Secret data interception against serious crimes

Adam Marttinen (SD)

Mr. Speaker! We are debating the Committee on Justice's report Secret data interception against serious crimes. The coercive measure itself is not a new coercive measure for today's debaters; the possibility for law enforcement authorities to use secret data interception was introduced with broad support in the Riksdag as early as 2020.

In short, it is about the traditional coercive measures, such as secret telephone interception or room bugging, being updated to match technological developments, where the police secretly access mobile phones, communication services, or similar, and the purpose is, of course, to let the police keep pace with how the criminal environments develop their ways of communicating and committing crimes.

Mr. Speaker! In 2020, the Left Party voted as the only party against the introduction of secret data interception. They argued that secret data interception would partly involve excessively severe infringements on personal privacy, and partly that the police lacked the competence to even use the coercive measure – somewhat contradictory objections, one might think.

When the law was introduced in 2020, it was on the condition that it would be time-limited to five years and that it would be evaluated, for example, regarding efficiency and the issue of personal integrity. Now such an evaluation has taken place, and it shows that secret data interception has been used more than expected and that this has been completely decisive in solving serious crimes.

The investigation also concluded that the law should be retained, which is now also the proposal from the government. Against this background, it is also proposed that the law should be made permanent following this evaluation.

In addition to this, the government and the Sweden Democrats propose that the law should be adjusted to become even more effective. I think those who describe that we are now going further than the Social Democratic government did in 2020 are making an entirely correct description. We ensure that covert data interception shall be allowed to be used in more cases for the purpose of investigating who can reasonably be suspected of a crime. We also ensure that surplus information that has emerged during covert data interception shall be allowed to be used for other purposes.

Against the background that Vänsterpartiet and other parties have historically had strong objections to secret data interception, preventive coercive measures, and other more permissive regulations of other coercive measures, it is not surprising that there are also quite strong objections from parts of the opposition to this bill. There is also a joint reservation in which Socialdemokraterna and Centerpartiet are also included.

In the motion, criticism is actually presented against all parts of the bill. That is, of course, useful for a democracy with divided opinions. I mean, however, Mr. Speaker, that the seriousness of the development of violence we have in Sweden means that the government's trade-offs are well-motivated. We need a police force that can intervene before serious crimes occur and that can investigate serious crimes and have dangerous people prosecuted. More intrusive measures against criminal individuals and against criminal environments are fully reasonable.

As a brief final comment to perhaps the broadest consensus of criticism in the report, namely reservation 7, which has the heading A comprehensive review of secret coercive measures, I can mention that the government on 20 February announced that such a mandate shall be carried out with three main sub-mandates:

to conduct a legal and systematic review of the rules on secret and preventive coercive measures in order to achieve a more effective and clear regulation and at the same time improve the possibilities of using the coercive measures in crime fighting

to evaluate the expanded possibilities of using secret and preventive measures and to take a position on whether the expanded possibilities of using preventive measures shall apply without time limits

to investigate a possibility to disrupt and interrupt ongoing crimes or criminal activities in the cyber environment in order to improve the law enforcement agencies' collective ability to intervene against such crime.

That assignment shall be reported on May 29 next year, and it should at least satisfy the core part of that specific reservation.

Otherwise, Mr. Speaker, I move finally for approval of the Government's proposal and rejection of all reservations.

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Petter Löberg (S)

Mr. Speaker! Today we have a committee debate concerning secret coercive measures – once again. As you can see in the documents, we have a reservation under point 7. I will return a little bit to that reservation. I do not, at this moment, move for approval of it, in that sense.

Secret data collection is a specific coercive measure that is particularly far-reaching, and it is perhaps the most powerful tool that the state can use against its citizens.

In our reservation, we emphasize the importance of a comprehensive review of the entire regulatory framework for secret coercive measures. It is also something that the Council on Legislation has demanded on repeated occasions. One thing is certain: one should listen to the Council on Legislation. It is a good practice that we politicians should have. For a fairly long time, it has been a bit hit and miss with the listening to the Council on Legislation. Well, now some things are starting to happen in that part.

We Social Democrats may be a bit old-fashioned when it comes to the processes of democracy, but we do get a bit tired sometimes. That was the case, at least, when we ourselves sat in a government position, of course, when it practically hailed announcements from the chamber towards the government. Since it was a minority government, it was quite natural.

But often, announcements were made regarding issues that were already under investigation or that were even on their way to the Riksdag in the form of government bills. Therefore, we actually say to Gunnar Strömmer and the group on the other side of the water today: Hats off! Thank you! On February 20, the government decided that a special investigator would be appointed to conduct a legal and systematic review of the rules regarding secret and preventive coercive measures. That is exactly what we demand in our reservation and what we have demanded for a number of years.

The purpose of the review is, of course, to create an effective and clear regulation as well as to improve the possibilities of using the various tools in crime fighting, naturally. This means that one shall evaluate the already existing and decided possibilities but also submit any legislative proposals for changes and adjustments in this. This shall then be within May 2026. In this way, our reservation has therefore been taken into account, and we are very pleased about that.

But I still want to stay a bit with the reason why we must be very thoughtful in these matters. The legislation has undergone extensive and quite far-reaching changes when it comes to secret coercive measures. This has made it complex and difficult to oversee. This also applies to the authorities themselves. It is actually not to anyone's benefit if one has a too complex regulatory framework. Here, one perhaps needs to review how they dock and jack into each other, as it is called. This has the Council on Legislation pointed out many times. A unified review is important.

We share the Council for Legislation's view that such a review is necessary also for a principled reason, not just for a practical reason. It is fundamentally about the protection of the individual's fundamental rights, something that we must manage to talk about in these times when we face difficult challenges with violent crime, gang crime, bombings and shootings. We have a historical responsibility as members of Parliament to ensure that we also safeguard the rights that we have established in our country, constitutionally, and in the chamber at various occasions.

We also have authorities, such as the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Swedish Security and Integrity Protection Authority, and other heavy external referral bodies that have repeatedly pointed this out when we politicians have moved the positions and tightened the secret coercive measures.

But fundamentally, it is not just about the authorities' view of us. It is also about the public feeling safe and having confidence in the justice system and its methods. To be clear: It is of the utmost importance that we find a balance between the need for effective crime-fighting tools and the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. That balance point must exist, and it is important.

With that said, I also want to say that we obviously see that the secret coercive measures – most of which we ourselves have been involved in introducing – are needed when it comes to meeting the challenges that exist.

Yesterday, for example, we from the committee were invited to the Swedish Prosecution Authority. We received a very illustrative picture and a review of how these tools are used through a concrete case. In a flash, we also received a receipt that it actually works, so that one can go from an operation and a problem to a court and a conviction. So that is how it is.

But, as was said, it is about clearer rules, good evaluation, and respect for the fundamental rights that every individual has. That is how it is.

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Ludvig Ceimertz (M)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden has, as you all know and have seen, for a long time been plagued by an increasingly reckless and brutal crime. Shootings and explosions have become commonplace in certain areas, and organized crime has been allowed to grow far too strong. Children are recruited into gangs. Witnesses are silenced. Criminals were for a long time a step ahead of the police, not least by using encrypted communication and digital tools to hide their crimes.

This is what we sought a mandate for to change in order to get Sweden in order, and we are doing it step by step.

An effective tool that the police have had in the fight against crime is secret data retrieval, which was introduced as early as 2020 by the government at that time. It was a good and important tool that was introduced nearly five years ago. It has been used to uncover and prosecute serious criminals.

Since the law was introduced five years ago, it has been expanded on a few occasions by this government, and this has created even better conditions for the law enforcement authorities to use it. We have also seen how the use has increased successively, step by step. This has become an entirely vital part for the police in its investigative work. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that we now take the next step and make the law permanent in order to further strengthen the police's possibilities to solve crimes and, perhaps above all, prevent serious crimes from occurring.

With this bill, some important changes are being implemented. Secret data interception shall be able to be used in more cases so that suspects can be identified. The rules for how information is retrieved and handled become clearer, which strengthens legal certainty. And surplus information shall be allowed to be used even for other purposes so that further crimes can be prevented.

Mr. Speaker! When the police carry out a secret data retrieval to investigate a specific crime, they may encounter information about other crimes concerning other cases. This could, for example, involve planned murders, weapon deals, or children who are exploited and drawn into crime.

Now we ensure that the police can use this information to the full extent, so that more can be prosecuted and, most importantly, to prevent new crimes from being committed and children from being drawn into crime. This is an important change that will make our justice system even more effective in the fight against serious crime.

Mr. Speaker! This also strengthens the police's ability to use the camera function in electronic devices to determine who is performing a criminal act. This is important evidence, which applies in particular to serious sexual offenses and crimes planned in closed digital environments, often from the perpetrator's home.

Mr. Speaker! Organized crime is penetrating further and further down into the younger age groups. Gangs recruit children to commit serious crimes, not infrequently shootings and bombings. This is a frightening development that we must meet with powerful measures.

That is why I would also like to highlight the investigation into using secret coercive measures even against children under 15 years of age. It is an important change that is moving forward and which we are fast-tracking by over half a year in order to be able to put into operation as early as this autumn. Thus, the police will have a greater opportunity to prevent children from being drawn into serious crime. It is an important change to be able to reach the organizers and protect children from being drawn into crime.

Mr. Speaker! This is part of a larger strategy where we strengthen the police's tools, tighten the legislation, and ensure that criminals are arrested, convicted, and serve their sentences. Secret data interception has for a long time proven to be a powerful and effective tool. By now making it permanent, expanding its scope of use, and strengthening the possibility of using surplus information, we ensure that it can do even more good. We do this to stop the violence, to protect society, and to restore safety in Sweden.

I want to say a few words about the reservation which is so clear when it comes to making an evaluation of the law. I was eager to request a rejoinder to Member Löberg's statement in the matter, but I thought I would take this now in the speaker's chair instead. In the reservation, one tries to build up a contradiction, where the government would now have changed its mind from February 20. That is not quite the case.

We can note that it states in the bill that a collective review is desirable. The Council on Legislation confirms that they share the government's view that a collective review is desirable. The Committee on the Constitution has commented and states that they share the government's assessment that a collective review is needed. In the committee, the opposition has then demanded that the government be told that a collective review is needed.

I note that there is a broad consensus from all sides that a broad review is needed. The change that occurred last week, on February 20, was not about whether the need for a review existed. It was about when it was scheduled.

I vote in favor of the government bill and the committee's proposal.

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Gudrun Nordborg (V)

Mr. Speaker! I move for the approval of the Left Party's reservation 1 and reservation 7, which we have written together with the other opposition parties. I naturally stand behind the Left Party's other reservations but therefore move for the approval of only these.

I see the review as something very important. Now, it came as news on February 20 that the government is appointing an inquiry that seems to meet the needs for a review. But it is February 26 today, so in just a few days we have apparently, with the reservation, influenced the government to appoint an inquiry. I cannot imagine that it will be anything other than that we strengthen the initiative and the inquiry further by having a reservation that many stand behind.

I now return to the matter that the debate is about, which is part of the extensive secret measures that we have hammered through in various contexts in the Riksdag.

When it comes to the secret data interception, I think it was quite difficult to understand what it was about initially. I believe this also applies to large parts of the general public, and I would therefore like to explain a few things.

It is, for example, about being able to secretly access computers, mobile phones, and user accounts for both storage and communication services in order to be able to read or extract data that exists in the physical equipment or the service. It can involve working with software by hacking and placing a Trojan or by going via hardware, for example via a keylogger, which records keystrokes. Information can therefore be obtained in that way. These are far-reaching efforts that one tries to sneak in without the suspect discovering anything.

It is true that we in Vänsterpartiet in 2020 were very critical of secret data interception. But both because of the development in crime and because of good examples of what HDA has been able to mean in investigations, we now realize that this is necessary. We accept that the law enforcement authorities can be given access to these tools. But we would still like to have stronger legal certainty.

Vänsterpartiet would actually like for it to be much clearer and for the specific crimes to be identified, and not just the sentencing levels. We want the preventive use of the means to track any suspects to be limited.

We are also critical of the use of surplus information. There are certain extra risks depending on how the decisions are linked. Are they linked to a location, to a car, or to a person? If they are linked to a person or to a residence, we see a risk that many are drawn in without having anything to do with crime at all. In that regard, we want to be more restrictive. Furthermore, we are, of course, concerned about the evaluation.

When it comes to the preventive [measures] and that one uses the means without having a designated or reasonably suspected [person], we think it is too far-reaching. We want to reject the proposition in the part that concerns expanded possibilities to use HDA to investigate who can potentially be reasonably suspected of a crime.

As I just mentioned, we are also suspicious of the surplus information. There, we believe that there needs to be a much stronger legal control.

Vänsterpartiet would also wish that it became completely clear which crimes it will be about instead of stating a certain sentencing range for which crimes are relevant. The sentencing range stated in the proposal now is a minimum sentence of two years' imprisonment. We can see which crimes we are taking a stand on with current legislation, but we will not know what happens if we proceed with the sentencing proposals that also exist. Should we not take a stand more successively? There is a risk that the boundaries will be stretched and that they will be moved even further.

With these views, I believe I have expressed the more serious criticism regarding certain points in this bill. On the whole, it is an important reform that we will be able to use technology to curb, above all, organized crime. I also believe that it can be used in further cases during dramatic events and that we need this.

I therefore move for approval of reservation 1 and 7.

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Ulrika Liljeberg (C)

Mr. Speaker! With the law on secret data interception that entered into force in April 2020, a new secret coercive measure was introduced. Through that law, the law enforcement authorities have been given greater opportunities to intercept and monitor persons who are suspected of or expected to commit serious crimes. But it was a time-limited legislation. It has now been evaluated, and the proposal is that it should be made permanent.

We in the Centre Party support the government's bill and consider this to be the right way forward. We agree with the government's assessment in the substantive parts. We consider the proposal to be an effective way forward and that it represents a reasonable balance between the benefits and the privacy risks that exist with the use of coercive measures. We consider it to be proportionate and, unfortunately, necessary.

In light of the debate on end-to-end encryption of communication channels, I would however like to point out that this proposal does not concern the installation of so-called backdoors and other things that sometimes fall under the designation chat control, which some parties are in favor of. This is about a different regulation. I therefore move for approval of the substantive parts of the bill.

Other members have today spoken about "the united opposition." That is entirely correct. There is a common reservation from the parties that are not part of the government base, and it concerns a collective review of the legislation on the area of secret coercive measures. The Council on Legislation emphasizes that the changes in recent years to the provisions on just this have resulted in the overall regulatory framework becoming very complicated. It is difficult to get a unified picture of the legislation and the extent of the intrusion into personal privacy that individuals can be affected by. It is for that reason that the Council on Legislation has for a long time conveyed the need for a collective review.

When the processing of this matter began in the committee, the government base had no unified view on the issue, but it is pleasing that the news arrived on Thursday that the government has commissioned an investigation. The Centre Party views this positively, but it is perhaps the case that the members from the government base must choose a side. Either one must say that there is a united opposition to the government, or that it is good that we all unite behind the evaluation. I hope that it is chosen to agree that it is good that all parties pursue the line of evaluation.

Despite the announcement from the government, I move for approval of reservation 7, which ensures from the Riksdag's side that the evaluation is completed.

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Ulrika Westerlund (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Since 2020, the law enforcement authorities have, through temporary legislation, been permitted to use the coercive measure of secret data retrieval in cases of suspicion of serious crime. The law was introduced for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the law enforcement authorities' ability to intercept and monitor persons who are suspected of or expected to commit crimes.

When Miljöpartiet sat in government, we judged that the law on secret data interception could constitute an important tool for being able to investigate, prosecute, and combat serious crimes. At the same time, the coercive measure implied a new investigative method with obvious risks to personal integrity. Therefore, the law was time-limited to five years, so that the need for and the proportionality of the law could be evaluated and analyzed at a later stage. The time-limited legislation has fulfilled an important purpose that should continue to be protected, as well as legal certainty guarantees regarding how and when the law is used.

Mr. Speaker! Miljöpartiet therefore shares the government's assessment that there is still a need for secret data interception in crime fighting. This is also confirmed by, for example, the Swedish Police Authority, the Swedish Customs Service, and the Crime Victim Authority.

We are, however, critical of the government's proposal to make the law permanent. In line with the Council on Legislation, we do not see that it would entail any disadvantages for crime fighting if the temporary law were extended. On the contrary, time-limited legislation would mean that a comprehensive review – which we have now heard mentioned several times – would have time to be undertaken and followed by new coherent legislation for all secret coercive measures or even for all coercive measures. It is regrettable that the government has not taken into account the relevant arguments that the Council on Legislation and also some referral bodies raise to point out the disadvantages of permanent legislation.

The Swedish Bar Association argues that the evaluation conducted of the legislation shows that the utility and effectiveness of the coercive measure have been limited and that there are therefore good reasons to extend the temporary law. The Swedish Crime Prevention Council considers that there is not even a sufficiently robust basis to enable an analysis of the utility of the time-limited coercive measure. Civil Rights Defenders points out that a comprehensive review should be conducted before existing legislation is made permanent. Miljöpartiet shares these objections and argues that the government does not provide sufficiently good arguments for why the temporary legislation cannot be extended instead of being made permanent.

Mr. Speaker! The Government proposes that the regulation of the use of surplus information should in principle be removed. The Green Party argues that there is a need for continued regulation of surplus information. It is not reasonable that information about crimes with low penalty values, which are discovered during such intrusive measures as the use of secret coercive measures, should be used.

The government's proposal risks posing significant risks to individual rights, while there are also great doubts as to how such an intrusive measure can be proportionate. JO also emphasizes that the proposal entails specific risks and requests a more legally secure regulation, not least against the background that secret data interception can give rise to a very large amount of surplus information. The handling of surplus information should be regulated within the framework of the overall review that Miljöpartiet requests.

Mr. Speaker! When it comes to secret coercive measures, a large number of legislative changes have occurred during recent years. This has led to the regulatory framework now being so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to get an idea of what infringement the collective legislation entails for personal integrity. Many have for some time asserted that they want the government to conduct a collective review. I can mention, among others, Lagrådet, Civil Rights Defenders, Centrum för rättvisa, Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten, Stockholms tingsrätt, and Svea hovrätt.

It is pleasing that the government has now announced that it will appoint an inquiry with the mandate to carry out a legal and systematic review of the rules on secret and preventive coercive measures in order to achieve a more effective and clear regulation. There is, of course, a difference between saying, as has been done previously, that one sees the need and actually appointing an inquiry. That is the explanation for the joint reservation that has already been up for discussion here several times.

We in Miljöpartiet stand by all our reservations. Since approval has already been requested for reservation 7, I instead request approval for reservation 2.

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 16.)

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