New law on international sanctions

Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! The Committee on Foreign Affairs' report number 17 concerns the government's proposal for a new law on international sanctions. I would like to begin by moving for approval of the committee's proposed decisions in all points.

The reason why Sweden is adopting a new law for international sanctions is that the EU has adopted a new directive for its sanctions. Sweden shall therefore incorporate it into its own national legislation. In doing so, the government noted that there could be reasons to review the entire Swedish legislation in the area. The previous law is from 1996, and much has happened in international politics since then.

Further back, sanctions in international conflicts were often directed against countries in their entirety. This method received much criticism because the sanctions affected the people, who were rarely guilty of the crimes their undemocratically elected leaders were responsible for. People suffered while the dictators could live undisturbed.

Now, the EU and the UN use so-called smart sanctions, where individuals and organizations are identified. The EU, which is Sweden's primary platform for these types of foreign affairs, is very active regarding the sanctions tool and has therefore adopted a new sanctions directive to ensure that all member states act in a similar manner. The intention is also that violations of the sanctions should be able to lead to prosecution.

The government's proposal means that the old law is replaced with a new one, which is adapted to the EU's directives but also applicable to the sanctions decided by the UN. We also supplement Swedish law with new paragraphs for what penalty shall be imposed for those who commit crimes against the sanctions. Those who commit sanction crimes shall be able to be sentenced to three years in prison and up to six years if the crime is serious or if it occurs repeatedly. Previously, no one was prosecuted for crimes that could be considered minor, but that is now being removed.

Mr. Speaker! The proposal also includes that a number of authorities, for example Transportstyrelsen and Exportkreditnämnden, shall have a reporting obligation if they detect suspected sanctions violations.

During the preparation of the matter, the Council on Legislation criticized this proposal. The Council on Legislation argues that it is not reasonable for authorities that do not have the task of investigating crimes to have to do so, as they do not have the required competence.

Here I mean that the Council on Legislation has gotten it wrong and the government is right. The Council on Legislation's comment is very strange because the normal thing is that one reports a crime to the police. That is what people in Sweden in general do – one contacts the police if there is suspicion of a crime. Why would Sweden's authorities with extra oversight in foreign trade not need to contact the police or a prosecutor if they suspect a crime? It seems strange.

Mr. Speaker! Motions from Sverigedemokraterna and Centerpartiet address the question of whether Sweden needs national sanctions. The committee proposes that these motions be rejected.

There has, of course, been a previous decision where the Riksdag has announced that it wants the government to investigate this possibility, and I personally am not against this at all, actually. But the bill that we are discussing today concerns international sanctions, not national ones. The proposals from Sverigedemokraterna and Centerpartiet are worthy of consideration, but not in this matter.

In other respects, I note that there is consensus on the bill here in the chamber, which is much appreciated.

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Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Sanctions are good, but they must also be followed. That there is strong legislation is good, but there must also be opportunities to effectively uphold the sanctions.

It can only be stated that Sweden has not exactly distinguished itself when it comes to upholding the sanctions against Russia regarding the war in Ukraine. Here, I would like to ask a few questions to Stefan Olsson.

Sweden is one of the few countries in the EU where no indictments at all have been filed against any company for sanctions violations – despite the fact that there have been alarming pieces of information. Dagens Nyheter conducted an investigation last year which showed that a number of Swedish companies could be suspected of exactly sanctions violations. DN had obtained information from Russia, Russian customs data, where it appeared that companies such as Ericsson, Sandvik, SKF, Atlas Copco and Volvo were included. Previously, it has been revealed that there were also connections to Tetra Pak and Securitas. Still, no indictments have been filed. Here, Sweden really stands out. We are one of the few countries where no indictments have been filed for sanctions violations.

This is extremely important, because it is not enough to just say that one imposes sanctions. One must also uphold them and be prepared to prosecute the companies and individuals who violate them.

My questions to Stefan Olsson are quite simply how he views the fact that Sweden has failed in this because there are no indictments, and what he and the Moderaterna – it is the Moderaterna who hold the Ministry of Justice – intend to do to prioritize and intensify the fight to uphold these sanctions.

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Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! Here I agree fully, or at least almost fully, with Member Johansson for the simple reason that I agree that it is very strange that Sweden has not followed up on these sanction violations.

I asked the Riksdag's investigation service to find out what we know about companies from Sweden that are still active in Russia. But there are actually no good summaries, so it is very difficult to obtain a factual basis regarding which transactions were carried out.

One of the reasons for that is that Swedish companies are not always Swedish. They can have foreign owners, and it is very difficult to follow up on that. Unfortunately, no one has full control over this.

My answer to the member is that I agree to a large extent. We need to get better.

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Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! One cannot tell the EU and others that Sweden is a country that does not have full control. In that case, we have a responsibility to acquire that control.

I can observe, when I look at how other countries handle this, that they are taking much tougher measures. In Germany, two Siemens executives were recently convicted of sanctions violations because Siemens, during their time as executives, had exported goods to Russia. In the Netherlands, a corporate leader was recently prosecuted for having exported goods with dual-use technology. In Finland, over 600 preliminary investigations are ongoing, and a judgment against a corporate leader was issued just recently. These are only a few examples; there are many more.

Mr. Speaker! Something is wrong when Swedish law enforcement agencies do not manage to identify these errors and crimes in the same way. This responsibility ultimately falls on the government. It is the government that governs the agencies, and there is much the government could have done. One could have given specific assignments to the law enforcement agencies. One could have strengthened the wording in the regulatory letters. If it is a resource issue, one could have allocated resources for those specific purposes.

I think this is extremely important. It is not only Sweden's reputation that is at stake, but in the long run, actually also Ukraine's chances of winning the war. If we do not maintain the sanctions – if Sweden distinguishes itself as a country that cannot manage it – Sweden will eventually have to be ashamed in international contexts. I therefore want to urge Stefan Olsson – since his party holds the Ministry of Justice – to take hold of this issue and ensure that we see some activity from the government on this point.

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Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! I take the prompt seriously. I am glad that the Social Democrats are following this issue very closely. I believe that we are fundamentally in agreement on what should be done, and it has not been done. I take this with me.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! We agree on the legislation, but we also have differing opinions regarding some points. I listened to Stefan Olsson who mentioned that this concerns international sanctions. That is the case, but they are introduced nationally.

As appears from the government's proposition, the sanctions directive is a so-called minimum directive. It allows the member states to have more far-reaching national provisions. The question then is, naturally: Why not take advantage of that opportunity and show that we can introduce what the Riksdag has announced that it wants to see happen, namely that we get sanctions that also hit corruption and systematic money laundering? It is now an opportunity for international crime to unite with a number of states on this in order to exploit the holes in our systems.

I think it is strange that the government does not choose to take advantage of the minimum directive's possibilities to introduce stronger national provisions. I wonder, Stefan Olsson, why that opportunity has not been taken. Why do the Moderaterna, together with the rest of the government in the committee, choose not to point this out, as we have previously agreed on?

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Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! Member Lundgren points out something I said in my speech, that we are actually in agreement on that point as well. The Riksdag, with the support of the Moderates, has expressed its opinion that the government shall draft a proposal on national sanctions. However, that is not the case in this matter, as this concerns international sanctions from the UN and the EU. That is how the bill is designed. There is nothing else for the Chamber to take a position on at this time.

There are absolute reasons to return to this, but perhaps not today. That is what I mean. This matter, at this very moment, might not be right. There is, however, every reason for us to remind the government that there is an announcement that we are to work with. I have done this informally. I believe that the government is working with the announcements that the Riksdag has made decisions on. I do, in fact, have confidence in the government, even though I can agree with the member that it sometimes goes too slowly.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! Yes, it is moving slowly here. In this issue, we stated jointly four and a half years ago that we wanted to see such a national opportunity. Now we have received an EU directive that is a minimum directive. It provides room to do more at the national level. Then the government chooses not to seize that opportunity but follows the minimum directive.

I basically agree that we should maintain minimum levels regarding many directives coming from the EU, but not in this area. Here, there is a statement from the Riksdag about doing more, but the government chooses to abstain. I think that is regrettable.

I also want to draw attention to another matter regarding this and ask a question to Stefan Olsson, Mr. Speaker. We have seen that the sanction instrument in the EU context is being hijacked by Hungary and Slovakia. We are not getting through with the sanctions we want to see. We have pointed out that a national sanction instrument must be able to be built up as a counterweight, where we, together with like-minded countries – EU-26, EU-25 – can agree to introduce sanctions but block the EU level. Then we could do this nationally to disarm the sanction veto that is currently being utilized so brutally from, among others, Hungary's side when it comes to Russia's war against Ukraine. Why do the Moderates not want to take advantage of that possibility?

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Stefan Olsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! The Moderates want to take advantage of that opportunity, but not in this matter. This matter is about the EU's and the UN's sanctions. It does not follow the EU's minimum directive exactly, but it is a bit more factual.

This will not be included in this matter, and one is disappointed that this was not the best opportunity. Apparently, the government did not think it was.

I can accept waiting a little, but otherwise I share the member's view that there may be reason to have national sanctions as well – for the reasons Kerstin Lundgren mentioned.

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Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! One cannot escape the fact that the background to this matter is the sanctions against Russia due to the war in Ukraine – even though the matter concerns sanctions in general. It is nevertheless this issue that the question revolves around most right now. There is therefore reason to begin in that direction.

It has been 1,167 days since Russia attacked Ukraine. It was a cowardly attack with imperialist motives. Russia's goal was to, through a full-scale invasion, seize the entire country, drive out or kill the democratically elected political leadership, dissolve Ukraine as a state, and incorporate the country into Putin's Russian dictatorship. Putin's plan was that this would be carried out in a few months. It was close to succeeding. At its closest, Russian forces were less than a mile from Kiev's city center.

But that did not happen. Thanks to a heroic resistance from the people of Ukraine, they managed to push back the Russian attack against Kyiv. They also received support from abroad. Just four days after the Russian invasion, the then Swedish Social Democratic government decided on a first aid package to Ukraine. It involved 5,000 anti-tank missiles to combat Russian tanks, and it involved helmets, body armor, protective nets, and field zones.

It was the first time since 1939 that Sweden sent weapons to another country at war, but it has since been followed by a large number of additional support packages in broad political unity. Sweden has sent air defense systems, artillery systems, missile systems, Stridsfordon 90, Leopard tanks, Stridsbåt 90 and much more to Ukraine.

We should be proud of this. When the Committee on Foreign Affairs visited Ukraine in the spring of 2023, all Ukrainian representatives expressed deep gratitude for the support the country received when it looked darkest.

The human consequences of the war have so far been appalling. Ukraine may have lost 600,000 men, if one counts the dead, wounded, and captured. Russia is reported to have even greater losses: 800,000 men.

The support must continue. It is important for Ukraine to be able to win the war. But it is not just about providing support to Ukraine, we must also do everything we can to ensure that Russia is isolated economically so that they cannot continue the warfare. This can, among other things, occur through effective sanctions, and that is what this matter is about.

Since the outbreak of the war, the EU has adopted 16 sanction packages against Russia. These have included, among other things, import and export bans for a number of goods, a ban on storing Russian oil in European ports, sanctions against individuals in the Russian state leadership, sanctions against Russian ships, sanctions against media companies and much more. These have been good and necessary measures.

As I said in my previous remark, however, it is not enough to just introduce sanctions; one must also ensure that they can be upheld. Unfortunately, Sweden has not distinguished itself as a country that is particularly effective when it comes to upholding the sanctions – despite the fact that there have been many signs that Swedish companies are also bypassing the sanctions.

Last year, Dagens Nyheter revealed that the EU Commission had alerted the Swedish government that there had been signs that a number of Swedish companies exported goods to Russia in violation of the sanction regulations. Companies mentioned at that time included, among others, Ericsson, Sandvik, SKF, Atlas Copco and Volvo. Furthermore, it had previously been revealed, during 2023, that Tetra Pak had developed a plan for how the company could send goods to Russia and how it could be concealed. Information also emerged that another company, Securitas, had sent technology to Russia that could be used in the manufacture of attack drones.

We Social Democrats reacted already then, and we demanded immediate measures from the government. The sanctions legislation that is now on the Riksdag's table could be seen as a response to that. But as Stefan Olsson noted, this is actually about tightening of laws that must still be done for Sweden to live up to the EU's sanctions directive from this summer. It is therefore not an initiative from the Swedish government but something that we must do to live up to the EU's requirements.

The fact remains: Sweden is one of the few EU countries where not a single indictment has yet been filed against any single company for sanctions violations, even though there has been plenty of information that such violations have been committed. We believe that the government has acted passively and has not reacted powerfully enough. It was only after we Social Democrats criticized the government that we began to see any activity.

Now, in any case, the different authorities have been gathered at various occasions, and a special coordinator has been appointed who has at least at some point spoken with the designated companies. But still, no indictments have been filed. This suggests that the law enforcement authorities have either not received sufficient resources to investigate the crimes or that the government has not been clear enough about how important it is that this is stopped.

It is against that background, Mr. Speaker, that we tabled our motion, which we now follow up with a reservation. We demand that the government strongly intensifies the fight against sanctions violations and that cases where it is suspected that Swedish companies continue to make money from trade with Russia are prioritized. If we are ever to end this war, Russia must be isolated economically to the greatest extent possible, and in that, all countries have a responsibility – Sweden too.

With that, I move for approval of reservation 1.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I must ask the Social Democrats and Morgan Johansson if they have reconsidered regarding the introduction of national sanctions. This is something that was previously refused.

I also stand behind the government's position in this part and consider that EU law and security policy reasons speak for the long-established principled line – that Sweden only implements sanctions that have been decided by the UN Security Council or the EU – also should continue to be followed. That position, Mr. Speaker, means that one gives Russia a veto in the UN Security Council, and then we know what happens with the sanctions that we have tried to get against Russia on the grounds of the country's warfare in Ukraine.

It is about not being able to implement the sanctions against Russia in the EU that we desire because Hungary blocks the decisions. But one could remove that veto weapon by, as other countries have done, introducing national sanctions. It does not mean that we should sit alone in our government chamber and think, but as the Center Party writes in its proposal, it is about working together with other like-minded ones. It could be EU-26, or perhaps EU-25, which states: Here we have a proposal, but we get a veto from some countries – okay, we implement it nationally.

This directive provides room to make even that type of intervention, and I do not think it contradicts our historical stance that we should live up to what is the basis of the UN system and to what we see when it comes to human rights. Why, then, do the Social Democrats have this position – if one still has it?

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Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Now, this matter is primarily about UN sanctions and EU sanctions. But in response to Kerstin Lundgren's question, I still want to say that I do not rule out seeking a way to find opportunities to introduce national sanctions. It must then be compatible with EU law, and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether that is the case. But I can definitely see the problem that Kerstin Lundgren raises, that is to say that certain EU countries are blocking necessary decisions.

Then one must be well aware that a national sanction instrument could be used not only when we talk about Russia but also in other issues. Just take the Middle East, where warfare is currently taking place with fearsome consequences. When it comes to this, we still stand in a situation where the EU has not been able to unite around proper sanctions against those who commit these crimes or against the settlers. I understand that Kerstin Lundgren's proposal could also open up for such a question.

I am prepared to investigate this further, but it must also be investigated how compatible it is with EU law. It is, however, nothing that I rule out.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! From what I hear now, there is at least an opening, and I hope that the government representatives will also listen.

In this case, it is not about sitting in the Swedish context and making unilateral decisions. It is not about us receiving national sanctions that are only Swedish. That is not a sustainable solution but merely symbolic politics, and symbolic politics does not move us forward. It is therefore not the type of sanction instrument that is needed; instead, one needs to be able to do it together with others to build up a pressure that makes a difference.

It is clear that it could make a difference for Ukraine if EU-25 or EU-26 were to introduce the sanctions that we want to introduce but which are now being blocked. The pressure on Russia could increase, and we would have had that possibility if we had made this decision today. It would have been an advantage.

We know that there are other countries that have national instruments, but unfortunately, neither from the government's side nor from the Social Democrats' side has one been prepared to press that button now. I hope it comes in the near future, because it is unsustainable that we give this instrument only to the level where the veto right exists, despite that we know that this is needed to move forward – not only when it concerns money laundering and corruption but also when it concerns Russia's war against Ukraine.

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Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! As I have said, I do not rule out that possibility, but I also want to point out another way to address precisely the problem that Kerstin Lundgren raises, namely to move to qualified majority in foreign policy decisions. We have been advocates for that. We realize that it naturally also has its risks, but if Kerstin Lundgren is looking to be able to gather a fairly large group of EU countries despite there being a small group that opposes necessary decisions, it could be a viable path.

We see the problem. With increased polarization in the EU, there is also a risk that a number of countries will intervene just to block things that must be done; we see that already now. One should be aware that this can be used not only in the Russian example but perhaps also in other cases where it is necessary to proceed with various sanctions to get something done.

Right now, I am deeply frustrated that the EU is not getting anywhere, for example, when it comes to the Middle East issue and cannot manage to move forward with any powerful measures there. If we can find ways forward to get a more effective EU also in that part, I am, of course, ready to discuss it.

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Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! What we are debating today may at first glance seem technical. It concerns a bill on international sanctions with headings about sentencing scales and agency responsibility. Fundamentally, however, it is about something much larger, namely our role as a country in an increasingly restless global situation, about how we can put actions behind values, and about how we can defend peace, freedom, and international law when these things are threatened.

The Christian Democrats welcome the government's bill and support the committee's report in its entirety. With the new law, Sweden will have a clearer and more effective regulatory framework regarding international sanctions. This is a tool that has become increasingly important, not least since Russia launched its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.

Mr. Speaker! In February 2022, Russia began its full-scale war of invasion. Since then, thousands of civilians have been killed, entire cities erased, and millions of people driven into flight. Ukraine has, however, stood firm with a courage and perseverance that has awakened admiration worldwide. When we in Sweden and the EU respond with sanctions, it is not only a diplomatic signal but also a concrete way to weaken the Russian war machine as well as the individuals and companies that are a prerequisite for it.

However, for sanctions to work, they must be complied with. We must be honest that Sweden's regulatory framework has had deficiencies. The new law aims to remedy some of these. It means that the penalties for violations of international sanctions are tightened. Even minor violations are criminalized. Clear criminal designations, such as sanction offense, sanction crime, serious sanction crime, and repeated sanction crime, are introduced. Attempt and aiding and abetting are criminalized, and certain authorities receive an explicit obligation to report suspected violations. It is therefore about substantial changes that strengthen both the rule of law and foreign policy.

Mr. Speaker! Sanctions are one of the few available non-military means when diplomacy is not enough. It is not an alternative to violence but an alternative to silence and passivity. When we direct sanctions against, for example, Russian oligarchs or Iranian regime representatives, we do so to show that violations of international law have consequences. But it is not enough to decide on sanctions – we must also be able to ensure that they are complied with and that there are legal consequences when they are breached. That is what this law enables.

Sanctions must not be able to be bypassed due to technicalities or a lack of national rules. The new law strengthens our capacity to act and our credibility both towards the rest of the world and towards Swedish citizens. At the same time, it is central to point out that the law is based on the rule of law. It sets requirements for clarity, proportionality, and reviewability. Decisions must be able to be scrutinized and rights protected. We believe that the bill has a good balance between efficiency and the rule of law.

Mr. Speaker! It is worth highlighting that Sweden does not stand alone. The law is part of our adaptation to the EU's sanctions directive, but it is also an expression of our will to be a credible partner in international cooperation. This is important in a time when the world order is being challenged and when democracies must show that they can cooperate and act quickly and consistently.

For the Christian Democrats, it is clear that Sweden should be a voice of freedom in the world. This means that we must be able to act when others are trampled down – with aid, with diplomacy, with clear political positions and, when required, with sanctions. Laws such as this give us the tools required to stand up for what is right.

Mr. Speaker! We do this for the people of Ukraine, who every day bear the cost of standing up against an aggressive dictatorship. We do this for the sake of international law and for future generations, who shall know that abuses have consequences. We do this also for our own sake and for the world we want to live in. It is a world where law takes precedence over power, where justice stands above strength and where freedom is not for sale.

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Rasmus Giertz (SD)

Mr. Speaker! With reference to the ongoing cooperation between the Sweden Democrats and the government, the intention in the Sweden Democrats' policy has in large parts found favor in the committee's positions. But since we, from the Sweden Democrats' side, want to go further than the government and the committee, apart from the Centre Party, with the introduction of a national Magnitsky legislation covering corruption and systematic money laundering, we have a reservation in this regard. I would therefore like to begin by moving for approval of reservation 3 from the Sweden Democrats.

Mr. Speaker! Today we are debating the government's bill on a new law for international sanctions. It is a bill that concerns both Sweden's international responsibility and Sweden's foreign policy independence. The Sweden Democrats welcome the basic intention of the proposal. We see it as necessary that Sweden receives a new, clearer and more purposeful regulatory framework in order to be able to apply international sanctions, especially those sanctions that are decided upon within the EU and the UN. The old law has played out its role, and given the increasingly strained global situation, a more robust system is required.

Mr. Speaker! We find ourselves in a time when international law and human rights are challenged and violated by authoritarian regimes, criminal networks, and state-sanctioned abuses. It is therefore crucial that Sweden has the opportunity to react both powerfully and in a legally secure manner. Sanctions must be able to be used both to exert influence and to clearly demonstrate what Sweden stands for. We therefore welcome the introduction of new criminal classifications such as sanction crimes and sanction offenses, as well as that violations of sanction rules now receive clearer criminal law consequences. It is a step towards greater clarity and a more effective enforcement of sanctions.

We consider, however, that the government's proposal does not go far enough, Mr. Speaker. More is required. The Sweden Democrats have for many years campaigned for Sweden to introduce so-called Magnitsky sanctions. These are sanctions aimed at individuals who commit serious human rights abuses. It is pleasing that the EU has now begun this development, but at the same time it is deeply regrettable that the EU's regulatory framework, unlike for example the USA's Magnitsky Act, does not cover corruption and systematic money laundering.

We see a clear and well-documented connection between corruption and violations of human rights. Corrupt elites strengthen their power by looting state resources, silencing opposition and undermining the justice system. Money laundering is often used to hide tracks, buy loyalties and smuggle money out of poor and authoritatively ruled countries. It is not just an economic problem but also a profound human problem.

Therefore, we believe that Sweden should take the lead in introducing a national Magnitskij legislation that also covers corruption and money laundering. It would give Sweden the opportunity to act more forcefully against individuals and regimes that today evade sanctions despite practically destroying people's lives through structural oppression.

Mr. Speaker! We also want to emphasize that Sweden needs to have its own national room for maneuver in sanctions policy. The EU and the UN are effective collaborations for sanctions, but they must not become an obstacle to acting in a timely manner. There are occasions when the EU does not reach a consensus, perhaps because member states have other interests or direct links to the party that should be imposed with sanctions. Sweden must therefore have an independent possibility to decide on national sanctions in these cases. Blindly waiting for the EU is not always compatible with Sweden's values and Sweden's role as a defender of human rights.

Mr. Speaker! I also want to raise an important rule-of-law aspect. When states use powerful tools such as sanctions against individuals or regimes, there must also be the possibility of judicial review and appeal. Sanctions must not become a matter of political signaling without a legal basis. It must be clear which criteria apply, and it must also be possible to defend the decisions legally in Sweden and in international contexts. It is not just a rule-of-law principle; it is also a matter of credibility.

Mr. Speaker! Lithuania has shown that it is entirely possible for an EU country to take the lead and introduce national sanctions when the union acts too slowly or fails to reach a consensus. By enacting legislation on its own sanction tools, Lithuania has been able to react quickly to serious human rights violations and threats to security in the surrounding area, particularly from Russia and Belarus. Sweden, which has long relied on EU decisions, risks standing by passively when the situation requires immediate action. With its own national sanction legislation, similar to Lithuania's, Sweden could strengthen its foreign policy freedom of action and take a clearer stand for human rights and international law.

Mr. Speaker! In conclusion: the Sweden Democrats stand behind the government's bill. It is a necessary step towards a more modern and functioning sanctions system. We believe, however, that Sweden must go further and introduce Magnitskij legislation that includes corruption and money laundering, as well as ensure national freedom of action when independent sanctions decisions are needed, so that Sweden can take a leading role in the fight for freedom and democracy not just in words but with action.

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Joar Forssell (L)

Mr. Speaker! Just as it has been said earlier, this debate is important even if the subject might not look so fun on paper.

The whole world is on fire in different ways because China, Russia, Iran, and other dictatorships want to destroy the rules-based world order and ensure that democratic values and rules of the game no longer apply. Therefore, it is so important that European countries and other countries that lean on democratic principles, democratic systems, and the rules-based world order stand up for these all over the world, in international contexts, and in international organizations. It is also about participating militarily where it is needed and about standing up to ensure that the sanctions imposed when crimes are committed against international law or other parts of the rules-based world order are actually followed. Therefore, it is important that we now strengthen the system and make it stricter in order that one cannot break or bypass sanctions or in other ways undermine the rules-based world order.

It is what this report is about – even if the heading looks a bit dry and meager.

Mr. Speaker! I naturally move for the approval of the committee's proposal. It is of the utmost importance that Sweden does its part so that international law, the rules-based world order, and democratic principles are upheld. It may sound a bit black and white, but it is us against them, we democracies against the dictatorships China, Russia, Iran, and others who are trying to undermine the rules-based world order even further. It is not the time to approach any of these countries, but rather the time to move further away from them. It is the time to ensure that more are reached by sanctions, and it is the time to ensure that sanctions cannot be bypassed. It is the time to draw red lines in the sand that must not be crossed when it comes to international law and the rules-based world order.

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Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! As a previous speaker, I have been in [the room] as we decide today on new legislation regarding international sanctions. The decision is a Swedish implementation of the EU legislation that has been introduced in the area. The parties in the Riksdag are in agreement on the introduction of the legislation, which, among other things, entails an important tightening of the penalties for crimes against sanctions.

When it comes to the more principled discussion about sanctions, one should be able to hold several thoughts in mind at the same time. Introducing sanctions against countries and individuals has become an increasingly common foreign policy tool in these times – much as a response to the fact that other foreign policy tools, such as diplomacy, have not functioned as desired. But we shall nevertheless maintain a critical stance toward the use of sanctions and what effects they have.

Historically, sanctions have been imposed against states with which the own state has had a political conflict. The sanctions have hit wide and broad, and often led to the country's population being hit hard while the country's ruling class escaped far-reaching consequences. Sanctions have throughout history created both severe distress and famine for many people around the world.

Nowadays, the EU and the UN are instead focusing more on targeted sanctions against the actual persons or entities, for example a company, that are responsible. Through this, it is hoped that the right party will be hit by the effects of the sanctions. Targeted sanctions have led to the sanction lists becoming ever longer in order to capture more and more persons. In politics, we often talk about sanction packages, and we give these packages serial numbers.

But even targeted sanctions can hit wide and broad. If a country's banking sector is hit with sanctions to put pressure on the bank management, it can affect everyone in the country who uses banking services, regardless of what role and what responsibility they have.

Sanctions are, therefore, in no way a perfect tool. But in the world we now live in with increased contradictions in the wake of the imperialists' return, where imperialists through violence attempt to take other states' territories, the sanctions tool becomes the best we have among few other tools.

Vänsterpartiet has a clear and principled position regarding international sanctions. We support sanctions as a tool to counter violations of international law, aggression, and occupation. In several current cases, we have demanded that Sweden and the EU act more firmly with sanctions.

Vänsterpartiet has demanded that trade sanctions be imposed against Israel to put pressure on the country due to Israel's occupation of Palestine and the war in Gaza. Suspending the association agreement with Israel would be a simple and good measure. We want the EU to ban all arms exports and arms imports to and from Israel. We simply need to cut the military ties to Israel's far-right government and Israel's military.

When it comes to the sanctions against Russia, it is regrettable that Sweden is the worst in its class. We are the only EU country that has not brought charges against any person or organization for circumventing the sanctions against Russia – this despite the fact that we are aware of several suspected cases. It is important to maintain economic pressure on Russia and to choke off Putin's war chest. Therefore, decisive action is required to stop the circumvention of the EU's sanctions against Russia. The government needs to act immediately and with force so that these crimes are detected earlier, prevented more often, and punished more severely. Therefore, it is necessary to bring together the responsible authorities and the business community to jointly increase efforts to uphold the sanctions. Every sanctions violation is a support for Russia's illegal war against Ukraine.

It also becomes clear when we see the differences between the two actors Russia and Israel that we are now on our way to introducing double standards in the world. It is also something we must counteract within the sanctions regimes.

The introduction of today's legislation is a clear signal from us in the legislative assembly, the Riksdag, to our law enforcement authorities that we want to see tightening and action. Sweden shall not let those who, for their own gain, bypass the sanctions against Russia get away with it. Therefore, Vänsterpartiet has stood behind reservation number 1 regarding sanctions violations.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! It has emerged with all desirable clarity in the debate that there is a broad consensus in this chamber to say yes to the government's legislative proposal regarding international sanctions – that the penalties for violations shall be tightened, that attempts and aiding and abetting of sanction violations shall be criminalized, and so on. It is, of course, good.

I hope, however, that it has also emerged that there are some dissenting opinions. From the Center Party's side, we want more and believe it is in our interest to be clear about the possibility of national sanction frameworks. It is not because our perspective is "Sweden first" or "Sweden alone" but because we see the need to push to get effective systems in the EU.

We also want to continue working based on a tradition that Sweden has. As appears from the report, a leading thought in Swedish foreign policy has been to support efforts that, according to Sweden, serve the UN's purposes, regardless of whether this can occur within or outside the UN. The Government also states in the bill that recommendations from the UN that express a generally widespread political and moral expectation are something that a member state such as Sweden shall follow. At the core, there is therefore a thought that we shall live up to what we have said, that we shall stand up for the multilateral framework and the UN's purposes and that there shall be a generally widespread political and moral expectation for an action.

Since there is now a legislative proposal that provides minimum rules and opportunities for member states to introduce more extensive national provisions, we believe there would have been every reason to take advantage of these opportunities.

We want to point out two things. For the first, it concerns what the Riksdag has previously been clear about and announced to the then Social Democratic government, namely that we want to see Magnitsky sanctions. When systematic money laundering and corruption are at hand, something we know from studies from among others the European Parliament hangs closely together with MR crimes, we need to have opportunities to introduce that type of sanctions. We have worked for the EU to do so. But if the EU is blocked, which is now happening because certain countries do not want to see this, we must ask ourselves: Are we satisfied with that, or can we find ways to increase the pressure?

We believe that we must find ways to increase the pressure. We also know that there are other member states that stand on our side. Let us therefore join forces with like-minded ones to make this possible! It is something that there is broad support for in Sweden, and there is a moral expectation. Therefore, I think we must create that space.

Secondly, we now see, as I have previously pointed out in exchanges of remarks, a new reality that disturbs us all from time to time. It may be that the Security Council is unable to make decisions because the veto right is exercised by, for example, Russia and its like-minded allies. Shall they be able to block and use their veto right against that which we perceive as being within the purpose of the UN Charter, that which is broadly covered in society and where there is a moral expectation? Shall we let them block us?

We do not consider it reasonable. We must also update our approach here based on a new reality.

The same applies to the EU. The Center Party is for achieving majority decision-making in the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council when it comes to, for example, MR issues, but it has been difficult to make progress. What we have the opportunity to do is to make the decisions ourselves. Just like other countries, we can introduce national legislation that gives us the opportunity, together with other like-minded countries, to introduce sanctions that we have worked out, actually down to the last comma, in the EU but which are blocked by one country or another so that this country can get a better deal either with Russia or with someone else.

We have seen it clearly regarding the war in Ukraine and our ambitions to tighten the sanctions against Russia. Those packages have been taken hostage, either because Hungary under Viktor Orbán wants close relations with Russia or because someone wants a different outcome in some other issue in the EU. We should have the opportunity to decouple ourselves from that type of hostage tactics. We could do that if we, as the Center Party proposes, signal that we are prepared to introduce national sanctions.

It would not be to unilaterally introduce them as symbolic politics. We know that the sanctions instrument in itself is blunt. For it to be effective, it must be covered by many other countries. But if EU-25 or EU-26 nationally decided on sanctions, it would be effective – perhaps additionally together with the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada and so on. It would have an effect.

So far, however, a majority in this chamber has thought, as written in connection with our proposals, that "international law, EU law, and security policy reasons speak for the long-established principled line that Sweden only implements sanctions that have been decided by the UN Security Council or the EU, and that this should continue to be followed."

This position, which the majority in the committee expresses, we consider to be weak. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I move for approval of reservation 4 under point 3.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jacob Risberg (MP)

Mr. Speaker! We are here today to discuss a new law on international sanctions. It is very welcome. It will become easier to reach those who violate sanctions, something that over the recent years has been very difficult when Sweden has introduced sanctions primarily against Russia. So far, it is what I understand no one has been prosecuted for crimes against sanctions. It is primarily this that we want to address.

Legislation already exists, and the tragic thing that has emerged today is that we have not managed to prosecute anyone at all. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to move for approval of reservation 1, which concerns exactly this. There are companies in Sweden that have obviously violated the sanctions.

Today's debate gives us an opportunity to talk a bit more broadly about sanctions, and it is one of my favorite areas. What is the purpose of sanctions, really? Ultimately, sanctions are about getting people to change their behavior or stopping different types of occurrences. It can be violations of human rights, or it can be war crimes and terrorist crimes. It is for those types of cases that we introduce different types of sanctions.

How are the sanctions then intended to work? If we look at the sanctions against Russia, it is primarily about ensuring that the country does not receive products that can be used in warfare or products that can contribute to their war materiel industry. It is also about strangling the economy so that they do not get money to wage war or continue to oppress a population. Furthermore, it is a matter of making it difficult for individuals. It can involve freezing their economic assets or making it difficult by introducing travel bans and other types of sanctions. Everything is, ultimately, about changing behaviors.

Mr. Speaker! Are the sanctions effective? One can say yes and no. The classic example is South Africa. But the change in South Africa, the transition to a democratic society, took a long time, and it was economically costly for the entire South African society. Many ordinary South Africans were hit hard by the massive sanctions that existed against South Africa in the 70s and 80s.

Sanctions are a blunt instrument. That is what we heard Kerstin Lundgren talk about just a moment ago. It is difficult to hit the mark with sanctions. Therefore, during the 90s and 00s, attempts have been made to develop smart sanctions. The sanctions should be somewhat more targeted towards, above all, individual persons rather than towards entire countries. There, we can see certain risks.

For sanctions to work, four parameters must be met. One of them is that the sanctions must be universal. Everyone must stand behind the sanctions. This is where we see the problem today with Russia. Trade continues, primarily with China. We also see energy exports to the EU that often go via Turkey and India, because those countries do not stand behind the sanctions. The first requirement is to get broader sanctions that all countries stand behind, or as many as possible.

Then we come to the question of the actual behavioral change. Punishment usually does not work particularly well to get people to change their behavior. It is often carrots that are needed. This is the great downside of sanctions. It is often difficult to find what type of carrots can be introduced to get people to change. It is difficult today to see how we can find carrots to get someone like Putin to change. But these are questions that we must discuss.

New law on international sanctions

President Roosevelt said: Speak softly but carry a big stick. Speak softly, but take with you a big stick.

It is about first and foremost offering something positive but being prepared to punish if someone does not do as they are told. One must reward good behavior and punish bad behavior. This is the second parameter of what is required. We must find the other side of the coin regarding sanctions.

The third parameter is that the punishment must be tangible. It must mean something for the individuals. If we introduce travel bans against persons who have never at all set foot in Europe, the sanctions will fall flat. They will not be tangible for those affected.

Finally, sanctions must be immediate. Positive behavior must be reinforced immediately, and negative behavior must be punished immediately. One cannot introduce sanctions several years after a behavior has occurred because it can never be mentally linked to the behavior one wants to punish or change.

Mr. Speaker! In other words, it is politically difficult to make sanctions precise. They are blunt. The entire sanctions regime and the view on sanctions must be reconsidered from the ground up. But while waiting for us to be able to have such a discussion at an international level within the EU, I must welcome at least this bill. Now, it will hopefully become somewhat easier to prosecute those who violate the sanctions in Sweden.

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 15.)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)