Strengthened constitutional preparedness

Ida Karkiainen (S)

Mr. Speaker! Estonia, storm Gudrun, tsunamis, forest fires, sudden financial crises and pandemic outbreaks – we have our experiences of when society needs to face great pressures.

Is Sweden then prepared to handle severe societal crises? Does our constitution have preparedness for it? Are we ready to make fast, difficult, and at the same time legally sound decisions at such times? Can we manage to live up to our constitutional requirements for decision-making?

These are important constitutional aspects of Swedish crisis management in peacetime. It is a very interesting question, but it is not new. The question has been discussed in rounds at least since the 1960s. The Constitutional Inquiry of 1963, the Civil Defense Legislation Inquiry of 1989, and the Constitutional Law Inquiry of 2008 are inquiries that have addressed the subject and stated that there is a gap in our constitution regarding decision-making in peacetime crises.

There is, in fact, no specific regulation in the Instrument of Government, in contrast to the conditions during war and the threat of war. Instead, ordinary rules regarding decision-making processes, norm-setting, and governance apply. One can get quite far with that, but not far enough. Many have therefore asked the question: Is it, after over 50 years with the Instrument of Government and with the new threats and risks we face in society today, time to think anew about our constitution?

The issue became relevant again when the severe corona pandemic spread across the world and in Sweden. This led to a unanimous Constitutional Committee stating that the government should consider a review of the conditions for legal action during peacetime crises. Also, the Corona Commission, the National Audit Office, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman have pointed out the importance of reviewing decision-making during just peacetime crises.

An investigation was therefore commissioned by the Löfven government in September 2021. It was given four sub-tasks with a strong connection: a review of the Riksdag's war delegation, the scope of application for the provisions on war and state of war, the Riksdag's meetings and meeting locations, and the government's possibilities to issue regulations during a serious peacetime crisis, the so-called norm-setting power. An international comparison was also included in the assignment.

Mr. Speaker! I myself had the privilege of sitting in this investigation. The final report was presented in November 2023, and the Moderate-led government submitted a bill to the Riksdag in June 2025.

Before I continue my speech, I would like to take the opportunity to thank Chairman Johan Hirschfeldt and the secretariat for a solid and well-executed investigation. I would also like to take the opportunity to specifically thank Minister of Justice Gunnar Strömmer for good cooperation on the issue. This shows that we can find consensus across party lines in difficult and fundamental issues, and I believe that is exactly what the Swedish people expect of us.

I will now focus on the proposal regarding the government's possibilities to issue regulations during serious peacetime crises, as that proposal is the one that has been most discussed and debated.

The proposal, which is a multi-step proposal, implies strengthened opportunities to govern Sweden in crises. To begin with, we emphasize that good constitutional preparedness is the foundation. By that, we mean that legislation for crises should preferably be in place in advance, before a crisis occurs. It is a dream scenario and a good ambition in theory, but in practice, our laws will never be written in such a way that they are equipped to meet completely different societal crises.

In such situations, that is, if a serious peacetime crisis situation occurs, the Riksdag shall be able to grant the Government special powers to issue regulations, so-called norms, if necessary to manage the crisis. For the Government to receive this norm-setting power from us in the Riksdag, an activation decision is required where at least three-quarters of those voting in the Riksdag must approve it, while a simple majority can withdraw the activation decision.

In exceptional cases, the government itself shall be able to make activation decisions, for example, if it is obvious that the Riksdag's decision cannot be awaited. It may be the case that it is difficult to gather, for example, in the event of a major catastrophe that makes it simply impossible for the Riksdag to convene, and in that case, the government must step in. In such a case, the government must notify the Riksdag as soon as possible, which must approve the regulations by a three-quarters majority.

The proposed regulations contain many limitations. Firstly, they shall be time-limited to a maximum of three months – after which they shall cease to apply. Secondly, they must be submitted to the Riksdag as soon as possible. If this is not done within one week from the day they were decided, they shall cease to apply. The regulations shall also cease to apply if the Riksdag does not review them within one month from the time they were submitted to the Riksdag.

The Riksdag can at any time revoke the government's power of regulation. We in the Riksdag do not, therefore, lose our regulatory competence. We always retain the possibility to enact laws that change or repeal the government's decisions.

The proposal means, in short, that a constitutional possibility is built in to quickly and flexibly introduce regulations through the government in peacetime crises, but with strong democratic control and limitations through the Riksdag and through the aforementioned time limit.

These specific constitutional rules for norm-setting will be written into a new chapter in the Instrument of Government just after the chapter on war and the threat of war.

Mr. Speaker! Many narratives have been spread regarding the proposal. I would like to take this opportunity to address the criticism and some of the critical voices.

Is this actually excessively far-reaching legislation? Many have wondered about this. Let me look back at how we reasoned in the investigation. During its course, we were instead struck by the question of whether the proposal does not contain very many safeguards and that decision-making therefore cannot take place sufficiently quickly and effectively during peacetime crises.

Another issue that has been highlighted in the criticism concerns the fact that the Riksdag's influence is being limited. Just as I have just explained, the Riksdag has a decisive influence even when the government acts based on the Riksdag's authorization. As I also mentioned earlier, the Riksdag can always pass a law that repeals what the government has decided.

The Government shall not be permitted to enact, amend, or repeal any constitutional law under this power, nor shall it be permitted to make any changes to the parliamentary rules of procedure or the Act on Elections to the Riksdag. It is also important to emphasize this.

Other criticism that has emerged concerns why we do not lean on the constitutional emergency power instead. It is an interesting thought, but it would mean that a government would not have a legal framework to lean on without it being able to take freedoms and powers that do not have a legal basis.

Is this a state of emergency? That is perhaps the most common question we have received regarding the proposal. No, it is not a state of emergency, Mr. Speaker.

My main arguments for this proposal are three.

Firstly: The Government governs the realm and is responsible for governing if a serious crisis occurs in Sweden. It must be considered that handling the consequences of a major catastrophe affecting the realm and its population is part of the Government's governing function. It is hardly a task for the Riksdag. It is also not a task for individual municipalities or for the courts.

Even though the government has its administrative authorities, which can work on and implement many proposals, it is ultimately the government that is responsible for how crises are handled. Accordingly, the government also needs to have these powers.

Secondly: Legal frameworks were needed for decision-making during peacetime crises. Through the proposal, we get a basis and a framework that one can lean on. One does not need to rely on the constitutional emergency power, which in itself entails problems.

For the third point: When we do not have the system in place, it means that the government sometimes, in order to be able to act quickly, needs to act via the Riksdag by having a committee take a committee initiative or by a question being raised here. In that case, one must remember that the Riksdag does not have the same investigative capacity as the government. It is the government's responsibility, and it is part of the government's steering function, to produce a decision basis that is sufficiently good so that we in the Riksdag can act on it. It should not be the other way around; it is not we in the Riksdag who bear this responsibility.

When the government shifts this responsibility onto the Riksdag, it also means that we cannot control and review the decisions in hindsight. The power of oversight is rendered ineffective.

Mr. Speaker! Finally: We do not know which peacetime crises we will face in the future. We live in an uneasy world where crises can occur quickly and unpredictably. What we do know, however, is that we will face crises in the future. At that time, our decision-making must also rest on a secure and legal basis. That is exactly what this proposal is about.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jessica Wetterling (V)

Mr. Speaker! It is a bit funny, but I could sign off on almost everything the previous speaker said. I thought it was a very good account of what the matter contains. It is a comprehensive and solid piece of investigation work, to say the least, that forms the basis for the matter we are debating today.

Mr. Speaker! Initially, I would like to move for approval of the Left Party's reservation 2 in the report, which concerns strengthening the role of the Council on Legislation and the protection of our civil rights and freedoms. I will return to the proposal later in my speech.

Above all, Mr. Speaker, I intended to say something about the report in its entirety. Since it concerns our constitution, it is a proposal that will be debated again after next year's election. As always when it concerns changes to the constitutions, it shall be done with great deliberation and not hastily based on temporary situations or the whim of a temporary parliamentary majority.

That is why a practice has formed over a long period of seeking broad majorities. In the near future, this practice will, at least as it appears, be established after the election by giving our constitution stronger protection. As is so often the case when it comes to changing a constitution, this has been carefully investigated in a parliamentary commission in which all parties have participated. We in Vänsterpartiet supported and support the commission's proposal in its entirety.

The important thing in the proposal – especially in light of the debate in society that previous speakers spoke about – is that one needs to see all the proposals included in the report as a whole.

Briefly, it can be said that the report contains a number of different parts.

Some are about strengthening the Riksdag's possibilities to convene so that we do not end up in the situation that the previous speaker raised, where the government is forced to make decisions on its own without initially seeking the Riksdag's approval.

Another part is to strengthen and make certain changes regarding the war delegation.

The third and perhaps largest part is, as the previous speaker said, that new provisions are introduced regarding norm-setting during serious peacetime crises, which means that the Riksdag, with a qualified majority, shall be able to grant the government special powers to issue the regulations needed to handle a crisis situation.

It should truly be emphasized that there is a strengthened minority protection in this part and that the Riksdag can at any time revoke such a power.

Mr. Speaker! For the Left Party, it became apparent, especially after the pandemic, that there is a lack of clear regulation on how decision-making should proceed in urgent and serious situations, for example a pandemic or another unforeseen and exceptional societal crisis.

This meant that during the pandemic, the Riksdag was forced to make a number of quick decisions that largely only concerned implementing what the government had already decided. Due to the time pressure, the Riksdag often faced difficulties in acquiring any deeper knowledge about certain matters.

The Riksdag therefore had difficulty holding the government accountable for the content of the legislative matters. Vänsterpartiet considers this to have been a serious deficiency. It was also this that formed the basis for appointing a parliamentary inquiry. The Riksdag and the committee chanceries do not have the same opportunity to investigate and prepare proposals as the Government Offices, and Vänsterpartiet considers it not to be a viable path to rely in that way on being able to legislate through committee initiatives.

There are a number of situations where this has occurred. This concerns, for example, the Sudan case, where I personally am quite critical that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, through a committee initiative, made a decision on an operation which, if it had gone wrong, would have been completely impossible to hold the government accountable for. It was the Riksdag that had taken the initiative on its own. And what we particularly care about in the Committee on the Constitution is being able to hold the government in power accountable.

We also believe that there are good opportunities, which was also demonstrated during the pandemic, to have rapid decision-making where the Riksdag is kept informed through a good dialogue between the Riksdag and the Government.

Something that the pandemic also showed, and also other crises before that, was that it is very difficult to predict what the next crisis will be. Now we may be prepared for an upcoming pandemic. Precisely because of that, the next crisis that hits our society in this way will probably not be a pandemic.

Mr. Speaker! Vänsterpartiet still wants to emphasize the importance of the government being restrained with the possibility that it will now be given within the constitution. We foresee and expect that there will be very few situations where the government will not be able to await a parliamentary process, based on the other parts of the proposal which ensure that the Riksdag gets greater opportunities to make decisions. If we, for example, were not able to make decisions in this chamber, this would no longer be bound to just these premises.

We also consider that the distribution of responsibilities between the Riksdag and the Government should remain as it is as far as possible, even in times of crisis.

We have, as mentioned, a number of reservations in the report. The one I intended to raise concerns the Council on Legislation – reservation 2, which I also move for approval of. We believe that it should be investigated how the Council on Legislation's ability to review legislative proposals ex post could be strengthened regarding how these relate to civil and political rights.

The latest crisis was the pandemic, and I feel that I talk very much about it. But historically, there are obviously also other crises where all parties have felt a desire to show decisiveness. We really saw that during the pandemic. All parties suddenly discovered that one could propose committee initiatives. There was almost inflation in that part. Everyone wanted to show decisiveness and their own good proposals on how the crisis could be handled.

In a future peacetime crisis, one could imagine that we parties in the Riksdag are so eager to demonstrate decisiveness that we forget to safeguard our civil liberties and rights. Therefore, Vänsterpartiet believes there are grounds to consider whether the Council on Legislation could fulfill a function in this regard.

Otherwise, we support the proposals in the report.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Lindahl (SD)

Mr. Speaker! First, I would like to vote in favor of the committee's proposal for a decision in report KU8.

We face a time when our society's security and resilience are being tested, not only by military threats but also by crises such as natural disasters, pandemics, or cyberattacks. In this situation, it is crucial that our democratic system of government can continue to function even under pressure. That is why the proposal Strengthened Constitutional Preparedness is now the basis for debate and decision.

The purpose of the proposal is clear: to provide Sweden's Riksdag and Sweden's government with better conditions to fulfill their duties in war and other serious crises. It is not about giving the government free rein, but about ensuring that decisions are handled with a legal basis and under parliamentary control.

These are some of the changes that are proposed:

The possibilities for the Riksdag to convene are strengthened, among other things, by the fact that it could be permitted to have fully digital Riksdag sessions in extremely exceptional situations.

The Riksdag's war delegation is maintained but with adjusted rules, for example, that a member who becomes a minister shall no longer be able to participate in the delegation.

Rules for norm-setting in serious peacetime crisis situations are introduced, with the possibility for the Riksdag to, with three-quarters of those voting, delegate special regulatory powers to the Government. For this to become a reality, broad parliamentary consensus is therefore required.

But the proposal is not just about efficiency. It is also about safeguarding our democracy and our rule of law. The Government and the committee emphasize that the foundations of the constitutional order shall be respected even in a crisis and that special powers shall only be used restrictively and with oversight.

I have only highlighted a small part of this in my speech. I think I do not need to repeat what the previous speaker, specifically Ida Karkiainen, took up and which was very detailed. I can agree with that and also with the description of the background to this committee report and this bill.

In addition to the written material, I can specifically refer to the committee's position on page 20 onwards. There, all the aspects that have had to be addressed since the question began being discussed in the parliamentary committee, up until the bill that the Riksdag is now to take a position on, are highlighted in a very good way.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jan Riise (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I would like to agree with previous speakers: Ida Karkiainen's speech covered a great deal that I and the Green Party could also stand behind.

What we are discussing now and are to make a decision on next week is truly no easy question. I would like to offer perhaps a somewhat different perspective on it.

One of the starting points for my political commitment is reasonably simple: I believe that people generally want to do well. They – and we – want the best for our children, we help our neighbors, and we do not stand by and watch if a friend or family member risks being harmed. We call for an ambulance if someone is injured or suddenly becomes seriously ill.

It is a kind of agreement we have, the vast majority of us: to help out if and when we can.

I understand that it is easy to dismiss my reasoning by referring to how things look around the world today, with wars, conflicts, famine and climate change making it difficult or impossible to stay, to grow what one used to grow or to be able to plan ahead.

Unfortunately, some of these misfortunes are created by us humans, sometimes for our own profit, sometimes due to ambitions for power. Sometimes it is states that are responsible for what we others find so difficult to accept – states' views on the right to territories or the right to benefit themselves and/or their own.

There is obviously an internal logic in power structures that causes decisions which are not at all good for those they affect to nevertheless occur in many places in the world.

The core question is therefore: What happens if the state is not good? That question, Mr. Speaker, has occupied philosophers, legal scholars, sociologists, and many other thinkers for a long time.

There is no doubt that the state is necessary. It is through the state that we protect, organize, create security, care for, and take care of. But the state also holds a very special position with its monopoly on the use of force.

Sweden and many other countries have systems of checks and balances, in Swedish kontroller och motvikter, or even simpler: separation of powers. This is where this comes into the picture. I shall ask to return to that in just a moment, Mr. Speaker.

First, I want to speak a little about my and the Green Party's position on the bill. We have a reservation concerning a specific aspect of the government's proposal. It concerns the government's possibilities to obtain special powers in peacetime crises.

Let me therefore say that in other matters we have no other opinions than the committee's. This concerns, among other things, the question of the Riksdag's possibilities to convene in times of crisis. It should, for example, be possible for the Riksdag to make decisions on digital meetings if security aspects or other reasons suggest that it would be best to do so. It may also, for security reasons or other causes, be better if the Riksdag convenes outside of Stockholm. This obviously belongs to the absolute exceptions but should nevertheless be seen as a not entirely unthinkable or improbable alternative. We have no deviating opinions on this either.

We also have no objections to the rules for the war delegation being updated, including with a larger role for the Speaker. For those who see this as a web or TV broadcast, it should be said that the war delegation is the group of 50 members and the Speaker who, in a war situation, shall be able to take over the Riksdag's role.

Mr. Speaker! In part of the report, the constitutional preparedness regarding legislation in severe crises is addressed – in peacetime and in wartime. These are proposals that make it possible for the Riksdag, in a serious situation, to grant the government special powers to issue regulations. A broad consensus shall be required for this, that is, three-quarters of those voting in the Riksdag must vote in favor for such powers to be granted. But if it is "obvious that the Riksdag's decision cannot be awaited", as it is written, the government itself shall be able to make such an activation decision. Such a decision shall, admittedly, be submitted to the Riksdag as soon as it can be done, and if a sufficient majority cannot be reached, the decision falls automatically.

We are, however, critical of the part of the government's constitutional proposal which implies that the government should be given the same opportunity as the Riksdag to introduce rules on, for example, restrictions of civil and political rights without an activation decision having been made by the Riksdag or the rules having been approved by the Riksdag in advance. It could mean that in some cases the government can make an activation decision that opens up for emergency legislation and simultaneously decide on new legislation that has not previously been prepared and which is then to be approved in retrospect by the Riksdag.

Mr. Speaker! I mentioned earlier the concepts of checks and balances or the separation of powers. Wise women and men have ensured that the type of abuse of power I spoke of earlier, where one cannot say completely and unequivocally that the state is actually good, is made difficult. Power structures have therefore been created where what is possible for one actor can be regulated by another. Most commonly, state functions are divided among different institutions, for example, the Riksdag, the government, and the courts. The Riksdag has the possibility to remove a minister or even the Prime Minister through a motion of no confidence.

We also have administrative courts and the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet) which review proposals for new legislation. We also have various forms of controls for how the state manages both power and other resources through the Parliamentary Ombudsman (JO) and the National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen). Through municipal self-government, the state's governance of a long series of activities is made impossible.

Then, of course, we have the fourth estate, that is, free media supported by the principle of public access – everything can be scrutinized. There are, admittedly, points of discussion regarding the media support that the state can provide, but in principle, scrutiny and transparency make it more difficult to take control of the state.

If we look for a moment at the USA and President Trump, who apparently has received a disproportionately large power, it is not actually because there is a lack of checks and balances, but it is, if I have understood it correctly, because there are both gray areas in the American constitution and that the president has used, for example, the appointment power to place loyal employees in key positions. Furthermore, the president has also used the media, not least social media, for direct communication, and he has shown distrust towards the established channels.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I and my party believe that the Riksdag has the capacity required to make quick decisions, which means that it is not necessary and perhaps counterproductive to give that power to the government during a serious peacetime crisis. We see concerns with the proposal and opportunities to exploit deficiencies to one's own advantage – if the government so decides.

The Riksdag can also choose to create emergency laws with the aim of limiting the scope of any delegation to the government of rule-making power. Or in other words: With a strengthening of controls and counterweights, we can reduce the risks of a situation arising where the state is no longer good.

I of course do not want us to end up in such a situation – never. And I have, as I said, a strong trust in other people. Therefore, I want us, in the first instance, to ensure that legislation is handled by the Riksdag, and in the second instance, through as clear conditions as possible through prepared emergency laws, so that it becomes difficult for future governments, regardless of color combinations, to take that opportunity away from the Riksdag. I really do not want such a situation to be able to arise at any time when we perhaps are not even left, while the next generation stands there with the pale pallor of hindsight and an autocratic state leadership.

If people were to ask my daughter whether it wasn't her father who was involved in making decisions about this once upon a time, she will be able to say: Yes, but he was among those who said no.

With that said, Mr. Speaker, I thank you for the floor and move for approval of reservation 1.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mats Green (M)

Mr. Speaker! Today we take a decisive step to ensure that our democracy can function even when it is faced with the greatest imaginable trial. The Government has presented a bill on strengthened constitutional preparedness, which the Committee on the Constitution has since endorsed with broad consensus. These are not just words on paper, but this is concrete action for Sweden's security.

Why was this then needed? Well, we find ourselves in an epoch where the unthinkable has become reality. Wars are being waged on European soil, and people are being killed and persecuted daily. Cyber threats and hybrid threats are no longer threats but realities, and it is happening in this very moment as we debate this issue.

Hybrid threats combine military and non-military means in the gray zone between peace and war. Disinformation campaigns aim systematically to undermine trust in our Swedish democratic institutions. As we know, society can also be faced with other types of severe pressures such as natural disasters or serious disease outbreaks, which colleague Ida Karkiainen detailed extensively.

When these threats materialize, when the crisis comes, Sweden's democracy must stand strong while we can act to mitigate the effects of these threats and crises. But for it to do so, we need the right tools. We need a constitutional preparedness that enables swift and effective action, while simultaneously safeguarding the principles of our democratic processes.

This is about three decisive reforms.

Firstly, it is wise to ensure that the Riksdag has the best possible conditions to function even during serious crises. We Moderates welcome the proposals that most of us agree on and that go in that direction.

I would, however, particularly like to comment on one of these proposals that is now on the Riksdag's table, namely to open up for the possibility of holding completely digital meetings when required for the sake of the Riksdag's security or for other forced reasons. While this is a justified change, there are, as both the committee and the government have emphasized, good reasons to consider the risks that accompany completely digital meetings. When the scope for digital meetings is to be defined more precisely in the parliamentary rules, it will therefore require well-balanced considerations so that the intended restrictive use is reflected, while at the same time there is a possibility to utilize digital meetings in the serious situations where it is truly justified.

Overall, we Moderates believe that the proposals that give the Riksdag improved opportunities to act during crises will create increased democratic stability. With a Riksdag that is well-equipped for future crises, its trust among the citizens is strengthened already today.

Secondly, Mr. Speaker, the fact that the war delegation's role and function is highlighted very positively. Probably, the knowledge of the war delegation's important tasks in extreme situations is not widely spread. Therefore, the description of this as a parliament in miniature in itself serves a pedagogical purpose.

Given the war delegation's very central role in war or the threat of war, it is very wise that the importance of not over-regulating the delegation's conditions for operation is emphasized in the report we are now debating. Since the war delegation is to act under extreme conditions, it is obvious that it is almost impossible to foresee in advance what exact needs will exist when its regulatory framework is to be applied in a sharp, serious situation.

The proposals in this part that are now before the Riksdag are of such a character that they do not risk hindering the war delegation's processes. They are well-motivated and create increased clarity. This applies, for example, to the proposal that members appointed as ministers should leave the war delegation. Such a change creates greater uniformity with the regulations for the Riksdag and appears reasonable given the likely workload for ministers in a situation where the war delegation is active.

Thirdly, when it comes to good constitutional preparedness, it must first be emphasized that the current government is reviewing regulations and mandates in several different areas that can be activated in the event of serious crises. It is truly wise policy. Those who are not prepared are unprepared.

What we have to take a stand on here today is based on the fact that it is very difficult to predict all needs in advance during a future crisis and that the constitutional preparedness will always have gaps.

At the same time, the preparedness legislation for peacetime crises today is less extensive than for war conditions. It has therefore been noted that situations may arise during a serious peacetime crisis where very rapid decisions on new legislation would be needed, but they cannot be managed with today's regulatory framework. Therefore, there is a need for the proposals in the report that give the government increased room to make decisions on legislative changes.

At the same time, it is given, as previous speakers here in the rostrum have pointed out, that we in this chamber safeguard the Riksdag's role and capacity even in situations where a serious peacetime crisis prevails. It is therefore important to emphasize the extensive considerations made by both the committee and the government regarding the balance between the Riksdag's continued influence and the need to be able to delegate certain rule-making to the government.

My party takes this issue very seriously and argues that the proposals currently before us are also well-considered. On the basis that it is the Riksdag which, with a qualified majority, decides whether there is a serious peacetime situation and that the government should therefore be given special powers, this chamber is given a continued very clear and, above all, very strong mandate.

In the same way, the limitation of three months' validity, regarding regulatory changes that the government decides on without authorization under completely exceptional circumstances, safeguards the Riksdag's real influence. To this can be added the minority protection that is proposed and which was touched upon here earlier.

It is about finding a balance between the interest of, on the one hand, protecting the population and the realm against dangers and threats and, on the other hand, upholding the foundations of the constitution, with the royal house at the forefront, and not exposing democracy and the citizens to unjustified encroachments on their civil liberties and rights. This is not a contradiction. It is a balance that we have now found.

Colleagues! We do not know when the next crisis will come, but we know that it will come. We know that the threats are real: cyberattacks, hybrid threats, disinformation, sabotage and, ultimately, armed attacks.

Now, through these reforms, Sweden is better prepared. Now we have closed gaps in the central democratic processes that are actualized in the event of crises and threats. We have moved past our uniquely Swedish naivety where we believed we lived in the kingdom of thousand-year peace. Now we have ensured that democracy functions even when it is put to the test. Now we have given the government tools to act, under the Riksdag's control.

Mr. Speaker! I shall conclude by saying that the state's most important task is to protect the population and our head of state and the head of state's family and safeguard our freedom, peace and security. In order to be able to take this responsibility, the Riksdag and the government need to function and be able to make necessary decisions in the right time and with legal support, even in war and during other severe crises. It is precisely when darkness falls that the light must be seen. And it is when the crisis comes that democracy must stand strongest. With these reforms, we ensure that it does.

I move for approval of the Committee on the Constitution's proposal for a decision.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Muharrem Demirok (C)

Mr. Speaker! Today we are debating the bill Strengthened Constitutional Preparedness. It is a matter that may lack the drama that budget negotiations provide, but whose importance for our democracy and our ability to withstand crises is of the most fundamental character. The Centre Party stands behind the bill in its entirety. Our support is not uncritical. However, it is clear, and it is based on a painful lesson that we were all forced to learn.

Mr. Speaker! In January 2020, the first case of covid-19 was detected in Sweden. What followed since then, we all have a collective memory of. It is something we never want to experience again. It was a period that was an extreme ordeal for all of us, both as individuals and as a society.

In this chamber, serious gaps in our constitutional preparedness were also revealed. In 2021, the investigation that forms the basis for this proposition was commissioned. It did not occur by chance but out of necessity.

During the covid-19 pandemic, a serious vulnerability in the Swedish social contract was revealed. We had robust constitutional rules for war, but we lacked a clear and legal mechanism to handle precisely a crisis that threatened our existence in peacetime. We know the consequence. We were forced to resort to ad hoc solutions, improvised laws and processes that were time-consuming and unclear and which, in some cases, left more to be desired from a rule of law perspective.

The Center Party has always placed the principle of legality at the center; if interventions in citizens' freedom and daily lives need to be made, they must have a clear legal basis. The bill we are now debating addresses this problem by creating a permanent, legal basis for crisis decisions. We are moving from uncertain ad hoc work to a predictable system enshrined in our own constitution.

Mr. Speaker! Our support is strengthened by the fact that this is the result of a proper and thorough parliamentary committee investigation. It is not a law that has been pushed through by a government in a panic, but a proposal that has been hammered out by all parties and then reviewed by heavy referral bodies such as our courts, the Chancellor of Justice, and the Bar Association.

We have, as is proper, turned and twisted every part of this. Our special focus has, of course, lain on the balance of power. A liberal democracy must never allow the executive power to appropriate the legislative power without strong counterweights.

Mr. Speaker! We need to speak plainly about the part that stands out: the competence for norm-setting, particularly the government's possibilities to act independently, which it is proposed to be written into Chapter 16, Section 3 of the Instrument of Government.

It is true that this is an odd bird in Swedish legal tradition. It is a provision that gives the government a historically unique opportunity to, on its own initiative, in an extremely acute stage, issue regulations that would otherwise be the matter of the Riksdag. This is an expansion of power that we do not take lightly and that no one should take lightly.

To understand this, we need to look at the entire basic proposal. It is based on, as several have said here, that the Riksdag in advance, in a slightly calmer stage – if we may call it that – gives the government an authorization to handle a crisis.

If everyone is in agreement on this. But the reality, which has also been described here from the rostrum, has shown us that situations can arise where the Riksdag's rapid action is not fast enough, and the reason is then the immediate threat but also the time factor. In these exceptional cases, the government shall be able to issue necessary regulations in the legal area without authorization in law.

We feel secure precisely because of the parliamentary thresholds that we have been involved in designing and securing in this proposal and which have been so profitably accounted for by several in this debate.

Mr. Speaker! The Centre Party sees this bill as a necessary constitutional safeguard against paralysis in future crises. We are balancing here two fundamental requirements: efficiency in crisis management versus democratic control. The solution we now see on the table is, in our assessment, a responsible way forward.

By voting yes to the bill, we ensure that our democracy and our rule of law have exactly the tools required to survive the most difficult peacetime crises, without having to compromise on our core principles. I would therefore like to conclude my speech by once again clarifying that the Centerpartiet demands approval of the bill in its entirety.

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Gudrun Brunegård (KD)

Mr. Speaker! In recent years, in our safe old Sweden, we have clearly become aware that we are part of a globalized world. When the covid-19 pandemic spread across the world, we discovered that our legislation lacked the preparedness to handle such a rapidly escalating health crisis.

To reduce the spread of infection, we had to quickly change our ways of working, not only at our regular workplaces but also here in the Riksdag, which is so clearly regulated by law. After record-fast preparation processes, decisions were made to reduce the number to 55 members during voting in the chamber, and committee meetings could be handled digitally with only the chairperson present in the Riksdag building.

Ministers called us members of parliament at all conceivable times of the day to anchor urgent proposals on how, for example, the schools' teaching should be handled, which age and student groups had the greatest need to be physically present in the classrooms, and what measures needed to be taken to balance the risks of other students being isolated at home against the risk of being infected.

I will not repeat all the crisis measures that the Riksdag had to decide on to regulate the healthcare's adaptation to the situation that arose, or how community life was suddenly reduced to a minimum, or how only the very closest circle of next of kin were allowed to participate at weddings, baptisms, and funerals.

On 1 April 2022, the pandemic was no longer declared to be a public health hazard or a threat to society. It was a huge relief when all these temporary crisis laws could cease and life could gradually return to normal.

But on February 24, just over a month earlier, Russia had launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, after President Putin had for some time spoken about re-establishing the Russian areas of interest, which include our closest neighbors on the other side of the Baltic Sea, and in some statements even Sweden. We could quickly conclude that with such a neighbor, we also needed the stronger protection that a full-fledged Nato membership entails.

Mr. Speaker! The proposal for a dormant amendment to the Instrument of Government that we are now discussing has, therefore, not arisen by chance, but because we have become aware in a rather brutal way that our legislation lacks the constitutional preparedness that many other countries have already equipped themselves with.

It is therefore high time that we also look at our house and regulate in what way the Riksdag and the government should be given better conditions to, in severe crises and, in the worst case, war, be able to fulfill their duties and make necessary decisions in a manner that is anchored in law. As we have heard from previous speakers, it is about the Riksdag's possibilities to convene, how the war delegation shall be composed, and the Speaker's role.

Furthermore, provisions are introduced regarding rule-making in serious peacetime crises, for example, if a new pandemic were to occur. The Riksdag shall be able to grant the government special powers by qualified majority to issue such regulations as are needed to manage the situation. These powers shall be able to be revoked by the Riksdag at any time.

I will not go into it further, as several previous speakers and colleagues in the Committee on the Constitution have gone into more depth on that. This applies in particular to our former chair Ida Karkiainen in her opening statement.

These pending proposals shall be confirmed by the Riksdag after the election next autumn, and they shall enter into force on 1 January 2027. Kristdemokraterna supports the proposal, and I hereby move for its approval.

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Mauricio Rojas (L)

Mr. Speaker! To be liberal is to be divided. These so often repeated words were uttered by the People's Party leader Gunnar Helén in the 1970s. He also added that it was about constantly presenting arguments for two sides, whether the debate is fought within oneself or in a public place.

It reflects a true liberal stance – one that shuns simplifications, one-sidedness, and dogmatism, and which instead tries to penetrate the complexity of difficult problems and in a serious manner weigh different arguments against one another. It is not synonymous – as some seem to believe – with indecisiveness, but with reaching a decision after a substantive examination of different viewpoints and alternatives. It is a proud folk-party tradition that we cherish.

Mr. Speaker! This is exactly what I have been forced to do during the past weeks regarding the bill we are debating today. I have taken note of the objections that the report underlying the government's bill has prompted, both from the left and the right, as well as from several significant organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists, Civil Rights Defenders, and Amnesty International.

Both Dagens Arena and Timbro have published extensive critical posts on the issue. ”Om djävulen och ett undantagstillstånd” (On the devil and a state of emergency) is the headline of the text that Dagens Arena published in connection with the publication of the report Stärkt konstitutionell beredskap (Strengthened constitutional preparedness).

It is a text that urges us to legislate with the thought that the "devil" could actually sit in Rosenbad one day. It may sound drastic to use such a working hypothesis, but it should rather be regarded as a self-evident precautionary principle, especially in light of the tragic historical experiences that countries in our surroundings have had.

According to Dagens Arena, the devil has "sneaked into the proposal that the government itself should be granted the right to decide if and when it is time to declare a state of emergency." The devil was also said to have hidden behind "the extremely unclear criteria for what should be counted as 'acute situations' when the government really needs to act quickly and unconventionally."

Timbro's critical contribution highlights the same points. It concerns a fifty-page report titled *Har nöden ingen lag?* (Does necessity have no law?), authored by the think tank's head of rule of law issues. The report begins with the following quote by Nazi Germany's constitutional jurist Carl Schmitt: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." It indicates the spirit of the text.

Mr. Speaker! Can we ignore the critical arguments that have been put forward in various places regarding the bill we are debating today? I think, as a good and conflicted liberal, that we should not do that. The two points mentioned above are undoubtedly both sensitive and important. It is true, as the critics point out, that the concept of serious peacetime crises is not defined exactly in the bill but is instead exemplified. There, among other things, the following examples of such crises are given: ”a severe natural disaster, a major accident, a large-scale terrorist attack, a widespread spread of a socially dangerous disease or a significant disruption of critical infrastructure”.

Both the parliamentary committee and the government state that regarding future crises, it is "difficult to predict which events may come to test society and even more difficult to predict what legislative needs a future crisis may lead to." This is, in my opinion, a reasonable assumption that explains why the concept of future peacetime crises cannot be defined with precision.

If anything, we know for certain that the unforeseen can not only occur but will occur. Karl Popper's famous black swan – that is, an event that is impossible to predict – often appears in the most unexpected situations, and we must be prepared for it. In that respect, the formulations in the government's bill are expedient.

Mr. Speaker! The second objection concerns granting the government the authority to decide on its own that a serious peacetime crisis prevails and that they can thereby take over the Riksdag's legislative power, even within the so-called mandatory legislative area. It concerns situations "where new regulations in the legislative area are needed in principle immediately or for a situation where the Riksdag temporarily cannot carry out its activities," as it states in the bill. It is not actually about introducing entirely new constitutional rules but about applying largely the same regulatory framework that applies when the realm is at war.

In the Instrument of Government, Chapter 15, Section 5, it states: "If the realm is at war and neither the Riksdag nor the war delegation can, as a result of this, fulfill their duties, the Government shall fulfill these to the extent necessary to protect the realm and conclude the war." This has a clear and important limitation in the second paragraph of the same section: "The Government may not, with the support of the first paragraph, enact, amend, or repeal the constitution, the parliamentary rules of procedure, or the Act on Elections to the Riksdag." It is essentially the same powers and limitations that are now proposed to apply during serious peacetime crises, with all the precautionary requirements and parliamentary control measures that shall surround the exercise of such exceptional powers.

Mr. Speaker! Is this reasonable – or can it endanger our democracy and our parliamentary system, as the critics argue? Given that the unforeseen will sooner or later occur and require immediate action, or that action must be taken even if the Riksdag temporarily cannot carry out its activities, the relevant question is the following: What is the alternative to the proposed reform? The realistic answer to that question is simple and is called constitutional emergency law.

In the report Strengthened Constitutional Preparedness, there is a definition: "Constitutional state of emergency usually refers to the state authorities, in emergency situations where the existence of society is threatened, setting aside the constitution and nevertheless claiming to have acted lawfully." It is obviously an oxymoron – an attempt to give the setting aside of the principle of legality a facade of legality. In Swedish constitutional history, the rejection of constitutional state of emergency has been the dominant position, but there have been a few but significant exceptions where this has been invoked, for example during the hijacking of the plane at Bulltofta in 1972, the Norrmalmstorg incident in 1973, and the terrorist attack against the West German embassy in Stockholm in 1975.

The Committee on the Constitution stated the following in connection with the tsunami disaster in December 2004: ”It may, however, be conceivable that there are crisis situations where the government may be forced to act in a manner that is not in full accordance with current legal rules, e.g., if the nation's existence is at stake or in order to save human lives.” The Committee further stated: ”In our country, one has primarily distanced oneself from constitutional emergency law.” The Committee did, however, add this important passage: ”Nevertheless, there may be a certain limited scope for a constitutionally emergency law based on customary law alongside the constitution.”

Mr. Speaker! The bill we are debating today has been developed precisely for the purpose of avoiding a situation that is, from a legal standpoint, difficult. We Liberals stand behind the committee's report after having made a careful analysis of the proposed constitutional amendment and of the alternatives available to be able to handle serious peacetime crises when immediate actions are required or when the Riksdag temporarily cannot carry out its activities.

We would, of course, wish that the decision that the Riksdag will most likely make were not necessary. But given that Karl Popper's black swan will sooner or later appear, it is our parliamentary responsibility to prevent us from ending up in a constitutional limbo where the principle of legality can be sacrificed on the altar of necessity.

Last but not least, I want to point out that the bill we are debating today underlines the need for the next important constitutional reform: to establish a strong and independent constitutional court that reviews whether both the Riksdag's and the government's decisions are constitutionally compliant. It is the step that remains for Sweden to finally be able to be defined as a full-fledged liberal democracy.

(Applause)

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(A decision was to be taken on 3 December.)

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