO membership and the respect that the Green Party has for the Riksdag's decisions. I think it is welcome. The argumentation also looks different; you write in your special statement, Emma Berginger, that it is natural to have a close cooperation with the USA and that it is natural for Sweden to enter this type of agreement. It is an important signal to everyone who is listening that you are making that distinction.

When it comes to the question of nuclear weapons or no nuclear weapons, we have an old position that applied even when Miljöpartiet sat in government together with Socialdemokraterna: We are clear that we do not want to see nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. That position has applied for a long time, which is something that did not emerge from Håkan Svenneling's description. But it has truly been a Swedish position that is well known and stated, and it is that stated policy that still applies and is confirmed in the report. Not to go the way of legislation has been the Swedish position. It is therefore the historical model, regardless of NATO membership or not.

To declare a moratorium on an agreement that is so security-politically important for us, for our neighbors, and for NATO's future planning is to make an intervention that is too large in our security and our opportunities to defend ourselves in an uncertain time. The question of whether a piece of legislation can be pursued entirely separately from this agreement is possible, but to declare a moratorium means that nothing happens with the agreement – it lies and rests. It is the model that actually is the basis, and it will return in the same condition.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! When it comes to Sweden's historical stance on nuclear weapons, we have been a strong advocate for nuclear disarmament in the world. But the world has changed, which has also been noted here previously. We have a completely different security policy situation and a NATO membership. We are now discussing the security agreements with the USA.

We have also seen a debate and discussion both in Europe and in Sweden concerning nuclear weapons that is completely new to us. In Europe, there is a discussion about whether one should build its own nuclear weapons and in that way create its own nuclear umbrella. We also see what Ulf Kristersson has said in interviews recently about that he does not rule out the possibility that Sweden could have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in war. It is a shift, and that shift worries us in Miljöpartiet.

Therefore, we believe that we actually need to strengthen and clarify the Swedish position regarding nuclear weapons. The best way to clarify it, both towards the Swedish people and towards our allies, is to produce legislation. If the Miljöpartiet and Vänsterpartiet were to gain support for the declaration of abandonment, it would also provide an opportunity for the government to return with a proposal for a law that prohibits the importation of nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory both in peacetime and in wartime. It would affect the Miljöpartiet's opportunity to consider how we take a position on the agreement.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Mr. Speaker! Today we will make Sweden a little bit safer. Today we strengthen the indispensable transatlantic link - that bond and link that binds free and democratic Europe with free and democratic North America and which is the guarantee that we will not meet the same fate as Ukraine has done. The transatlantic link has served Europe well for decades.

Briefly, it can be said that the defense cooperation agreement known as DCA is part of our preparatory work in case the worst should happen to our country, that is, war. But it is equally much an agreement that deters war, as whoever attacks Sweden knows that they will also have the USA as an opponent. In other words, the agreement makes Sweden a little safer in a restless world.

Mr. Speaker! I just said that this agreement is part of our preparatory work - our preparedness and planning - for that which we do not want to happen. By being prepared, we manage difficult challenges better. It can be in small things, for example, everyday things such as carrying a bottle of water on a warm day. That is to prepare oneself. It can also be such as having a drainage pump in one's basement for when there is a flood.

Now, war is not something small and something that can just be called a challenge, but it is, to speak plain and clear Swedish, a pure hell for those who are affected. That is why we are reinforcing the civil and military defense, and that is why we are now allied in Nato. It is also why this agreement is important so that we can prepare as well as possible. Sweden is, in fact, best defended together with others, and Sweden best defends others together with others.

Mr. Speaker! Through this agreement, we provide good conditions for Sweden and the USA to cooperate. We also give the USA the opportunity to get to know our terrain together with us, and it gives the USA the opportunity to, for example, store materiel in Sweden. The latter is extremely important, because as everyone knows, it takes a very long time to transport supplies and vehicles from the USA to Sweden and Europe.

There are already places today where the Americans have equipment stored, for example in Norway. Then we stand together ready to meet threats much faster, as someone pointed out earlier.

If we are prepared, and if Russia knows that the USA is quickly on site in Sweden and ready to contribute to the defense of Sweden, it will contribute to deterring an attack on Sweden. Therefore, this agreement contributes to maintaining peace in our part of the world.

Mr. Speaker! In the debate on this agreement, things have been raised such as that we are now getting permanent American bases in Sweden, that American soldiers who commit crimes in Sweden now go free, and that the USA will now bring nuclear weapons into Sweden. Several recognize this. However, it is completely wrong, and it is furthermore based on incorrect grounds. At best, it is a matter of ignorance; at worst, it is actually a matter of pure and simple antipathy towards the USA.

Firstly, there is no reason for the USA to have permanent bases in Sweden. Secondly, it is very expensive. The USA is also increasingly concentrating its military forces in the Pacific region. Thirdly, which is also the most important: Sweden does not want permanent American bases here, and since everything must occur with Swedish approval, there will therefore be no permanent American bases in Sweden.

Mr. Speaker! I want to return to this regarding any crimes committed by American soldiers. In the debate, it sometimes sounds as if this is the only thing that will occur. The agreement clearly states that a crime committed by an American soldier in Sweden will primarily be prosecuted according to American law, but if the act is not criminal according to American law, the person will be prosecuted by Sweden. If Sweden wishes, the person will additionally be prosecuted according to Swedish law; Sweden therefore has the possibility to request this. That American soldiers should have some kind of immunity is therefore not true at all.

Mr. Speaker! When it comes to the placement of American nuclear weapons in Sweden, I think everyone who claims that the USA wants to place nuclear weapons here first should answer the question: Why would the USA want to place nuclear weapons on Swedish soil? I contend that this is a matter of ignorance regarding both economics and military strategy. Just like permanent military bases, this is incredibly expensive. I have also never heard or read that the USA would have a need for any nuclear missile silos on Swedish soil. This need does not exist. The USA already has enough nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. One also has the possibility to place nuclear weapons on submarines and on aircraft.

We agree that we do not want any nuclear weapons in Sweden in peacetime. This is a position that Sweden has held for a long time and which is well known and respected. Once again: Everything that occurs in accordance with this agreement shall occur with Swedish consent. Thus, there will be no nuclear weapons in Sweden if we do not want it – it is not more complicated than that.

Mr. Speaker! This agreement has been described by a few as a threat to Sweden, but it is precisely the opposite. This is an opportunity for Sweden to continue to live in peace and freedom if the worst were to happen. The agreement makes Sweden safer and more secure.

I vote in favor of the proposal in the committee's report.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm, Helena Bouveng, John E Weinerhall, Gustaf Göthberg, Oskar Svärd, John Widegren and Viktor Wärnick (all M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! We in Sweden, like Finland, have drawn the conclusion that our Baltic neighbors quickly drew, like other countries that have experienced dictates and, ultimately, tanks crushing the will of the people under Soviet rule.

Alone is not strong. As small countries near Russia, we have known of their imperialist ambitions for a long time. They have never settled these, and for those of us who perhaps hoped, Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 were a harsh awakening.

Today we know that our security is built on us building up a strong and common capability to deter the Kremlin for a long time to come. We do this as a full member of Nato since March 7 this year, and we do it as a member of the EU since 1995. The agreement that we are to decide on today is about strengthening our and Nato's capability to meet threats from Russia, which is the only state that poses a direct threat to us and Nato in the foreseeable future. It is a Russia that unites with North Korea, China and Iran. It is a Russia that cultivates its self-image on the idea of the Russian Empire's resurrection. It is a Russia that has converted its country to a war economy and which arrests and imprisons everyone who dares to show a tendency toward any meaning other than the one Putin approves.

There is a broad political consensus in the Riksdag regarding the importance of approving the DCA agreement today. Only the two parties that opposed NATO membership now oppose the DCA agreement. This is an agreement that strengthens deterrence and increases the credibility of Article 5.

Centerpartiet has since Crimea 2014 made the assessment that we in Sweden need to create the conditions for a unified and common defense with the ability to react quickly together with others if any NATO land in our region is attacked. The agreement creates a necessary complement to the NATO SOFA agreement to ensure American possibilities to quickly be able to support us and our region against an attack.

We in Sweden are now doing the same as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and our Nordic neighbors. We are entering into an agreement that regulates the conditions for the USA to be able to build up necessary forward depots for its troops and protect them. It is about us now, as a NATO member, having to realize the importance of being able to move personnel and equipment between countries in a smooth way. Furthermore, there is a lot to learn within the EU.

All activities covered by this agreement shall be conducted with full respect for Sweden's sovereignty, legislation, and international legal obligations, including regarding the storage of certain types of weapons on Swedish territory. That is what it says in Article 1, which concerns scope and purpose. Both through the government's proposition and through the Riksdag's upcoming position, we make it clear from Sweden's side that, like our Nordic neighbors, we do not see any reason to have either nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory in peacetime. This is an approach that was also expressed in connection with our ratification of NATO membership.

There is a strong Nordic profile here that is well known and respected by all. The agreement also states that Sweden, through the Armed Forces, shall be notified in advance of the type and quantity of pre-negotiated materiel that the American forces intend to transport or pre-position on Swedish territory.

Mr. Speaker! It is fascinating to take part in the two separate statements submitted by the Left Party and the Green Party, respectively, with justifications for their motions to reject the bill. They agree to reject it, but not on the grounds.

The Left Party wants, as we know, to develop other defense collaborations - with whom is unclear - in order to be able to leave Nato. The greatest threat the Left Party seems to see is that Sweden becomes more closely tied to the USA. Here, the Left Party displays its old rhetoric once again. The USA is always the threatening power. It is a rhetoric that is also cultivated vigorously by Russia and the Kremlin; we must not forget that. This happens both in Sweden and in many other countries. The Left clearly does not see the value of the collective defense of and in our region and that it is actually the USA's nuclear umbrella that constitutes a counterweight to the stated nuclear threat that Russia constantly plays with.

The Green Party, on the other hand, has chosen to accept the membership and writes that it is natural for Sweden to enter into agreements that regulate the conditions for American presence in Sweden. The Green Party wants to see legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons in both peacetime and wartime. I think that such legislation would neither protect Ukraine, if they had had such, nor Sweden against Russian nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons threats. Ukraine is also not protected by any nuclear umbrella. But regardless of this security agreement with the USA, the question of legislation can, of course, always be driven in Sweden.

It is understandable that the issue of nuclear weapons engages and mobilizes people. Nuclear weapons have unimaginable humanitarian consequences. The Centre Party would welcome the NPT being developed and steps being taken to raise the thresholds for use. But as a result of Russia's brutal and internationally illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the security situation in the world is very serious. A global disarmament of nuclear weapons could have taken place in another time, but unfortunately, that is not where we are now. We cannot fold up a nuclear umbrella and leave the field free for Russia, North Korea, and China. Today, we also received reports that China has increased its nuclear capability by 18 percent.

But we do not give up. Disarmament, however, presupposes reciprocity, including all recognized and known nuclear powers. We live in serious times when confidence in international law, rules, and signed commitments is extremely weak. It requires a lot of work from all of us to find new paths to disarmament.

The nuclear weapons issue is used, not least by those who are opponents of Nato – and many times also of all weapons and Swedish defense. We have all received both many signatures and emails, which has emerged previously. One is against the agreement being concluded and justifies it by saying that Sweden opens up for nuclear weapons on its territory. But however many times it is repeated, that is not the case. Six of eight Riksdag parties have made it clear that nuclear weapons on Swedish territory are not an option. Even Nato's Secretary General has made it clear that there are no plans for nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. Sweden will not have nuclear weapons stored or stationed on its territory.

So, regarding the question of permanent bases. In line with our Nordic neighbors, we see no reason to have permanent bases on Swedish territory in peacetime, neither American nor of any other NATO nationality. But obviously, we shall ensure that there is forward storage so that the USA can act for Sweden, in Sweden and from Sweden, as well as in Finland, Norway, and the Baltics. Obviously, we shall train together and build up our NATO defense as members fully. There are countries that unsuccessfully wish to see permanent American bases on their territory to strengthen the deterrent effect, but Sweden is not one of them.

In conclusion, I shall comment on a few demands that have been put forward in the general debate. Some want a referendum on the agreement, but I note that no parliamentary party has put forward this demand. For the Center Party's part, we have made it clear that in this security policy situation, we do not want to play Russian roulette with the security of Sweden and Sweden's neighbors. Just as with the NATO membership, a referendum on this is now directly inappropriate. It would admittedly please the Kremlin and Putin, but it would not benefit our security or our Nordic and Baltic neighbors.

Yes, but then we can declare the agreement suspended, as the Left Party and now also the Green Party demand. But the Center Party absolutely does not want to do that. The reason is that we do not see that there is any substantive basis for it. As I have said before, this is not even mentioned in the specific statements and reservations, so the reasons for a suspension have really not been able to be justified.

We see the agreement as an important complement to our membership. It strengthens our credibility, our security, and our ability to deter an attack from Russia.

I move to reject the proposal on the declaration of invalidity and on all reservations and move to approve the committee's proposal to approve the DCA agreement.

(Applause)

(cont.)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)