(cont.) Agreement on defense cooperation with the United States of America (cont. UFöU1)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! One can, 75 minutes after Kerstin Lundgren's speech, wonder whether it was I or Kerstin Lundgren who requested this reply. It felt quite a bit like Kerstin Lundgren was out fishing for a left-wing reply, if I may say so.

I want to correct the member regarding the collective defense of our region. I want to be very clear that we all agree that we shall collectively defend Swedish territory and that we shall defend our neighboring countries. Sweden is now a member of Nato. We have an obligation under Article 5.

I was a Nato opponent, but we will complete it. Of course, we stand behind that Sweden should defend all who are members of Nato as an alliance. Vänsterpartiet also voted for Nato SOFA, the agreement that regulates the relationship between Sweden and other Nato states.

It is Russia that constitutes the threat in our immediate vicinity, it is Russia that has violated Swedish territory as recently as just a few days ago, and we see that it is Russia that is conducting a hybrid war against us and against our region in various ways.

All eight of our parties are actually fighting for nuclear disarmament. I am very concerned: Peter Hultqvist says that the NPT applies, and I am happy about that, but in the next breath Kerstin Lundgren comes up and says: It is not now that we should work with the NPT; we will do that sometime in the future when the winds blow a bit better. So that is also what it sounds like from the nuclear-weapon states when you ask them when it is time for disarmament.

If one has signed the NPT, one must work for disarmament every day, in accordance with the NPT.

I also want to say something about the matter of tabling, which has obviously upset the members and the third deputy speaker Lundgren. We do have this possibility in our constitution to table in accordance with minority protection. It doesn't matter when you think about it. The Chamber Office has a requirement, and that is that you submit ten names the day before.

That we have done so and furthermore concluded that this table-laying principle is possible in this type of agreement and in a broader definition than before, demonstrates the importance of also utilizing this instrument in the Riksdag.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! It is good that Håkan Svenneling says that he and the Left Party stand up to defend Sweden, our neighbors, and our region. The problem is that the DCA agreement is a part of this defense that makes it possible that we, together with Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Poland, and so on, have this agreement and build security, deterrence, and the ability to be able to react in time.

We clearly see Russia and Russian nuclear weapons as the great threat, and what is it then that holds back the Russian attempts to threaten with nuclear weapons? Well, whether we like it or not, it is a fact that it is the American nuclear umbrella. That is why Putin is actually only interested in talking with the USA.

It is the USA that is the strength in Nato, and what we should be worried about is if the USA were to reduce its presence in Nato. Then Nato as a whole would be weakened, and then we as a whole would be weakened. It is of course extremely important that the USA is involved and that we have an agreement with the USA and create conditions to build thresholds, build deterrence and build the ability to be able to react and act quickly.

When it comes to NPT, I never said that I didn't believe that NPT was possible now. I am working very hard so that NPT will be the goal for 2026, ahead of the next review conference. That is why I have said no to the ban treaty and other things that can split the focus. I stand behind the Stockholm Initiative and naturally want it to be possible to disarm. But when we see that China has armed itself with plus 18 percent nuclear warheads in the last year, we realize that the situation is not there just now.

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Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I think this debate highlights very much that we have different views on the USA. There is a very positive view of the USA among many parties. When I look in the rearview mirror, I am a bit surprised by this positive view, also considering that Trump could become president, which I have repeatedly returned to in this debate.

I also think that Kerstin Lundgren has turned to some strange argumentation, especially in her speech, regarding popular anchoring. We know that the Kremlin does not like democracy and people who care about the country they live in, which the Ukrainians have shown that they do through both democracy, cohesion, and resilience. I expect the Swedish people to do the same.

Not agreeing with each other on agreements, NATO membership and such things is a part of democracy, and I mean that we as a state fundamentally become stronger by the fact that we stand here in the Swedish Riksdag and are at odds, do not agree with each other and counter each other's arguments. This ensures that we together build Swedish resilience in the long term.

I believe one should be careful not to be contemptuous towards those who demand a referendum, who want to be engaged in a democracy and who actually care about Sweden and the Swedish defense.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I am far from contemptuous. I believe that the debate belongs in this chamber, and I am happy to disagree with Håkan Svenneling and others.

I think it is important that we avoid disinformation and spreading images that, for example, concern us getting nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. I think this is part of a disinformation campaign, and we can see how it spreads on social media. We all have reason to hold back and mark against that type of attempt to reinterpret the agreements made in a way that is absolutely liked by the Kremlin but which does not promote a good debate in Sweden.

I must also say that I hear different arguments. From Håkan Svenneling, it is nuclear weapons and the anti-NATO movement, and now it is the USA that again seems to be the major threat for Vänsterpartiet. I think it is super strange that one has not moved on from the old rhetoric, which has also lived on in Sweden and which obviously remains, at least in parts of Vänsterpartiet, if I interpret it correctly.

The latest argument against the DCA agreement links to the fact that Trump can win the election this autumn, and then it has become a reason to say no to the DCA agreement or to declare it dormant. I think, Mr. Speaker, that this is seeking arguments for a dormancy declaration that fundamentally is about securing our rights according to Chapter 2.

It is freedom of movement that is to be secured here. However, there is no one – not the Council on Legislation, not the Committee on the Constitution, and not the Left Party or the Green Party – who has pointed out that just that question is threatened by the agreement. This has come as some kind of extra addition in the final stage of the debate in order to make it larger than it is.

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Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Now that we have had a slightly longer break, perhaps a small recapitulation is needed of what it was that Member Kerstin Lundgren said that caused me to request the floor.

Lundgren explained that she believes the issue of legislation prohibiting nuclear weapons on Swedish territory can be pursued at any time and that it does not need to be pursued right now while we are debating the DCA agreement. I mean, however, that even though Miljöpartiet has pushed for legislation prohibiting nuclear weapons on Swedish territory for a long time, the whole issue has become increasingly relevant, not least by reason of the DCA agreement.

It is about this: If one compares the DCA agreement that Sweden has signed with the agreements that Finland, Norway and Denmark have, it becomes clear that precisely Sweden stands without any kind of reference that we should not have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

Finland has legislation, and Sweden should also have legislation. It is this that makes Miljöpartiet say that legislation is needed that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory so that we can consider an agreement.

My question, Mr. Speaker, is therefore: When Kerstin Lundgren now clarifies that she sees no reason for nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, why can Kerstin Lundgren and Centerpartiet not stand behind legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! Fundamentally, it is about the fact that for a long time we have had a stance in Sweden that has served us well. We have, from the Swedish side, towards all others, declared that Sweden does not want to see nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. This has been respected by others. That is the starting point.

We do not need to change anything because of the DCA agreement, as no question regarding nuclear weapons is introduced there. Rather, it states that consideration shall be taken of the model we have also when it comes to the storage of different defense materiel. It is full sovereignty.

Denmark's and Norway's agreements are fundamentally a reference to their previous history. They have been members of Nato for a long time and have had agreements for a long time. The agreements you are now referring to, Emma Berginger, are so to speak supplementary agreements to previous agreements. One increases, for example, the number of bases in Norway and adjusts in Denmark and says that it does not change anything in the previous policy. This policy has not been contractually bound, but it has been an expressed policy. It has been the reason from their side.

During our discussion before NATO membership, there has been a clear signal: Keep this out of the agreement, and keep the agreement clean! That is what we did, with a clear signal that Swedish policy will continue to apply. This has been acknowledged by everyone I have spoken with. They say that they of course respect this and that they would be surprised if anything else applied. This I have heard from NATO's Secretary General and a long line of other people.

That the question of legislation on nuclear weapons is being brought forward right now is quite certainly an attempt to create doubt about what applies in the contractual issue.

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Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! As Kerstin Lundgren herself says, Norway and Denmark have been members of Nato for a long time, and they have seen a need to have a type of policy that clarifies that they do not want nuclear weapons on their territory. Even Finland, which has not been a member of Nato, has chosen to have such legislation.

The world is changing, and then one needs to take new positions. We need to show that we are clear on this issue, and the absolute best way to be clear is to adopt legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peace and in war.

We can observe that we have a Prime Minister - Ulf Kristersson - who has entered the NATO membership very clearly without reservations and who in various interviews opens up to having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in times of war. There are therefore shifts in the Swedish discussion when it comes to nuclear weapons. It is clear that I become worried then, for what will be the next step on this slippery slope?

The best way is for us to jointly clarify, both towards the Swedish people and towards our allies and the rest of the world, that we shall not have nuclear weapons in Sweden, by adopting legislation.

I think it is very strange that parties like the Center Party, which say that there is no reason to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, still cannot stand behind a proposal that we should legislate to ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. It creates an ambiguity both in relation to the voters and towards our allies.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I have not heard any ally ask what applies in Sweden. Everyone is clear on what the Swedish position is regarding both bases and nuclear weapons. None of those I have met have raised this question during the rather long process, not only in the last two years but also earlier. One is very clear on what Sweden thinks and how Sweden positions itself. Furthermore, it is seen as part of the Nordic position.

That Finland has legislation is connected to something else entirely. It is not the DCA agreement that is the basis for the Finnish legislation, but it is nuclear energy issues. It was a different starting point when that legislation was drafted, and I am convinced that Emma Berginger is aware of that.

The Norwegian and Danish writings are almost identical to ours, that is, respect for independence, respect for laws and respect for international agreements. That is also our starting point, just as we emphasize that it concerns which defense materiel shall be on Swedish territory. It is clear.

But I understand, I hear, Mr. Speaker, that it is a question of confidence. Now I heard that the confidence in the Prime Minister is not at its peak, and I heard that Håkan Svenneling does not have confidence in Trump. That is the type of question one plays up.

We can see that six of the eight parties in the chamber agree that the agreement is needed to make our NATO membership more stable. This means a lot for us, for our neighbors, and in deterrence against Russia and any attempts from Russia's side. I hope that we can be in agreement on this.

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Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! Today we have to deal with a report on approving an agreement on defense cooperation between the Kingdom of Sweden and the United States of America, the DCA agreement, defense cooperation agreement. The report also contains proposals for a new law on criminal procedures within the defense cooperation with the USA as well as amendments to, among others, the Social Insurance Act, the Act on Immunity and Privileges in Certain Cases, the Aviation Act and the Act on Operational Military Support so that Sweden can fulfill its obligations under the agreement and ensure that even better conditions are created for Sweden to give and receive military support.

Let me make it clear at the outset that we Christian Democrats support the report. We do so because we believe that the agreement is a natural continuation of the NATO membership and that it is a self-evident fact that the agreement makes Sweden and surrounding allied countries safer.

Mr. Speaker! We live in a challenging time, where the rules-based world order is facing challenges from authoritarian countries. Russia has set the world on fire through its unjust attack against Ukraine, but the actions of China and Iran also need to be mentioned. Security aspects are now linked to far more political areas than before, such as energy, food, and critical infrastructure. Sweden must pursue a policy that protects our security interests, of which NATO membership is the ultimate example.

Today we are not going to decide whether we should be in Nato or not. An overwhelming majority has already voted for it in this chamber. Through our newly acquired membership in Nato, we will therefore continue to promote the fundamental values that are at the core of our foreign and security policy. The Christian Democrats place great value on the broad consensus that exists regarding this in the Swedish Riksdag, and our common endeavor must also in the future be a consistent and long-term foreign and security policy, especially regarding our support for Ukraine.

Mr. Speaker! I know that among the parties in the Riksdag there is total agreement that we do not want to see uninvited Russian soldiers on Swedish soil. On the other hand, this consensus seems to be lacking from two parties regarding how we view invited American soldiers. Personally, I believe that invited American soldiers in Sweden reduce the risk of uninvited Russian soldiers, which history also shows. If one is unsure about that matter, one can ask Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which all share a land border with Russia, as well as a concrete threat, as these countries constitute central pieces in Russia's ambitions to recreate the empire.

The importance of the American presence for peace and security in the Baltics cannot be overstated. It has been deterrent, and it has had a great strategic significance. And it will also have that for Sweden.

What we are to decide on today is primarily about the world becoming safer with an agreement with the USA that gives them access to parts of 17 military installations in Sweden and which also includes the possibility of storage of certain materiel. We shall also decide if it facilitates the procedure if we clarify the legalities in a way that is reasonable for both countries and thereby increase security further.

Mr. Speaker! Let me comment on something that was said earlier in the debate. If there are parties or members who want a medal for being the biggest opponent to Nato and DCA, they should consider who is awarding that medal! It is not our Baltic or Finnish friends.

In NATO membership, rules are included for when troops from different NATO countries visit allies, which falls under the name NATO SOFA, a legally more complicated and therefore time-consuming method. Since there is one country, the USA, which has a military capability that significantly exceeds that of the other allies, and which therefore much more often than others visits or is stationed with allies, there is reason for clarifications. DCA agreements are now being written with many countries in order to simplify cooperation.

A simple way to answer the question of whether such an agreement is needed is simply to look at our neighboring countries Norway and Denmark, which have been members since Nato was founded. They too have signed their own DCA agreements with the USA.

Mr. Speaker! Two of the concerns that are sometimes raised regarding the agreement concern nuclear weapons and jurisdiction respectively, and I intended to comment on them briefly.

The first question to ask is whether there will be nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. The simple answer is no. The cooperation according to the DCA agreement is based on Sweden's approval and fully respects Swedish sovereignty. The agreement does not affect Sweden's position of, like in the other Nordic countries, not having nuclear weapons on Swedish soil in peacetime. This position simply remains unchanged.

The second question is what applies to any Swedish crime victims if an American soldier commits a crime in Sweden. The fact that Sweden in this context waives certain jurisdiction does not mean that American forces have immunity. The starting point will instead be that American authorities handle the legal cases in the normal case. It is worth noting here that this will thus in most cases imply sentencing scales that are higher than the Swedish ones. Sweden can, however, reclaim jurisdiction in cases of significance depending on the severity of the crime, type, circumstances, and who is the victim and the perpetrator. The consideration emphasizes in particular that the legal certainty of crime victims in Sweden shall be protected.

Mr. Speaker! With the DCA agreement, the next natural and important step in ensuring the nation's security is taken. It is a self-evident decision for us, and we make the decision with pride and wisdom today. We Kristdemokrater will therefore vote for the committee report in its entirety.

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Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! First and foremost, I want to clarify that we in Miljöpartiet have nothing against American soldiers. We see a need to have a cooperation with other allies within Nato, not least with the USA.

Therefore, we also need to have clear agreements that regulate what applies when American military and civilian parts of their forces are present in Sweden. But the agreements must be clear. Not least, we mean that Sweden's government needs to be clear when it comes to nuclear weapons and ensure that we close the door for nuclear weapons both in peace and in war with legislation.

I want to ask Magnus Berntsson the same question that I asked earlier. If one now does not see a need to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, why can one then not agree to legislation that regulates this in a clear way?

In connection with what Magnus Berntsson says about the jury system, I also want to ask how the Christian Democrats view the consent legislation. Do the Christian Democrats mean that Sweden should abolish the jury system in cases involving sexual offenses, or that one should not abolish the jury system in these cases?

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Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! If I am to clarify a bit, I perhaps do not quite perceive that Miljöpartiet is striving for that medal in the same way that a certain other party sought it regarding the clearest Natomotståndet or the DCA-avtalsmotståndet.

I unfortunately cannot give Emma Berginger any other answers than what has already been given on these questions. Kristdemokraterna have the same view on this as the other government parties and the total of six parties here in the Riksdag who think the same way. We have a very clear historical stance on nuclear weapons in Sweden, and there is nothing that has changed in that part. The DCA agreement changes nothing.

It was mentioned earlier in the debate that it is the same wording regarding nuclear weapons in the Finnish text as in the Swedish text, which means that there is nothing preventing the issue from continuing to be discussed. One can always discuss, but I want to be clear that there is no uncertainty regarding whether we consider that nuclear weapons should be on Swedish soil or not. There is no request from the Swedish side, which is a requirement, and there is also no pressure from any of the nuclear-weapon nations in Nato to deploy any such weapons.

The Chairman receives no other answer to the question from me than what has been given previously.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I still want to emphasize that I do not see it as if nothing has changed. On the contrary, very much has changed in recent years.

We have a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has changed security policy and the security situation drastically in our immediate vicinity. It has also led to Sweden applying for membership in Nato, something that many judged as totally irrelevant a number of years ago. But now we are here. Sweden is a member of Nato, and Nato is an organization that ultimately is based on nuclear deterrence.

I also believe that many would have been surprised if, a few years ago, one had heard the interview where Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson opened up to having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in times of war. But that is where we are today; those are the types of discussions being conducted.

Looking at the European discussion and debate, we know that even there, such questions are beginning to be discussed. Does Europe need its own nuclear umbrella? Should Germany develop nuclear weapons? Should France share its nuclear weapons more? These are discussions that a couple of years ago were completely unthinkable but which are now a reality. Of course, it means that we must renew and clarify our positions if they are to be relevant in the contemporary era we live in.

That is why we would need a clear position with legislation, adopted here in this chamber of the Swedish Riksdag, which clearly closes the door on nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peace and in war. In that way, we would be clear both towards our citizens, many of whom are actually wondering what it is that applies now, and towards other allies.

We can observe that Finland has legislation. Norway and Denmark have their policies which are referred to in the agreements. But Sweden does not have anything such.

I received no answer regarding KD's view on the legislation on sexual offenses and whether the consent law should apply to everyone in Sweden.

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Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! What we are trying to avoid here is that we should end up in a time of war in Sweden. We have slightly different strategies for that. I mean that the DCA agreement and the Swedish NATO membership are two very important paths there.

When I commented that nothing has happened, I meant the Swedish position on nuclear weapons. It has not changed, except that Sweden is now in an alliance and that in this alliance there are countries that have nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there is the deterrent factor as a very important part of NATO's defense. The part that I mean has not changed anything concerns precisely the placement of nuclear weapons in Sweden.

Emma Berginger's second question, which I did not have time to comment on in my first reply, concerns the consent law. We believe it is an important piece of legislation that we have in Sweden, and this is something that will need to be handled in cases where we do not know exactly how they will look for the time being. We have clear wording in both the bill and, not least, the report regarding the importance of taking the crime victims into account. Furthermore, there is the possibility to repatriate the cases to Sweden. That part is clearly stipulated in the agreement.

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Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker! It is a great stroke of luck that these debates are being recorded, because I believe there are quite a few things that we will want to go back to in the future. But actually, I hope that we do not need to go back to these things and that nothing will happen at all.

I have been reflecting on something since the entire debate began a long time ago. One writes an agreement that is 30 pages long. It is quite detailed, and it contains discussions about driving licenses and stamps and heaps of tax legislation - which is a completely different thing, which one should also discuss.

But when it comes to other things that are very important, one chooses not to make any regulations. That remains with me as some kind of question. Why does one choose to write in that American stamps apply but have it as some kind of gentlemen's agreement - sorry that I am speaking English - that the Americans shall not bring nuclear weapons here? That is a question I have for the member. Do the big questions not need to be regulated in such an agreement when the small questions are regulated? It makes me very confused.

The member stated that the court's jurisdiction can be taken back in cases of significance. Which cases does the member consider to be of significance when it comes to crime?

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Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! The question of stamps has been raised quite many times here now. It seems to be an issue that engages people.

I know that the two major, more principled issues that have been raised – and it is reasonable that they are raised – concern jurisdiction and nuclear weapons. Before the debate, I reflected on a visit I made a few years ago to Dnipro in Ukraine, to a factory that previously built rockets and warheads. The factory had been reformed as a result of the settlement made in Budapest when Ukraine handed over its nuclear side to Russia in exchange for guarantees and assurances of security. They reshaped the factory to instead build civil space industry but also tractors. They literally forged swords into plowshares.

Unfortunately, this did not help Ukraine, as Russia simply ignored its responsibility to guarantee Ukraine's security and instead became an aggressor with the goal of erasing both Ukraine as a state and Ukrainian culture. The core of the entire issue is therefore that we cannot trust Russia and must strengthen our own security.

The only thing worse than a world with nuclear weapons is a world where only authoritarian states such as Russia, China, and Iran have nuclear weapons.

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Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker! I certainly agree with Magnus Berntsson - we all do here in the chamber - that we need to strengthen our own security. That is why we have produced a defense preparedness report and reached an agreement on, among other things, 2 percent of GDP and a major expansion of the total defense. There we have no differences of opinion at all. Those debates sweep through the chamber without any problems.

I am also for both tractors and space. I am also for disarmament, which we all here in the chamber are.

However, I want to ask my question to Magnus Berntsson again: Which cases of crime does the member mean are "cases of significance", as the member said from the rostrum, when it comes to taking back the court of judgment?

And why do you need to include paragraphs about stamps in such a 30-page long agreement, but nothing about the most fearsome weapons we have, that is, nuclear weapons? How does the member view that discrepancy, that we need a stamp paragraph in the agreement but not a nuclear weapons paragraph?

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Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! I am quite sure that it is not the Swedish side that has raised the issue of stamps. It has probably come from the standard draft for the DCA agreement. I have not checked whether this is included in all the agreements that have already been written, but I would be very surprised if this were not a standard wording.

It is difficult to see in advance exactly which cases of significance are those where the court's jurisdiction can be reclaimed. Just as I said, it depends on the degree of severity of the crime, what type of crime it is, what the circumstances are, and who is the victim and the perpetrator. Our six parties have, however, jointly been very clear in particularly emphasizing that the legal certainty of crime victims in Sweden shall be protected. I feel secure with that.

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Anna Starbrink (L)

Mr. Speaker! Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dramatically worsened the security situation in Europe. An armed attack against Sweden cannot be ruled out. These are serious times.

Alone is not strong. In serious times we need our friends. With that insight, it becomes our common task to do what we can to improve our security and ensure that Sweden, if necessary, can act quickly individually and together with others.

Our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be defended. We are prepared to defend our country, our population, our democracy, our freedom and our way of life, if necessary by use of armed force.

Sweden's security policy is based on cohesion with like-minded countries. Therefore, our NATO membership is extremely welcome. Together with our allies, our country becomes safer, and we get the opportunity to contribute to the security of other NATO countries. That is also important and good.

With the bilateral defense cooperation that DCA enables, our NATO membership gains even more power. In order for us to be able to quickly receive help on the day when we need it most, we must be well-prepared. DCA is a way to take responsibility and be prepared if the worst should happen, much like a good home insurance. It is a great security.

I have, like many other speakers, noted that there is some concern and also some incorrect claims in the debate, where an image is conjured that Sweden, with the agreement, is now giving up its sovereignty and subjecting itself to another state's whims. It is, of course, completely wrong.

It is stipulated in the DCA that all activities shall take place with full respect for Swedish sovereignty, Swedish laws, and Sweden's international obligations. Sweden will also, with the DCA, just as today, have the right to decide whether activities may take place on Swedish territory, and a fundamental prerequisite for all American presence is that it takes place with Swedish consent.

The American personnel who will be present in Sweden do so with Swedish consent and with the aim of working for peace and security. The storage of materiel and supplies that will take place here also occurs with Swedish consent.

A strong transatlantic link is indispensable for both Sweden's and Europe's security. The new agreement regulates the conditions for American forces and forward deployment in Sweden. This deepened cooperation builds up thresholds that can deter an attacker and thus becomes important for the defense of our part of Europe. It strengthens the security for our Nordic and Baltic neighboring countries. The agreement is also an important signal of the USA's security and defense policy commitment to Sweden, something that I think we should be grateful for.

In the general debate, one can get the impression that the USA constitutes our greatest problem. But it is, of course, Russia that is the threat. Their war against Ukraine can spread in Europe. Hybrid activities, the shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea, and the fact that they violated Swedish airspace as recently as last Saturday are just a few examples of the demonstrations of their ill will towards free Europe that Russia engages in.

Mr. Speaker! I detest nuclear weapons. They are one of the worst things humanity has created. It is a misfortune that disarmament and non-proliferation, which Sweden has been, is, and shall continue to be deeply engaged in, has not reached the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Russia rattles its nuclear weapons threateningly, and something more frightening than a nuclear attack can hardly be imagined.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, there is only one thing that is worse than some Nato allies having these nuclear weapons, namely that Russia, China and Iran alone have nuclear weapons and direct these towards disarmed and weakened democratic states in the West that want to avoid nuclear war and therefore unilaterally dismantled every possibility of meeting the threat. It would be appalling. Nuclear weapons are part of Nato's deterrence, and it works.

I note that the debate on the nuclear weapons ban has gained momentum in Finland. Their ban came at a completely different time and was about preventing the Russian giant from placing its nuclear weapons on Finnish soil. Today, the situation is completely different. I welcome that our good neighbors in the east have a lively debate and, in a Finnish way, are reconsidering and adapting their security policy based on the global situation.

Here at home, it is at least good that the Riksdag has established that it is not relevant to have any nuclear weapons on our territory. The question simply lacks relevance and is mostly a theoretical discussion, a side issue in the debate. No country is interested in placing its nuclear weapons here, and we do not want them. Nevertheless, it is this question that characterizes the discussion about our cooperation with the USA.

I mean that it is fundamentally important that we do not write into the agreement that we say no to nuclear weapons. No one wants that. We are bound by other agreements. And Sweden owns the issue. But I mean that decisions on how our security is best protected must be made based on how our surrounding world changes and how the security situation develops.

Future decision-makers must have the opportunity to make the decisions required to secure our country. The day Russia directs its nuclear weapons at us – may it never come – the government and the Riksdag must, of course, be able to make the decisions required then for our security in a democratic manner.

Continuing the work for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a foreign and security policy priority. But it must not become a unilateral decommissioning of nuclear weapons among NATO countries. It would give the ruthlessly aggressive and authoritarian Putin an unreasonable power advantage.

Mr. Speaker! We all know that it is a bad idea to postpone the signing of that home insurance that I mentioned initially. Yet, that is exactly what the Left Party, with the support of the Green Party, is now proposing that we should do. In the vote, when the matter is to be decided and most of us want to vote yes to approve the agreement, the Left Party and the Green Party propose that we should press the snooze button and let the matter rest for a year. The effect would be that Russia is given more time to prepare an attack against Sweden. It is weak, it is dangerous, and it only favors Putin's interests.

We must ensure that the help to defend our country and our freedom can be here the day it can be needed. We shall not extend a helping hand to Putin. We shall take a firm handshake with the USA.

Mr. Speaker! I vote in favor of the joint committee's proposal in the report without referral.

(Applause)

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Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you for the speech, Member Starbrink!

The member of parliament says that she detests nuclear weapons immensely. That is very good. I do too. I truly detest nuclear weapons. But the member Starbrink apparently does not detest them so much that she really wants to ban them. I find that strange.

The DCA agreement, which we are now debating, contains no ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. It is remarkable. Norway, Denmark, and Finland have similar agreements, but there are reservations or bans on nuclear weapons in those. We in Vänsterpartiet have long advocated that there should be a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, in both peacetime and wartime. It would make Sweden stronger and safer.

In a debate against Håkan Svenneling on SVT recently, Anna Starbrink said that she can imagine that one must be flexible when it comes to nuclear weapons. I would like to have an explanation of what the member actually means by that. Does the member mean that there are situations where it could be relevant to station nuclear weapons on Swedish territory?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Anna Starbrink (L)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you for the question, Member! You are quoting me incorrectly, however. I have not said that we should be flexible when it comes to nuclear weapons. What I have said is that we must not lock future decision-makers. They must be able to make the decisions that are required in a given situation.

I abhor nuclear weapons. I believe everyone in here does. I would like to abolish all nuclear weapons, but not unilaterally. It is a life-threatening thought that the free West should get rid of all nuclear weapons and let Russia, Iran, and China, with their authoritarian and malevolent view of the West, have this means of power for themselves. It is an irresponsible stance.

Therefore, I am against us enacting legislation in this area. Sweden already has a clear line and international agreements to lean on. We do not need to enact legislation or formulate anything else in this DCA.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! Then it perhaps became a bit clearer for me. But if we now have such a clear and distinct line when it comes to nuclear weapons, why can we not legislate? What is it that is so dangerous to legislate about, if we do not want to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory?

Does the member not insert that nuclear weapons on Swedish territory would make Sweden a clearer target in connection with a potential conflict, which we naturally hope will not happen? The idea of deterrence as a method only leads to an arms race and a balance of terror. Sipri shows this clearly in its yearbook.

From the Swedish side, we must fight against all types of nuclear arms racing, both Russian and American, and all nuclear weapons that exist. We must be a clear voice for nuclear disarmament. There should be no uncertainties whatsoever regarding Sweden's position when it comes to nuclear weapons.

Sweden should adopt legislation that prohibits the import, storage, and transit of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. Does the member not agree that this would make Sweden safer?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Anna Starbrink (L)

Mr. Speaker! I thank you for the question. The member asked the same question again. I do not know if I can express it more clearly.

No, I do not think it would benefit us to enact a specific law on this. We already have the international agreements we need. And we ourselves have the right to make decisions in any given situation. That is what we shall hold to.

I am, however, interested in understanding how the member and her party think. Is it reasonable for the free West to abolish all its nuclear weapons and let Russia, China, and Iran stand alone with nuclear weapons? It is indeed life-threatening. And it is precisely what the line the member advocates for would lead to. It is a dangerous path.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden has had a long-term effort for nuclear disarmament. Foreign Minister Tobias Billström declared earlier this spring that he intends to continue working for nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Stockholm Declaration, which is very welcome. But when I hear Member Anna Starbrink speak warmly about nuclear weapons in the rostrum, a small doubt is nevertheless born as to whether it is a direction shared by all parties within the Tidö Agreement.

I would like to get an answer from Anna Starbrink on how she views Sweden's work for nuclear disarmament and how it should proceed.

For Miljöpartiet, it is important that we continue to work for mutual nuclear disarmament. I say it again: mutual nuclear disarmament. I do not want us to be accused of anything else. It must be an active effort, even though we are in a very challenging situation at the moment.

I would also like Member Anna Starbrink to say something about how the Liberals view the issue of sexual offense legislation and how we should approach it when it comes to the reclamation of the right of judgment. Do the Liberals want that we should be able to take back the right of judgment in cases concerning sexual offense legislation, so that the Swedish consent law can apply to everyone in Sweden?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Anna Starbrink (L)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you for your question, Member Berginger!

You claim that I speak warmly of nuclear weapons from the rostrum. That is how one creates an unpleasant narrative about one's political opponents. I think perhaps the member should be too good for that.

Regarding the view on nuclear weapons, we have different opinions. This does not concern our abhorrence of nuclear weapons. We share that. But we have different opinions when it comes to the strategy for how we should handle the dangerous situation we find ourselves in.

In response to the member's question, I mean that we shall continue to work for and hold the important role of being the clear voice in the work for non-proliferation and for the elimination of nuclear weapons from our globe. But as long as the malicious states have nuclear weapons, it is an all too great risk if our allies in Nato were to get rid of the nuclear weapons that exist within the alliance.

In Nato, nuclear weapons are part of the deterrence, and it works. I think we should stick to that. It does not prevent us, together with like-minded [nations], from continuing to work actively to remove nuclear weapons from the globe.

There are sharp shifts between the subjects here. The member posed a question about sexual offenses. These are extremely serious crimes, and I think Sweden has very good legislation. Swedish law applies in Sweden. That is perhaps obvious, but it is also highlighted in connection with this agreement. The possibility to reclaim the right to handle legal processes is written into the agreement. I imagine that it can also apply to the sexual offense legislation and the consent law, which is part of it. On the other hand, I think it would be unfortunate if we went into too much detail regarding which crimes it concerns, as it can be difficult for us to imagine in advance what may need to be handled.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I heard, in any case, how Member Starbrink said with emphasis in his speech that it is fundamentally important not to have any ban on nuclear weapons. I interpret, in any case, that the Member is speaking quite warmly in favor of nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect.

We from Miljöpartiet are concerned about the loosening of the rhetoric when it comes to nuclear weapons, where we, for example, are being questioned for our position where we want to ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. It is made to sound as if it is a very separate and strange stance, even though we actually all say that we should not have nuclear weapons in Sweden. I wonder what it is that makes it impossible to imagine banning nuclear weapons, if one does not want them on Swedish territory. To say that we should have legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory would have been the absolute clearest towards both Swedish citizens and our allies.

When it comes to the legislation on sexual offenses, I wonder which sexual offenses Anna Starbrink does not want Sweden to take back the jurisdiction over. Which sexual offenses can one imagine where the Swedish consent law should not be applied? It is very strange to me that the government parties do not want to say in a clear way in which sexual offense cases we should take back the jurisdiction. If they had done that in advance, it would have been clear which legislation should apply. Then there would be no uncertainties and no questioning of the jurisdictional issue.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Anna Starbrink (L)

Mr. Speaker! I thank the member for the follow-up questions.

I do not question the member's or the member's party's position on the issue of nuclear weapons. I simply do not agree. I do not think it is a wise path to take. Nor do I put words in others' mouths or misinterpret what other members say.

When it comes to sexual offenses, I think it is important that there is a possibility in the agreement to take the important cases back to Swedish court. I believe it is difficult if we here in the Riksdag describe in detail in exactly which situations this shall be done. We should probably keep it quite open, but it is very clearly written that special consideration shall be taken for the victims' legal certainty. I feel secure with that formulation.

I can think of many other things than sexual offenses that we also judge as very important cases that we want to keep in Sweden. But if we start regulating it, there is a great risk that we miss important principled issues. In that case, it is better to handle it by examining the matter case by case. In that way, a practice is also built up.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! We are in the final stages of extensive work to produce a bilateral agreement with the USA on defense cooperation - that which is called the defense cooperation agreement. The agreement was negotiated during 2023 and was signed by both parties on December 5 last year.

After obtaining views from 111 referral bodies, including all affected municipalities, and after the Council on Legislation has completed a review and also assessed that the proposal is compatible with the constitutional laws, the Government submitted a bill to the Riksdag on 8 May 2024. The Government proposes, on one hand, that the Riksdag approves that Sweden enters into the DCA agreement, and on the other hand, that the Riksdag adopts the legislative amendments required to implement it.

The agreement establishes the conditions for American military presence in Sweden by regulating the legal status for visiting personnel and providing access to 17 Swedish military facilities. The agreement also enables the development of military infrastructure in Sweden.

The DCA agreement contains provisions regarding the legal status of the American force and its personnel, dependents, and suppliers. It concerns criminal jurisdiction, exemptions from taxation, and the right to maintain discipline within the American force. Furthermore, issues such as the right of access to Swedish territory, the right to use certain of the Armed Forces' facilities and areas, and the right to conduct activities in support of its own force and its personnel are regulated.

The DCA agreement builds upon and complements the Nato SOFA agreement which the Riksdag recently adopted with a large majority.

Mr. Speaker! The DCA agreement is a natural step in a changed world and a logical continuation of the Swedish membership in Nato. The agreement responds to the changed conditions for Swedish security policy that this entails.

Sweden and the USA are now allies within Nato, and that means we have an obligation to defend each other. The decisive turning point for Swedish security policy was Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia's brutal war of aggression and attempts to redraw Europe's borders demonstrate the Kremlin's fundamental lack of respect for international law and the vulnerability it entails not to be allied.

NATO as an organization and the USA as its strongest member is the cornerstone of North Atlantic security. Our security rests on the fact that the transatlantic link is maintained. A credible Swedish ability to obtain allied support and support other allies is built on preparations and cooperation in peacetime. Our neighboring countries have drawn the same conclusions. Denmark and Finland are currently carrying out DCA processes, and Norway has reviewed its DCA agreement and added further locations where an American presence is possible. In total, it concerns 47 locations in the Nordic region, of which 17 are located in Sweden.

The DCA agreement will facilitate current and future American presence in Sweden. It enables and simplifies other allies' presence on our territory, which is the basis for being able to give and receive military support.

Sweden has over the years had extensive international defense cooperation, and it has grown ever stronger. For a longer period, we have worked on preparing and simplifying international cooperation and host nation support. The DCA agreement is one of several steps that facilitate allied military presence in and movement through Sweden. It was needed when we as allies are covered by common defense obligations.

As a member of Nato, the needs and expectations for a foreign presence in Sweden will increase, not least from the USA. Our exercise cooperation with the USA is important and extensive, and it also strengthens our defense capability.

Mr. Speaker! Let me take a few examples just from the last few months. In March, the Swedish Armed Forces cooperated with the American Bomber Task Force and conducted flights over Stockholm and Uppsala as part of the exercise Nordic Response. At the beginning of May, an American battalion was deployed to Hagshults airbase during the exercise Swift Response. At the end of May, the Swedish Armed Forces supported the movement of an American unit from Norway to Finland through the exercise Immediate Response 2024, and at the beginning of June, the exercise Baltops 24 began, an American-led naval exercise which, among other things, takes place in the Stockholm archipelago, on Gotska Sandön, and on Gotland. This involves thousands of American soldiers and hundreds of moments and activities just during the last month.

Before NATO membership, the government gave the Armed Forces mandates restricting time, location, and operations for the presence of foreign troops in Sweden. In recent years, the government has eased the permit process through framework decisions. But with the DCA agreement, we avoid ad hoc solutions and instead get a comprehensive agreement that covers current and future requirements for exercises. This facilitates and streamlines cooperation as allies, and it strengthens our security.

Mr. Speaker! The DCA agreement becomes a cornerstone for defense in northern Europe by creating conditions for American support and American presence if the security situation so requires. The USA's security policy engagement and military presence in northern Europe is a vital interest for Sweden's security, especially in the serious security policy global situation that we now find ourselves in. The DCA agreement promotes Swedish interests and makes Sweden safer by acting as a deterrent and stabilizing.

The agreement itself is also an important signal regarding the USA's security and defense policy commitment to Sweden. A US presence in Sweden acts as a deterrent to a potential aggressor and can prevent the emergence of armed threats. The DCA agreement is also beneficial for Sweden's relationship as an ally with the USA. Sweden already has a close cooperation with the USA within the security and defense policy area, and it is further deepened with the NATO membership.

The use of the DCA agreement will be a long-term joint bilateral project that, in addition to operations and exercises, can facilitate the creation of new and future military capabilities. The agreement strengthens security for the USA, our Nordic and Baltic allies, and Nato as a whole. It strengthens the conditions for the defense of our immediate vicinity and facilitates Sweden's effective integration into Nato and cooperation with our neighboring countries.

It is a strength, Mr. Speaker, that Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway obtain effective and similar forms of cooperation with the USA. It is a signal of security policy consensus. It strengthens security in Northern Europe and facilitates NATO's defense planning.

Overall, the DCA agreement is a natural continuation of Sweden's NATO membership and the changed security policy conditions that it entails. It creates conditions for American military support to Sweden and becomes a cornerstone in the defense of northern Europe. The agreement is deterrent and stabilizing and is of great importance for Sweden.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Nuclear weapons are a weapon of mass destruction that threatens our existence. If a single detonation of a nuclear weapon occurs, it implies an immense humanitarian suffering and an extensive destruction of the environment. During the debate, we have discussed the presence of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. I sense that there is a fairly broad consensus that we should not have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. But the paths to get there look different. I wonder why the government cannot imagine putting forward legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory to ensure that we do not slip when it comes to the question of having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. It would be a clear signal both towards the Swedish people and towards other allies.

I would also like to ask the Minister of Defence how he views the Prime Minister's previous statements during the spring, where he opened up to having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in times of war. Is that a position that the Minister of Defence shares? How does one imagine that it should work in that case? What type of anchoring process does the Minister of Defence envision ahead of such a process?

I also wonder how the government would like to ensure that no nuclear weapons enter Swedish territory, even though we have no reason to believe that anyone wants nuclear weapons here right now. How does one want to follow up and control that American aircraft and ships at sea that enter Swedish territory do not bring nuclear weapons with them?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Emma Berglinger for the questions. I will try to address them in turn.

Emma Berglinger wants to see legislation against nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. I note that this declaration of intent is justified by that the government shall prepare a proposal that allows even Miljöpartiet to stand for the DCA agreement. The problem, Mr. Speaker, that I have with Emma Berglinger's proposal is that there are only two parties in the Swedish Riksdag that want legislation against nuclear weapons. If the government were to accommodate Emma Berglinger's proposal, it would mean that the broad consensus that exists regarding our line in Sweden linked to nuclear weapons fell, namely that there is no need for either nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory. In the interest of finding the broad solutions, the government has chosen to formulate itself exactly as the Foreign Affairs Committee formulates itself in its report in connection with the NATO process. It has been very careful for me. We have also been careful to anchor the formulations, so that we stick exactly to the text that we have agreed upon. It is important.

Emma Berglinger is actually misrepresenting what the Prime Minister has said about nuclear weapons. We have a policy in Sweden, a line, which has been adopted by the Riksdag. It says that there are no reasons to have either nuclear weapons or permanent bases in peacetime. It is broadly anchored and accepted, and the Riksdag has decided on it. It refers to peacetime conditions. There is no reason to speculate on what one does otherwise, and neither did the Prime Minister; he stated that there are other conditions and other parameters to consider if there is no peace in Sweden.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! If one truly wanted to find a broad consensus, one could have looked at producing legislation that clarifies this, since it is now being said that there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime. The policy that Pål Jonson mentions concerns the fact that it has been written in the main text of reports that there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime. These reasons could very well be changed. It is more of a kind of description rather than a clearly adopted direction. I believe it would have become much clearer if we could have achieved this legislation.

Pål Jonson does not want to speculate on what could happen if Sweden ended up in war. But that is exactly what we must do. We must try to prepare ourselves for all eventualities and reflect on what this agreement means for us in peace, what it means for us in war, and how we should handle different situations. In light of the statements the Prime Minister made on the radio, I can state that one can still assume that even the Prime Minister has entertained the thought that we might potentially have nuclear weapons in Sweden during a war situation. The Green Party does not find this reassuring. We want to see legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peace and in war, because we know that the threat posed by nuclear weapons does not decrease if we are in a war situation compared to a peace situation – on the contrary.

I can also state that I did not receive any answer to the question of how the government, in accordance with the policy that Pål Jonson says the government and the Riksdag now stand behind and the report text that the Tidö parties and the Social Democrats have jointly negotiated, intends to follow up, control, and ensure that nuclear weapons are not brought into Swedish territory.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! It is very clear that the agreement is based on respect for Swedish sovereignty, Swedish laws, and Sweden's international obligations. The USA must report what kind of defense materiel it is bringing in, when it is being brought in, and how much is being brought in. This is included in the agreement. The Swedish agreement is also based on consent; all activities shall, according to the agreement, be planned jointly between the American defense forces and the Swedish Försvarsmakten.

I want to return to the declaration of intent. The purpose is to adapt this and include Miljöpartiet. One reason cited was that information was not received during the negotiations regarding the design of the agreement. This was because there was no agreement to refer to. We presented the agreement as soon as it was fully negotiated; on 5 December, it was posted on the Riksdag's website. I informed the committee before the negotiations and during the negotiations. The Foreign Minister and I have also been in the joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and presented and lectured on this. There is no reason to claim that information was not received; the Riksdag's parties received information during the negotiations.

I announced at Folk och Försvar in Sälen in January 2023 that the work had begun. It was started by the previous government. That no information has been received is actually not true, Mr. Speaker.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Both I and Defense Minister Pål Jonsson are from Värmland. That means we debated Nato and Sweden's relationship to the USA long before Pål Jonsson became Defense Minister.

In a debate we had on Nya Wermlands-Tidningens web-TV, Pål Jonsson emphatically claimed that Nato was bigger than Trump. Everything would go well, and Sweden should join Nato even with Trump in the White House.

Now, not everything went so very well for Trump. At the end, he was trying to attempt some kind of coup when his supporters stormed the US Congress.

In November, there is an election in the USA. Once again, a tired and old Joe Biden stands against an old but somewhat more energetic Donald Trump. In seven months, the US president could be none other than Donald Trump. I wonder even today: Is the DCA agreement bigger than Trump?

My second consideration is regarding nuclear weapons. In the Norwegian and Danish agreements, nuclear weapons are clearly inscribed in the agreements' paragraphs. In the Finnish agreement, there is a reference to the Finnish legislation which prohibits nuclear weapons on Finnish territory.

In the Swedish agreement, there are no mentions at all regarding nuclear weapons. There are also no mentions regarding landmines and cluster bombs. Something that the Defense Minister nevertheless says he has communicated to the American side.

I have listened to Defense Minister Pål Jonsson over and over again during this journey up to the decision. Not even once have I managed to hear him explain why these writings do not exist.

Now he has one last chance before the decision. Why is it not written about nuclear weapons, landmines and cluster bombs in the Swedish DCA agreement?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! I am pleased that Håkan Svenneling remembers our debates from many years ago. I said that Nato will survive Trump. So it can also be stated that it has.

Håkan Svenneling knows that the basis is that we do not enter into agreements with presidents, but we enter into agreements with countries. Here we have entered into an agreement that is very clear regardless of who sits in the White House. It is based on Swedish sovereignty, respect for Swedish laws and Sweden's international obligations. It is a strength.

The agreement also creates better conditions for securing a long-term American commitment in Sweden but also in the other Nordic countries. We believe this is a central Swedish interest regardless of who sits in the White House. It creates a continuity and a long-term perspective that is important and central.

Let me return to the second question regarding the agreement. I have heard Håkan Svenneling refer to the Finnish agreement a number of times today. One does not refer to the Finnish legislation there, Håkan Svenneling, but it is exactly the same wording as it is in Sweden. One refers to Swedish legislation and Swedish international obligations.

Everyone has the right to their own opinion, but not to their own facts. In that respect, the Swedish agreement and the Finnish agreement are completely identical. The difference is only that we refer to Swedish sovereignty.

It means that the Riksdag has established that there are no grounds to have either nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory. There is no difference in that respect between the Swedish and the Finnish agreement.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Let me take up the thread of the last thing the Minister for Defence says. I would still argue that there is a difference between the Swedish and the Finnish agreement despite the fact that we are working with the same wording. I also have support from a number of referral bodies that come to the same conclusion.

It is about the fact that Finland has a law, unlike Sweden, which prohibits nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. It concerns both storage and transit and that they are deployed.

That means that when one has the formulation that exists in both the Swedish and the Finnish agreements, they mean different things in practice as long as Sweden lacks legislation against nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

I am worried about what will happen if Trump becomes president. I hope that this applies to many members of Parliament here in the chamber. We see now that Sweden is the country that lacks clear writings such as nuclear weapons.

If Trump decides that he wants something, to buy Greenland or to place nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries, perhaps Sweden is the obvious choice.

I wonder what the Minister of Defence will do if Trump wants to station a missile battery in Visby or a nuclear-armed bomber in Luleå. Will a consent clause really be enough then, or does the Minister of Defence have a veto against Trump?

It is also important to speak about this with war and peace linked to the NPT. An interpretation from the Minister for Defence, the government, and other bourgeois members is starting to creep in.

One must remember that the NPT legislation that the Social Democrats have had passed applies both in war and in peace. There are no such arguments as those found in this debate.

I would also like to hear more from the Minister for Defence regarding transparency concerning what the Americans are bringing in. It is quite true that, according to the agreement, the Americans must report which weapons they are bringing in.

It has been communicated from the Swedish side that one does not want nuclear weapons, landmines and cluster bombs. But are any controls at all being carried out, other than communicating with the Americans, regarding what they actually bring onto Swedish soil?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! There are a number of questions that Håkan Svenneling is pushing forward.

There is legislation which means that if Sweden sails a warship and places it in another country, other countries may not inspect it. So it will also work with the American legislation, that one has immunity.

We are now allied with the USA, Håkan Svenneling. It is based on the fact that we have a great measure of trust in each other. We make the greatest commitments that countries can make between one another. That is being willing to defend each other. Therefore, there must also be an element of trust.

With that said, Håkan Svenneling also knows that in the other agreements, there is nothing that says "with consent." All activities shall, according to the Swedish agreement, take place with Swedish consent. It is an important success for us during the negotiations.

I return to the fact that it again is based on Swedish sovereignty and respect for Swedish legislation. It is a carefully elaborated work.

I have had the privilege of listening a lot to Håkan Svenneling today, as he is a diligent debater. I can state that he says that no one knew about the agreement before December 5. But that is not true. The Riksdag has repeatedly received information.

It is said that this should be laid to rest because there has been no debate or discussion. In that case, my question to Håkan Svenneling must be: How many interpellations have I received from Håkan Svenneling, or how many interpellations have I received from Miljöpartiet? How many written questions have I received? I have received one interpellation on this. The opposition also has a responsibility to drive that debate.

We ensured that the bill arrived in time so that the Riksdag could deliberate on it thoroughly. It was not a shortened motion period. There were 111 referral bodies. The Council on Legislation is very clear that the proposal is compatible with the Swedish constitution. That is a strength.

I am pleased that six of the eight parties are willing to stand behind this in the committee report.

(Applause)

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Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Minister for Defence, for both the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs being here and taking the debate with us at this late hour. I know that many are going out to have dinners and such things, so we shall hurry along.

I have a small, short question. At the same time as we are now signing the DCA agreement, we are in a construction phase of the Swedish total defense. That is what we agree on here in the chamber. We agree on 2 percent of GDP and that whole part. This will take time, it will take effort, and it will take space.

Something I have been thinking about a bit while we have had this discussion is therefore how the construction of the Swedish total defense and the space it requires - we are to have more conscripts and more officers, and we are to employ more personnel - will work with the fact that we, at least according to the agreement, even if we do not know where it lands in the end, also must accommodate American soldiers, warehouses, and the space that the Americans need for their operations. I have not quite been able to reconcile that in the discussions we have had, so I would like to hear how the Minister of Defence views it.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Emma Berglinger for the question. No, I apologize - I thank Hanna Gunnarsson for the question!

I note that at least Håkan Svenneling has said that there is a concern within the Armed Forces that DCA will have a displacement effect out in the units. Let me therefore say a few things that are important to consider.

The Swedish Armed Forces are very clear in their referral response that DCA is important for the Swedish Armed Forces' operations. The agreement will streamline its international defense cooperation, especially with the USA.

It is also the case that it is the USA, i.e., the American defense forces, which in close cooperation with the Swedish defense forces has chosen all the 17 different locations around the country. It is, in my opinion, well-informed decisions that come directly from the authority and are made with care so that it shall create a cooperation between the USA and Sweden in the military area that is as effective and good as possible.

I therefore perceive that this will go well. The Armed Forces have in all stages been logged into the process itself.

I want to raise one more thing that Håkan Svenneling raised earlier, namely what is the Left Party's alternative to a DCA agreement. We got a picture here that it would be an increased regionalization of the defense cooperation.

I can inform the Left Party that Nordic defense cooperation is flourishing. It has never been as good as it is now, I dare say. But that is for two reasons: Finland's membership in Nato and Sweden's Nato membership. Thanks to the fact that we are Nato allies and can now work much better with Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, regionalization is flourishing. It is thanks to Nato membership, not despite it. I want to emphasize that. But Hanna Gunnarsson may perhaps further develop the thoughts regarding the alternative to DCA.

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Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker! I thank the Minister for Defence for the question. I will very gladly do so.

Our alternative to the DCA agreement – if one looks at the agreement itself and not at Nato as an organization, for those are actually two different things – is that Americans who want to exercise in and with Sweden shall be granted permission for that on each individual occasion. Now, we are no big fans of American exercises, but we want the Swedish Armed Forces to have control over what happens and where it happens. If anything is to be stored in Sweden, we shall be the last ones to close the door. It is we who shall have the key, and it is we who shall know what is in the stores.

What the DCA agreement does is hand over all that power to the USA and say: "Be my guest! Now you can be here - this is your area. We will not look or interfere, and we will not have any opinions." That is our fear regarding the agreement, and that is why we do not want the agreement at all, regardless of whether it would contain anything about nuclear weapons or not. We want instead that the Swedish Armed Forces, which in the long run is the Riksdag, has that control and does not hand it over to the Americans. That is what we see as the greatest risk here.

It does not only apply to the regimental areas, but it also applies in the vicinity of them. As the Minister of Defence knows, I live right near P 7, and we do not know what it will look like going forward regarding the possibility for the local population living around that area to use it. Ultimately, it becomes a question of public support.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Mr. Speaker! I just want to remind that all activity shall take place with Swedish consent. It also appears clearly from the agreement that there shall be joint planning between the Swedish Armed Forces and the American Armed Forces when it comes to the further design and implementation of the agreement.

Otherwise, I just want to refer to our differing views on security policy. One such matter that has featured during the day is the approach to deterrence.

Deterrence is a necessary component in security policy, as it reduces the risk that we are subjected to an armed attack. Here I also want to be clear that we are now full-fledged allies in Nato and that we therefore also stand behind the fact that Nato is based on conventional and nuclear deterrence. Then we do not need - and we have no intention of - having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, and there is no expectation of that from Nato's side.

It is, however, obvious that there are different views on how to approach deterrence. In light of the fact that Russia is willing to take very large political and military risks and shows a brutality and bestiality in Ukraine, as well as high ambitions regarding building up a strong defense capability, it is our assessment that it is necessary to actually also deter Russia from aggression. The DCA agreement will contribute to an improved opportunity for Sweden to deter aggression by providing us with better conditions to have a strong American presence both in Sweden and in the rest of the Nordic region.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! In today's security situation, the DCA agreement, the bilateral agreement on defense cooperation with the USA, is of particular importance for Sweden's security. Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine has now been ongoing for over two years. The security situation in Europe and our immediate vicinity has drastically deteriorated as a result of this. This has led to the fact that we in Sweden have collectively decided to join Nato and upgrade our defense.

Sweden's DCA agreement with the USA should be seen in this security policy context. The DCA agreement is stabilizing. It raises the threshold for attacks against Sweden and is important for the defense of our entire surrounding area. Russia's attempts to undermine the European security order, the country's systematic evasion of arms control limitations as well as threats and bluster with nuclear weapons are both irresponsible and unacceptable. Russia's actions have severely and for a long time to come worsened the security policy situation in Europe and in Sweden's surrounding areas.

Russia has chosen a confrontational approach towards the EU and NATO, as well as towards the entire Western world. That confrontation needs to be met through cohesion, resilience, and an enhanced ability to defend ourselves together with our closest neighboring countries and allies. Today, all Nordic and Baltic countries have signed DCA agreements with the USA. It is a powerful expression of the security and defense policy consensus that now exists in Northern Europe and which lacks historical equivalent.

Sweden's geographical location means that our ability to support other allies is crucial for NATO to be able to operate in our part of Europe. Sweden takes this responsibility. We fully embrace our opportunities to significantly facilitate the collective defense, including that of our neighboring countries. Sweden's DCA agreement is also of importance for these countries' security, and we benefit from the fact that Norway, Denmark, and Finland have effective and very similar forms of cooperation with the USA. It also facilitates NATO's defense planning.

The Minister for Defence has described how the DCA agreement improves the practical conditions for the ongoing bilateral defense cooperation with the USA. I want to emphasize that the agreement thus creates the necessary conditions to receive early and effective military support from the USA, both bilaterally and within the framework of Nato, in the event of a deteriorated security situation.

I also want to emphasize that the USA's security policy commitment and military presence in northern Europe is of vital interest for Sweden's security, especially in the current security situation. The USA is central to the credibility of NATO's Article 5. The DCA agreement is therefore of particular importance from a deterrence perspective and for our ability to defend Sweden and have the opportunity to strengthen security and stability in the surrounding area.

The transatlantic link is indispensable for Europe's and Sweden's security. Sweden is allied with the USA, and cooperation with the USA constitutes a fundamental pillar in Swedish foreign and security policy.

The DCA agreement provides opportunities to further deepen our security policy cooperation with the USA in a way that benefits our vital interests. The agreement strengthens both Swedish and American security and confirms the strategic relationship between Sweden and the USA.

The DCA agreement with the USA is a cooperation agreement. Everything that occurs within the agreement occurs with Swedish consent and with respect for Sweden's sovereignty.

Mr. Speaker! The DCA agreement does not change the broad political consensus on nuclear weapons and permanent bases that exists today in Sweden and which was expressed in connection with Sweden's Nato application. Sweden applied with broad support in the Riksdag for membership in Nato without reservations. This position remains firm, but in the same way as in the other Nordic countries, there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory in peacetime.

Let me emphasize in this context that Sweden continues to be a clear voice for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. One example of this is the international meeting aimed at strengthening the work to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons - with the participation of 21 countries from different parts of the world, including nuclear-weapon states - which Sweden recently hosted. Furthermore, Sweden, together with Germany, continues to be a driving force in the Stockholm Initiative for nuclear disarmament.

In order for the USA and Nato to be able to effectively contribute to the defense of Sweden on Swedish territory, the DCA agreement gives the American military access to 17 existing Swedish facilities which the Armed Forces, and in one case the Defence Materiel Administration, make available. It is not about the establishment of permanent bases.

The rights that the American military receive through the agreement are granted within well-regulated frameworks in line with a standard that several NATO members, EU members, and other Nordic countries use in their respective agreements with the USA. It is already established in the preamble of the agreement that all activities shall take place with full respect for Swedish sovereignty, Swedish laws, and Sweden's international obligations. It is also established that the closer security cooperation established through the DCA agreement takes place in accordance with international law and is based on Swedish consent. These principles have been important starting points in our dialogue with the USA, and this is well reflected in the agreement.

Mr. Speaker! We live in a time of danger. The best way to contribute to a peaceful development is to strengthen our conflict avoidance capability and our ability to defend ourselves together with our allies. Russia will pose a serious threat to Europe's security for the foreseeable future, and the USA's security policy commitment and military presence are of vital interest for the security of Sweden and Sweden's neighboring countries.

The DCA agreement is an important step in adapting Swedish security policy to these changed conditions. With the solidarity alliance policy as the guiding principle, we are, from Sweden's side, actively involved in and shaping the future security in our immediate area. The DCA agreement is instrumental for us, together with the USA and in harmony with our Nordic and Baltic neighbors, to realize the opportunities that our NATO membership gives us to strengthen our own security and regional security.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs for participating in the debate - I think it is very good.

The American military forces that are soon to be stationed in Sweden will, for the most part, not be subject to Swedish laws. During their deployment, the soldiers will largely have immunity and be subject to US laws. If they commit crimes, it will be handled by the American justice system. Should it not be obvious that Swedish law should apply to everyone who stays in Sweden and who commits crimes in our country?

Sweden has a far-reaching consent law, which the USA does not have. We also have a prostitution law that differs from the USA's. What rights do victims of crime have in Sweden when the legal process is handled by another country?

It is far from unusual that sexual crimes are committed in connection with American bases and by American soldiers; there are several examples of this. There is, among others, a current example from 2022, when Swedish police arrested two men from the crew of an American military ship that had docked in Stockholm because they had purchased sex at an apartment brothel. There are also several other examples of girls and women being subjected to human trafficking and forced into prostitution around American military bases.

Shouldn't Swedish law apply to everyone who stays in Sweden and commits crimes in our country? And must Swedes who have been subjected to crimes by American soldiers be prosecuted in American military courts?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Lotta Johnsson Fornarve for the questions.

It is interesting to hear Lotta Johnsson Fornarve use the phrasing "largely not subject to". Personnel from the American forces are in no way exempt from punishment. They are covered by both countries' criminal legislation - both Sweden's and the USA's.

What the agreement regulates, and which the Riksdag now has to take a position on in connection with the agreement, is the right to exercise jurisdiction, namely more specifically which country has the primary right to prosecute and judge for a crime committed in Sweden. If one listens to some of the participants in the debate, one could get the impression that we are to make decisions to grant impunity for the person who commits a crime and who is a US citizen. This is under no circumstances relevant.

The USA will have the primary jurisdiction for crimes committed by members of the force both on and off duty. From Sweden's side, we will be able to reclaim jurisdiction in cases that we consider to be of particular importance to us regarding off-duty incidents that are not solely directed against American interests.

I have a question for Lotta Johnsson Fornarve: Were the American soldiers who were arrested for having purchased six punished? I would very much like to find out that.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! In principle, it is American law that shall judge American soldiers when they commit crimes; that is what the Minister himself says. Only when it is of particular importance shall they be judged in Sweden. Swedish and American law do, in fact, look different when it comes to the cases that I raised.

I also wonder what gender equality analysis has been conducted regarding the DCA agreement. The truth is that no gender equality analysis has been conducted at all regarding the DCA agreement. It is quite remarkable given that the link between military personnel stationed at bases abroad and sexualized violence is so extensive. None of the referral bodies that the DCA agreement has been sent to work with specifically gender equality or sexual violence. Why has no gender equality analysis been conducted?

There are lawyers and researchers who have looked at these agreements. One can see that there is a great uncertainty when it comes to specifically the consent law and the prostitution law; it is not possible to clearly say which legislation should actually apply. In the purchase of sexual services, which is illegal in Sweden, one can see in American law that some form of solicitation or coercion is required for a person to be convicted of sex buying. The purchase alone is not enough, unlike how the Swedish sex buying ban is formulated. Also, when it comes to the consent law, it is very unclear what actually applies.

I think that one should at least have cleared up these ambiguities before signing the agreement.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! We received no answer as to whether the American soldiers were actually convicted of the crimes. It would be interesting to hear that, as this was highlighted as an example.

No, Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, it is not primarily American law that is to apply. What the agreement regulates is solely the jurisdiction, i.e., which country shall have the primary right to prosecute and judge for a crime committed in Sweden. We will have the opportunity to take back the jurisdiction in cases that we consider to be of particular importance. As was said here earlier during one of the exchanges of remarks - I believe it was Anna Starbrink who said it - there is therefore a possibility for Sweden to build practice by working in that way. It is thus fortunate that the agreement is designed in precisely this way.

I feel no concern whatsoever that we are creating this relationship with the USA by designing the agreement in the way the parties have agreed upon. As has been noted during the debate, neither the Council on Legislation nor the Committee on the Constitution has had any views on how we have handled the preparation of this agreement.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Upholding the principles of the rule of law and countering impunity has been a Swedish core value in foreign policy for a long time. This has led to Sweden being a driving force in the introduction of international conventions against the use of landmines, cluster weapons, and nuclear weapons. It has also led to Sweden standing up for the decisions of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and other international bodies. Certainly, there have been occasions when previous ministers have acted hesitantly, such as during the deportation of the two Egyptians. But on the whole, Sweden has nevertheless adhered to the international order.

Today, Sweden takes a step we have not taken before. We surrender our own legislation in favor of another country's legal system. Now, American military law can apply in Sweden when someone from an American force, one of their relatives, or even a subcontractor is suspected of a crime in Sweden. As the Foreign Minister pointed out, there is a so-called valve where jurisdiction can be reclaimed, but in the bill, it states on page 195: "A member of an American force will thus, as a starting point in cases of suspected sexual offenses, be tried under American military criminal legislation."

This naturally has consequences both in Sweden and internationally. In Sweden, it means that crime victims could end up in an American military court to seek redress. Neither I nor the Foreign Minister have used the word immunity, but some of our colleagues have. I want to be clear that our concern is about impunity. That is what we want to avoid, and therefore we are raising this with the court.

Internationally, this shows that Sweden is yielding to the pressure from the USA, which can make it difficult for other countries to stand up against the superpower USA. When even Sweden cannot assert its position as a rule-of-law state, how then is a country in a weaker position towards the USA to succeed in doing so?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! It is interesting with the spin from Vänsterpartiet and Håkan Svenneling about that this shows that we are yielding. In what way does this show that we are yielding? The design of the agreement is, as I have said before, clear. The personnel from the American forces are in no way exempt from punishment. Håkan Svenneling now tried to make a clever turn by trying to remove the word immunity. But there is, therefore, no impunity either, and both countries' jurisdiction and criminal legislation cover the personnel from the American forces.

Let me return to another word that has been raised in the debate, namely consent. There is reason to repeat that the Swedish state's consent must be obtained for the measures one takes. The agreement regulates the right to exercise jurisdiction, but we have reserved the right to take back the jurisdiction in cases we consider to be of particular importance. Which these cases will be is, as said, something that must be built through practice. But that is natural. It is nothing unknown or strange that it is the case in this way. There are already other international agreements where practice-building in the relationship between two states is part of how the agreements are structured. It is therefore no innovation for the DCA agreement.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Our concern remains regarding impunity, and therefore I am pleased that the committee went further in its description of how we should proceed so that impunity does not prevail than the government did in its bill. It is a step in the right direction.

I think we should not have to have American law at all in Sweden. The Swedish legislation works perfectly well.

Consent legislation does not exist in American legislation, and the prostitution laws do not look the same as ours. What happened then to the soldiers on the aircraft carrier? It is possible that the Foreign Minister has some information, but in Swedish media, it has not been reported how it went for them. They were arrested and handed over to the American military justice system, but we do not know the outcome. It has therefore not been tried in accordance with Swedish law.

The nuclear weapons issue is important. The Foreign Minister himself raised the Stockholm Initiative. When the Foreign Minister took office, he first downplayed the Stockholm Initiative in a newspaper article, then he corrected himself and withdrew it, and now he has held a meeting on it. It is clear that there is a great interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament in the chamber, and from today's debate, I take away that the interest is broad across party lines.

I hope that the Foreign Minister succeeds in keeping the flag flying high in the Stockholm Initiative, that it does not lose momentum until the next review conference on the NPT and that Sweden can continue to be a leading voice. This has been promised by previous Foreign Ministers even if we join Nato. But it will be difficult if one does not participate in all discussions, and I think it is shameful that the Swedish government has decided not to participate as an observer at the state party meeting for those who are affiliated with the UN's nuclear weapons convention. Many of the world's countries participate here, especially from the global south. In a time when Russia and China are trying to make their moves, Sweden needs to have a good dialogue with many countries globally.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! Both the Stockholm Initiative and the overarching principles for arms control have always been part of how my party has viewed the issues regarding nuclear weapons. Let me be clear that there have never been any intentions whatsoever to either abolish the Stockholm Initiative or change these principles.

The Left Party and the Moderate-led government are, however, not in agreement on the view of TPNW, i.e., the convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This is because the government considers that the convention has a number of shortcomings. It does not offer a credible or effective path towards either nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, or the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Furthermore, the government considers that TPNW, as a result of how it is designed, is not compatible with the commitments that follow from our membership in Nato. Therefore, the government decided after a collective assessment that we should not participate as observers at this meeting. This decision was made based on the reasons I have just stated.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I believe that at least the Foreign Minister has learned how to pronounce my name, unlike the Defense Minister, but I want to have it recorded in the minutes that my name is Berginger and nothing else.

But it was not this that I was going to speak with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about, but rather I intended to follow up on a previous discussion regarding the possibility of having a public discussion and anchoring of this agreement. As has been mentioned, both the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Defence have been informed during the course of the negotiations, but under secrecy. Consequently, the opposition has not had the opportunity to have a public discussion and hold the government accountable during the process, but instead, we were presented with a finished agreement to contend with.

I would have wished that we could have had an earlier discussion about the possible implications of such an agreement and how one should approach it, precisely to clear up the question marks that have existed in the debate.

We in Miljöpartiet are also concerned about how the government will be able to stand up for the need for mutual nuclear disarmament. Even though the Foreign Minister has been clear that he wants to continue working in line with the Stockholm Initiative, we see how the government adapted during Sweden's membership process to Nato.

Why can't the government clarify Sweden's position regarding nuclear weapons by introducing legislation that clearly prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory? It would have been the absolute clearest way to be open and transparent towards the Swedish people, our neighboring countries, and our allies within Nato.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! I do not know how much clearer one can be. In the additional foreign policy declaration I gave in the Chamber on March 20 this year on the occasion of Sweden's membership in Nato, it states on pages 8 and 9: "Sweden supports Nato's strategic deterrence and shall continue to be a strong voice for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Sweden's work to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used shall be strengthened in a time of strong tensions. Sweden applied with broad support in the Riksdag for membership in Nato without reservations. This position remains firm, but in the same way as in other Nordic countries, there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons, or permanent bases, on Swedish territory in peacetime."

How much clearer can it become? That is what I wonder. This has also been published in three languages: Swedish, English and French. I therefore think that by this point it should be clear what the government's position is.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you very much, Mr. Minister! I actually have not read the French version.

I think it is good that the Foreign Minister is clear in their declaration, but action is also required. By the fact that the government does not want to see legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, one still gives somewhat mixed signals in this issue.

Mr. Speaker! I would also like to ask the question about the sexual offenses. For us in Miljöpartiet, it is very important that the principle of voluntariness, what is called the consent law, shall apply to everyone who is in Sweden.

Now that we have discussed here the possibility of reclaiming the right of judgment under different circumstances, I wonder why the government cannot stand behind the position that one should reclaim the right of judgment in cases involving sexual offenses? Why can one not ensure that victims of sexual offenses shall be able to receive the same rights as other victims of sexual offenses in Sweden, where perpetrators can be prosecuted according to the consent law that we have? Which victims of sexual offenses is it, in that case, that the Foreign Minister does not consider should fall under the legislation that other victims of sexual offenses in Sweden can nevertheless obtain redress through?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! I say just as I have said in the previous exchanges: It is not the case that personnel from the American forces are exempt from punishment. They are covered by both countries' criminal legislation.

Sweden will take back the jurisdiction in cases that we consider to be of particular importance to us. But it would be far from my place here, as a representative of the government, to start making a list of which cases these might be.

Emma Berginger must nevertheless be included in that it cannot just be about a delimitation to sexual offenses. We could discuss issues related to driving under the influence - a serious crime in this country. We could discuss murder or theft. We could make a very long list. But the question is: Is it up to us in this chamber, seen in light of the principles of the separation of powers and the relationship between governments and courts, to make such a selection? Does it really serve our interests to start making those types of lists? I am very skeptical about that.

Therefore, it is entirely correct that, as the government has done, not to choose to define this but instead to say that we will reclaim the jurisdiction when we consider there are grounds for this. It is up to the government to answer for those cases before the Riksdag. It is naturally reasonable that the government is held accountable for this at a later stage, but not that we begin defining in advance what those cases actually will be.

Mr. Speaker! We are not to hand over gifts or anything else in the chamber, but the foreign declaration must still constitute an exception. Emma Berginger receives it from me so that she can study the parts concerning nuclear weapons extra carefully.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! First of all, I would like to say a big thank you for a good, albeit long, debate so far. It concerns a very important issue.

This is an important agreement because close military cooperation between Sweden and the USA can very well prove to be completely decisive in a sharp situation. In that case, it is perhaps not so strange that we spend so much time discussing this today, for it is an important position.

The security policy situation has deteriorated significantly in recent decades. This has occurred as a consequence of Russia's destabilization of and aggression against a long series of its neighboring countries. The war in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the maintenance of the dictatorship in Belarus and the involvement in Moldova's political life with among other things Transnistria are just a few examples of the deeply destructive role that Russia played even before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

That invasion constituted, and still constitutes, a flagrant and brutal violation of international law and a complete disregard for the European security order. But it does not stop there when it comes to Russia's activity. It is not enough that they invade and destabilize their neighboring countries. Russia also attacks the democracies in the West – directly with cyberattacks but also indirectly through influence operations aimed at increasing division in the West and playing groups against each other. For decades, they have operated their troll factories to influence public opinion in both Europe and the USA. Russia has actively cultivated contacts with, supported and financed, above all, far-right parties in the EU for the purpose of creating division.

We could very well have seen the result of that in the latest EU election, where pro-Russian parties made significant gains in Germany and France, the two largest countries in the EU.

Add Putin's increased oppression of his own population, the killing and imprisonment of political opponents, the total restriction of freedom of expression and the press. We have to go back to Stalin's days to find anything similar. Then one understands what kind of regime we are dealing with.

Putin's Russia is characterized by violent outward aggression and harsh inward oppression, and it will be so for the foreseeable future. This will not end tomorrow, next week, or in some years or even if Putin disappears. Then there are others who are ready to take over and who are of the same cloth and grain, and perhaps even worse than Putin.

It is this situation we have to contend with. We must realize that we are dealing with an extreme-nationalist, anti-democratic and aggressive neighbor against whom we must build a bulwark so that this country cannot harm us.

This is in itself the background to the large-scale expansion of the Swedish defense that our government began already nearly ten years ago through the 2015 defense decision, the reintroduced conscription, and many other measures. Since then, Sweden's defense expenditures have doubled and now amount to 119 billion kronor, 2 percent of GDP. There is a broad consensus in the Riksdag that this shall continue.

This is also the background to the Swedish and Finnish NATO membership. We concluded that in a sharp situation, in the event of a Russian attack against our countries, Sweden and Finland can hold out for a time. But we also realized that we will need help from others, just as Ukraine has needed help in its war.

With NATO membership, we now have 31 other allies who are committed to helping. The heaviest actor in that circle is, of course, without competition USA, which has the world's largest defense force and alone accounts for almost 70 percent of NATO's defense expenditures.

In plain terms: If we are attacked, we want help from the USA. Then the next question is: Do we want that help quickly or do we want it slowly? I believe most would answer that we want that help quickly.

Once again, an experience from Ukraine: Russia had imagined that they could manage this in a few weeks. They were to take Kyiv, kill the political leadership or drive them out of the country, dissolve Ukraine as a state and incorporate the country into Russia. And they were very close to succeeding. At their closest, Russian forces came less than 1 mile from the center of Kyiv. The Ukrainians managed to repel that attack thanks to the support that came from outside, including from Sweden.

Time is therefore crucial in sharp situations. There is a strong Swedish interest in that the USA can be on site quickly if needed.

The second question one asks is: Do we want Swedish and American units to be co-deployed if it becomes a sharp situation? Of course we do. Regular exercises are absolutely crucial for the defense to be effective. This can be particularly important when it concerns units coming from different countries.

Exercises can probably be said to be vital. If one is not coordinated and knows exactly how to communicate and how one's respective system functions, there is even a risk that it ends with one shooting at each other instead of at the enemy. Such things actually happen in war if one has not practiced and practiced.

A defense that does not train regularly is not really a defense. It just becomes a defense on paper. Therefore, Swedish and other NATO forces must train regularly together, and this applies particularly to American forces. That is why the agreement is important, because it enables American forces to store their military equipment - weapons, vehicles, protective equipment and much more - in Sweden.

Then American forces will be able to be on site much faster than otherwise, and this facilitates the joint exercises enormously. One simply avoids moving one's equipment back and forth across the Atlantic every time one is going to exercise. And if it really comes to a head and becomes war, American forces can be on site much faster to, together with Swedish forces, defend Sweden.

This is, of course, not about nuclear weapons. The agreement has never been about that. We do not want any nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, and the USA does not want to place any such weapons here either. There is no reason for them to have them. Their nuclear weapons can already reach Russia in countless other ways, if they were to want to do so.

This is about conventional military equipment. The critics say that nothing is stated about it in the agreement. It is clear that it perhaps would have been better if it had been stated explicitly, because then we would have avoided this side debate, this questioning, and this mistrust on that point.

We now establish in the report what applies, and furthermore, we emphasize that both our countries have signed the non-proliferation treaty from 1968. Sweden has no right to receive nuclear weapons. The USA has no right to transfer any such weapons to us. We would then be violating that treaty, which is just as legally binding as the DCA agreement.

Furthermore, there are other weapons that we do not want in Sweden, such as cluster munitions and landmines, which we have mentioned earlier and which we also shall not have.

We must also remind you that the entire agreement is based on consent between Sweden and the USA. The USA may not undertake anything that Swedish authorities are not part of. It states explicitly in the report that "all activities covered by the DCA agreement shall be carried out with full respect for Sweden's sovereignty, Swedish laws and Sweden's international legal obligations".

We Social Democrats have been clear from the beginning. Neither our NATO membership nor the DCA agreement shall contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and neither does the agreement. With the wording that now exists in both the bill and the committee report, there are, in my opinion, both shackles and lifelines in this issue. The agreement is not about nuclear weapons and does not open up for nuclear weapons in Sweden.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, the agreement is important. It is the most concrete expression of the so-called transatlantic link, that is to say, the USA's commitment to participate in defending the democracies in Europe if necessary, just as was done during the Second World War.

It is not a given that the transatlantic link will prevail forever. It ultimately actually depends on the USA and on whether they are prepared to also next time send their youth to Europe to fight for democracy here, if that situation were to arise that democracy is once again threatened.

Speculation has been made about what would happen if Trump wins the election. I do not think, perhaps, that one should engage in such speculations. Above all, I think that the conclusions so far have been a bit peculiar. The problem with Trump, if he were to win the election, is not that he would want to impose Sweden's nuclear weapons, as was suggested in a remark here earlier. The problem with Trump is rather the opposite, that he has wavered in his commitments towards Nato.

It is actually the opposite – the transatlantic link risks being weakened with Trump. There are reasons to feel concerned about this, I think. It is just one more reason for us in Sweden to strengthen the transatlantic link so that the USA's commitments to Europe become even clearer. This is precisely what DCA is doing now.

On one point, I agree with all other speakers in this debate: It is an important agreement and an important decision for Sweden's Riksdag, because fundamentally it can actually be about whether Sweden will be able to survive as an independent state and democracy if war were to come upon us one day. That is what it is fundamentally about.

With this, Mr. Speaker, I move for approval of the proposal in the joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence's report.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! In the summer of 2019, an American citizen was arrested and suspected of assault in central Stockholm. He was remanded in custody on the grounds that there was a risk that he would flee and thereby achieve impunity. The American citizen was not just anyone, but it was the American rapper Rakim Mayers, better known as ASAP Rocky.

On July 20, US President Donald Trump wrote on Twitter that he had held conversations with Prime Minister Stefan Löfven regarding ASAP Rocky. Trump wrote that he had offered to pay bail for the artist, something which is obviously not possible in the Swedish legal system.

Current Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson had probably hoped for a quiet holiday, but the USA sent its deputy foreign minister to Stockholm to meet the rapper and see that he was doing well. Sweden's ambassador to the USA was forced to cancel his holiday to meet American members of Congress and calm them down.

When things were spinning at their worst, the Ministry of Justice's head of legal affairs had to travel down to Morgan Johansson in Lund and hold a telephone meeting with Trump's chief counsel for hostage situations involving American citizens. This person sat in the White House situation room and wanted to talk about ASAP Rocky. Time and again, Trump's right-hand man demanded that ASAP Rocky be released from custody. It was a language of power, the head of legal affairs said afterwards. Trump's lawyer even threatened trade sanctions against Sweden.

Finally, ASAP Rocky was sentenced in accordance with Swedish law to a conditional sentence and damages to the crime victim. On Twitter, Donald Trump shouted out his joy.

If Trump becomes president again, it could be more than cowboy soup next time, with the DCA agreement, because in the USA, court cases are often politics. I wonder: How does Member Morgan Johansson view Sweden giving up its jurisdiction? What would have happened if ASAP Rocky had been an American soldier?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I would gladly tell a lot about that incident. I sat in my kitchen at home in Lund and spoke with Trump's advisor Cipollone, who was in the White House situation room. It was exactly in the way it was described. It was about them trying to get us to short-circuit the Swedish legal process. We did not do that, of course, but we stood our ground and said that Swedish law and Swedish statutes apply here and that is how it works. Then everything was done according to our Swedish rules.

This can, of course, be discussed. If I ever write my memoirs, there will probably be a separate chapter about ASAP Rocky. However, I want to say that the connection to the DCA agreement is extremely far-fetched. What we are saying is that the soldiers will follow both Swedish and American law. When these two collide and there are things that are criminalized in both places, so to speak, it is American jurisdiction that applies, unless we want to take it back. Then we can do that.

I have heard the other exchanges regarding sexual offenses and such. In such situations, it is not at all ruled out that one takes back the jurisdiction, if it is particularly important for Sweden. But this must, of course, be tested on a case-by-case basis. Then one must be aware that it is not at all certain that an American trial would become milder for an American soldier. I just googled an American soldier who was convicted of rape and murder of an Iraqi girl in 2012, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison in an American court. This must be tested on a case-by-case basis.

To claim that American soldiers would go unpunished here is actually completely wrong.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I thought that Morgan Johansson handled the case with ASAP Rocky in a good way. Just as he himself noted, it resulted in them falling and he had to return to the USA after paying a fine and receiving a suspended sentence in Sweden. It was fundamentally good that the then Minister for Justice did not involve himself in the case but succeeded in keeping Trump and his lawyers at arm's length from the Swedish justice system.

But the case shows how court cases are politics in the USA. The case shows that it can be the case that we end up in a situation where the court has been handed over and the USA exerts pressure on Sweden. We have seen it earlier in history with the Egyptians who were deported from Sweden to Egypt at the request of the Americans. They turned out to be completely innocent. In the end, one of them received a residence permit in Sweden and the other in Canada.

I accept that it is a stretch to talk about ASAP Rocky linked to the agreement, but it shows how American politics works and how Donald Trump works as president. It is important to remember.

I fundamentally believe that we should not have abandoned the jurisdiction at all. Swedish law should apply in Sweden. But Morgan Johansson represents a line where one thinks that American law should apply for these soldiers. In that case, it is important to highlight this in the debate. If we had not talked about it, perhaps the principles that should apply for future governments would have become less clear. Now the question has been raised in the committee report and in the debate. I have hopes that current and future Swedish governments use the application - the valve - in a good way so that there is no impunity if the American force, relatives, or subcontractors commit crimes in Sweden.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! It feels as though Miljöpartiet and Vänsterpartiet have really been cooking soup on a nail in this debate. The nail is getting thinner and thinner the longer the debate continues.

We are reasoning about the question of who is to judge if an American potentially commits a crime in Sweden. We can gladly have that discussion, but the answer is also there, Håkan Svenneling. It is regulated. These people will not go unpunished. They will be punished either according to the military order in the USA or by Swedish law if we take back the jurisdiction.

As I understand it, Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet want to scrap the entire DCA agreement through this questioning of these points. Think about the proportions of what we are talking about. A DCA agreement can be completely decisive in a critical situation if Sweden is attacked by another country. What is the difference between Americans being able to be quickly on site during an attack or if it takes a very long time before they are on site? The difference can be tens of thousands of dead Swedes - hundreds of thousands of dead Swedes. The difference can be whether we can maintain our democracy and independence.

To then want to reject this entire agreement based on a question of who should judge at which occasion - excuse me, but that is not proportional in the discussion.

Now there is a clear answer. If Americans commit crimes in Sweden, they will be prosecuted. Then there is a regulatory framework that determines where they should be prosecuted and how they should be prosecuted. Just as I said, there is nothing that guarantees that an American soldier would in any way get off easier in an American process than in a Swedish process. I can assure you that, Håkan Svenneling.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker, honorable colleagues and ministers! Hello to all of you sitting in the gallery or at home listening live or afterwards.

Today we are debating the DCA agreement. It is a defense agreement that Sweden has signed with the USA. Vänsterpartiet is against it, and we will vote no. We have also demanded a stay, a so-called suspension, to provide more time for public debate on the major issue. We know that many people are engaged in the question of DCA, and the debate may have been somewhat drowned out because it has been an EU election.

Mr. Speaker! I will not repeat what my party colleague Håkan Svenneling said at the beginning of the debate, but I still want to present some of the Left Party's arguments.

Firstly, we are in principle opposed to an agreement that gives the USA far-reaching rights and opportunities on Swedish soil. For the sake of clarity, I want to say that we would have been opposed to such an agreement even if it had been another country than the USA that wanted to sign an agreement.

Secondly, the DCA agreement contains far-reaching possibilities to judge according to law other than that in Sweden.

For the third, the agreement contains a tax exemption for American soldiers. It does not only apply to soldiers but also to relatives and employees in various companies. We do not like that.

For the fourth, the agreement gives the USA access to Swedish military garrisons and training areas. It is a great opportunity not only for American soldiers to stay there but also to decide over the locations. That is not what we want. On Swedish military garrisons, the Swedish Armed Forces shall decide, control, and cordon off when needed.

For the fifth, the DCA agreement gives Sweden very little opportunity to know what it is that the Americans are bringing in and storing in Sweden. We believe that it should always be Sweden that ultimately closes the door to a warehouse, holds the key, and thus knows what is in the warehouse.

For the sixth, it is of course about nuclear weapons. As has been mentioned several times in the debate, the Left Party hears the government and other parties saying that nuclear weapons are not relevant in Sweden, and therefore we should enact a law against nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

Mr. Speaker! In an agreement that is 30 pages long, which has been negotiated for a very long time, the Defense Minister described it as an extensive piece of work, one has spent time writing in rules for vehicle inspections, for driving licenses, for stamps - yes, you heard correctly - and a whole mass of tax issues, but nothing about such important issues as whether there should be nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. These are vague formulations open to interpretation regarding how serious crimes should be handled. This is, Mr. Speaker, to split hairs and swallow camels.

I want to focus on some other things that have not been mentioned as often in the debate. Sweden is in the midst of a very large expansion of the Swedish total defense. We agree on that in the chamber. We also agree on the expenditures, but not yet on the financing. We look forward to the government's proposal for financing later this autumn.

The build-up of the Swedish total defense, specifically the military defense, which is relevant today, takes a lot of time and resources. The number of conscripts shall increase, more officers shall be trained, more soldiers and civilians shall be employed, more vehicles shall be purchased and other different types of weapons systems. Garages need to be built, and halls and storage need to be built. Furthermore, we are in the process of setting up entirely new regiments, which takes a lot of time and effort.

In addition to this, we shall now provide space for American soldiers. It may seem like a minor issue in the context, when we are talking about so many major issues. But it is about ensuring that everyday life out at our garrisons functions. If even American soldiers, operations, and warehouses are to be accommodated, someone will need to make decisions and prioritize. Beds for more Swedish conscripts or beds for American soldiers; I know what I choose.

Another question I would like to raise, Mr. Speaker, which I do not think has been mentioned in the debate at all, is the question of land use. It is a rather large issue in the context of total defense.

We are proud of our Swedish right of public access. We who live near training grounds know, of course, that we cannot run around on the training grounds at any time and in any way, and we know that there will be more and more exercises within the Swedish total defense. But I see very large risks with more and larger permanent closures, especially if an American troop is to be allowed to decide.

That we in Sweden do not block off more than is required by our own defense forces and do not cancel more than is necessary for the exercises is an important part of Swedish public support. It ensures that one can still live and operate in the vicinity of a garrison or a training ground.

We already see that it is becoming more difficult for neighbors, for entrepreneurship, for tourism, for housing construction and for municipal services in the vicinity of our garrisons and training grounds, and I see great risks that it will get worse with the DCA agreement.

Mr. Speaker! I stand behind the motions that Håkan Svenneling made earlier today.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I listened to Hanna Gunnarsson's contribution in a previous exchange and heard very clearly that you do not want a close cooperation with the USA. That was a fundamental starting point for Vänsterpartiet. You do not want this agreement, regardless of what is stated regarding nuclear weapons.

With that starting point, Mr. Speaker, it can be understood that the Left Party seeks every argument that can in some way block agreements and cooperation with the USA and cooperation with other neighbors within the NATO circle.

I wonder then, Mr. Speaker, if the Left Party is not trying to deceive the citizens with these various arguments and claiming that Sweden would open up to nuclear weapons when there is nothing that says so. It has been clear in this debate. Still, the Left Party continues to assert it. Is that not deliberately deceiving Swedish citizens into believing that the DCA agreement entails such openings?

I am also a bit curious to hear how Vänsterpartiet wants to secure Sweden and the Swedish population against Russian nuclear threats and Russian nuclear weapons in general. It is Russia's process and their threats that we must protect ourselves against. How does Vänsterpartiet want to do this? It would be interesting to know, because you have no alternative. USA is absolutely crucial for us to be able to manage deterrence and stand up against Russian threats. You are silent about that.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker! Yes, we are against the DCA agreement in principle. It is no secret. It is stated in our accompanying motion, and I have responded to countless emails regarding this.

Vänsterpartiet is against DCA because we do not want to see this type of agreement that provides this far-reaching opportunity to be and operate in Sweden on their own strength, as the Americans can do. As I said in a previous exchange, we in Vänsterpartiet are not huge fans of exercises with Americans, but Sweden is now in Nato and we have to somehow accept that is how it looks. But we want these exercises to take place on a case-by-case basis. We want an exercise to be planned together and that the activity is carried out and then the site is left. One should not stay behind and build their own small areas or enclaves on our Swedish garrisons, where one can fence off, guard, and have oneself.

I do not think we are deceiving the voters. I think we have been very clear about what we think regarding our opposition to Natomo and our opposition to DCA. We have also been clear that Vänsterpartiet stands behind the expansion of Sweden's total defense. We have a unanimous defense preparation in all matters concerning the Swedish buildup of the total defense. When it comes to the financing, we do not yet know what the government wants to do.

When it comes to the expenditures for the Swedish total defense, it is a quite large expansion that we are making together, and that is something I am very satisfied and happy about. It is clear that it would have been better if the world had looked different, but I am happy that we together have been able to make the investments and make the decisions regarding the Swedish total defense that we have made. But I do not want to give ground to American soldiers in this way.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! We agree on the total defense perspective and the Defense Commission. But there, six of the eight parties – or perhaps even seven of eight, as the Green Party has a slightly different stance – draw their conclusions from the fact that Sweden is now also a NATO member.

Vänsterpartiet does not want Sweden to be a NATO member. Vänsterpartiet should have a completely different level of defense investments for Sweden to be able to stand alone. What you do when you try to oppose forward deployment, to create readiness and to create freedom of action and deterrence and to raise the thresholds, as the DCA agreement entails, is that you build uncertainty. You build uncertainty for the Swedish population, for our Nordic neighbors and for our Baltic neighbors.

As someone said earlier: You will surely get a medal for your contribution if you go to the Kremlin, but you do not contribute to security. I listen and hear you say that it is American troops and the Americans who decide. But if one listens to this debate and if one reads the agreement, one hears and sees that it is very clear that it is about Swedish consent, respect for Swedish sovereignty and Swedish laws and international agreements. It is about joint planning. It is not one person sitting and ruling.

At the core, behind the entire Left Party's actions, lies your fear of the USA and your mistrust of the one who truly provides us with security and whom our neighbors see as absolutely crucial in order to be able to stand up to Russia.

I regret that Miljöpartiet has chosen to step onto the same track as Vänsterpartiet when it comes to the DCA agreement, as Miljöpartiet seems to have a different stance than Vänstern.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker! No, we are absolutely not afraid of the USA. There is no reason to be afraid of the USA, but we do not want to give them the opportunity to decide over land in Sweden. We do not want to give them this type of tax exemption, and we do not want the American stamps to apply. We do not want this agreement.

The cooperation one should have with the USA must be conducted on more equal terms. This is not equal terms. This is not an agreement that gives Sweden the same opportunities in the USA, but it is something completely different. I have also read the agreement, and I know that it mentions consent. But I also know what is written in all those paragraphs where the Americans are given a lot of different opportunities to fence off, to have their own guards, and to have warehouses that we do not know what they contain. This applies even outside the garrisons, in their vicinity. What does that mean for me who live near a garrison?

Kerstin Lundgren asked about the financing of the total defense. I think a bit like this: I believe that the defense budget, which actually is not a question for this debate at all, is a question where we have landed on something that I believe we can all be relatively satisfied with. I would actually not want to spend 2.6 Natoprocent on military defense, but I would want a different society where we would not need to do so. But I believe, therefore, that we have landed on something where we have been able to meet in a sensible and good way.

What we, on the other hand, want and must do is to ensure that the civil part of the total defense, which this debate is not at all about, is upgraded and receives a much better budget than what applies today. We have no healthcare that can handle the worst situations that we sometimes talk about; we must be aware of that.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I move for approval of the committee's proposal in the report in its entirety and for rejection of both the reservations that exist and the motions to table that have been submitted by Vänstern and Miljöpartiet.

I think the last motions are doing both Sweden and our allies a disservice, specifically a Russian disservice. We Sverigedemokrater were clear that the Swedish membership in Nato in combination with the DCA agreement strengthens our national freedom of action and our absolute right to make our own security policy choices.

We can observe that Sweden and the rest of Europe, after decades of irresponsible downsizing and disarmament, are relatively poorly prepared for a potential conflict with Russia. Due to the extensive disarmament that various right-wing and left-wing governments carried out during the period 1991-2015, Sweden will, in the foreseeable future, be directly dependent on military assistance from abroad in the face of a Russian military threat.

The military assistance, Mr. Speaker, can largely only come from the USA, which is the country that actually has available forces with the right capabilities that could be directed and transported here in the event of a rapidly changing security situation.

In this context, the DCA agreement should be seen as a generic military-technical framework, which anticipates and removes all the administrative hurdles that our country is full of in order to enable a rapid American reinforcement of Sweden's and NATO's defense capability in northern Europe. The agreement can later be supplemented with details regarding the or the specific units that have been agreed to be deployed, that is, where they may move, where they may group, with whom they shall cooperate, and who shall exercise command over them.

In the same way, one can very well adjust the DCA agreement over time if or when deficiencies or opportunities for improvement are discovered. It is not actually about Moses' stone tablets or an eleventh commandment. This is a mutual cooperation agreement, not a capitulation, which is based on full respect for Sweden's sovereignty.

Mr. Speaker! Very few, if any, wars have started because the attacking party perceived itself as inferior. Rather, the opposite has been the spark: the certainty that now we are superior, so now we take the chance and strike - roughly as one can suspect the Russian regime reasoned before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The basic principle of the defense alliance NATO's collective capabilities is to deter, primarily Russia, from attacking a NATO land through a clear balance of power, high readiness, and a defensive posture, that is to say, to primarily prevent a war from being started at all through deterrence. The DCA agreement, we believe, contributes strongly and very palpably to strengthening precisely our collective deterrence capability.

Mr. Speaker! There are two factors linked to why we are voting on this agreement today at all.

The first concerns Sweden's previously pursued security policy, which, simplified slightly, was non-alignment in peace aiming for neutrality in war. That, in turn, was based on the fact that we had a strong Swedish defense, which we had in the 80s - 30 brigades, 500 aircraft and so on. The strong Swedish total defense was central to the credibility of our former line. That capability does not remain today in the same extent.

During the Cold War, the starting point was that the Soviet Union/Russia would be tied down by an armed conflict in Central Europe and only be able to detach smaller forces, possibly reinforced with units from other Warsaw Pact countries, for attacks against Sweden and the Nordic countries. The strong Swedish defense would then be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union/Russia from attacking us as well.

The second factor was, and continues to be, Russia and its aggressive actions against its neighboring countries. Since the end of the Cold War, former Warsaw Pact countries - Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, among others - have learned and drawn conclusions from history and, as soon as they were able, joined both the EU and Nato. Several of them have also signed or are in the process of signing similar agreements to the one we are now debating. Some of them should know what they are talking about.

Mr. Speaker! In today's security policy situation, there is only one dimensioning enemy for Sweden, namely Russia. It is a Russia that is becoming increasingly nationalistic, imperialistic and neo-Stalinist and which directly threatens the independence of its neighboring countries and thereby also Sweden.

The hope for a democratic development in Russia after the fall of the Soviet dictatorship in 1991 was dashed as early as the mid-90s. When Western Europe was disarming at that time, Russia instead chose to deliberately rearm. Since then, conflicts with neighboring countries have been a constant until today.

Mr. Speaker! On 21 December 2021, Russia, in the same manner as in connection with the so-called note crisis in 1961, sent letters to among others Sweden and Finland where they demanded so-called security guarantees from us and that we should adapt our security policy according to the Russian demands. For us Sverigedemokrater, something such is completely unthinkable.

Pressure, blackmail, subversion, disinformation, information warfare and psychological warfare are active tools in Russian foreign policy. This is nothing that ceased with the collapse of the Soviet Union but something that is used more and more often and in new forms, supported by new technology, in Russia today. The Russian demands in 2021 were, in other words, not about security guarantees for Russia to achieve a peaceful stability but solely about creating increased Russian room for maneuver, and thus military superiority, ahead of a possible escalation of the war in Ukraine.

Russia is also the country that today has a large part of its nuclear weapons in our immediate vicinity. In total, Russia possesses over 5,000 warheads - of which barely half are tactical, that is, short-range - and conventional combat forces which, after some recovery, have the potential to far exceed the combined numbers of the Nordics.

Russia and the Russian dictatorial regime despise weakness and indecisiveness but understand and respect determination and strength. Therefore, Sweden must, like Finland in 1939 or 1961, not yield to Russian or other pressures, but instead we should approve the defense cooperation agreement with the USA that lies before us in order to increase our and the collective European security.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize that the Sweden Democrats is a social-conservative party with a clear national outlook. Therefore, we believe that what is best for Sweden in today's security policy situation is to enter into this defense cooperation agreement with the USA. It is central and non-negotiable for us Sweden Democrats. A delayed DCA decision would only benefit Putin and Russia and weaken Western democracy. It is nothing that the Sweden Democrats are prepared to contribute to.

One final point: Nuclear balance of terror is actually better than nuclear terror without balance.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jacob Risberg (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Goldsboro in North Carolina, January 24, 1961. A single safety switch was all that prevented a 20-megaton hydrogen bomb from exploding. A B-52 plane with two atomic bombs on board suffered a fuel leak in the wing. The plane exploded and dropped both bombs. The parachute from one of the bombs deployed, while the other bomb almost exploded when five of its six safety mechanisms failed.

The American Air Force managed to recover the bomb's plutonium, but despite months of searching, they never found the uranium.

At midnight on October 25, 1962, a dark figure climbed a fence near Volk Field Air National Guard Base in Minnesota. A guard identified the figure as a Russian spetsnaz soldier preparing a sabotage on the American base. A number of shots were fired, and the alarm system was activated so that a klaxon horn sounded over the airbase. This resulted in pilots from two aviation units with F-106 fighter jets armed with 400-kilogram nuclear missiles rushing to their planes under the assumption that a third world war had broken out. At the last moment, it was realized that the dark figure was a black bear climbing the fence, and the operation was aborted.

Mr. Speaker! During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, intense negotiations eventually led to the Soviet Union withdrawing its nuclear weapons from Cuba and the USA dismantling some warheads in Turkey. But two events during the very same day brought the world to a hair's breadth from a nuclear war. A captain aboard a Russian submarine mistook practice depth charges for a real attack and ordered a nuclear missile to be fired, but was stopped at the last moment by one of the officers on board.

On the same day, an American U2 pilot happened to navigate incorrectly and entered 50 miles into Soviet airspace. The Americans sent in fighter jets with nuclear payloads on board to escort the U2 plane home to the USA.

In October 1960, a radar system in Greenland signaled that the Soviet Union had sent a dozen Soviet missiles on their way toward the USA. The American surveillance command Norad was put on high alert before it was realized that something was not right. Investigations later showed that it was the sunrise over Norway that had been mistaken for missiles.

In June 1980, President Carter's security advisors received a call after a computer warned of 2,200 incoming Soviet missiles. Bombers and tankers were manned, and the aviation authority was in the process of ordering all civilian planes to land before the next call came stating that it was a false alarm. The false alarm was caused by a faulty computer chip.

Mr. Speaker! Approximately the same thing happened in the Soviet Union on September 26, 1983, when computers warned that five American missiles had been launched against the Soviet Union. The General Staff was informed in order to receive guidance from Andropov on whether to launch a counterattack. The lieutenant colonel who read the flashing electronic maps intuitively felt that something was wrong. He had been taught that when the USA does attack, it will be a massive attack, not just five missiles. He came to the conclusion that it was probably a false alarm.

On January 25, 1995, a Russian radar warned that an American air attack was underway. President Boris Yeltsin was alerted and received a briefcase containing instructions on how to initiate a retaliatory strike. The Russian nuclear forces were put on alert. In the end, Yeltsin decided not to initiate a counterattack. It eventually emerged that the Russian warning systems had been activated by a Norwegian-American research rocket that had been launched for the purpose of studying the aurora borealis.

There are at least 22 known cases, an average of three per decade, where we have been very close to nuclear war and several hundred different incidents and accidents that could have led to nuclear catastrophes. And those are just the examples of when nuclear weapons did not function as intended. I will return shortly to the effect of nuclear weapons when they do function.

Mr. Speaker! I believe that we in the Riksdag agree that nuclear weapons are not a good thing. I believe that we all would most preferably see nuclear disarmament and, in the long run, a nuclear-free world.

Sweden was for a long time one of the strongest voices for nuclear disarmament. We stood behind and defended the non-proliferation treaty, NPT, and were also driving for and voted for the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, TPNW. But after that, something has happened. The Swedish voice for disarmament and for a nuclear weapons ban has fallen silent and rather become a submissive voice that is most often completely silenced.

The government says that it is still not relevant to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. Therefore, we do not need to include it in this agreement, even though the agreement is to be valid for at least ten years and even though we know that much can happen in ten years. Just look at how the view on Nato has changed in Sweden over the last three years. What happens if we have a government that changes its stance on the issue of nuclear weapons as easily as most of us change the clothes that sit closest to the body?

And what happens when another American president and government suddenly think it is a good idea to massively expand the troop presence in Sweden or decide that we perhaps should have nuclear weapons at our disposal a little closer to the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland?

Mr. Speaker! Denmark and Norway refer in their respective DCAs to the nuclear weapons policy already in force in the countries, and in Finland there has been legislation since earlier. But none of this exists in Sweden. One gets the feeling that the Swedish government has not even attempted to include a provision on this.

The agreement resembles a standard agreement very much where Swedish interests are conspicuously absent. The large number of military bases that are to be made available to the Americans betrays this. And when asked a direct question about what successes the government has had in the negotiations regarding the agreement, it is pointed out that they have managed to get the word consent into Article 1, meaning that the frameworks for this agreement are thus set with Swedish consent.

Mr. Speaker! There is also other things missing in this agreement. One of these things is a proper risk analysis. Nor even when asked direct questions about how the risk analysis was conducted and what considerations were made regarding which geographical locations should be included in the agreement, does there seem to be any basis whatsoever.

How can the very presence of American military or storage of American weapons potentially contribute to an increased risk of Sweden becoming a target? If this is not stated even one word, despite the fact that the Norwegian police's security service has said that there has been unwanted Russian attention regarding the facilities that American military has access to in Norway.

And what happens if Putin suspects that the USA is storing nuclear weapons at any of the facilities we are now giving them access to? It does not say a word about any increased risk of these facilities becoming a target or increased risk of sabotage or other crimes.

Mr. Speaker! On August 5, 1945, the city of Hiroshima lay spread over half a dozen islands in the delta of the Otas River. Many of the population were in the countryside, but around 300,000 inhabitants remained in the city. Aioi Bridge was located in the heart of the city in the middle of a residential district, far from the industrial facilities on other islands that had been obvious military targets. It was Aioi Bridge that was the target of the bomb Little Boy when it was dropped from Enola Gay shortly after eight in the morning. The bomb fell for 44 seconds before it detonated at an altitude of 580 meters.

On the ground under the explosion, the temperature rose to 5,500 degrees. Everyone on the bridge was incinerated, and hundreds of fires broke out. The pressure wave leveled buildings to the ground, and a firestorm engulfed the city. From the planet, Hiroshima looked like a bubbling sea of smoke and fire.

Only 1.38 percent of the uranium in Little Boy actually underwent nuclear fission, and most of it was transformed into lighter elements. Only 0.7 grams of the uranium were transformed into pure energy and killed around 80,000 people.

Three days later, the weather was cloudy, which caused the crew aboard the aircraft Bockscar to drop the bomb Fat Man over Nagasaki instead of over Kokura, the site of Japan's largest weapons depot. 40,000 people were killed. Several hundred thousand were injured by the two bombs, and many thousands died prematurely from various types of cancer and other radiation-related diseases.

The agreement does not contain a single word about nuclear weapons.

Mr. Speaker! I would like to take the opportunity to, as Emma Berginger previously did, move for the approval of Miljöpartiet's all reservations, in the event that the suspension declaration unexpectedly does not pass.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Margareta Cederfelt (M)

Mr. Speaker! After six hours of debate, everything has been said and a bit more. I find the debate increasingly strange. Here, arguments are being presented from Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet regarding issues that are not relevant and that should not be included in the debate at all.

The Government has prioritized the work on the bill, referral bodies have commented, and we have the Council on Legislation's work.

We have had the report for preparation in the joint committee. It is adjusted. We have a debate. But the arguments that have been consistently put forward during the preparation remain, despite answers having been provided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Defence, and party representatives. Moderates, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Social Democrats, and Sweden Democrats have answered, but nevertheless, the Left Party and the Green Party continue to ask questions.

Mr. Speaker! I understand nothing of this debate and what these six hours have actually been about, because what is being claimed is not correct. It does not exist anywhere. There are explanations. There are decisions. There are underlying documents.

Let me say something that I think is important: This is an agreement that concerns our national defense and that concerns security in the region. I have just returned from Odessa in Ukraine. What was conveyed there by everyone I spoke with, Mr. Speaker, was that a military attack can come quickly and without warning. In that case, it is a matter of being prepared as much as possible. The wish that was expressed, in addition to the one for more weapons deliveries and support regarding healthcare and civil society and so on, was for membership in the EU and Nato and for obtaining a DCA agreement that makes it possible to train and have stocks in order to be able to defend themselves.

Mr. Speaker! I vote in favor of the proposals in the report.

(Applause)

In this speech, Gustaf Göthberg and Oliver Rosengren (both M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! We have had a long debate because this is a serious issue. It is about Sweden's security, but it is also about an agreement that is quite extensive and complex and which we have needed to debate. We have received answers to questions, but it is not certain that the answers have been satisfactory.

We from Miljöpartiet stand firm that nuclear weapons must not occur on Swedish territory and that the best way to guarantee that in the long term and under all eventualities is to ensure that there is legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peacetime and during wartime. The government parties have questioned the need for it, even though the Prime Minister has actually opened up for nuclear weapons on Swedish territory during wartime.

We consider it important to have this type of debate and that we can ask questions and get answers. But if Margareta Cederfelt thinks that we have debates that are too long, perhaps it is not necessary for so many from the government side to speak in the debate.

I believe that everyone, regardless of whether one is a minister or just a member of a committee, should be allowed to go up to the rostrum and argue for their cause. I believe it is an important principle in Sweden's Riksdag. If all 349 would like to participate in the debate, it is welcome! We need to be clear towards the voters about why we take the positions we take and make the stances we make. I hope that Margareta Cederfelt also stands behind this.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Margareta Cederfelt (M)

Mr. Speaker! It was not I, but Emma Berginger, who said "just a member." I have never expressed myself that way. On the other hand, I have said that we have debated the issue for six hours. That cannot be denied. I have also said that exactly what Emma Berginger is requesting is found in, among other things, the foreign policy declaration, which was handed over to Emma Berginger to read. Perhaps it has been read now while the debate has been ongoing. I hope so, because it states exactly what Emma Berginger is requesting regarding rules on how nuclear weapons should be used, and that it is something that Sweden, the Foreign Minister, or Sweden's government does not stand behind.

This is a debate that I find very strange because facts exist and have been presented. Nevertheless, question after question is repeated that has already been answered.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! The fact that we ask the questions over and over again is perhaps because we do not receive satisfactory answers. It is, in fact, clear in the bill and when one looks for information in other places that in both Finland's agreements—they have the same wording as Sweden but still refer to their own legislation when it comes to the ban on nuclear weapons on their territory—as in Norway's and Denmark's agreements, one refers to the fact that they do not change their existing nuclear weapon policies. And then one compares that with Sweden's agreement where it states that one shall respect Swedish legislation when it comes to the import of various materials. But we have no clear legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in the same way as in Finland. It is clear that this raises questions about how Sweden relates to nuclear weapons.

We have been able to observe that there is a wording in the bill and the committee report stating that there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime. I observe that this is not legislation that we are voting through here in the Swedish Riksdag to ensure that we do not get nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime or wartime in the way that Miljöpartiet strives for. It is therefore why we repeat the questions.

I actually think it is reasonable to debate such an agreement for six hours if necessary so that everyone can have their say. Member Margareta Cederfelt chose to question whether we should debate this for so long and said that she did not understand the debate. I therefore repeat the question: Why can the government, if it sees no reason to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, not stand behind clear legislation that provides guarantees to both Sweden's population and our allies that nuclear weapons shall not occur on Swedish territory?

In this speech, Jacob Risberg (MP) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Margareta Cederfelt (M)

Mr. Speaker! I note that Emma Berginger has not understood anything of the debate that has taken place here. I am now using the same language and exactly the same terminology that Emma Berginger used against me. Emma Berginger has not understood any of the arguments that have been put forward. I find this very tiresome.

I find that the debate that has taken place concerns a DCA agreement intended to defend Sweden and avert a situation where we are attacked by a foreign power. I hope that this will never happen and that we can continue to live in peace in Sweden. Therefore, I have also said that we have debated the matter for six hours. I have not placed any valuation in this. It is Emma Berginger who has placed a valuation in that the debate has lasted for six hours.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! The Swedish Parliament will shortly this evening vote on the military agreement with the USA, DCA. According to the agreement, the USA shall be granted the right to dispose of ports, air bases, naval bases, army bases and transport systems as well as stationary personnel and shall be granted the right to store weapons at 17 bases around Sweden.

No Swedish authority or intelligence service will, according to the agreement, be able to demand access to what is happening or what is located at the bases. That is actually how it is. It is remarkable, to say the least.

The DCA agreement has been debated very sparingly and is an agreement that the Swedish people are critical of. I would really have wished that the Swedish people had been given a referendum on this extremely important agreement, because there is strong opposition to placing military equipment from a foreign power on Swedish territory.

American defense and security policy is based on nuclear weapons. Despite this, the agreement contains no ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. Nuclear weapons are a threat to humanity. That the government does not demand any guarantees against such a brutal weapon of mass destruction is frightening. Vänsterpartiet therefore says a clear no to the DCA agreement in its entirety. In the event that our objection is not granted, we have submitted a reservation, which I move for approval.

The government's handling of the agreement is not only naive but directly reckless. Norway, Denmark, and Finland have similar agreements with the USA but have been careful to include prohibitions against nuclear weapons. Finland even has legislation against nuclear weapons. Vänsterpartiet has long maintained the position that Sweden should introduce similar legislation, which makes it clear that we do not accept the use of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in either peacetime or wartime. The absence of a clear position from the government's side is something that, among others, Region Gotland has taken note of in its referral response to the government. Despite this, the issue is hardly addressed in the bill.

Nuclear weapons are not a protection against international conflicts and wars. In reality, nuclear weapons are an enormous threat to Nordic and global security. In an increasingly insecure environment, it should be completely obvious that Sweden and the Nordics are significantly safer without nuclear weapons. Without clear legislation against nuclear weapons on our territory, Sweden would become a clearer target for a potential attack. Even considering the solidarity with our Nordic neighbors, we should have clear legislation.

If nuclear weapons were to be used, it would mean a humanitarian and climatic catastrophe with consequences that no state has the capacity to face. A single nuclear weapon can kill hundreds of thousands of people, destroy an entire city, and make the earth unusable for an unforeseeable amount of time. In a nuclear war, there are no winners, only losers. We never forget Nagasaki and Hiroshima, where over 300,000 people were killed. The effects of these nuclear weapons still remain so long afterwards. And it was the USA that dropped these nuclear weapons, we must not forget that either.

Nor neither in the application to the Swedish NATO membership is there any reservation against nuclear weapons. The government does state that there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory in peacetime. But this must rather be regarded as an assessment than as a prohibition. On the contrary, it indicates that the situation may come to change.

The idea of deterrence as a method instead leads to an arms race spiral and terror balance. In its 2023 yearbook, the peace research institute Sipri notes that the number of operational nuclear warheads is increasing. All of the nine nuclear-weapon states continue to modernize their nuclear weapons. If diplomatic trends do not reverse, the world faces a new and dangerous phase, according to Sipri. Sweden shall not be a part of the nuclear arms race. There shall be no ambiguities regarding Sweden's positions concerning nuclear weapons. Sweden should adopt national legislation that prohibits the import, storage, and transit of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in both peacetime and wartime.

The DCA agreement is also, from a legal perspective, completely reprehensible. The agreement means that American forces and personnel are largely granted immunity. This also applies even if they were to leave the base and commit crimes affecting Swedish citizens. Soldiers who commit crimes against Swedish citizens will be brought before an American military court, not Swedish courts, except in exceptional cases.

American military legislation differs from Swedish law, for example when it comes to consent legislation and sex trafficking. The government argues that this is a misconception and refers to the fact that American soldiers will be covered by both countries' criminal legislation - if something is legal in the USA but illegal in Sweden, Swedish law applies. It is true that Sweden has the possibility to reclaim jurisdiction in cases considered particularly significant. However, there is a lack of reasoning and principles from the government on how that possibility should be viewed, something that, among others, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, highlights in its referral response.

As an example, a case from 2022 can be mentioned, when Stockholm police arrested two men in the crew of an American military ship for having purchased sex at an apartment brothel in Östermalm. Cases similar to this would likely not lead to a Swedish legal process. This is a very legally insecure situation. This could, among other things, mean that Swedish crime victims or witnesses are forced to participate in legal processes in American military law. Swedish crime victims should not have to be prosecuted in American military courts. The government should demand that the DCA agreement does not give the USA jurisdiction outside the bases where American forces are located.

In the proposition, it is mentioned how there is a scope for military personnel to carry weapons in order to more generally secure their own or the commanders' security. On the other hand, there is a lack of clarity regarding which situations are intended. The Government assumes that the possibility to use the weapon in such cases should be limited to situations where there is a right to self-defense or necessity and where it is otherwise justifiable and proportionate. It seems to open up for the possibility of carrying weapons even when it is not justified by the performance of duties.

In many of the USA's states, the death penalty is also applied, as is well known. The Faculty of Law at Stockholm University argues, in contrast to the government, that Sweden should submit a reservation or at least issue an interpretive declaration clarifying that it is prohibited to sentence and execute the death penalty on Swedish territory, as well as to extradite anyone to a country where he or she risks such a penalty. FOI also highlights the risk of a norm conflict regarding extradition in the event of a risk of the death penalty.

The American forces in Sweden were, according to the DCA agreement, granted permission to also act outside the bases to secure American interests if they deem it necessary, this without Swedish approval. In the bill, it is emphasized that all activities shall be carried out with full respect for Swedish sovereignty, Swedish laws and international obligations. This does not, however, give the whole picture.

Article 6 of the agreement states that American forces are permitted, under exceptional circumstances, to take necessary measures beyond the immediate vicinity of the agreed facilities and areas to secure American operations. However, what circumstances these may be are not described in further detail. The Government should, in order to guarantee Swedish sovereignty, demand that the DCA agreement does not grant American forces the right to act on their own on Swedish territory.

The DCA agreement binds us to the USA for ten years and means that we waive a large part of our own independence. A lot can happen in ten years. The security situation can change quickly. We believe that it constitutes a security policy risk to bind oneself for such a long time. Who knows what the security policy situation will look like after the American presidential election? The USA will soon have a presidential election where Donald Trump could be elected president, something that would have a major impact on American foreign and defense policy, including the USA's actions within this agreement.

The safest and best option is, of course, to completely reject the DCA proposal. In the second instance, one should vote for the declaration of inactivity submitted by Vänsterpartiet. I move for approval of all of our reservations.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! One advantage of standing in the rostrum like this just before a late vote is that one has an unusually large audience. But I will try to keep the needle as short as possible. I have only two questions for the member.

The Member of Parliament speaks about nuclear weapons. Which nuclear weapons is she thinking of, physically? Is it the 170-meter-long Ohio-class strategic submarines, three times as large as Swedish submarines, or is it possibly the intercontinental missiles, which are in large silos in the Midwest? Is it those that are going to come here? I find it very difficult to see that. The Member of Parliament is welcome to provide examples.

In a previous post, the member spoke about that Swedish legislation should in principle apply in Sweden even for American troops. It was also something that colleagues from Vänsterpartiet said. I assume that the member also considers that this should apply vice versa: If Sweden deploys troops in Norway or Finland, shall Norwegian or Finnish law apply for Swedish troops. Is that correct?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Member Wistedt for the questions. He asks which nuclear weapons it should concern. It is clear that I do not like any nuclear weapons whatsoever. We do not want any nuclear weapons on Swedish territory at all. We do not want any nuclear weapons on Nordic territory at all. Nuclear weapons on Nordic territory would constitute a threat both to Sweden and to the Nordics.

We would become a target in a completely different way if there were nuclear weapons on our territory. Therefore, we want guarantees for this. We do not have that today. We have no legislation stating that we should ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

What we are so upset about is that there is no wording about it in the agreement. Everyone says that they are against nuclear weapons. Why is it then that one is so cautious and afraid to legislate that we should not have any nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, either in peacetime or in wartime? Of course, we do not want to see any nuclear weapons, regardless of what they look like or where they are placed.

It is not quite the same thing. We do not have the agreements with Norway and Denmark in the same way as what this is about. When we train and exercise in Norway, Denmark or Finland, we do so for a short period under a cooperation agreement. It is not the same thing as having this type of agreement that gives a nation very far-reaching rights on our territory.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I was thinking about the type of nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even want to deploy them here. You can hardly even get the giant submarines into the Baltic Sea. They cannot hide. They are meant to be out on the Atlantic far away.

The point with the other intercontinental missiles is that you are on the other side of the earth and well protected. From a purely nuclear planning perspective, it is madness to cram them into Sweden.

I do not think the member needs to feel such great concern about that part. I feel a bit more concern that one sees the USA as the big villain state. It is actually the guarantor of our defense and for our freedom in the West.

I should be significantly more concerned as a member of Parliament regarding the Russian nuclear weapons. Here, new missiles have been presented in Kaliningrad, Murmansk, and all that. They are Iskander missiles, Kalibr missiles, and all that. I should feel an enormous concern about that.

As for the disciplinary legislation, each country handles the disciplinary legislation for its own troop. That has also been the case for Sweden when we have been abroad.

It has not been a matter of another nation being able to step in and simply legislate how we are to behave and what punishments we are to receive.

I would very much like to hear how the member views, for example, the Swedish involvement in Afghanistan. We were actually there for 20 years. There, Swedish legislation applied inside the camp and Swedish disciplinary legislation, and we were not taxed in Afghanistan. Above all, the troops did not obey Sharia laws in Afghanistan.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! When it comes to what kind of nuclear weapons it is, perhaps the submarine-based nuclear weapons may not be relevant. But there are nuclear weapons placed in Europe. Those nuclear weapons were placed there without the population there being allowed to have their say. Not even the parliaments were allowed to have their say.

What can happen in Sweden? We do not know what happens in the future. What happens in five, six or seven years? I am deeply concerned that we do not have legislation that prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in both peacetime and wartime. It would secure our own safety and our security. It would secure the security of all of Sweden and the Nordics.

Of course, I see the Russian nuclear weapons as a major threat. Therefore, Sweden must work for nuclear disarmament more powerfully than we do today. We must, naturally, place demands on all nuclear-armed states, both Russia, the USA and the rest of the nuclear-armed states, in a clear and distinct way.

The best thing we can do is to ensure that the Nordic region remains nuclear-weapon-free. I am convinced that it is the best for our own security.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! The USA is an ally of Sweden and has asked us to sign an agreement that resolves various legal issues in the event that the USA must act militarily on Swedish territory.

It has surprised me how much talk there has been within certain circles in our country. Every day when I open my inbox, I have four or five letters pleading with me to vote no.

At the same time, the support for Sweden joining the agreement is compact here in the Riksdag. There are also no academic authorities with competence in international law or security policy who advise against it, other than a few isolated voices.

I therefore get the impression that the opposition is based on something completely different, namely on a kind of diffuse negative attitude towards the USA in general.

For example, the Left Party expresses itself in its reservation in this way. It is stated that there is a "great risk that American soldiers will move into Swedish garrisons and build up parallel small communities. In addition to own jurisdiction and exemptions from tax, such as that cars do not need to be inspected, American labor law applies in employment, and even that American stamps shall be valid."

Miljöpartiet, in turn, believes that the USA will use the agreement to torture prisoners. I quote Miljöpartiet's reservation: "Despite the agreement being clear that Swedish legislation and international commitments shall be respected, there are historical reasons to question the implementation of this. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled against both Poland, Lithuania, and Romania for the CIA having practiced torture at American bases within the countries' territories."

Stamps and torture. That is how it looks. Small is mixed with large. There is no common thread other than that the USA is dirty. This is, fortunately, not representative of the Swedish people as a whole. The absolute majority of the people think very highly of the great country in the west.

We have no problem with a close cooperation. For us, it is a matter of security. USA is the country with the world's strongest military and has agreed to back us up if we were to end up in war. It is unfortunate that the anti-American attitude is spread by Miljöpartiet and Vänsterpartiet.

Mr. Speaker! A question that I know has been discussed is what happens when Sweden lends out its jurisdiction to American authorities when it concerns criminal offenses.

Here, the critics of the agreement focus on the Swedish legislation on rape and that it goes further than the American one. They want to scare people by letting them believe that American soldiers could rape Swedish women however they want and get away with it.

Doesn't the USA have legislation against rape? Yes, because it is a normal country. American military personnel are subject to a law called the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The American legislators do not take rape lightly. Where the maximum penalty in Swedish legislation for rape is ten years, American soldiers are sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

A Swedish rapist can be released after already two-thirds of the time. It will be barely seven years. A rapist in an American uniform gets to sit in prison until he dies. I am not sure that it is Sweden that takes rape most seriously if one compares our two countries.

Mr. Speaker! When I read the agreement we are now entering, I see only that it concerns practical matters, nothing more than that. The Riksdag has recently adopted corresponding agreements concerning the NATO countries as a whole, where the NATO SOFA agreement is the most important. Even here, it is about solving practical legal issues so that allies can send forces to each other's countries.

That agreement went through as easily as possible without any major debate, even though it also presupposes that other countries shall have a certain right of jurisdiction in Sweden. Taken together, it shows that the protests against the DCA agreement are about something other than the agreement itself.

As I have pointed out, however, there is broad popular support for close cooperation between Sweden and the USA. Relations between our countries have long been the very best, and I know that many Swedes look forward to seeing American uniforms in town.

(Applause)

In this speech, Helena Bouveng, Mats Green, Gustaf Göthberg, Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström, David Josefsson, Carl Nordblom, Thomas Ragnarsson, Johanna Rantsi, Oliver Rosengren and Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (all M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I had obviously not intended to take the floor at this relatively late hour, but when someone accuses me of not liking the USA, a line is crossed. In that case, I must nevertheless reply.

I am likely the only baseball-playing member of this chamber - I played a match as recently as the day before yesterday, against Gothenburg. Unfortunately, we lost with the scores 12-7 and then 5-2, I believe that was it. I have been to the USA many times in my life and am likely one of few members of parliament who, for a period of a month, has traveled from coast to coast. I have plenty of American friends and like American popular culture. What I do not like, however, is the politics that the USA pursues.

Member of Parliament Olsson is completely right that the US imperialist history shows how one many times uses their role as a superpower in the world to favor American interests over those of other, smaller states. That makes me think that an agreement with the USA is not the wisest for Sweden as a state when we go as far as to – which has been up for debate many times now – give up our own jurisdiction and receive no guarantees against nuclear weapons. It is only unilateral Swedish statements and no American verifications.

American politics is very special. It is clear that presidents have a lot of power. If Donald Trump comes to power, we will get a completely different USA than the one we have had under Biden, or Obama for that matter. In the USA, one lacks consensus legislation, and they have the death penalty, as one of the few countries in the world. Some rogue states are worse, such as Iran and China. One has also not signed the convention with the ban on landmines, the ban on cluster bombs, and the ban on nuclear weapons.

We have had a decent and good debate today. I hope that the right can maintain a good tone and not believe that every single leftist in Sweden dislikes the USA.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! We have had a very long debate here today - I believe it has lasted for over six hours - and Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet have taken the floor on almost every single speaker. Only a few have managed to get away.

One topic has been nuclear weapons, and there has also been a great deal about Sweden lending out its jurisdiction. It has been described throughout how incredibly dangerous this is - how the USA will take over our country and place nuclear weapons here against our will, as well as how reprehensible it is that the American legislation for rape looks in a completely different way. What does one want to say with this? Yes, one wants to spread fear and claim that American soldiers will commit crimes. The word impunity has also been used several times during the day.

I mean that Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet have thereby spread anti-American - yes, what shall one call it - rhetoric for several hours, throughout the entire day. I really mean that it is what you have done, Håkan Svenneling, and I stand by that. It will probably also be visible in the minutes later.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I believe that most Swedes have enough sense to realize that we will have a completely different USA if Donald Trump becomes president again. During this debate, we have given a few examples of what he did during his time as president, but there are plenty of other examples.

We have asked again and again why the government has not included nuclear weapons in the DCA agreement. It was an opportunity that Norway, Denmark, and even Finland managed to fix, but the Swedish government has not included it. It is still a core issue. None of us have said that the USA will arrive with a small ship with nuclear weapons tomorrow, but we have only pointed out that the agreement applies from the moment the Riksdag decides on it and for a long time to come. There is no protection and no verification from the American side.

I thank you anyway for this debate. In broad strokes, I think all members, on both sides of the political spectrum, have conducted themselves well. I think the ministers did a good job of answering clearly and well to the questions we have raised. It is obvious that we do not agree with each other, and it is therefore time to move to a decision.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! It is definitely time to move to a decision. But that is not how Member Svenneling wants to do it here, that is to say that it has only been about nuclear weapons. He himself, in the speaker's chair, has spoken about the reprehensible nature of American postage stamps. The stamps are mentioned in the Left Party's motion, and they are also mentioned in the Left Party's reservation.

When it comes to the USA, it is therefore obviously not only a problem that Donald Trump could possibly be elected president and that it is a nuclear-armed nation, but apparently even American stamps are a problem.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I had not intended to take the floor at this late hour either, but when a speaker attacks one's party from the rostrum, one must still stand up and defend oneself.

I believe that during this debate I have clarified my party's position on the agreement. I have said that we also see a need for cooperation with allies, that my party respects the broad decision that Sweden shall be a member of Nato and that we want an agreement with the USA to regulate what the presence of the USA's military force shall look like in Sweden.

If we nevertheless think that Americans and the USA are okay, we do perhaps think a bit less of Sweden's government, of Sweden's government's approach to nuclear weapons and of its inability to clearly close the door to nuclear weapons. We point out that we want Sweden's government to be clear and present a proposal for legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peacetime and in wartime.

This agreement has good wording regarding respect for sovereignty and legislation, but these provisions must be complied with. That is what we say in the example that Member Stefan Olsson read out: We see different instances where the USA has not respected other countries, international conventions, and obligations. Does that not justify posing the question and underlining the need for the agreement to be complied with? It is crucial for the view on the cooperation with the USA and whether this will turn out well in the end. That is why we highlight it in our reservation.

(Applause)

In this speech, Jacob Risberg (MP) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! The Green Party has been incredibly active in this debate, so there is no doubt as to what the Green Party's policy is. I believe it is well known, at least for those of us who have listened, and it was good that the member took the opportunity to repeat those points now that there is a larger audience in the chamber.

Why do I criticize the Green Party? It is clear that there are many problems with an agreement. There always are; they are difficult trade-offs that must be made. Is the USA the perfect partner in all respects who one knows will follow the agreement to the letter? No, one probably cannot count on that either. One or another mistake will be made, and we will disagree with the USA on many points. But of all the mistakes, what does the Green Party think is most important to focus on—so important that one writes it into their reservation? Yes, it is that the CIA may use American bases in Sweden to torture prisoners.

If one chooses that example, of all the things that can go wrong between the USA and Sweden, one chooses one of the most extreme and grotesque cases that can arise – and one does so only to say that one does not like the country one is talking about.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I agree with Stefan Olsson when it comes to the fact that torture is extreme and grotesque. The reason we highlight this is that it has actually occurred. It has occurred at American military bases in Europe, and thus these countries have been convicted for it. That is why we highlight this as an example.

It is not about whether we like the USA or not. We dislike torture regardless of which country performs the torture, and we think it is important to take a stand against it. I hope that the government side can also clearly take a stand against this and distance themselves from it.

What we have put forward as our most important argument for why we will vote no to the DCA agreement today is the government's inability to close the door to nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. The government has not clearly declared that it will produce legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peace and in war. Instead, they have chosen to present an agreement where they have no reservations or qualifications, which, for example, Norway and Denmark have in their respective agreements.

Sweden has the same wording as Finland. It states that one refers to legislation, but Sweden has no legislation when it comes to nuclear weapons. That is, legislation is needed that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. This is the primary reason why we, from the Miljöpartiets side, vote no to this agreement today and will support the abstention declaration that Vänsterpartiet has submitted. We believe that it gives the government time to resolve the question, which is crucial for us, of producing legislation that prohibits nuclear weapons on Swedish territory both in peace and in war.

Nuclear weapons are terrible weapons of mass destruction that could lead to enormous humanitarian suffering and a destroyed environment, and precisely for that reason, we do not want them to exist in Sweden. It would increase the risk of Sweden becoming a target for others' nuclear weapons.

(Applause)

In this speech, Annika Hirvonen, Rebecka Le Moine and Jacob Risberg (all MP) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! To the newly arrived members listening to the debate, I want to say that we must praise Emma Berginger for consistently presenting the Green Party's policy regarding nuclear weapons issues for several hours. However, it was not this that I took up in my speech. Instead, I took up that the Green Party has not only talked about nuclear weapons policy today but has also attempted to cast suspicion on the USA in many other ways, primarily by asserting that the USA has far too lax legislation on rape. In my speech, I showed that this is not the case at all, because the USA has significantly stricter penalties for rape than Sweden does.

The example that Miljöpartiet raised – that it could result in the DCA agreement leading to the CIA torturing prisoners in Sweden – also shows that one actually wants to blacken the USA; that was the purpose of bringing up this example.

I want to object to this for the simple reason that I naturally support the agreement entered into by the government and want the House to vote for this shortly. I mean that the USA is the guarantor of a functioning Nato and thus for the defense of Sweden. The agreement regulates largely only practical details, for example that the Americans want to use their own stamps when they have soldiers in Sweden. It cannot be a big problem for Sweden to agree to such a thing.

(Applause)

Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) had, with support of Chapter 2, Section 22, first paragraph of the Instrument of Government, through written communications submitted a motion that the bill presented in the report should rest for at least twelve months.

The motion was to be taken up for a vote at today's voting.

The incoming communications read as follows:

To the Speaker

With regard to the proposal for the approval of the agreement on defense cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America, it is hereby requested that the proposal for an amendment to the Protection Act (2010:305) insofar as it concerns Section 5, as well as the amendment to the Act (2020:782) on operational military support insofar as it concerns Section 4, shall rest according to Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Instrument of Government in accordance with Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Instrument of Government.

The joint committee meeting consisting of the Committee on Defence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs adjusted report 2023/24:UFöU1 on 13 June 2024. In the report, the committee approves the government's proposals for amendments to the Protection Act (2010:305) as well as an amendment to the Act (2020:782) on operational military support.

The defense cooperation agreement with the United States of America gives, through Article 6, American forces the right, under exceptional circumstances, in accordance with jointly approved security plans, to take necessary and proportionate measures beyond the immediate vicinity of the agreed facilities and areas to maintain or restore the security and defense of the American forces as well as the continuity of their operations. Which circumstances these may be are not described in further detail. When another country is given the power to act without direct approval outside the military bases, limit public access to previously open areas, and cordon off or fence in land, the freedom of movement of Swedish citizens is compromised. The proposal thus risks constituting a restriction of the freedom of movement regulated by the constitution in Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Instrument of Government. Such restrictions should be preceded by careful considerations regarding, among other things, proportionality, effectiveness, and necessity, which we believe have not been done.

In the current bill, there are proposals implying that areas where a US force conducts military activities within the framework of the agreement of 5 December 2023 between Sweden and the United States of America on defense cooperation can be decided to be protected objects. There are also proposals implying that the Armed Forces may decide that American military personnel who are in Sweden and are active within the framework of the agreement of 5 December 2023 between Sweden and the United States of America on defense cooperation may be hired for the guarding of protected objects as referred to in 5 § of the Protective Security Act. The proposals risk constituting a restriction of the freedom of movement regulated by the constitution in Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Instrument of Government. The Government addresses this briefly in the bill and argues that there are grounds for the legislative change. We believe that the issue has not been highlighted to a sufficient extent and we also do not share the Government's view that the restrictions that may result from an expansion of the Protective Security Act are proportionate.

With the support of the above, we request that the proposal for an amendment to the Protection Act (2010:305) as far as it concerns Section 5, as well as the amendment to the Act (2020:782) on operational military support as far as it concerns Section 4, shall remain in force for at least twelve months.

Stockholm, June 17, 2024

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Nooshi Dadgostar (V)

Samuel Gonzalez Westling (V)

Andrea Andersson Tay (V)

Kajsa Fredholm (V)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Andreas Lennkvist Manriquez (V)

Isabell Mixter (V)

Daniel Riazat (V)

Linda W Snecker (V)

Vasiliki Tsouplaki (V)

To the Speaker

Supplement to the communication submitted on 17 June 2024 regarding the motion that the proposal for an amendment to the Protection Act (2010:305) as far as it concerns Section 5, as well as the amendment to the Act (2020:782) on operational military support as far as it concerns Section 4, shall be declared lapsed. It is hereby motioned that the proposal to approve the agreement on defense cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America shall be laid before the Government in accordance with Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Instrument of Government, equivalent to Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Instrument of Government.

The joint committee meeting consisting of the Committee on Defence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs adjusted report 2023/24:UFöUl on 13 June 2024. In the report, the committee approves the government's proposal that the Riksdag approves the agreement on defense cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America.

The defense cooperation agreement with the United States of America gives, through Article 6, American forces the right, under exceptional circumstances, in accordance with jointly approved security plans, to take necessary and proportionate measures beyond the immediate vicinity of the agreed facilities and areas to maintain or restore the security and defense of the American forces as well as the continuity of their operations. Which circumstances these may be are not described in further detail. When another country is given the power to act without direct approval outside the military bases, limit public access to previously open areas, and cordon off or fence in land, the freedom of movement of Swedish citizens is compromised. The proposal thus risks constituting a restriction of the freedom of movement regulated by the constitution in Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Instrument of Government. Such restrictions should be preceded by careful considerations regarding, among other things, proportionality, effectiveness, and necessity, which we believe have not been done in connection with the conclusion of the agreement or in the current proposition.

With the support of the above, we request that the proposal to approve the agreement on defense cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America shall rest for at least twelve months.

Stockholm, June 18, 2024

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Nooshi Dadgostar (V)

Samuel Gonzalez Westling (V)

Andrea Andersson Tay (V)

Kajsa Fredholm (V)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Andreas Lennkvist Manriquez (V)

Isabell Mixter (V)

Daniel Riazat (V)

Linda W Snecker (V)

Vasiliki Tsouplaki (V)

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 9.)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)