Report on subsidiarity and proportionality and on the relations with the national parliaments
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
S considers that Sweden is an active member state that contributes to European cooperation 1 and that the subsidiarity principle strengthens legitimacy 1. SD emphasizes that parliaments have a treaty-compliant obligation to monitor compliance with the principle 2 and requests increased information exchange 2. M questions why Sweden accounts for a large part of the reasoned opinions but a small part of the others 3 and suggests that Sweden should discuss the focus on the formal aspects or the substantive content 3. MP advocates for a decentralized decision-making process 4 and wants the EU to pursue a more active environmental policy 4. MP welcomes the Commission's work to strengthen the subsidiarity principle 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Mariya Voyvodova (S)
Mr. Speaker! Sweden is a full member of the EU, and as a member, Sweden has a great responsibility to be an active and contributing member state in European cooperation. We are not just one country among many, but we are an actor that both wants and shall contribute to the development and strengthening of the laws that make our common societies better.
The Committee on the Constitution's report KU19 deals with the Committee's [review of] the EU Commission's report on subsidiarity and proportionality and on the links with the national parliaments. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality give us the opportunity to influence and express our position on both how and where a decision should be taken. It is clear that Sweden makes use of the principles, and we must remember that the use of these different methods of review strengthens both the credibility and the legitimacy towards the citizens when we members make our contribution yesterday and today for a better society tomorrow, provided that we apply the principles in the right way so that the citizen feels a greater acceptance of the policy.
Two weeks ago, the Committee on the Constitution was on a study trip to Brussels to, among other things, study the EU's decision-making processes and current issues within the committee's preparatory area. We met representatives from the Swedish EU representation in Brussels and discussed, among other things, the mechanism for subsidiarity control. We received information on how the Commission handles reasoned opinions from the national parliaments. We had the picture confirmed that Sweden's parliament is more active within the EU than other national parliaments.
The Committee on the Constitution notes that according to the treaties, all parliaments have a responsibility to monitor compliance with these principles. This also gives the parliaments the opportunity to influence the EU's decision-making process. Some national parliaments, such as the Swedish Riksdag, have submitted a significant number of opinions. Many others have not done so recently, which is a problem. This raises questions as to why certain parliaments do not participate and whether the mechanism is effective. In the report, the Committee emphasizes that it is concerning if only a few parliaments actively use the subsidiarity mechanism because these controls are important for the EU's democratic process.
Mr. Speaker! During 2022, the EU Commission received a total of 32 reasoned opinions from all parliaments. This is a significant increase compared to previous years, which KU has previously noted. Despite this, the Commission points out that some of these opinions were not based on clear criticism of the subsidiarity principle but rather on a lack of analysis by the national parliaments. The number of reasoned opinions has unfortunately decreased significantly during the current Commission's mandate period compared to previous periods. The Swedish Riksdag accounted for 40 percent of these opinions during the year. It has not been that way in previous years, which raises questions that the Committee on the Constitution has discussed, even in Brussels.
In the autumn, KU conducted its 14th follow-up of the Riksdag's application of the principles. In KU, we welcome the Commission's work with better legislation and its measures to strengthen the application of the principles. We can also note a clear improvement in the Commission's justification of both the subsidiarity principle and the proportionality principle compared to previous years, but we still request more detailed information from the Commission to facilitate the work with these matters.
An explanation for the relatively high number of statements from the Swedish Riksdag may be the broad responsibility the Riksdag has to review all proposals submitted for consideration. The committee also points out the need for increased information exchange between the parliaments, and my impression as a new member is that the committee is quite united on this.
Lars Andersson (SD)
Mr. Speaker! Today we are discussing the Committee on Constitutional Affairs' report number 19 Report on subsidiarity and proportionality and on the links with the national parliaments. The Committee welcomes the Commission's work for better legislation and the measures the Commission takes to strengthen the application of the subsidiarity principle.
It is a treaty obligation for the national parliaments to monitor compliance with the subsidiarity principle and that it is applied in accordance with the procedure set out in Protocol No. 2 on the application of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. But it is also an opportunity for the national parliaments to exert influence in the EU's decision-making process.
A question that is essential for the Committee on the Constitution in this context is whether the national parliaments have seized the opportunity and obtained the desired influence. According to the Commission's annual report, which distinguishes between reasoned opinions and opinions that fall within the framework of the political dialogue, it appears that 32 reasoned opinions were submitted during 2022. However, no proposal gathered enough objections to reach the threshold for a so-called yellow card.
During the autumn of 2023, the Committee on the Constitution conducted the 14th follow-up on the Riksdag's application of the subsidiarity principle since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. The Committee notes, however, that only a few parliaments have submitted reasoned opinions and that the Swedish Riksdag alone accounted for over 40 percent of all reasoned opinions. Other national parliaments appear to perform some form of selection of proposals to be tested for subsidiarity.
Within the framework of the political dialogue, however, most national parliaments have submitted statements. We can observe that there is a certain imbalance between the national parliaments in the application of the subsidiarity mechanism.
A question that arises is whether the national parliaments that do not submit objections within the framework of the subsidiarity mechanism refrain from doing so because they have no objections, or if the omission instead is due to other factors, perhaps that the mechanism itself is not perceived as effective or purposeful.
The exchange of information between the national parliaments is not only significant but also necessary. The parliamentary EU committee, which had the task of reviewing the Riksdag's work on EU issues, considered that the Riksdag should cooperate more with other national parliaments and encouraged an exchange of information at a political level. From the material we have had access to so far, it does not appear that any such exchange of information has actually taken place before or during subsidiarity reviews.
The Committee considers it concerning from a democratic perspective if only a few national parliaments maintain the possibility of monitoring the applicability of the subsidiarity principle within the framework of the subsidiarity mechanism. The national parliaments' subsidiarity control is an important democratic instrument within the framework of the EU's decision-making.
The committee has on several occasions previously emphasized the value of contacts and information exchange between the national parliaments to ensure effective monitoring of the subsidiarity principle. If the national parliaments alert each other when there are objections regarding a proposal's compatibility with the principle, the chances of gathering enough parliaments to reach the threshold for a so-called yellow card, and thereby have a proposal reconsidered, increase.
With this, I move for approval of the committee's proposal in the report.
Ulrik Nilsson (M)
Mr. Speaker! Politics takes place in a large number of arenas. One of the arenas that means a lot for Sweden is the European Union. We could call it Brussels. From the European Union's side, for many years, one has been aware of the need to link the national parliaments to what happens in the halls of Brussels, the so-called political dialogue between the Commission and the national parliaments. One step in that work is the report we have on the table today. It is an account of how it has looked over the past year, and it is an account that one can shrug at and state that so it became. But it should also be a basis for us to dare to debate how we should handle the political arena of the European Union and how we should ensure that the issues where Sweden has differing views are listened to.
If one reads the report, it can be noted that a total of 355 statements have been received from the national parliaments, so-called opinions, of which 18 come from Sweden. At the same time, of the 355 in total, there are 40 that deal with submissions against the subsidiarity principle, so-called reasoned opinions. Of those, Sweden accounts for 14.
A few speakers have already mentioned from the rostrum that Sweden accounts for 40 percent of the reasoned statements, but we can also note that Sweden does not account for more than just over 1 percent of the other statements. It is a matter of those statements that do not concern formalities but rather the content of the proposal. It raises the question: Why do we choose a so radically different strategy than many other countries obviously do?
Mr. Speaker! Let me try to reflect. I do not know why. I would like to discuss possible thoughts as to why it differs so much. Let me speculate a little. Is it that we are the ones who are formalistic, that we think we are right and that something is not an EU matter? But there is a difference between being right and getting it right.
Some have previously pointed out that not many have agreed with the criticism of subsidiarity, and thus no yellow cards have been issued to initiate a renewed process. Is it the case that Sweden stands for too much on the formalistic ground? If we choose the formalistic path because we do not agree with the substance, someone can naturally say: You do not want this, so why should you discuss it? It can also be the case that our potential substantive views are disregarded because we have exhausted our ammunition in the subsidiarity review.
We need to reflect on this. Is it so, or is this a lapse in judgment on my part when I try to explain it to myself?
Mr. Speaker! Could it be that instead one should focus on saying that there are a number of points in the proposal that we do not like? I believe that was how the large committee in the Finnish Parliament reasoned when they said that they get increased influence by acting in a different way. In that case, one influences the content, and one influences the proposals instead of saying that one should not care about this because one does not like this.
Mr. Speaker! With this report as a basis, one should initiate a discussion on how we find a way of working that best reflects Swedish interests in relation to the European Union. Is it by insisting on subsidiarity, on the formal, or is it to try more to meet halfway?
Mr. Speaker! This raises a number of other questions. The prerequisite for meeting is that one also respects and tries to understand different views, rather than just blaring out one's own view. It requires a different approach: to listen, try to argue, and try to meet halfway rather than marking one's own position.
Mr. Speaker! I hope that the report leads to a continued debate. I move for approval of the Committee on the Constitution's proposal in report KU19. Above all, I hope that this is not the end of the debate but that we can continue to discuss how Brussels can also become a good political arena in Sweden. I believe that will benefit us in the long term.
Jan Riise (MP)
Mr. Speaker! The relationship between the European Union and the 27 member states is an issue where one often gets the answer "it's complicated". Handing over decision-making power over matters that were previously resolved at the national level to Brussels has certainly caused headaches and frustration in at least 27 different ways in as many member countries with different circumstances.
This discussion concerns the subsidiarity principle, that is, the principle which states that decisions should be made as close to the inhabitants as possible or that the EU should only engage in decisions that are either decisions where the EU has exclusivity, for example when it comes to the common fisheries policy, or decisions that it appears sensible to make together rather than individually.
The member states' different ways of handling this are reflected in the statistics of incoming communications to the Commission from the member states' parliaments. Some countries communicate relatively frequently with the Commission while others do not communicate at all or do so very rarely. Everyone knows by this point that Sweden, according to the latest report, had by far the most so-called reasoned opinions: Of a total of 32, 14 came from Sweden's riksdag.
This can, of course, be interpreted as that the different parliaments in Europe see that the possibilities to achieve something with the help of such opinions differ, or that the Commission has not been completely clear on how such opinions are handled, what role they actually play, and how they are intended to be understood among the Member States.
At the core, the member states have an obligation to ensure that the subsidiarity principle is followed. One can, of course, also see it as an opportunity to participate in the work in the EU and thereby legitimately influence the development.
Mr. Speaker! The Committee on the Constitution visited Brussels and the various institutions in the EU just a couple of weeks ago. At one point, the Commission's handling of incoming communications, that is, not just the reasoned opinions, was described as a kind of machine that is fed with opinions and objections in the form of documents, not only from the member states' parliaments but also from other forms of consultations, for example with residents in the EU.
From a green perspective, the principle of subsidiarity is naturally particularly important. Our policy stands for a society where decision-making is decentralized and where those who are closest should primarily decide. There are, of course, many exceptions. Issues regarding research, specialist care, or cultural heritage may perhaps be handled better at a regional or national level, while issues regarding climate and cross-border transport in many cases are handled better at, for example, a Nordic or European level. There is nothing dramatic in this; rather, it is almost to be regarded as a self-evident matter.
To my surprise, however, it seems that the possibilities for participation for the European parliaments are actually less developed than one might think, or in any case, less utilized. This can possibly explain or be a starting point for a discussion on the major differences between the various parliaments' engagement in the EU cooperation.
With the Treaty of Lisbon, which now has 15 years behind it, the opportunities for EU member states to report deviating views on subsidiarity in the form of a reasoned opinion to be submitted to the Commission within eight weeks after the receipt of a legislative proposal were strengthened. This is what we are so diligent with in the Swedish Riksdag, at least relatively all other member states. It constitutes part of a kind of early warning system. If a third of the parliaments submit a reasoned opinion, the legislative proposal shall be sent back for revision, but this has, therefore, not happened to any significant extent yet.
Mr. Speaker! We in Miljöpartiet are warm supporters of international cooperation. We want to see Europe as part of a world of democracies where people move freely across borders and where people and countries trade and cooperate with one another.
We are positive towards intergovernmental cooperation where countries participate voluntarily in the decisions. In issues of a global character, there are also strong reasons that speak in favor of decisions taken together with other states. This applies, among other things, to cross-border environmental issues and the protection of fundamental human rights. Today, the EU is an important forum for this in our part of the world.
We think, among other things, that the EU must pursue a more active environmental policy and that the EU must take responsibility for developments in the world by leading the way in international climate agreements. The EU's budget must be designed so that it does not go towards measures that harm the climate. From our decentralist basic view, we are therefore an EU-critical party, and we work to change the union.
Mr. Speaker! In the report, we in the committee write that we welcome the Commission's work with better legislation and the measures that the Commission is taking to strengthen the application of the subsidiarity principle. Some have already been made, as I have mentioned, but more remains to be done. The question must also be asked whether the national parliaments have seized this opportunity and thereby gained the influence that is desirable.
As the commission notes in its report, the Swedish Riksdag, as you have already heard, stood alone for 40 percent of the reasoned opinions. That imbalance and the differences that seem to exist between the national parliaments regarding the extent to which they use the subsidiarity mechanism raise, according to the committee, a number of questions. One such question is whether the national parliaments that do not submit any objections within the framework of the mechanism do not do so because they have no objections or because it is not perceived as effective or expedient.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I think the committee considers it concerning from a democratic perspective if only a limited number of national parliaments take advantage of the opportunity to monitor the applicability of the subsidiarity principle. We would like to see increased cooperation between the national parliaments in these matters.
With this, Mr. Speaker, I move for approval of the committee's proposal.
The deliberation was hereby concluded.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.