Strengthened protection for democracy and the independence of the courts

Hans Ekström (S)

Mr. Speaker! We live in a restless and conflict-ridden time. Institutions in our world that we believed were stable are shaking. In country after country, democracy is threatened. The judiciary is challenged by politicians in several countries and risks being politicized. Naturally, with such a world around us, we must see if our institutions are sufficiently protected, even if we feel we live in an unthreatened democracy and rule of law.

The Government notes in its bill Strengthened Protection for Democracy and the Independence of the Courts that everything is functioning relatively well here, but that the protection can be strengthened in certain areas. We Social Democrats share this view.

When a constitutional law is to be amended, a unanimous decision is required with an intervening election – this is so that the proposed amendment can be discussed before the election. There is also a minority protection so that one-third can request a referendum in connection with the election.

To further strengthen the protection of the constitutional laws, a so-called quorum rule is proposed, meaning that the calculation shall be based on all members of the Riksdag and not only those voting on the decision. Furthermore, it is proposed that a two-thirds majority shall be required in the second decision, which the investigation notes is already Swedish practice. Changes to the constitutional laws have not been pushed through with narrow majorities.

It has also been proposed in the debate, a so-called eternity clause regarding central parts of the Instrument of Government. This is rejected because there is a risk that it could lead to the constitutional laws becoming a rounding mark if they are perceived as impossible to adapt to the changes in the world. This happened, for example, with the Instrument of Government of 1809, which did state that the king alone has the right to govern the realm.

The changes in the decision-making procedure are also proposed to apply to the main provisions of the parliamentary rules. Furthermore, constitutional laws must also be reviewed by the Council on Legislation in the future. One reason for this is that the Instrument of Government is today more frequently interpreted in the application of the law in the courts than previously.

Regarding the independence of the courts, it is proposed that the court administration be given a freer position in relation to the government. Also, the provisions on the appointment of judges and the regulation of the number of judges in the supreme courts, as well as the provisions on retirement, are reviewed. All of this is done to make it more difficult to make such interventions as have been made in other countries. The supervision of the courts' adjudications is freed from the government and placed entirely under the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the National Audit Office, which are under the Riksdag.

It is pleasing that a broad majority in the Riksdag stands behind this proposal to protect democracy and the justice system. The Sweden Democrats supported the proposal in the investigation but now believe that too small a minority can stop constitutional changes. They therefore believe that a third is a small minority. Consequently, they turn against the Swedish tradition of seeking broad majorities for changes to our constitutions. I hope that the Swedish people notice that position.

I vote in favor of the proposal in the report in its entirety.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Martin Westmont (SD)

Mr. Speaker! In accordance with tradition, I would like to begin by moving for the approval of reservation number 1 in the report, but I naturally stand behind all our reservations.

Today we are debating the bill Strengthened protection for democracy and the independence of the courts, an issue that concerns the very heart of our constitutional system. It is a proposal that goes straight into the core of our democratic order: the protection of our rule of law, the independence of the courts, and how the constitution shall be able to be amended.

It is pressing issues, Mr. Speaker, which also require a certain caution. For the Sweden Democrats, it is of great importance that we safeguard the principles of the rule of law, our democracy, and the will of the people. Democracy deserves balance and not barriers. We believe that the government's proposal, which we can find in KU2 Strengthened protection for democracy and the independence of the courts, ignores the big picture.

What is the big picture, Mr. Speaker? It is that the government's proposal risks locking our democracy into a system where a minority is given a veto over the majority's will. A minority shall, therefore, be able to block a bill that a majority of the Swedish people's representatives want to push through. Does it safeguard the principles of the rule of law and the democratic core that is so important to safeguard and protect? It is a question worth contemplating.

The main proposal of the bill is that the second parliamentary decision in a constitutional amendment shall always require a two-thirds majority. A third of the members of parliament are given a veto right and, in practice, the power to block changes that are good for Sweden and Sweden's citizens, regardless of the election result. This constitutes a barrier that can prevent necessary and popularly supported reforms from being implemented. It contradicts the core of the majority principle – the very engine of a representative democracy.

We already have a strong protection today, with two decisions and an intervening election, to carry out an amendment of the constitution. It allows for reflection, debate, and popular influence. Adding an additional requirement will create a rigid system that is not in step with society's development. We risk being unable to carry out important constitutional amendments even though a majority of the Swedish people have clearly shown through their ballot papers that it is precisely this that they want to happen.

Mr. Speaker! To realize the problem, one only needs to look at the content of certain current political proposals that the Tidö parties are now pushing through to repair a worn-out Sweden. Reforms to stop organized crime, to ban terror support, to revoke citizenship granted on incorrect grounds, or to strengthen the protection of property rights can become impossible to implement with the proposal that is now being presented.

If a minority of the members of the Riksdag is constantly given a veto right to stop important reforms that put the well-being of Sweden's citizens first, our ability to meet precisely those threats that democracy needs to be protected against is weakened. These can be threats with AI-generated content, global disinformation, and other digital elements that require Sweden to be able to act resolutely.

The Government also proposes that Sweden's relationship with the EU and the European Court of Justice receive reinforced constitutional protection. Since joining the EU, the balance of power has changed. Migration, labor law, and energy policy are increasingly influenced by the EU. To constitutionally anchor the relationship in this situation makes it more difficult for future generations to reconsider our national independence. This is not something we should decide lightly.

We see, however, Mr. Speaker, with some satisfaction regarding the parts concerning the independence of the courts. We support the elements that strengthen the core of the rule of law. But even here, balance is required. That the role of the courts is strengthened in the constitution, that the Courts Administration is given a freer position, and that judicial appointments are made with increased independence is something that the Sverigedemokraterna welcome.

Mr. Speaker! We must handle issues concerning constitutional amendments with caution and respect. That is also why the Sweden Democrats propose that the government should reconsider this issue. We have referral bodies that have submitted various views – both positive and negative. Take these into account, analyze the holistic perspective regarding the bill, and return with which important constitutional laws should be subject to a qualified majority in the second vote!

The Sweden Democrats say no to a general requirement for a qualified majority. We are prepared to discuss a model where the most fundamental parts of Swedish legislation have a special protection but, Mr. Speaker, where other constitutional amendments remain changeable if a majority of the Swedish people want that to happen.

The people's support and the people's voice shall weigh heavily in our general elections; it is one of the pillars of democracy. It is also why this is such a fundamentally important issue for the people's party – Sverigedemokraterna.

Democracy is strong because it is anchored among the people, because it is open and because it is adaptable. Our constitutional laws on freedom of expression and the press are cornerstones of a free society, but they must be able to be updated to be in step with the reality we live in.

The principle of popular sovereignty is a principle based on the will of the majority of the citizens. It is not the Sweden Democrats or the Social Democrats who should decide whether we should carry out a constitutional amendment or not. It is a majority of the Swedish people who shall hold that right and no one else.

Let us safeguard the will of the people, exactly as it is formulated in Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Swedish Instrument of Government: All public power in Sweden derives from the people.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Ulrik Nilsson (M)

Mr. Speaker! There will be some repetitions here as we, in different words, say that we are now talking about something of the most fundamental we have in Sweden. Then we can draw some different conclusions, and I will return to this. Regeringsformen has a special position in Swedish legislation regarding the description of how Sweden shall function and how we shall interact and make decisions.

The proposal we now have on the table concerns essentially two issues. The first concerns what should be included in the Instrument of Government and how it should be amended. The second concerns the position of the courts.

Let me begin with the first, that is, the amendment of the Instrument of Government. The balance that needs to be struck between protecting what must be permanent – that each individual should be able to rely on – and what should be changeable is clearly described in both the bill and the referral statements that exist.

The balance is not simple. If it is too difficult to change, the will of the people may come into question, which a couple of referral bodies also claim. If it is too easy, it can, on the other hand, pose a threat to democracy. We see states where, for example, a so-called constitutional majority has been exploited to carry out far-reaching changes that do not favor democratic development.

Mr. Speaker! When I take into account both of these aspects – both the need for the will of the people to be realized and the need to be able to presuppose a stability in our constitutional laws – I conclude that it is a reasonable balance that is made in the proposal we see today. I think it is a reasonable balance to have two decisions, where the latter decision should have a qualified majority when the question has been able to be out in a broad debate in an election campaign.

Here we approach the question: What is it then that we are to protect? If one uses the constitution to establish a political opinion, I can understand that one wants to be able to change it in a simpler way. Then one wants to be able to both remove and add. But I believe that is wrongly conceived.

I believe that everything that it is reasonable to have different political opinions about is what we should face in the debate – not constitutionally protected. One should not use the constitution to ensure the opinions that one oneself thinks are right or that one's party advocates. This should happen in the debate. That is exactly why the qualified majority is important. Then it is the core, what we all agree on, that we stand behind.

The fundamentals also have other purposes. We must ensure the basic human freedoms and rights. We must ensure the functioning of democracy. This is the foundation, for a society can only be built on people who, in cooperation, develop their own abilities. We must all have security so that we can grow, participate in social life, and develop ideas, thoughts, and ambitions.

Mr. Speaker! The trilogy of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is often repeated in many contexts. It is also a fairly good description of today's matter, because it concerns the rule of law. It is about how we can ensure that we have courts that independently examine our case, not because of political indications and on a political basis, but on a factual basis that rests on what we have actually decided here in the Riksdag. The law shall be followed without influence. It is precisely for that reason that it is so important that we review how the courts are made independent. The principle that we shall all be equal before the law is fundamental and important. We must be able to trust it. Even here, a change comes that I believe implies a significant improvement in individuals' opportunity to cooperate for a strong and united Sweden.

Mr. Speaker! We agree on the substance, but there is a certain discrepancy regarding how simple it should be to adopt a constitutional amendment in the second decision. We must also remember that it is a question of the second decision, that is to say, if a constitutional amendment has been presented in the first decision, it can be debated in a public debate. If the issue has strong popular support, that support will likely gain traction in the second decision. It is not that there must be a qualified majority all the way.

Mr. Speaker! It is a strength that we are so united in substance. It shows that Swedish democracy stands strong, but we must also nurture it. Democracy must be nurtured by those of us who are representatives of political opinions. If not we, who are actually tasked with managing democracy, think it is important, it will be undermined through various interventions and debate systems – I do not need to mention social media.

We must nurture democracy, and it is a responsibility we have in the parties and here in the chamber. But we must nurture it with respect and objectivity. We must listen to one another, try to understand, and find reasonable compromises. The constitution shall regulate that which ensures that Swedish citizens can grow and develop. At the same time, we shall avoid using the constitution to define political positions and political opinions. These shall be met in the open and free debate, which in turn shall be secured by the constitution.

Mr. Speaker! I move for the approval of the proposal in the Committee on the Constitution's report 2.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jessica Wetterling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Why do we have democracy? Is it really so good, and why?

More and more people, especially young people, seem to doubt and question democracy as a social system. Yesterday, this year's report from the Youth Barometer was released, which shows that more and more young people are worried about the future of democracy and doubt its ability to handle our societal challenges. At the same time, only one in four young people in Sweden feels that they can influence society. Before the corona pandemic, approximately half of young people felt that they could influence. In five years, the decrease has been significant.

I believe that we adults really need to reflect on what lies behind this. The global decline of democracy and an uncertain world where the moods of authoritarian leaders affect our daily lives are, of course, contributing factors. But many young people also describe in the survey that everything is connected to a social climate that is perceived as increasingly divided, with insecurity, growing social and economic gaps, as well as increasing polarization. Despite everything, the breakthrough for democracy in Sweden with universal and equal suffrage occurred just over a hundred years ago. One does not need to go back so many generations in history to find a time when many of the civil and political rights that we take for granted today were far from self-evident.

Mr. Speaker! The democratic decline among the world's countries has been ongoing for 25 years and shows no signs of abating. The latest democracy report from the VDem Institute at the University of Gothenburg shows that democratic countries are now in the minority and that freedom of expression is decreasing. Their measurements also show that autocratization, that is, de-democratization, often coincides with a high degree of disinformation and polarization. And no country is immune – not even Sweden.

What is the point of democracy, really? Is it just the least bad system? It is often accused of being slow and inefficient, and as a politician, one risks not getting exactly what one wants. One also has to compromise, and the impactful proposals might be watered down along the way. Or is it exactly the opposite, that is to say that we succeed in making wiser and more well-thought-out decisions when we have a solid legislative process, when we get to reflect and turn over the arguments for and against. There is a point to a certain inertia, predictability, and stability in our system.

Research has long shown that democracies make more knowledge-based and thus more sensible decisions. Autocracies, on the other hand, suppress free knowledge, free media, and artists who scrutinize and question power. This leads to irrational decisions and suffering in the form of war, famine, and ill health.

As late as last year, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economics, which is incorrectly often called the Nobel Prize in Economics, went to researchers who have just shown how crucial social institutions are for a country's prosperity. Their work shows how inclusive institutions, such as a functioning democracy and strong legal systems, create better public health, lower infant mortality, less domestic violence, and higher levels of happiness. That should be something that all of us in this chamber can agree is good.

The proposal, which the Left Party obviously stands behind, has also been preceded by a parliamentary commission of inquiry, which was given ample time to turn and twist arguments regarding how we should or should not review the conditions for changing the constitution and how we should strengthen the independence of our courts. It was a unanimous inquiry, something that I have truly welcomed. Otherwise, it is usually my party that reserves itself in various inquiries regarding the area of the constitution.

Now we are creating greater protection for our courts' independence. Through the amendment of how the constitution is changed, we establish what previous speakers have pointed out has been practice for a long time, namely that we seek broad agreements in the chamber precisely because our constitution holds a special position and builds a foundation for our country. Then it shall not be possible to change it hipp hopp. Of course, it has not been possible to do so previously either, but now we are strengthening the protection.

I therefore move for the proposal in the report to be approved.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Muharrem Demirok (C)

Mr. Speaker! I shall begin my first speech in a KU debate with an acknowledgment. When I, as a young student at home in Linköping, chose to engage politically, questions regarding constitutional laws and the independence of the courts were low on my agenda. But over the years, this has changed. Perhaps one becomes wiser with age, as it is often said, but more likely it is due to a changing world.

I now follow constitutional issues with great interest, precisely because we live in a changing world. We live in a time when democracy in many parts of the world is being questioned, where important foundations of the rule of law are being eroded and freedoms are being restricted. It makes it extra important that we here at home in Sweden are vigilant. We need strong and independent institutions that act in the long term.

Today we are debating one of the most fundamental questions in our democracy, namely the protection of the constitutional laws and the independence of the courts. We agree on most points.

We will together remember that this is the foundation upon which our rule of law rests. The constitutional laws are not just rules. They are guarantees for precisely the rule of law, for the individual's freedom and rights, and for democratic principles to endure over time.

At the center of the bill lies the proposal to make it more difficult to change the constitutional laws through the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the confirming decision. It is a clear step to strengthen the protection of democracy. The Center Party sees it as an important safety mechanism. We know that short-term majorities do not always take long-term consequences into account, but by raising the threshold, we ensure that changes only occur when there is broad and long-term support here in the chamber of the Riksdag.

Mr. Speaker! Democracy is more than just majority rule. It is about stability, predictability, and protection for minorities. Requiring a two-thirds majority for confirming decisions is a way to combine these principles.

At the same time, we clarify for the citizens that the constitution is something more than political contingencies. It is the very framework for our society.

It is certainly possible to argue that higher requirements make it more difficult to quickly implement reforms. But for the Center Party, it is about balancing stability and flexibility. They are two sides of the same democratic coin. It requires a lot from us. It requires cooperation across block boundaries so that democracy can be both protected and dynamic.

Mr. Speaker! Another important area in the bill is the independence of the courts. In a democracy, the courts are not just a part of the justice system. They are the very guarantee that the laws are applied fairly and impartially. If this independence is threatened, we risk the citizens' trust. We also risk that the business community's trust in the system is completely eroded. If that happens, we risk not only that investments will be withheld, but we also risk seeing corruption spread throughout our society.

In the proposition, among other things, changes are proposed to the rules regarding judges' retirement at a certain age and limitations on authorities' supervision of the courts' judicial activities. This strengthens the courts' protection against political influence. For the Center Party, this is precisely what is central. The courts must be able to make decisions without having to take political considerations into account.

Mr. Speaker! We must not, however, let ourselves be blinded by the security of merely raised thresholds. Democracy must be alive, it must be inclusive, and it must be responsive. Citizens must see that their voices matter. Raised requirements for constitutional amendments do not make change impossible. It only makes it more deliberate, broadly anchored, and respectful of the principles that carry our society forward.

The proposition contains several legislative proposals. But I think we should also see it as a chance to reflect on our responsibility as legislators. It is not just about decisions here and now. It is also about building a system that works for generations.

Finally: This is not a question of political points or short-term gains, which feels safe in today's debate. It is about standing up for the principles that make Sweden exactly what it is. Our courts must be able to judge fairly. Constitutional laws shall not be disturbed by temporary majorities. And the citizens' civil liberties and rights shall be protected.

Centerpartiet sees this bill as an important step in the right direction. We want to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and the institutions that make our society safe. Therefore, we support and stand behind the bill, and we urge the Chamber to do the same.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Gudrun Brunegård (KD)

Mr. Speaker! This debate concerns, as we have heard, a proposal for a constitutional amendment to strengthen the protection of democracy and the independence of the courts.

An independent judiciary and independent institutions are cornerstones for securing the principles of the rule of law. The consequences when this is not the case are something that I, in my role as spokesperson for aid policy, see many examples of. It is therefore an important part of Swedish aid to strengthen the building of democracies and independent, autonomous institutions in different parts of the world.

Through, for example, the impartiality of judges, trust is created in the individual citizen that one will receive a fair and lawful review of one's case, even if the opposing party is a person in power, an authority, or the state itself. Justice must, after all, be administered in accordance with the law, not to satisfy anyone's own interests. This is just as important in our own country, Sweden.

One might think that the fact that there is already a constitutional protection requiring a two-step change with an intervening election should be enough to ensure the independence of the courts. But we see a worrying development in many places in our world. Previous democratic gains have been rolled back step by step, and more and more authoritarian regimes have taken control of the judiciary. For example, the appointment of judges, especially in the higher courts, is being politicized, and constitutional amendments are being pushed through that reduce the possibility of holding those in power accountable and of the individual citizen getting their rights.

It is to counteract the possibility of something similar occurring in Sweden that the government, after a unanimous parliamentary investigation has spoken out, proposes a number of steps to safeguard the independence of courts and judges.

The first step we are now taking is to make a decision on a dormant constitutional proposal that is to be finalized after next year's election. When the new law enters into force on 1 April 2027, it will be required that at least half of the members of the Riksdag – not half of those who happen to be in the chamber, but half of the members – vote to adopt a constitutional proposal that becomes dormant. A qualified majority of at least two-thirds of the members of the Riksdag then needs to vote at the second decision, after an intervening election, to finally amend the constitution.

The Council on Legislation shall, according to the proposal, issue an opinion before the Riksdag decides on amendments to the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.

When it comes to the independence of the courts, the proposal means that the risk of political steering is reduced. The authority responsible for the administration of the courts shall, according to the proposal, be led by a board where a majority of the members are judges. The members of this board shall not be removed from their mandate unless a qualified majority of at least three-quarters of the members of the Riksdag decides so.

The number of justices in the supreme courts is also proposed to be regulated in the Instrument of Government. A new provision is also introduced stating that a regular judge may be separated from employment if he or she has reached the age of retirement prescribed in the law.

Another important point for reducing the risk of politicization is that the Chancellor of Justice, JK, who is the government's representative, will not be able to exercise supervision over the courts' judicial activities. That mandate shall rest with the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, JO, and the National Audit Office. On the other hand, JK's task to watch over freedom of the press and freedom of expression remains. According to the proposal, JK shall not be able to bring criminal charges against Justices of the Supreme Court.

These are several steps that are important to ensure that one reduces the risk of politicization and that a regime undermines the rule of law we have today. They strengthen the rule of law instead.

With these examples of how the proposed constitutional amendments will strengthen democracy and the independence of the courts, I would like to move for the approval of the proposal in the report.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jan Riise (MP)

Mr. Speaker! The first KU debate of the Riksdag is therefore about something as important as strengthened protection for democracy and the independence of the courts. These are two cornerstones of Swedish society, and questions concerning these should, of course, be given the significant attention they deserve.

The strengthened protection for democracy that we are talking about is about tightening the conditions for being able to change our constitutional laws. This may seem counterproductive in times when demands for efficiency and productivity prevail. But I do not think one should see it as the proposed rules making anything harder. Rather, it is that they make it easier to defend the laws we have and which we believe have been good for Sweden.

We therefore oppose the proposals on quorum rules and on the requirement for a qualified majority for constitutional amendments. We also oppose that these rules should apply to all constitutions. Proposals have been discussed to designate certain constitutions as particularly important, but we believe it is reasonable that constitutions are judged as equal. Overall, such rules contribute to making it more difficult for a temporary majority to attempt to implement changes for the benefit of their own party or their parties.

To begin with, we believe that an important aspect of our democratic system is the proportional democracy that allows for more parties and thus more opinions that can be raised, discussed, and eventually rejected or accepted. In which case, they contribute to broadening the debate and the free formation of opinion. It is something we must take very much to heart.

Mr. Speaker! Our fundamental laws reflect our common perception of how our society should be organized. They are part of the answer to the question: What kind of society do we want? They are the very foundation of the Swedish system of government.

Usually, one might think of a sovereign state as a territory with fixed and recognized borders, and that has its grounds and good reasons. But one can also think of a state as an area where the inhabitants have a kind of agreement on how this area shall be governed, which is then expressed in legislation and administration.

As a small side note, one can say that it also makes it possible to imagine a state with more than one people. We do not need to go further than to Norway to find that idea – a country that has two peoples: Norwegians and Sámi.

Mr. Speaker! We in Miljöpartiet thus welcome the proposals we have received on our desks. It is reasonable, we think, to strengthen the protection of the fundamental laws through additional requirements on how changes can be implemented.

There has been a consensus among the parties in the Riksdag that constitutional amendments should only be made with broad majorities backing the decisions. Likewise, it has hardly been questioned that constitutional amendments should require two decisions with an election in between. The inertia that this creates has been regarded as desirable in order not to invite rapid changes to the way the country is to be governed.

It is almost a self-evident matter, I would argue, that constitutional laws should not be able to be pushed through by a majority that is no larger than half plus one member. We do not, as I mentioned just now, have that kind of majority rule, and I believe it would be unfortunate if we went in that direction, especially in times when polarization is generally considered to be increasing in society.

In this context, it has also been discussed whether it is important that all constitutional amendments are covered by requirements for quorum and qualified majority at the second decision point. For our part, we agree with the committee's considerations and decisions – it is reasonable that the requirements should apply to all constitutional amendments. On the one hand, it is difficult to determine where the line should be drawn between requirements for a qualified majority and requirements for a simple majority at the decision, and on the other hand, there are examples from other countries where constitutional decisions have been made as ordinary majority decisions, which, if it occurred here, would counteract the idea of broad participation from the parties in the Riksdag.

It is also not reasonable, we argue, to introduce rules that mean certain constitutional laws cannot be changed at all – eternity clauses that completely disregard the extensive changes our planet and the world's states are facing.

Mr. Speaker! We also have a proposal regarding the independence of judges and the courts. Developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world have made it necessary to strengthen the independence of judges and courts and reduce the risks of improper pressure, not least from governments that might want to influence how justice is administered in our country. Such examples exist from other countries, even countries that perhaps have seen themselves as immune to such rather shocking changes to the country's legal system.

The European Commission conducted a survey some years ago on citizens' trust in the judiciary in each respective country. In some countries, trust is increasing, albeit perhaps from low levels. In Slovenia, Slovakia, Italy, and Portugal, trust has increased significantly, but from very low levels. In some countries, an already weak trust has fallen further. This is most evident in Hungary and Poland but has also occurred in, for example, Croatia. Here we are talking about trust figures of 22–25 percent of the population.

In the upper half of the table, there are countries that have lost a little or gained a little. The judicial systems of Denmark and Finland enjoyed, in 2023, the greatest trust among their respective inhabitants, a full 86 percent. In places three to five, Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg were found. In sixth place, we find Sweden, which after a decline of a couple of percentage points was noted to have trust among 75 percent of the population. In these positions, the movements are quite small, and I cannot account for how confidence intervals and other statistical data look.

Another study is the one that the Foundation Rättsfonden conducted a few years ago in Sweden, which showed that a large proportion of young people defined as final-year students in upper secondary school lived in the belief that the government can change judgments. A full 68 percent, that is, just over two-thirds of the young people, answered in the study that this is the case. This is worrying. It is a reason good as any to implement the proposed changes, which not only increase independence actually and formally but can therefore also create better confidence in judges and courts. A rule of law is simply not conceivable without a completely independent judiciary.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize that the Green Party's positions are based on congress decisions that encompass both constitutional changes and the independence of the courts. The specific statement submitted by the Green Party in connection with the investigation concerns reflections regarding the possibility that one of the required elections could be an extra election.

In this speech, Jacob Risberg (MP) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mauricio Rojas (L)

Mr. Speaker! With today's decision, we will take an important step towards a normalization of Sweden in a constitutional sense.

It has been a long journey from the time that has rightly been called the constitutional-less half-century, when our constitution was largely both irrelevant and rather contentless. It was a strange time when we had full parliamentarism and at the same time could read in the Instrument of Government: "The King alone owns the right to govern the realm."

The void consisted of the absence of a catalogue of the fundamental civil liberties and rights that the state committed itself to respect. There was also a lack of both a constitutionally mandated right of judicial review and a specific instance where the constitutionality of laws and administrative decisions could be reviewed. These are the two most important liberal elements in modern constitutions. Their purpose is to protect the individual against the abuses of power.

Mr. Speaker! To defend the individual against the potential overreach of political power – regardless of whether this power is autocratic, aristocratic, or democratic – constitutes the very core of a Western political tradition that began some centuries before Christ in ancient Greece and extends to our day. This tradition is based on the existence of inalienable or self-evident liberties and rights. Governments have been established among people to secure these rights, to use the words of the American Declaration of Independence.

This tradition has largely been absent in Sweden, where trust in – rather than mistrust towards – the state power has characterized political thinking. It is precisely this state-centered Swedish tradition that we are now distancing ourselves from in a clear way.

Mr. Speaker! On a day like today, it may be worth reminding [us] of the origin of this state-loving tradition, as it says much about Sweden's historical characteristics. Several historians have pondered its strong position in modern Swedish history.

The legal realism of the Uppsala School is often mentioned as a source of a political practice that rejected all talk of rights other than those that were actually granted or allocated by the prevailing system. This stood in sharp contrast to the natural law tradition that underlies the classical American and French declarations of rights and likewise the modern international declarations, from the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the European Convention.

In the Sweden that during the post-war period was dominated by the Social Democrats, practically nothing was noticed of the natural law renaissance that followed the fall of Nazism. Here, legal realism continued to prevail, which suited the Social Democrats' claims to power perfectly.

The explanation for the Swedish state-friendly tradition goes even further back in time, Mr. Speaker. Several historians have pointed out the unique form that the state took in pre-modern Sweden, especially regarding the relationship between the monarchy and the free peasantry. The Lund historian Eva Österberg has, for example, highlighted the significance of the free peasant class's strong position and its relation to a paternalistic state power that both protected and controlled the common people, which in turn safeguarded a conditional but still significant freedom.

The now so relevant Lars Trägårdh has in the same spirit written that the Swedish democratic culture emerged from ”a domestic tradition characterized by the Swedish farmer's unique freedom from serfdom and the political participation associated therewith at both local and national levels, as well as a pronounced pro-monarchist attitude based on the farmers' alliance with the monarchy directed against the common enemy, the nobility”.

Trägårdh adds: ”Thus, the peasant–royal alliance played a completely central role in the history of Swedish political culture, and in its time, the labor movement and social democracy could shoulder the double heritage and take over both as king and commoner from above, in the form of a state-bearing party, and from below, in the form of a popular movement.”

There is a fundamental political-cultural continuity between pre-modern and modern Sweden which, for better or worse, still lives on and is reflected, among other things, in the fact that we can still use state and society as synonymous concepts.

My conclusion from this very summary review is that both the dominance of legal realism and the unique position of power of the Social Democrats during the 20th century were built on a substantial harmony with a deeply rooted historical heritage, permeated by state-friendliness but also – and this must not be forgotten – by mutual trust between state and society. This can help us understand both the strength of these phenomena as well as the great significance of the constitutional changes that we are now undergoing.

Mr. Speaker! The decision that the Riksdag will make today is, in other words, historic. We are taking the first step towards ensuring that our constitutional laws can no longer be changed – or completely abolished – by a simple majority at two votes with a parliamentary election in between. This arrangement has been an anomaly among democracies, a vulnerability for our system of government and, not least, a potential threat to our fundamental freedoms and rights.

Most parties have therefore stood behind the amendment. The Sweden Democrats are an exception. They have fundamentally taken the same position that the Social Democrats previously had, that is, to brake or delay any strengthening of the constitution's position. Other parties, such as the Social Democrats, have only recently seen the light on this issue, which is pleasing after the party's long-standing opposition to strengthening the protection for our constitution and thereby for our democracy and our fundamental rights.

One could say a lot about a history that today's Social Democrats can hardly be proud of. There was a time – not so long ago – when the constitutional laws could be changed in just a few weeks. That was how the 1974 Instrument of Government was originally constructed. It was the social democratic order in a nutshell. This order we are now definitively leaving behind, but today we stand behind the same line. It is appreciated, regardless of the motives for the Social Democrats' shift in position.

Mr. Speaker! For us in the Liberals, it is gratifying to note that Sweden is now taking the first step towards a constitutional reform that we have long advocated for, but we would like to proceed with the constitutional reform work. This applies particularly in two areas.

The first thing concerns strengthening the judicial review institution by establishing a strong constitutional court with broad powers. This is a self-evident matter in most democracies, but it has been – and appears to still be – a red flag for social democracy. A constitutional court would be the best way to create an effective review body for both laws enacted by the Riksdag as well as decisions by the government and other authorities. The strong and highly respected German constitutional court could serve as a model in this regard.

Mr. Speaker! The second reform that we would like to implement concerns further strengthening the independence of the courts. In the 2020 Constitutional Committee, the Liberal representative Cecilia Malmström, together with representatives from three other parties, submitted a special statement on the need to strengthen the independence of the courts through the establishment of an independent court council responsible for the central court administration. In this way, the judiciary would be completely freed from its traditional dependence on the government, and it would constitute a definitive and very welcome breakthrough for the principle of the separation of powers.

Such a change, together with the establishment of a strong constitutional court, would constitute a solid constitutional safeguard for both the democratic rule of law and our fundamental freedoms and rights.

Mr. Speaker! Finally, I would like to move for approval of the committee's proposal.

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 12.)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)