Response to interpellation 2023/24:289 on sanctions against Russia
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
I believe that strong and sustained support for Ukraine is the primary foreign policy task 1 2. I mean that Sweden is proactive within the EU to tighten the sanctions 1 and that the government takes compliance very seriously by adapting the management of sanction enforcement 1. I emphasize that the sanctions already have an effect by pressuring Russia's economy and limiting access to advanced technology 3. I mean that legislative changes must be preceded by investigations 4. I highlight that authorities need to stay updated to be able to assist companies that want to support Ukraine 4 and that audits of European companies' activities in third countries can contribute to punishment and improvement 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)
Madam Speaker! Tomas Eneroth has asked me if I intend to take any new initiatives to ensure that the sanctions against Russia are complied with.
Let me begin by saying that strong, predictable and sustained support for Ukraine constitutes our primary opportunity to limit Russia's options for action. Our military, political and economic support for Ukraine remains our primary foreign policy task.
Furthermore, Sweden is pushing within the EU to tighten the sanctions and limit Russia's ability to finance its war of aggression.
The government takes the work of compliance with sanctions very seriously. Compliance with the EU's sanctions is a complicated issue that requires collective and also long-term efforts. It is an obligation that involves cooperation between the member states' governments and relevant authorities, the EU Commission and EEAS, as well as with international partners.
The increasing number of sanctions against Russia aims to reduce the country's possibilities to continue the attack against Ukraine and is thus an important component of our support for Ukraine. It simultaneously constitutes a challenge for all member states who have to implement the EU's decisions in an effective and legally secure manner.
It is welcome that the recently adopted twelfth sanctions package contains sharp measures against the circumvention of the sanctions. Sweden has actively contributed with proposals in the negotiations, and the government views positively that the issue is high on the agenda. For the export of certain goods outside the EU, requirements are introduced that the sales agreements must stipulate that re-export to Russia may not occur. The ban on the transit of goods through Russia is extended, which also reduces the risk of circumvention. Furthermore, more individuals and companies in third countries that have been involved in the circumvention of the sanctions are placed on the sanctions list.
The Government welcomes these steps and sees that there is room to tighten the measures in the future. Continued pressure on third countries is necessary to close loopholes.
On a national level, competent and relevant authorities have a responsibility for sanctions compliance. These authorities also bear the responsibility to ensure that sanctions legislation is followed and that crimes are countered. The Government Offices have ongoing contact with competent and relevant authorities and with other member states regarding sanctions compliance. The Government continuously adapts its governance, control, and coordination of sanctions implementation based on the decisions made in Brussels.
As I previously conveyed to Tomas Eneroth, the EU Commission presented a proposal for a directive regarding the criminalization of violations of EU sanctions in December 2022 - this with the aim of strengthening enforcement by introducing common minimum rules regarding, among other things, criminal definitions and penalties. The Council and the European Parliament have now reached an agreement regarding the directive, which will therefore go to a decision shortly.
The Government has appointed a special investigator who has been tasked with analyzing the need for and submitting proposals for constitutional amendments and other possible measures that are necessary to implement the directive. The investigation will, among other things, analyze the need for changes to ensure purposeful cooperation and information exchange between authorities regarding sanctions, both between law enforcement agencies as well as in relation to and between other authorities.
In conclusion, I want to repeat that our military, political, and economic support for Ukraine remains the primary foreign policy task for the coming years. We limit Russia's options primarily through strong, predictable, and sustained support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the government prioritizes both new sanctions against Russia and the effective implementation of already adopted sanctions.
Tomas Eneroth (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister, for a very good answer! I share the government's and the Minister's view on the importance of strong sanction provisions. I think it is good that Sweden, with broad support in the Riksdag, has pushed forward internationally and in the EU when it comes to the sanctions framework. The twelfth package is good; it was an important step forward, and it is important that it is also implemented in all European states, not least.
But it is a matter of us, in order to be credible when we politically drive this within the EU, also managing to fulfill the responsibility regarding the sanction regulations at home. It is up to each member state to take its responsibility and ensure that it follows the regulatory framework that we have now decided on in the EU and the intentions behind the different sanction packages.
Finnish Customs recently revealed that two Finnish entrepreneurs exported 3,500 drones to Russia, along with semiconductor components and other war materiel. Charges have now been filed in Finland to curb this in an effective manner.
In Sweden, the work has unfortunately not been as successful so far. When I checked in with the Prosecution Authority yesterday, I was informed that not a single indictment has yet been filed against any Swedish company. Despite this, in Dagens Nyheters investigation, to take an example, we have been able to see that suspicions have arisen against very many Swedish companies regarding violations of the sanctions. It has concerned large, well-known Swedish companies - Trelleborg, Astra Zeneca, Assa, Securitas - where corporate managements have naturally communicated that this is unacceptable. But nevertheless, Swedish products have been in Russia. In different ways, they have made their way there, sometimes through ordinary, simple export transactions and sometimes through transports via other countries into Russia.
The Center for Financial Crime and Security, an organization based in the United Kingdom, I believe, states that there are deficiencies in Sweden's controls. They say that it is clear that the capacity to investigate sanctions violations within law enforcement agencies is very low.
Here we have a concern if we see the political necessity of having tough sanction provisions but at the same time do not appear to have effective work at home. This undermines credibility, not least for the Foreign Minister, if one pushes the issue of sanctions hard in international contexts and in EU contexts.
Here, the government could take several different initiatives. One could convene Swedish business to talk about common codes of conduct, designate an authority as specifically responsible, have a national coordinator, increase resources to the responsible authorities, or have specific assignments in regulation letters. But what I have understood is that the only action the government has taken so far is to appoint an investigator who will look at how the EU's new sanction rules should be implemented.
In a situation where not a single indictment has been filed and Sweden appears to be falling behind in the important crime-fighting work it entails to fulfill and uphold the sanctions that we consider so important from a foreign policy perspective, the question is posed to the Minister if he does not think it would be urgent to, perhaps together with some colleague at the Ministry of Justice, take more and new active initiatives to ensure that Swedish products do not constitute indirect support for Russia's terrible warfare in Ukraine.
Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)
Madam Speaker! It is of course welcome that Dagens Nyheter, the recently mentioned CFCS and other actors examine how the EU's sanctions are implemented. The better the sanctions are complied with, the more the pressure on Russia increases.
The Government takes these issues very seriously. Sweden, just like other member states, has an obligation to implement the EU's decisions. As I have just explained, UD is adapting its management and control of sanctions compliance in order to strengthen the coordination between the Government Offices and relevant authorities to prevent sanctions violations. UD is therefore analyzing different models for information sharing and more efficient follow-up adapted to the increased number of sanctions in recent times.
It is quite true that the government intends to task a number of agencies with reporting on how they carry out the work with the EU's sanctions and providing proposals for measures that ensure compliance. It was good that Tomas Eneroth also raised this aspect in his review.
Within the framework of the investigation on the implementation of a directive on the criminalization of violations of EU sanctions that the government has appointed, changes are being considered to ensure purposeful cooperation and information exchange between authorities regarding sanctions. The government is awaiting the investigation and can then proceed with the measures that are necessary.
It is important to remember that the sanctions against Russia are already having an effect, but also that this is a long-term effort. Russia is suffering large military losses and is pressured by an increasingly weakened and isolated economy. The ruble exchange rate is set under currency control measures, and the manufacturing industry suffers from a shortage of Western components.
Russia's limited access to advanced technology as a result of the sanctions has also weakened the country's ability to manufacture war materiel, and this shows that the EU's policy is working and that time is not on Russia's side. On the contrary, the longer time passes, the more difficult it becomes for Russia to maintain its warfare.
We now have the most powerful and far-reaching sanctions ever against Russia, and this directly means reduced revenues for the Russian state treasury. But more needs to be done. The Government has, before, during, and after Sweden's presidency in the EU, pushed to increase the pressure on Russia, including through sanctions, and the Government looks forward to discussions on the conditions for a thirteenth sanctions package, including tightened measures against circumventing the sanctions.
The entire EU - member states, institutions, companies, and private individuals - has a responsibility to ensure that the sanctions are complied with, and it is therefore welcome that the European Commission assists with written guidance to facilitate regulatory compliance among European companies. At the beginning of February, the European Commission will visit Stockholm for a dialogue on the follow-up of the EU's sanction regimes, which will be an excellent opportunity to receive advice on how circumvention can be combated.
The need for written guidance will persist and likely increase as further sharp measures are introduced from the aforementioned twelfth sanctions package. The scope and complexity of the sanctions may then increase as we effectively need to counter the Russian attempts to circumvent them. To support Ukraine to the greatest extent possible, we therefore need to both work with compliance and introduce further sanctions to increase the pressure on Russia.
Tomas Eneroth (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister, for the answer! I appreciate the commitment, and I know the Foreign Minister well enough to know that it is also sincere and genuine. Therefore, I am a bit surprised. Appointing an inquiry is commendable, but it will take its time. Guidance from the EU is also good, but that too will take its time.
What I am calling for is a more active approach from the government now that there are clearly reported media reports regarding Swedish companies. Not least, Ukraine itself, in its investigation of, for example, war materiel, has been able to demonstrate that there are Swedish products there. Then it is not just about looking at the regulatory framework and slowly but surely implementing tougher rules, but it is about ensuring that the authorities have the right resources, pointing out a specific responsibility for a number of authorities, perhaps appointing a national coordinator and convening Svenskt Näringsliv and other actors and asking what responsibility they have.
Just as the Foreign Minister points out, we cannot say that it is only a legal question, but it is a moral question where we as members of the Swedish Riksdag, where the government's members, where the Swedish people and where corporate leaders and organizations also have a responsibility to do what can be done to choke off the access for the Russian war machine.
Even though there are positive signs regarding the conflict and the effects of the sanctions against Russia, we must remember that the USA still has not agreed on a support package, as this is being blocked by the Republican majority in the Senate. Also in Europe, support for further large economic or military support packages has faltered in some of the EU's member states. From Ukraine, we hear desperate cries for more ammunition but also for further and increased support.
For those of us who follow the media debate, it is obvious that all the focus that is now increasingly directed towards the conflict in the Middle East poses an obvious risk that support for further interventions in Ukraine will decrease. I am very happy and proud that this support is strong here in Sweden's Riksdag and in many of Europe's countries. It is important. But precisely because of that, we must have all our focus on ensuring that Swedish or European products do not come in through the back door and indirectly help the Russian war machine, because that is precisely what is happening.
That there is indirect support for Russia from other countries in the world is difficult to do anything about, but even there, one can act in foreign policy through indirect measures. It is about ensuring, from the Swedish side, that we do what we can. There, I believe that the government, despite the commitment that exists, could do more.
What is the obstacle to summoning Svenskt Näringsliv and providing proper, knowledge-enhancing information to export-oriented companies so that these take their own responsibility to ensure that there is no Swedish export company contributing in any way to Russia's warfare? What is the obstacle to appointing a specific responsible coordinator to ensure that the authorities become even more effective? What is the obstacle to injecting extra resources to the authorities that have the responsibility - Tullverket or Kommerskollegium - to ensure that they can work even more effectively?
When international observers say that Sweden's capacity within law enforcement agencies to investigate sanctions violations is very low, this is a failing grade for Sweden. Here we should be able to do more.
Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)
Madam Speaker! Tomas Eneroth, who himself has been a minister, knows that if one wants to change legislation or regulations, this must be preceded by investigations. That is how it is.
The Government assumes that all Swedish actors comply with current legislation, including EU sanctions, which take precedence over national law in Sweden. When the EU adopts new sanction packages, there is an absolute need to disseminate information about the new sanctions to authorities and other actors in the member states. Here, the EU Commission has an important role to play, and it is welcome that a new written guidance is prepared when new measures are presented.
At the same time, the member states' authorities, including the Swedish ones, need to stay updated in order to be able to assist companies and other actors who want to support Ukraine by complying with the sanctions to the letter.
There are positive examples to highlight that can facilitate compliance. One example is the brochure Russian Technology Procurement, which the Security Service, the Swedish Customs, and the Inspectorate for Strategic Products, ISP, have produced. The brochure aims to inform Swedish companies in order to avoid sanction circumvention. This is an example of exactly the type of information that I perceive Tomas Eneroth recently requested.
The issue of circumvention is about all actors in the EU needing to do their homework and be vigilant. I completely share the view that this also involves a moral aspect; there are no differences between Tomas Eneroth and myself there. But it is also about ensuring that actors in third countries do not contribute to the sanctions being bypassed. It is therefore welcome that the EU has appointed a sanctions envoy and that this person is very active in their contacts with global partners.
We know that the envoy's work yields results and also increases vigilance. Through the talks, the EU and the Member States also receive information about any suspected companies, which is useful for the EU and the Member States in their further work. In the sanctions envoy's and our own talks with global partners, including the USA and the UK, these underscore the importance attached to the issue.
Many countries that are pointed out in the media in various contexts are eager to rectify and do the right thing, partly to support Ukraine, partly to maintain good relations with the EU and its member states. In this way, the reviews of European companies' activities in third countries are important. They shed light on important issues and can contribute to remedy and improvement when it comes to doubts, but they can also provide incentives for global partners to take the issues even more seriously.
Tomas Eneroth (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you again, Foreign Minister Billström, for the answer! It is true that I myself have been a minister and know that legislation, regulatory changes and such take time. But I also know that regulatory letters do not take much time. Special assignments to agencies do not take much time. Enhanced agency dialogue, reprioritization of resources and appointing a national coordinator can also be fixed quite quickly, not to mention calling in business organizations for a proper review of the regulatory framework and instilling the importance of every company taking its responsibility. This can still be done. It does not require any long legislative work or long processes in either the Government Offices or the Riksdag.
With all respect for a brochure which is admittedly certainly very good, I believe that the time is past when just a brochure to authorities or companies is the answer to how one implements knowledge in organizations. A slightly more active approach is required. That must be my message here to the Minister.
If we do not have a more active approach, the risk is that even in a month, in two months, or in three months, we might distinguish ourselves as one of the few countries in the entire EU where not a single indictment has been filed, even though I am completely convinced that there are also companies in Sweden that have deliberately or inadvertently actually violated the sanction regulations.
It is clear that it is incredibly important that one ensures that there is law enforcement in this regard, partly to prevent Sweden from becoming a country where other companies choose to establish themselves if the control is poorer, and partly because we must do our utmost to prevent that we indirectly help Russia in their terrible war against Ukraine.
I have a final appeal to the Minister. We share the same commitment, but it is possible to have an even more active approach and not just refer to rules, brochures, and legislation, but also actually take active action to ensure that this issue is at the top of the agenda.
Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)
Madam Speaker! I thank the interpellor for a good debate on an important issue.
As I have mentioned, it is welcome that different actors examine how the EU's sanctions are implemented, and it is important to have a clear picture of the problem in order to be able to take appropriate and effective measures to curb this.
Against the background that since the autumn of 2023 several pieces of information have emerged regarding possible sanctions circumvention in Sweden and in other EU countries, the government has intensified the work on sanctions issues. And it concerns more than just the example I mentioned in the form of the brochure. UD has, for example, asked Kommerskollegium for proposals on operational measures - entirely in line with what the interpellor is requesting - that can be taken at both the national level and EU level to identify and counteract any circumvention of the sanctions against Russia.
This is one of several pieces that, together with changes in regulatory letters, provide a broader knowledge base and sharpen Sweden's work for strengthened sanctions compliance.
It bears repeating once more: Our military, political and economic support for Ukraine remains the primary foreign policy task for the coming years. We limit Russia's options primarily through strong, predictable and sustained support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the government prioritizes both new sanctions against Russia and an effective implementation of already adopted sanctions.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.