Response to interpellation 2025/26:318 on the state's control over strategically located land on Landsort
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
I work to strengthen the protection of Sweden's security and total defense by preventing property from falling into the wrong hands 1. I emphasize that Landsort has an important military-strategic role 2 and argue that the legislation needs to be adapted to the current security policy global situation 3. I want to take into account the Finnish legislation 3 and propose stricter identity checks 1 as well as stricter control of foreign real estate acquisitions 3. S considers that the state's control over strategically located land is part of Sweden's fundamental security 4. S argues that the state should not voluntarily reduce its control over land concerning national security 5 and wants the state to take greater responsibility 6.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Mr. Speaker! Markus Selin has asked me if I intend to take any initiatives within the framework of my area of responsibility or in cooperation with other relevant ministers on account of the planned sale of state land on Landsort. Markus Selin has also asked me if I assess that there is any need for further legislative or governance initiatives to ensure the state's long-term control over strategically located areas of importance for the total defense, such as Landsort.
The Government is actively working to strengthen the protection of Sweden's security and to prevent activities and property of importance to the total defense from falling into the wrong hands. Just over two years ago, legislation was introduced that enables the screening of foreign direct investments in security-sensitive activities. The purpose of the regulation is to prevent investments that could harm Sweden's security.
The Government has also recently submitted two bills containing proposals that in different ways aim to counter security risks. One proposal concerns the fact that those who conduct activities of importance for Sweden's security need to take various types of protective measures before the transfer of real estate. The other proposal concerns tightening identity checks during real estate purchases.
In addition, the Inquiry into control over the transfer and lease of property of essential importance to the total defense has presented a report (SOU 2024:84). In brief, it is proposed that a control system be introduced that gives the state the opportunity to review and, if necessary, prevent transfers and leases of real estate that risk harming the total defense. The proposal has been referred.
Through measures in several areas, the government is thus building a regulation that strengthens the protection of Sweden's security and the interests of the total defense when real estate changes owners or users.
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Minister for Defence, for the opening response!
We now know that Sweden finds itself in a highly serious and long-term changed security policy situation. The war in our vicinity, increased geopolitical tensions, and an even more unpredictable global situation place high demands on Sweden. It places demands on us, on our preparedness, and on a robust total defense. In this situation, the state's control over strategically located land is not a marginal issue but part of Sweden's fundamental security.
This debate concerns the state's plans to sell land at Landsort on the island of Öja, which is the southernmost outpost of Stockholm County. It is an area that has historically had and still has significance for maritime surveillance, coastal defense, and the control of the direct inlets to our capital.
My question to the Minister for Defence is fundamental and can be expressed in a fairly simple way: How does the government ensure that the state does not lose actual control and command over land that both today and in the future may be of importance for Sweden's defence and total defence?
Mr. Speaker! I want to be clear that I note that the government is now preparing legislation on tightened control of foreign property acquisitions. This shows that the government shares the view that today's regulatory framework is not fully sufficient to protect our total defense and our interests. This is fundamentally positive, but the upcoming legislation primarily aims to examine who is allowed to acquire properties.
The debate here and now is fundamentally about a related but partially different question, namely whether the state should sell strategically located land at all.
We in the Social Democrats have been clear in our committee motion on total defense: The state must long-term guarantee influence and control over all significant security interests. This applies not only to systems, operations, and infrastructure but also to physical land in strategic locations, Mr. Speaker. In our committee motion, we also explicitly highlight risks regarding plots and properties in proximity to strategically important sites with connections to Sweden's security – our security. This is, therefore, an identified problem, and it is concrete security policy.
Against that background, I mean, and we Social Democrats, that the precautionary principle must carry great weight. Once the state's control over land has been relinquished, it is difficult, sometimes even impossible, to regain in a sharp situation. It is therefore why I mean that the question of the state's control must be treated with greater clarity, greater caution, and greater seriousness than what has emerged so far.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Mr. Speaker! I am fundamentally making no other security policy analysis than Markus Selin's, linked to the serious global situation.
A symptom of the situation is that intelligence gathering against Sweden has increased most drastically, and both Säpo and Must are clear in their annual reports regarding who the perpetrators are. It is primarily about Russia, and it is about China and Iran. This means that we simply must build up much stronger protective barriers so that, for example, critical infrastructure does not end up in the hands of foreign actors with state connections.
We have taken a number of measures precisely to strengthen this. I will be clear that some were also initiated during the previous government, which then handled an announcement from the Riksdag. One such thing is, of course, the screening process that takes place regarding foreign direct investments. It is completely necessary for those actors who conduct security-sensitive activities, that is, activities that affect Sweden's security.
It is good that that function has now been put in place. It is managed largely by ISP, which has built up strong competence there. There is also EU legislation that this is linked to. Screening of foreign direct investments is therefore a way to achieve the construction of stronger resilience and stronger protective barriers in a deteriorated security policy global situation.
The second is the new security protection act, which we have further developed. The current government has worked on it during this mandate period, and the previous government also worked on it. It is important. It is divided into different parts, but it is primarily about both information security and physical security as well as the constitutional support that exists. The security protection act entered into force in 2019, and then the security regulation also came. There, a number of measures have also been taken to address a good deal of the problems.
Much of this activity was regulated during the Cold War, but in the early 90s, for example, the entire control mechanism for foreign direct investments in critical infrastructure was deregulated. It has not benefited Swedish security; there are cases from the last ten years where we have seen foreign acquisitions of, for example, semiconductors, which I know Markus Selin is very involved in.
There are, therefore, a number of measures that need to be taken, and we are further developing and strengthening the work that was partly initiated during the previous mandate period.
When it comes to Landsort as a specific case, much concerns the consultation that Statens fastighetsverk has had with Fortifikationsverket and Försvarsmakten. Just as Markus Selin says, Landsort, which is located in the approach to Stockholm and naturally Södertälje, has continued to have an important military-strategic role. On the other hand, there is no permanent military infrastructure on Landsort today, but it is primarily about having availability over – can one imagine, depending on how Försvarsmakten values this – perhaps harbors or certain parts of the island.
What I have understood in connection with this, without going into or having any opinion on the matter, is that Fortifikationsverket in January said that they had nothing to object to connected to the property that this concerns. What I have understood is that it stands on what is called unfree ground, and there is a need to install a sewage system.
The important thing here, however, is that Fortifikationsverket and the Försvarsmakten must be fully engaged and participate in consultations to ensure that we have strong command and control. In those cases where we exceptionally must divest state activities, it shall be done based on a well-informed decision where Försvarsmakten and Fortifikationsverket have had the opportunity to comment. I believe it would take a great deal to override Försvarsmakten and Fortifikationsverket in such matters.
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! I thank the Minister for Defence for the answer.
I hear that the Minister for Defence takes the questions seriously, but I would like to go back to a fundamental question here. The Minister for Defence describes a number of control mechanisms when real estate changes ownership. But my question actually concerns, implicitly, in which cases – and why – the state should at all sell land if one knows that the land is strategically located, and here I still lack a clear answer.
The government and the Minister for Defence refer to a number of upcoming and ongoing legislative proposals, and in that regard also to legislation already introduced. But that legislation is primarily reactive: individual acquisitions are examined, often late in the process, and the starting point is who the buyer is. My question concerns something even more fundamental, namely: If the state already knows today that certain land is strategically located and can be of importance for the total defense, why should it be sold in the first place?
Mr. Speaker! The investigation behind the upcoming legislation states that it is difficult to specify exactly what constitutes strategic land in law, and I understand that. That is precisely why the state's actions become extra important and decisive here and now as we speak. When the state itself owns land in such situations, one has the opportunity to maintain freedom of action, flexibility, and control. If the state instead sells the land, the security assessment is moved to a later review, and by then, one has lost agility.
I may explain the following in somewhat sweeping terms, but the day we lose control involves risks. I do not need to explain this to the Minister for Defence, but for any viewers out there, I can say that it involves risks for future military presence – unwanted such. Risk of limited availability I have already mentioned. It also involves risk of the state ending up in a state of dependency that we want to avoid, risk of murky activities, risk of grey zone phenomena and risk of we sooner or later end up in a situation with concealed but still coldly calculated atrocities against Sweden and our interests.
We Social Democrats are clear and will continue to be clear in our starting point: Total defense requires long-term thinking and a holistic view. The state shall not voluntarily reduce its control over land concerning national security. I therefore want to return to the Minister of Defence with the question: Is the government prepared to stand up even more and more clearly and assert in both governance, stance, and any future law that state land of strategic importance for total defense should not, or should avoid being, sold off?
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Mr. Speaker! There are two parts to Markus Selin's question, but I will try to answer it.
Connecting to Landsort and the specific case, it is primarily about a property on the island. The island, as mentioned, has no permanent military infrastructure. What I have gathered is that it concerns the conditions for installing sewage systems. The property is owned by an individual but stands on unfree land, and in order to install a sewage system, there is a need to own the property. Then, one must weigh that against the statements that Fortifikationsverket has made in close dialogue with Försvarsmakten.
Without going into individual cases but just to put things into proportion regarding this: Is state land strategically important, one naturally needs to think through the matter extra carefully, but it is also for that reason that the consultation procedures exist – so that the Armed Forces and the Fortification Agency can actually have the opportunity to comment and so that one can find that balance.
If state land is not strategically important, there is no inherent purpose in it remaining in the state's hands; there, one must weigh different interests. The consultation is, however, crucial, that is to say the opportunity for Fortifikationsverket and the Försvarsmakten to engage in dialogue and express their views. Fortifikationsverket concluded that they could accept this. That is one thing.
The second, which is somewhat broader, is naturally the range of measures that are now being taken and which I touched upon earlier. Some are a further development of what was also done during the previous government. It concerns the strengthening of the Security Protection Act, the screening of foreign direct investments, and the control of foreign ownership of real estate. There are strong reasons to continue working with these issues.
We can look at Finland to some extent, which has acted with quite great decisiveness when it has concerned properties, especially in the Finnish archipelago. There, they have acted with all desirable clarity.
Then this sometimes concerns complex legislative issues; I believe that both the current and the previous government have experienced this in connection with the fact that the right of ownership is constitutionally protected. All things being equal, it is of course not negative with foreign direct investments or with foreign ownership of real estate, so one must have openness there. Therefore, one should have legislation that is effective and clear and that achieves what we strive for.
It is against that very background that we are now working to get new legislation in place to further strengthen the state's authority in light of the serious security policy situation in the world that we have to manage together with our allies. This concerns in particular the increased intelligence threat that characterizes Sweden's security.
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! I thank the Minister for Defence again for the answer.
I hear that the Minister for Defence takes this fully seriously. I would, however, like to emphasize that I perceive there is an exciting nerve. We are not finished with these issues; that is why the Minister for Defence and I are standing here this Monday morning.
I want to emphasize that this is not about casting suspicion on individual persons or companies. That is not why I am standing here. I am seeking that the state should take greater responsibility for strategically located land. I know from before that the Minister for Defence can [address] these questions.
Finland is an interesting example. They have a different view on preliminary review. They have a different and significantly more advanced view on whether the state should block purchases. They have a different view on whether security reasons are sufficient in themselves. They also have a different view on the ownership of private land.
Mr. Speaker! It may happen that we return to this question a bit later. Today I have chosen Landsort, the southernmost outpost in my constituency, as a striking example. It is a very beautifully situated island with an area corresponding to approximately 250 football fields. It is at the same time very important strategically – it has been for at least 300 years and will surely continue to be for many years to come.
In conclusion, I want to say this: Caution is not weakness, but caution is taking responsibility. Therefore, I promise, as a social democrat, to continue to monitor and follow these issues.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Mr. Speaker! I think Markus Selin is reasoning wisely and insightfully. This is legislation that needs to be adapted to a completely different security policy global situation than the one we had 10 or 20 years ago. I do no analysis in principle other than what Markus Selin does regarding these issues. There are different interests and different legislations that sometimes need to be balanced, but there is no doubt whatsoever that the security and defense policy interests weigh much more heavily now in light of the deteriorated security policy global situation.
We are, of course, following the implementation of the Finnish legislation. It is my Finnish colleague Antti Häkkänen who, in a government constellation, makes decisions on these matters. One looks at what is good and effective with the Finnish legislation and where it may need to be developed. For example, a discussion has been held on how it should work regarding dual citizenship and whether this can be a way to bypass it.
We will consider this when we approach the Riksdag with proposals for tightened control of foreign real estate acquisitions to ensure that there is legislation that hits the mark and is effective, which strengthens the state's sovereignty and ultimately protects Sweden's security.
Apart from this, there is also legislation that affects the area of expropriation. A number of cases that have appeared in the media show that there may be reasons to look at how the expropriation instrument can be further developed, also in order to weigh in security policy aspects.
In light of the deteriorated security policy situation in the world, a long series of measures are now being taken to strengthen the state's command and, ultimately, Sweden's security.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.