Response to interpellation 2023/24:829 on the government's view on changing the Public Order Act

Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! Rasmus Ling has asked me whether I and the government will present proposals to the Riksdag that involve giving the police increased opportunities to deny demonstrations and public gatherings, what risks I see that foreign powers would exploit changes to the Public Order Act and that pressures against Sweden would increase if the police are given the opportunity to deny public gatherings, and whether I share his concern that public gatherings could be denied on grounds that are subject to secrecy.

I begin by stating that Sweden's security policy situation has seriously deteriorated in recent times. This includes the situation for internal security. There is a high level of terror threat in Sweden, and the country faces threats from violent extremism. Threats against Sweden as a country, Swedish society at large, Swedish interests abroad and Swedes abroad have occurred from a number of different actors. Certain occurrences in connection with public gatherings have contributed to this. Different actors have exploited events in Sweden as a pretext to incite and use violence, including by having Swedish missions attacked. Several of the gatherings that have acted as threat-driving against Sweden have been organized by foreign citizens.

The government takes the deteriorated security situation very seriously. It must be met both with measures that have an immediate effect and with decisions that strengthen our long-term ability to handle various threats to Sweden's security. It was against that background that the government in August 2023 decided to task a special investigator to investigate the conditions and submit legislative proposals implying that circumstances threatening Sweden's security shall be able to be taken into account during the permit review for public gatherings and in considerations regarding the postponement and dissolution of such gatherings. At the same time, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly shall be protected.

In connection with the appointment of the investigation, I particularly highlighted the need to strengthen Sweden's constitutional preparedness against various types of serious threats against Swedes and Swedish interests, that is to say, that we needed to ensure that there is a basis for decision-making in order to be able to act in the future if the situation requires it.

Since these questions undoubtedly have connections to the freedom of expression and assembly, a parliamentary reference group, with representatives from all Riksdag parties, has also been attached to the investigation. It has been important for the government to have a transparent and trustworthy process.

At the beginning of the summer, the Inquiry on strengthened protection for Sweden's security at public gatherings submitted its report to the government, and that report contained a number of different proposals - alternative proposals - on how circumstances that threaten Sweden's security can be taken into account during permit reviews and other decisions. The Inquiry also submitted a number of proposals that do not target the country's security specifically but are more generally intended to ensure that the Public Order Act functions in a good way and as intended.

The investigation has thus delivered a broad basis with several alternative proposals for solutions. The report has been sent for consultation to a large number of referral bodies which will have the opportunity to provide their views on the investigation's proposals. At the beginning of November, we will have the collected referral responses.

Rasmus Ling asks several questions about how the government will proceed after this. To begin with, I must say that the referral process must be allowed to run its course. When it is completed and the basis for discussion is broader, I foresee that there will be reason to resume deliberations with the parties in the Riksdag to find a suitable way forward.

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Rasmus Ling (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I thank you for the answer.

We agree that the security situation in the world is very worrying and that the threat against Sweden exists and is significant. We also agree that this change requires both preparedness and wise, well-considered measures. However, one does not need to agree on what constitutes a wise measure and which measures might end up being counterproductive, that is, worsening the security situation.

It also does not seem that we are in agreement on the threat posed by the fact that there are proposals that would entail a restriction of the freedom of demonstration in a rather transformative way, which is actually the case in this instance. The implication of the proposal is that the police should be able to deny demonstrations if they are judged to pose a threat to national security. There are also proposals, which are not as far-reaching, to be able to move demonstrations more than what is the case today.

Mr. Speaker! During the last year, there were a large number of high-profile cases concerning Quran burnings, and unfortunately, the same was the case the year before that. For my part, I cannot emphasize enough how much I dislike Quran burnings and how wrong I think they are, in contrast to some of my colleagues in the Justice Committee. I distance myself very strongly from such acts.

As elected officials – representatives – we also need to be able to think further. There may be demonstrations that I like and that Gunnar Strömmer likes, but which provoke the rest of the world and could thus pose a threat to Sweden. One example is the demonstrations that the organization Russia Out of Ukraine has carried out every Wednesday for the past two years at Free Ukraine's site, right next to the Russian embassy. There, the undersigned has spoken, and I know that very many in the Riksdag have spoken there. I also believe I know that ministers have participated and spoken there. This is, of course, not welcomed by Russia.

The same can apply to other authoritarian regimes when demonstrations take place outside embassies or consulates. It could be Iran, China, or others. If these states know that the police are given the opportunity to deny the permit if they threaten Sweden's security, what incentives are we creating then? It risks worsening the situation, Mr. Speaker, and creating an increased threat instead of managing it and making it smaller.

One can also imagine that pride parades do not appeal to all tastes. The same applies to climate demonstrations, demonstrations in support of releasing political prisoners, and so on.

I truly believe that this must be taken to heart, Mr. Speaker. If the government presents such a proposal and it is approved by the Riksdag, the situation will become more dangerous than it is today. I therefore think that we should receive a notification that this path will not be taken, Mr. Speaker. It would simply be to expose the country to risk and danger.

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Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! I just want to start by saying that I think the objections that have been raised are justified. This applies to everything from the risk that, in practice, we will let actors in other countries set the boundaries for our own freedom of speech to the risk that we create new vulnerabilities.

Those types of questions are also those that are raised and touched upon by the investigator, and I am sure that they will be some of the central issues that the referral bodies will comment on. I do not want to anticipate that process, but I want to confirm that they are legitimate questions that lie in the other balance.

I would still just like to say something about the fundamental choices that led to us commissioning the investigation, just so that we remember where we were then, so to speak.

I have already mentioned quite a few things about the reality – an elevated terror threat level, various individuals in both Sweden and Germany who were arrested for terror crimes, disinformation campaigns about Swedish social services, Quran burnings and other things that led to Swedish embassies abroad being set on fire, that two Swedes were killed in a terror attack in Belgium and so on.

We must simply accept that the security threat is real and not, so to speak, downplay it. It is precisely the strength of this public interest that makes it justified to discuss these types of issues in the first place.

Regarding the principled choices in the wake of these various events, different proposals were raised in the debate. Some said they wanted to reintroduce a blasphemy crime or change the law on hate speech against a population group in order to practically prohibit violations of religious scriptures. It is, moreover, the path that Denmark eventually chose.

We in the Swedish government clarified on our part that we considered it to be the wrong path to take. We rejected proposals that in practice meant that certain expressions should be prohibited because of their content regardless of when, where, and how they are presented. Such far-reaching restrictions would furthermore presuppose restrictions in the constitutional protection for freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, and it is clear that this is not an option for this government.

Regarding the proposals that have been submitted by the investigator, I also just want to say that they do not presuppose any changes to the constitution but fall within the framework of today's freedom of speech protection. At the same time, we are clear that the security situation must be taken seriously and met with measures that have an effect in both the long and short term.

That was the background. We then pointed out the gap between, on one hand, public order disturbances at a specific location, where the police today can limit the conditions for a public assembly, and on the other hand, the threat of war, where the government can intervene in a corresponding manner with reference to national security. The police, however, cannot in any situation between the traffic disturbance and the threat of war intervene or weigh in security issues of this kind in their assessments.

It is a reality that this is a gap that also constitutes a security vulnerability, and that is why I said in my introduction - which I also underscored at the press conference when we commissioned the investigation - that we must look at our home. It is about our constitutional preparedness to be equipped to meet various serious threats against Swedes and Swedish interests. We must ensure that there is a decision basis so that we can act if the situation requires it, and it is that decision basis we have now received.

I do not want to anticipate the referral process of the investigation's proposals, but to be somewhat fair to the investigator, I would still like to say that many of the situations that Rasmus Ling highlights as examples of offensive demonstrations are not affected by the proposed regulation, given the high level of security threat that the investigator sees as a prerequisite for these types of provisions to be usable in practice. That being said: Now the referral bodies will shed light on this, and we shall see what that process yields. Then we shall continue to have a transparent and straightforward dialogue between the government and the Riksdag regarding these very important issues.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Rasmus Ling (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I will start by saying that the investigator has done a good job. The investigator has worked based on the directives that have been given, so I have absolutely no comments on that. On the other hand, I do not think the proposals are good, because I did not like the directives. I had the privilege of sitting in the political reference group and have given my input along the way - this is said so that there are no ambiguities in that part.

Another problem that one can foresee is that threats directed at Sweden, which would then form the basis for a rejection from the police, are not often, but most often, something surrounded by secrecy. It is a major problem when one receives a rejection to carry out a demonstration when the reasons for it are secret. I want to ask the Minister for Justice if he also thinks so, Mr. Speaker.

It is very easy, both generally in life and in politics, that when one sees that something has happened, one can identify something that could have solved the problem in advance. It is harder to see new types of problems ahead of oneself. This can also apply to problems that can arise as a result of what one puts forward and changes.

In this case, I believe that is exactly how it is. We can see that if there had been a possibility for the police to deny the Quran burnings, it would have facilitated things in very many ways. There would not have been such large riots and not as many problems, but we must also see what consequences it could have in the long run and in other areas.

Mr. Speaker! I agree with the Minister that the path that Denmark chose for this was not a good one. From the perspective of the Green Party, we have not argued that one should go that way. I know that other actors have emphasized that path in the debate. But in that question, Gunnar Strömmer and I agree that it was good not to do so.

It is true that there are no constitutional changes in the proposal, but nevertheless, it concerns enormously large changes. There is a possibility within the existing Instrument of Government to make changes such as these, but it has never been done that way before. It would mean a very large change if one went that route.

Another aspect, Mr. Speaker, is whether such legislation would fulfill its purpose, that is, whether the person seeking permission to do something that threatens the country's security is denied permission. I believe it would be quite simple to bypass the whole thing to achieve the very purpose of the provocation for those who have the intent for it.

I think, Mr. Speaker, that the LVU campaign showed exactly that. It was not about any general gathering or demonstration, but it was a disinformation campaign that primarily took place in social media. It has damaged our country enormously, created dangerous situations and damaged trust in the country. It has been negative in every possible way.

Nor this legislation would, however, address that type of problem. I believe that even with such an opportunity for the police, with the negative consequences it would have, it would not stop those who were out to provoke.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! I agree with Rasmus Ling that there are many examples in politics - even in Swedish political history - where one has, so to speak, fired from the hip to put out a fire here and now without truly anticipating what the long-term consequences of the choice of path would be, either in similar or in other situations.

This happened at a time when others were demanding very immediate measures. One of our Nordic neighboring countries acted very quickly that autumn and implemented something which, admittedly, did not require a constitutional amendment there but would have required a constitutional amendment in Sweden. We therefore did not really have practical possibilities to do so given this.

Under all circumstances, we chose a different path. We chose a very Swedish path. We chose not to rush off, but instead to appoint a regular, honest government inquiry, give the investigator a year, and link a parliamentary reference group to the inquiry, even though it was an inquiry that did not presuppose any constitutional changes. But we did it because the questions naturally relate to important issues regarding freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

We justified this by stating that we wanted to create a constitutional preparedness. Unfortunately, in other crises, we have seen examples where the Swedish constitutional preparedness has been deficient and where legislation has been forced together in a very short time without being able to properly oversee the consequences of such measures. In that sense, I believe we have handled this situation very responsibly.

I find it easy to express my concern for the dilemmas and risks that Rasmus Ling and others point out, and which the investigator also addresses in his investigation – the risk that we expose ourselves to external forces that, in practice, through their actions, will be those who set the boundaries for Swedish freedom of speech. All of that has a reality, and it will be one of the most important issues to discuss further moving forward.

On the other side of the scale, we can also see that one can have such information – and last year we were very close to such a situation – of the nature that one realizes that if we do nothing, it can have devastating consequences for the citizens' safety and security, for critical infrastructure in a country or for the central state leadership, that is to say, the fundamental institutions of democracy. But we lack the room to act on such information. We see the train coming but have no possibilities to use tools, which in and of themselves could exist, to put a stop to the train and prevent a very serious outcome, for example a serious terrorist attack. It is also a dilemma: to have information about serious events but not be able to act on the information.

These are realities that must be handled within the framework of the discussion we are now having. I think that the basis we receive through the investigation is an excellent foundation for the continued discussion.

One can familiarize oneself with the investigation and do so in different ways. One can read opinion pieces, one can, if one is very ambitious, work through the report, or one can, as I did the other day, listen to a podcast. Svenska Dagbladet's editorial page had invited the investigator and asked critical questions for 45 minutes. If one does that, we see that we have a classic example here of that the law is not the complicated part. I believe that the technical solutions in the investigation are quite unassailable.

However, we will subsequently need to jointly handle the practical aspects of the whole – on the one hand, how the application shall take place in practice, and on the other hand, what the practical effects will be. Furthermore, we have the more principled questions about how we view how extensive the freedom of demonstration and freedom of expression should be, regardless of consequences in other respects. If this happens in the same constructive way as during the investigation, I have good hope that we will find ways forward also when the referral period has expired.

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Rasmus Ling (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Of course, we look forward to the referral process. I want to express that I think it is positive that the referral process has been given customary time so that there is sufficient time for those who are to respond to work their way through the report. It is, after all, an extensive basis that is well worth reading. One can supplement with the podcast; I have also listened to it. Several parts of the report are, however, also worth reading.

Mr. Speaker! I believe, like the Minister for Justice, that these considerations will interest many and will take up a lot of space. I also hope that the whole thing will be discussed. A combination of restricted freedom of expression and the risk of an even worse threat situation is not a good cocktail. I hope and believe that several will see this and will convey it to the government.

I hope that it will not be proceeded with regarding submitting proposals to the Riksdag in these parts. I am completely convinced, Mr. Speaker, that it would not be good for Sweden or for Swedish security.

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Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Rasmus Ling for the opportunity to discuss these issues, which are important for a number of different reasons.

Let me begin with the heavy public interest that is the starting point for this process, namely the very serious security situation Sweden finds itself in: war in our immediate vicinity and a very potent threat from terrorists and violent extremists of various kinds. It concerns state actors who either act on their own or in alliance with other actors, regardless of whether it concerns violent extremism or organized crime. For example, on the eve of spring, we received reports that Iran is recruiting perpetrators in Sweden for its politically motivated acts of violence. All of this is a reality, and it is obviously this reality that makes it justified to examine our legislation in light of the reality we will realistically need to handle for a long time ahead. This was an important starting point for the government.

Another important starting point has been not to do things that disturb the constitutional protection of freedoms and rights in this area. Many proposals that have been put forward, also by parties in the Riksdag, presuppose changes with very far-reaching restrictions of our freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, which are protected in the Instrument of Government and in other fundamental laws. But this has not been relevant for the government.

Now we are moving into the practical but fundamentally significant area of public assemblies. We have received an extraordinarily good basis for continued discussion, and I think that when it concerns matters close to the constitution, it is also right to allow a properly extended time for referral bodies to comment. We have at all times been keen on an open, transparent and familiar relationship with the Riksdag in these matters, and we will continue to have that as we see the outcome of the referral bodies' comments. Then we will take it further from there. We request to be allowed to return.

The interpellations debate was hereby concluded.

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