Reporting on the use of secret coercive measures during 2024

Petter Löberg (S)

Madam Speaker! The Riksdag is today considering the government's report on the use of secret coercive measures 2024. It is a recurring report. Ever since the 80s, it has returned to this chamber with regularity, and there is a good reason for that.

Secret coercive measures belong to the state's most intrusive powers. They mean that the state can, in secret, wiretap, monitor, and in some cases intrude into people's most private sphere. In a constitutional state, such tools must be able to be used when needed. At the same time, they must be subject to careful democratic control – that is the balance point. It is precisely for that reason that we receive this report.

There is no doubt that the law enforcement authorities are in a very tough position, and they have been for a very long time. Organized crime in Sweden is in many ways actually more of a threat to the system, more technically advanced, and more internationally oriented than it has been previously. One has encrypted communication services to deal with in different ways. One has advanced network setups, and it is a completely different organization from the side of organized crime. At the same time, crime is cross-border. This places high and new demands on the police, prosecutors, and security services. In that case, secret coercive measures are very important tools.

The government's communication, which we are debating today, also shows that these tools are used in a significant and increasing extent. It is assessed that they have been of good use in a multitude of different investigations to prevent crimes and prosecute criminals. But it is also important to clearly state that these tools must be handled with very strong control. This concerns, for example, the fact that it must be proportionate. It is a requirement we set for the use of this type of tool. It must be able to be tested in court, and it must have a particularly important significance for the continuation of the investigation in the actual crime fighting.

It is a number of criteria we set up for secret coercive measures, and that is how it shall be. This also applies to the transparency and the possibilities for review.

The annual report raises a number of questions. We can see that the secret coercive measures are increasing in scope and use. Surveillance of electronic communication has reached the highest levels in almost ten years. New tools that we have introduced in the form of secret data interception may have been used in a more extensive scope than we thought when we made the decisions on the law.

This does not have to be wrong, but on the contrary, it can be very reasonable. But it also implies higher requirements for us decision-makers to follow the developments even more closely. We shall ask the questions: Is the control functioning in a good way? Is the proportionality, which I spoke about earlier, maintained? Does the Riksdag have sufficient oversight? So far we have been satisfied, and we are also in this case.

Another important aspect regarding this legislation that I believe we need to discuss more in the chamber and in the committee is the cumulative effect of all these reforms and new tools that the police have received. It has changed rapidly over the last decade. The preventive coercive measures have been expanded, and secret data retrieval is conducted in a different way than before. Many other reforms have also been implemented.

All these reforms have good intentions – to strengthen society's capacity to combat serious crime. But when the changes are layered on top of each other and the whole is sometimes difficult to discern, we also need to consider the cumulative effects at times. This is something that the Council on Legislation has pointed out on a number of occasions when we have intended to introduce new legislation in the area.

This is important: The Council on Legislation is not a rubber stamp in Sweden. The Council on Legislation is something important and in many respects a fundamental pillar in our legislative process. When we Social Democrats have been in power, we may have sometimes dismissed the Council on Legislation a bit too lightly; that is the self-criticism we must practice. We must realize that the Council on Legislation contains some of Sweden's most distinguished lawyers, who have worked with these issues for an incredibly long time. I say this as a small nudge to our comrades on the government side ahead of upcoming exercises.

In any case, we need to act powerfully against crime but also have a balance when it comes to the fact that there is a strength in the state scrutinizing itself when one receives these powerful tools.

Madam Speaker! Against this background, I propose that the Riksdag place the communication in the records. But the work of following, reviewing, and, if necessary, developing the regulatory framework surrounding secret coercive measures must continue, as it is a prerequisite for a constitutional state.

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Ulrika Westerlund (MP)

Madam Speaker! The powers of the Police Authority and the Prosecution Authority to use secret coercive measures have been progressively expanded over time, and this has had broad support in the Riksdag.

From the government's report, which we are now discussing, it appears that the use of secret coercive measures continues to increase and that even the levels during 2024 were at a high level. Expanded possibilities to use secret coercive measures have long been requested by the law enforcement authorities and are judged to be an important tool in the work against organized and gang-related crime. Against this background, Miljöpartiet has also contributed to the development where the use of secret coercive measures has increased.

By the use of secret coercive measures, even for preventive purposes, the police's ability to prevent and investigate serious violent crimes as well as prosecute perpetrators has been strengthened. The coercive measures are thus significant for public safety in society, for providing redress to crime victims, and from a broader crime-prevention perspective.

It also appears from this year's report that secret measures are primarily used in preliminary investigations concerning serious crime, for example, serious organized crime, drug offenses and violent crimes.

Against this background, Miljöpartiet largely shares the government's assessment that the current order for the use and control of secret coercive measures fundamentally works well and that the expanded powers are primarily directed towards serious crime.

At the same time, the Green Party argues that a continued expansion of the use of coercive measures must go hand in hand with a strong and consistent focus on legal certainty and protection of personal privacy. As the use increases, so do the requirements for follow-up, transparency, and effective oversight.

The annual report to the Riksdag, which we are talking about here, therefore becomes increasingly important as a tool for democratic control.

Miljöpartiet notes that the government's communication also this year exhibits certain deficiencies regarding transparency and the possibility for the Riksdag to fully assess the consequences for individuals. When secret coercive measures are used on a large scale and in many cases are directed against persons who are not later prosecuted, it is of particular importance that the Riksdag has access to a sufficient and comprehensive basis in order to be able to exercise its oversight power.

Madam Speaker! A deficiency regarding notifications to individuals. Today, statistics are presented on how many notifications are not sent due to secrecy, but the government does not report how many people are actually notified that they have been subject to secret coercive measures. The lack of such statistics hinders a collective assessment of how the notification obligation is applied in practice.

Miljöpartiet therefore wishes that the government returns with statistics that clearly show how often intelligence is provided and how often it is omitted.

Furthermore, Miljöpartiet considers the current time limit of one year and six months, after which an intelligence report no longer needs to be disclosed due to secrecy, to be far too narrow. For the individual, it can have significant value to be informed in retrospect that secret coercive measures have been used, even if a long time has passed. When the use of secret coercive measures increases, the requirements for openness and the possibility of oversight should also be strengthened. The time limit should therefore be raised to at least ten years.

I can say in this context that we welcome the investigation that the government has appointed and which now has the mandate to review how today's system of intelligence works in practice. We look forward to, in May, I believe it was, taking part in the investigation's conclusions.

Miljöpartiet also notes that an increased use of secret coercive measures places high demands on the correct application of the legislation. The government's communication provides limited information on incorrect use and on how issues of responsibility are handled. To strengthen legal certainty, the government should therefore appoint another investigation or give additional assignments to the current one in order to reduce the scope for what service errors can be considered minor, and thus exempt from punishment, when it comes to the use of secret coercive measures.

Finally, Miljöpartiet notes that the lowered thresholds for the use of secret coercive measures, in combination with the fact that they are now also used for preventive purposes, have led to a significantly increased workload for the supervisory authority, the Security and Integrity Protection Authority. This has, among other things, been reported in connection with the authority's visit to the Committee on Justice in November 2024.

The Green Party argues, therefore, that the authority needs to be strengthened, both in terms of resources and powers. When secret coercive measures, including secret data interception, are used on an ever-increasing scale, the supervisory authority must have good conditions to conduct an effective and qualified supervision so that coercive measures are not used on incorrect or disproportionate grounds.

I vote in favor of reservation 2.

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Pontus Andersson Garpvall (SD)

Madam Speaker! In accordance with the Riksdag's request, the government has since 1983 annually reported how the rules on secret interception of electronic communications have been applied during the past year, which for the 2026 debate will be the use during the year 2024.

If we look at the issue over a longer time horizon, it is clear that the use has increased, which is a direct consequence of the increased organized crime we have seen emerge in Sweden over decades. It is precisely that organized crime that the Sweden Democrats, together with the government, are now combating with full force.

Secret coercive measures, that is secret wiretapping and surveillance of electronic communication, secret room wiretapping and secret data retrieval, are important parts of the work we do to repel organized crime in Sweden.

The Sweden Democrats have, since we were elected to the Riksdag nearly 16 years ago, constantly pushed the issue of expanded possibilities for specifically secret coercive measures, and since we were given the chance to truly influence policy in our direction, a lot has happened in this area.

The latest measure was implemented in the autumn, on October 1, 2025, when we made it possible to also intercept children under 15 years of age, an important measure both to prevent and deter crime and to prevent children's participation in criminality. The major problem has been that older criminals have exploited younger ones, as they have known that the previous legislation was insufficient. Now we are ensuring that fewer children come into contact with persons from the criminal world at an early age.

Perhaps the most important measure in this area was that on 1 October 2023, we introduced the possibility of preventive interception, which means that it can be used to prevent crimes. Preventive interception can therefore be used before a crime is actually committed.

Already on February 25 of the following year, that is less than five months after the new legislation was in place, the police commissioner could announce that permission had been granted for over 200 coercive measures according to the new legislation and that over 30 people had been arrested as suspects for serious crimes.

It is quite obvious that our new legislation in a number of areas has contributed to the increasingly calmer situation that we see today in Sweden. The situation looked worst in 2022 during the Social Democrats' last year in power, when 62 people were shot dead in Sweden. The number of fatal shootings has since decreased in the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, and 2026 has started very well. So far this year, only one person has been shot dead in Sweden, which means we have only had one fatal shooting in Sweden in the last 86 days, a very large difference compared to just 2022 when a total of 62 people were shot dead.

With that said, we have received criticism for our measures in the criminal policy area. The Sweden Democrats and the government have been criticized by, among others, Civil Rights Defenders, Amnesty, Save the Children, the Institute for Human Rights, and several others. The funny thing in this context is that none of these organizations directed an ounce of criticism toward Sweden or the previous government when the wave of violence in the country meant that hundreds of people were shot dead in the open street during an eight-year period.

One can certainly ask oneself why they think criminals' rights are more important than ordinary people's freedom. The fact is that if we had been anxious and listened more to the criticism from these organizations, Sweden would not have solved the problems that Sweden is currently in the process of solving.

With that said, I move for approval of the committee's proposal and rejection of all reservations in the area.

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Lars Jilmstad (M)

Madam Speaker! In the matter we now have to take a position on, we can observe that there is a fundamental agreement within the Committee on Justice, which has also emerged from previous statements. The differing opinions mainly concern the design of the annual report and a proposal to strengthen the Security and Integrity Protection Board.

The committee's majority wants the Riksdag to reject these motions and that the government's communication be added to the records.

As has been shown previously, this report has existed since 1983. Initially, it concerned secret telephone surveillance, which was considered to be a very major infringement on personal privacy and was therefore extremely controversial. Gradually, the report has been expanded to also cover the use of a long series of other secret coercive measures, and I shall list some of them.

The report also covers today secret surveillance of electronic communications, secret camera surveillance, secret room bugging, and secret data retrieval during investigations in criminal cases as well as in the application of the Act on Measures to Prevent Certain Particularly Serious Crimes, the so-called preventive law, which was addressed in a previous speech.

The report also includes an account of the acquisition of data according to the Act on the Acquisition of Data on Electronic Communications in the Law Enforcement Agencies' Intelligence Activities, the so-called Acquisition Act. We also learn about the use of these coercive measures in the Security Service's activities.

This long enumeration shows with great clarity that very much has happened since 1983. Partly it is about the development of crime, partly it is about that since then many new ways have been added for criminals to keep in contact and to prepare and carry out crimes of various kinds. The current government has, with new and advanced coercive measures, streamlined crime fighting, and for that we should be grateful.

Madam Speaker! The committee shares the government's view that it is of fundamental importance in a constitutional state that the right to protection of private and family life is respected. At the same time, it is necessary that the law enforcement authorities, in cases of serious crime, shall be able to use secret coercive measures as a last resort.

There must, however, be high legal certainty requirements and a strictly regulated oversight in the application of the various coercive measures. The requirements must, of course, exclude the use of coercive measures becoming routine, and it is of great importance that we can assess what results the use leads to.

After a few years of varying extent of secret coercive measures, we can now see an increase, which reflects both the development of crime and the result of several different legislative changes. Without going into more detail on the results of these individual measures, the committee can share the government's assessment that the authorities' use of secret coercive measures during 2024 has been a purposeful and necessary instrument in crime fighting.

Madam Speaker! A year ago, the Government commissioned a special investigator to conduct a comprehensive legal and systematic review of the rules on secret and preventive coercive measures with the aim of achieving more effective and clear regulation. The investigator shall map out the utility of the measures and also the consequences for personal integrity. The investigator shall also take a position on how the continued annual reporting shall be designed. The investigation shall be completed by the summer and will likely provide good information on the issues that the motions in today's matter address.

I move for the motions to be rejected. I also move that the government's communication be added to the records.

(Applause)

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(A decision was to be taken on 11 March.)

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