Reporting from the Council of Europe meeting on June 18-19

Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! The European Council met last week on Thursday and on Midsummer Eve for what we usually call the EU summit. The focus was on Ukraine, China, and the EU's next long-term budget. Even though the agenda was considerably longer than that, this is what we spent the most time on.

President Zelenskyy participated on-site at the meeting and remained more positive regarding how the war is developing. We discussed the matter in detail when we spoke privately in Uppsala in connection with the agreement to sell Swedish Jas Gripen to Ukraine. He could state that the better situation on the ground continues to hold. Militarily, Ukraine is therefore in a stronger position now than before, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that Russia does not have time on its side.

At the same time, everyone understands that a pressured Russia with nightly pillars of fire in Moscow is not a harmless Russia. The intelligence picture is currently quite fragmented between different countries. We know that Russia is pressured, but what they might consider doing is more unclear. Sweden and other countries in Russia's vicinity are keeping a close watch on this – on the Baltic Sea with the shadow fleet but also in the air.

President Zelenskyy was also physically present so that we could make the first unanimous decision in a long time regarding Ukraine after the Hungarian power shift. Sweden is among the countries at the forefront. We do it because it is right and proper, but we also give our support to Ukraine because it is good for Sweden and Swedish security. President Zelenskyy acknowledged the historic opening of the first cluster, as it is called, in Ukraine's membership negotiations.

During the dinner on Thursday evening – a relatively late dinner even by EU standards, one could say – global economic imbalances were discussed. The focus was on China's aggressive trade policy and economic policy which is now increasingly affecting European industry. Even for us, who are Europe's foremost friend of free trade and continue to be, it is evident that there are problems regarding the issue of a level playing field in trade with China. We are therefore not naive, but we do not dress general protectionism in security policy terms either.

China makes use of very extensive state subsidies. European companies do not have the same access to the Chinese market as many Chinese companies have to the European one. China has tended to limit exports of critical raw materials, and there is an obvious risk of an unreasonably large unilateral dependence in the longer term.

Overall, this speaks to the fact that the EU needs to arm itself with sufficiently powerful and effective tools and have the readiness to act. There was broad support in the discussions for the Commission to now develop proposals on how the EU's existing trade policy instruments can be used more effectively and developed to adapt trade policy to the global reality that our countries and our companies are now facing.

The discussion on the EU's long-term budget followed very well-known patterns. There is a clear conflict between those of us who pay in a lot and receive less back, in every case in substantial amounts of money, and those countries that receive significantly more back than they pay in. Sweden belongs, as is well known, to the first group, and together our countries account for more than 40 percent of the EU's economy.

We were clear that the proposal that the Cypriot presidency had put on the table was not even a starting point for negotiations. We will not accept a budget where there is not even an attempt to prioritize. First and foremost, we are there to represent the interests of Sweden and the Swedish people. Sweden is, as I also said at the meeting, not an ATM in the EU system.

The meeting contained some quite harsh exchanges, and it is clear that we are far from in agreement. It was also, frankly, not expected at this stage of the negotiations. Now it is up to the Irish presidency, which takes office on July 1, to move the negotiations forward. Many want to be finished by January 1, 2027. For our part, we are in no hurry. Together with countries such as Germany, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium, we stand firm in our demands for a much less extensive budget than the one that has now been put on the table.

The discussion on the Middle East took place in the light of the agreement between the USA and Iran, which had been concluded just before the meeting. It is positive that there is an agreement. However, there are many question marks regarding how the agreement will be implemented and what it will concretely mean for shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and for the region as a whole, not least regarding Lebanon. The continued very difficult situation in Gaza was also touched upon, particularly Israel's obligation to secure unimpeded access for humanitarian aid. Regarding Israel's illegal settlements in the West Bank, the government has pushed for further listings of extremist settlers and ministers. The Commission will now present action alternatives for further steps to be discussed at the meeting of the foreign ministers in July.

Migration was on the agenda as usual. As usual, most of the discussions also took place at the preliminary meeting rather than at the meeting itself. The Commission's President Ursula von der Leyen wrote a letter before the meeting outlining the legislative work. The single most important thing is that an agreement has now been reached on the EU's new return regulation.

That Swedish members of parliament from Vänsterpartiet, Miljöpartiet, and Centern voted against the proposal in the EU Parliament was somewhat expected. They usually vote no to proposals aimed at getting migration in order, both in Sweden and in Europe. However, that the Socialdemokraterna also did not stand behind the proposal was concerning. This is, therefore, a decision that is completely crucial for Swedish and European migration policy – those who have their asylum applications rejected must also leave the country. In a situation where four out of five who are rejected choose to stay in the EU without legal right, this regulation is obviously important. Now the decision went through anyway, and we in Sweden are already doing a lot so that those who have been rejected leave the country. We have also had more countries of origin agree to take back their own citizens who have received deportation orders.

Only one member state voted against the proposal, and that was Spain. Furthermore, it is the same country that recently granted amnesty to 500,000 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, for which it received extensive criticism from other member states at the meeting. Each country bears responsibility for its own immigration policy, but free movement in Europe means that this is also a shared responsibility. That responsibility must be taken by every country and every party.

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Matilda Ernkrans (S)

Madam Speaker! It has been four years since Ulf Kristersson attended his first EU summit as Prime Minister. It is four years since Sweden needed to be one of the strongest voices in Europe. But it is not to Ulf Kristersson that one calls, but rather to Mette Frederiksen in Denmark or to Finland's president.

When Europe's future competitiveness and several of the issues that are important for Sweden are discussed, Sweden's voice has been weakened when it comes to Swedish jobs and Swedish companies. EU's climate and sustainability legislation has been eroded, which disadvantages Swedish companies that have already invested in the technological transition. The possibility of using bottleneck revenues for investments and support for households has fallen into uncertainty.

Now we see the budget negotiations, which are developing in a direction that is far from Swedish priorities. The proposal that has been presented does not go Sweden's way. There are few signs that the government has succeeded in moving forward the Swedish positions.

What Kristersson has done, however, is to promise away more than half of future ministerial posts to the Sverigedemokraterna, and Åkesson himself has said that he wants three of the four heaviest ministerial posts.

The EU's budget negotiations are now entering a decisive stage. Ulf Kristersson has neither succeeded in lowering the budget framework, securing the discounts, nor averting the threat of new EU taxes. The government is therefore already today finding it difficult to gather support for its line.

In what way does the Prime Minister mean that it would be easier if Sweden were represented by Sverigedemokratiska ministers around the table, those who actually do not believe in cooperation between countries and do not even think that Sweden should sit at the negotiating table?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! Here we have this customary blackening of Sweden that occurs time and again. One may naturally think poorly of Sweden, but it is dangerous for leading Social Democrats to systematically speak ill of Sweden in front of other countries. I would not do that.

Let us be serious for a moment. It is the opposite that Swedish energy policy and climate policy are priced in Europe. The Swedish economy is priced in Europe. The Swedish financial market's capacity is priced in Europe. Swedish security policy is priced in Europe. The Swedish defense industry is priced in Europe. I therefore do not know why there is such a constant need to speak ill of Swedish successes in Europe.

I do exactly the opposite. I speak well for Sweden when I meet my European colleagues. I do everything to ensure that Sweden's voice, when we think differently than other colleagues, becomes as heavy as possible. When Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark and Belgium act together to stop those who want to use the EU's budget as an ATM for their own economies, we have a significant strength with us.

That countries have different opinions on budget matters is nothing new. That is also why I said: We are in no hurry to resolve these negotiations, but we will stand up for the interests of Swedish taxpayers.

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Matilda Ernkrans (S)

Madam Speaker! What Kristersson says is simply not true. That is how it goes for Kristersson, whether it is in Brussels, in Stockholm or in Fållökna.

Now it was Kristersson himself who said that nothing has gone Sweden's way in the budget negotiations. When we Social Democrats negotiated the current long-term budget, we saw to it, among other things, to withhold EU funds to countries that violate the principles of the rule of law, which must be protected and strengthened. We also managed to secure a historically strong discount to keep down the Swedish EU fee.

Today, the writings on the national discounts are uncertain. We need a budget that focuses on strengthening Europe's security, support for Ukraine, Europe's competitiveness, green technology development and democracy.

The government is already finding it difficult today to gather support for its priorities. Why would it become easier in the autumn, when Sweden, if Kristersson gets what he wants, is represented by Sweden Democrat ministers around the negotiating table?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! When the Social Democrats last time tried to negotiate the EU budget, you did not even have support in the Swedish Riksdag – so weak was that government. You had to come to us Moderates and ask us for help to get a majority for your proposal in the Swedish Riksdag. I take no advice from you.

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Ilona Szatmári Waldau (V)

Madam Speaker! Thank you, Prime Minister, for the report!

In the EU committee before the European Council meeting, I raised the issue of Iran and that it has mostly come down to fuel prices in the Western world and potential nuclear weapons threats. I hoped that the European Council would not forget the people in Iran and the situation of women and would continue to support the democratic movements in Iran. The Prime Minister then chose not to comment on it at all.

Now I see that the European Council has nevertheless added that it urges the Iranian regime to cease the violence against and the oppression of its own people. I assume that the Prime Minister was not the one who pushed the issue or had any opinions on it. Or was it that the Prime Minister took my co-signature and was actually the one driving the issue?

I also want to ask the Prime Minister how he views Bulgaria and what Bulgaria's new government could have consequences for, for example, the support for Ukraine. It is pleasing that there is now a consensus, but will this consensus hold? What was the atmosphere in the council?

Finally, I want to ask the Prime Minister about Gaza. We have discussed it many times in this format. The Prime Minister usually repeats that the EU is not a major player and does not have any significant influence. But at the same time, the EU has an agreement with Israel that regulates trade and gives Israel the opportunity to participate in the EU's research programs. Freezing the association agreement as long as necessities are not brought into Gaza or as long as Israel pursues an expansionist policy would make the EU a power factor.

I therefore want to ask if this was even raised in the Council at all. I know that the Prime Minister usually answers that different countries have different opinions, but I would like to hear a bit about how the discussion went regarding the pressure means that the EU does have when it comes to Israel.

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! When it comes to Iran, it is clear that it was mentioned in the discussion that one of the hopes that existed was that this would in some way lead to a better situation in Iran. But this has in no way been achieved with this.

This concern was expressed very clearly, both in text, as said, and in the discussion. It is a very uncontroversial position – one of the few uncontroversial positions when it comes to the Middle East in a European context. There is no significant disagreement there.

The opposition is, just as is implied here, the issues regarding Israel and the Gaza issues. There are fundamental disagreements there. The exact text that exists now is probably as far as the agreement reaches.

It is worth noting that Slovenia is now taking a very reluctant position regarding taking any step further at all. Principally, it is the same disagreement as before. I therefore maintain my view that the EU as an actor is not a heavy player when it comes to the questions regarding the Middle East.

I received a question about Bulgaria. We had a group of new participants this time, but there were no fundamentally major changes.

The big change was, of course, that we have a new government in Hungary and that we could therefore make unanimous decisions for the first time in a long while. It was well known, but naturally still a big step forward.

Then it is as I have said in many other contexts: When a negative land disappears, other disagreements can sometimes be revealed. So it was, for example, with the question of frozen assets. We shall see how massive this consensus will now be. I perceived that there was a very strong pressure that negotiations must get started.

All of us who are Ukraine's closest friends say that negotiations will begin when there are serious efforts from the Russian side and when Ukraine wants to negotiate.

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Ilona Szatmári Waldau (V)

Madam Speaker! I thank the Prime Minister for the answer.

I want to point out that the difference is that the conclusions now contain an appeal to the Iranian regime regarding its own people. They did not do that before the meeting itself. I also hope that Sweden in the future will belong to those countries that push for one to have greater influence by seeing what pressure one can put on Israel.

I also want to ask a question about the defense readiness. Sweden is careful to point out that it should be membership-driven. At the same time, everything is moving more and more towards a defense readiness at the EU level. I would therefore like to ask how the discussions are going within the European Council. Is there an agreement that military and civil defense are national matters, or are there countries that want to go further, for example towards an EU defense, and does Sweden, in that case, oppose it?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! It is funny that it is precisely the Left Party that is now eager to safeguard NATO's integrity. I think that is important. There are no ambitions whatsoever to double NATO's military role in the EU. Absolutely not! On that point, I think everyone has a very distinct view. It is clear that those who are not NATO members might possibly be interested in a greater EU responsibility when it comes to other defense issues, but this is not a big issue at all.

This is about, as I have said many times, economic issues. A question that always recurs is, for example, the defense industry cooperation and what we can do to complement NATO's role in security policy. But there are no discussions at all about the EU doubling or replacing the work that NATO performs.

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Catarina Deremar (C)

Madam Speaker! I thank the Prime Minister for the report.

The process for Ukraine's and Moldova's membership in the EU is now underway again after Hungary has stopped blocking it. It is crucial that the process continues and that they become members as soon as possible, of course based on their own merits.

How does the Prime Minister perceive the talk, or what is the feeling? Is everyone as convinced as we in Sweden that this is important? Are there other countries besides Hungary that have been skeptical or that continue to be?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! It is an important but difficult-to-assess issue. As I said just a moment ago, we have more than once experienced a country blocking a decision, and when it disappears, one discovers that there were other countries hiding a little bit in the shadow of the blockage.

This time, however, it was not so. It was a unanimous decision to open cluster 1. When we move forward, I am completely convinced that new concerns will arise. We are a number of countries pushing for it to go as fast as is possible at all, within the framework of a merit-based process.

I believe that some of the disagreement will be visible in how well one considers the merits to have been achieved. It is one thing to say that it should be merit-based and therefore also proceed quickly, and another to say that it should be merit-based and therefore take a long time. I believe that this question remains very open.

I nevertheless judge that, in the long term, there is no doubt that Ukraine will enter the unified European community for many reasons. I do not believe one should have hopes that it will happen very quickly. I also believe that Ukraine realizes this. All the more important, of course, is that the achievements that are actually attained are solid and are clearly perceived by all other EU countries.

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Catarina Deremar (C)

Madam Speaker! I thank the Prime Minister for the answer. We can hope that it moves forward and that we will be satisfied with their merits.

I would also like to hear a little bit about something that has been unfolding over the last few weeks, namely the relationship between Poland and Ukraine. Most recently today, I heard on the radio that an award has now been taken back from President Zelenskyy.

I have understood that Poland is very interested in establishing good contacts, not least with us in the Nordic countries, and that they see it as an important development for Poland. This is, of course, welcome, I believe. Given what has happened between Ukraine and Poland and their exchange of words recently, I want to hear how the Prime Minister thinks this can affect the view on the support for Ukraine. Is there a risk that this creates division? Is it an isolated incident, or what consequences does the Prime Minister see this could have?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! One must be able to see two things at the same time here. One is that Poland truly is one of the foremost supporters behind Ukraine in many different ways. All the logistics into Ukraine, for example, have been an enormous Polish effort. I think that Poland has truly proven this in many different ways.

They think roughly like we do. They do it for Ukraine's sake, but they also do it literally for their own sake. Poland knows better than most what it means to be included in a Russian or Soviet view of the world. That is what is important.

Since there is no doubt that a debate is currently taking place. I do, however, think that one should be honest and say that it is very much about a polarized domestic political situation in Poland. I do not intend to interfere in that, but I do not think we should exaggerate its importance for Poland's support for Ukraine.

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Malte Tängmark Roos (MP)

Madam Speaker! I thank Ulf Kristersson for the report.

Before the meeting, we asked if the Prime Minister would raise the issue of environmentally and climatically harmful subsidies during the item concerning the EU's long-term budget. The serious geopolitical situation means that Europe's population needs political measures to become independent of fossil fuels, not a further deepened dependence.

Sweden is pushing for budget restrictions within the EU cooperation, which we think is good, but at least as important to discuss is the content of the budget. Today, approximately one hundred billion kronor of EU money is spent on fossil and environmentally harmful activities. This hampers the transition, disadvantages Swedish competitiveness, and keeps us in a harmful and risky dependency that directly benefits, among other things, Putin's war chest and the Iranian mullahs' repression and terror financing. Therefore, Sweden and all of Europe would benefit from raising the issue of cleaning EU's long-term budget from precisely climate- and environmentally harmful subsidies.

Since the Prime Minister did not take this up himself in his report, my question is: Did the Prime Minister take any initiative to discuss this during the meeting or bilaterally, and if so, how did the discussion go?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! As I believe emerged from my account, it was therefore a pure discussion about the volume of the budget. There were no content-related discussions at all. That was also not expected.

There are fundamental disagreements over whether we should have a very expansive EU budget that dramatically increases the costs for the member states or a restrictive budget. This is nothing new, but that is where we are right now. It is clear that the volume of the budget in turn will affect what will be possible to do and what will be prioritized within the framework of the budget.

I had rather low expectations of reaching a new consensus on this, as the proposed negotiating box was not a negotiating starter at all. The countries I just mentioned also pointed out exactly that. The answer is therefore no, no discussions were held regarding the substantial content of the budget.

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Malte Tängmark Roos (MP)

Madam Speaker! It is regrettable that one did not get any further in the negotiations than that. I hope that the Prime Minister and the government will push to reduce the environmentally and climatically harmful subsidies, regardless of how large the budget will be in the future. The hope is, of course, that it will be a red-green government that gets to negotiate those matters later.

My second question concerns the fact that it was reported in DN today that the government has pushed to invite the Taliban to an EU meeting in Brussels to be held today to discuss migration issues. Actively pushing to invite the Taliban legitimizes an extremist and women-oppressing regime. My question to the Prime Minister is therefore how the government justifies this invitation of the Taliban to the EU meeting.

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! For natural reasons, that specific question was not on the agenda of the European Council. As I said in my introduction, however, it was indeed on the agenda that the recurring issues are important.

There I know that we think completely differently. We think that one should return to one's country of origin if one is denied an asylum application. You seem to think the opposite: that one should remain even after a no.

Of course, the Swedish government does a great deal to ensure that citizens from other countries who receive a rejection decision in Sweden return. We have really not kept that a secret.

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Erik Ottoson (M)

Madam Speaker! This government has, in many respects, placed Sweden on the right side of history – as a clear, strong ally of Ukraine and in Nato, with a clear line towards Russia but also towards undemocratic forces that are pressing the European Union from different sides.

Some of these forces are constantly met in the Republic of Moldova and push to try to place Moldova in a situation that is more similar to the Georgian than perhaps the Ukrainian and EU-oriented direction. Several times, they have now succeeded in Moldova in pushing Olle out of the gate and standing guard over the democratic movement and the movement towards the EU.

In the discussions surrounding the EU summit where the Prime Minister participated, several claims and discussions were made regarding a so-called decoupling between Ukraine's EU process and the Moldovan one, with the aim of trying to make them more merit-based but also to ensure that a lower speed in the process for Ukraine does not mean that Moldova is held back or vice versa.

Therefore, I want to ask the Prime Minister whether there were discussions at or around the summit regarding a clear such decoupling between Moldova and Ukraine in order, in that way, not to hold back Moldova's EU process, should it be the case that things get stuck in Ukraine again.

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! No. There was a certain fear of this if Ukraine continued to be blocked. Then, of course, there is a limit to the patience Moldova wants to show by simply becoming collateral damage. Now, however, that did not happen; on the contrary. Now we are opening up for both of them.

Right now, I do not think there is any such view at all. Then it depends a bit on, as we said earlier, at what speed this can be moved forward. I believe there is a strong desire to take both countries forward hand in hand. But ultimately, it is each country that in its negotiations must show that one can take new openings as they go.

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Erik Ottoson (M)

Madam Speaker! These are good news.

I also want to follow up on the question about Poland that Member Catarina Deremar raised.

Polish domestic policy is, for obvious reasons, very complicated. We should not try to understand it, because I believe very few, including the Poles themselves, really do. It is two very different forces that rule in the presidential palace in Warsaw and that lead the government.

Are there any signs in the exchange that have been questioned by those leading the government, namely Donald Tusk and others, towards the Ukrainian, or do they mainly come from the president and the right-wing nationalist and populist forces who have the presidency in their hands?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! I usually say that the Swedish government does not interfere in other countries' domestic politics. This also applies to Poland. I can, however, say that we have a very good cooperation with the Polish government on many different levels. It is no coincidence that they are also part of our Nordic-Baltic preliminary meetings. Both the Polish Prime Minister and the German Federal Chancellor are part of our preliminary meetings, which well suggests approximately how closely we cooperate – this in contrast to the old government, I can also say, which completely lacked that kind of functioning cooperation.

In the enormous conflicts that exist in Polish domestic politics, security policy, defense policy, and support for Ukraine have so far remained largely spared. I perceive that it continues to be largely so. But polarization is a dangerous thing. One never knows where it will lead. Our cooperation with the Polish government, however, works very well.

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Gudrun Brunegård (KD)

Madam Speaker! Thank you, Prime Minister, for the feedback from the meeting and the answers so far!

I have during recent years been part of the Riksdag's steering group for democracy development in the eastern partnership, first in a cooperation with North Macedonia and thereafter with Armenia. There we have recently seen democratic elections carried out, despite disruptions from Russian disinformation and problems similar to those that Erik Ottoson recently raised when it concerned Moldova. A pro-Russian party moved forward, but the Europe-oriented governing party retained its own majority.

It is important that we strengthen these countries' resilience against Russian attempts to destabilize. This applies to both Armenia and Moldova, which we were previously discussing, with their geographical proximity to Russia. I would like to hear the Prime Minister elaborate on how the discussions are proceeding in the EU and how we, from the Swedish side, can strengthen this cooperation.

I also wonder how the discussions are going regarding the Middle East and the conflicts there. It is well known that Iran's proxy activities via the Hamas terrorist organization in Gaza and Hezbollah's same in Lebanon have the stated ambition to wipe out the state of Israel, a country that was formed following a UN decision and which is the region's only democracy. In the report from the council, however, there is a strong bias towards criticism of Israel and less attention on how the terrorist organizations should be disarmed and a peaceful two-state solution come to fruition.

My question is how Sweden influences in the EU so that the EU's power is directed towards those who constitute the real problem.

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! The risks of Russian disinformation were not explicitly up for discussion at this meeting. However, I believe that in a previous report I have spoken about a very detailed discussion we had regarding the obvious risks of extensive Russian disinformation in various countries. We have had entire elections that have had to be redone, for example in Romania. In Moldova, this is well known. I have close contact with Maia Sandu in Moldova. They have managed to get this far, it must be said, but it is not obvious.

Different countries are differently sensitive to this. In our countries, we do not always understand the problem. The somewhat banal Russian narratives do not gain a foothold here. Nevertheless, I gathered all the leaders of the Riksdag's parties for a conversation just a few months ago, where we explicitly looked at the risk of disinformation efforts from other countries against the Swedish election.

My and the authorities' assessment is that we stand strong so far. However, we must not be naive. Constant attempts are being made to influence other countries' elections in an illegitimate way, and I think the awareness of this is very great – naturally most in the countries that are most vulnerable, but it can also apply to other countries. But there is no room for naivety.

Sweden always points out in the discussions about the Middle East that Hezbollah is an acute threat to many different actors and that Hamas cannot be part of a long-term solution in Gaza. It is always said. But as I said earlier: As the text looks right now is as far as we have reached in agreement in the European Council.

The discussion always continues at the foreign ministers' council meetings, but there have been no actual changes regarding the overall picture of where the EU stands together on Middle East issues. I also do not see that it will change particularly much during the coming period.

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Gudrun Brunegård (KD)

Madam Speaker! I thank you for the answer so far.

In my post here, I would like to take the opportunity to ask, just as Member Deremar did, about the increased tensions between Poland and Ukraine. These could develop into a problem for the common and strong European support for Ukraine. How can we, from the Swedish side, contribute to ensuring that the development goes in the right direction there as well?

We were discussing the question of the long-term budget. A part of that is the EU's aid budget, which is much larger than the Swedish budget in that matter. To the extent that the question was touched upon, I wonder how much the Swedish reform agenda for aid is included and functions as a direction with the priorities that have been made there for the EU.

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! Let me start from the end. As I said, we did not discuss content-related issues in the budget. Given that there were such enormous disagreements in the entire framework for the budget, it was not meaningful to start discussing substantive issues, but they will come. But they will not come until we have reached greater agreement on the scope of the budget. I said earlier that the budget should be better, not larger.

There are well-known historical issues between Ukraine and Poland. But during the coming weeks, the Eastern Flank Summit and the Ukraine Recovery Conference will take place in Poland. I still think overall that Poland is a solid player when it comes to our collective support for Ukraine – without underestimating that polarization is pulling away. That risk always exists. If we can counteract it, we will do so.

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Jan Ericson (M)

Madam Speaker! I was a little surprised when I heard the Social Democrats' representative speak about how skilled the previous government was at negotiating the EU's long-term budget. Those of us who were there at the time and sat on the EU Committee remember how it went. We remember how the Social Democrats then laid themselves flat and actively voted for the EU's recovery fund, which will cost Sweden a net amount of several tens of billions of kronor until the recovery fund has run out.

What is the informal tone in the discussions in the European Council regarding this? Have any lessons been learned from the recovery fund, which will cost an ever-increasing share of the EU's budget in the form of rising interest payments and the like? Has the lesson been learned that borrowing money collectively to distribute it among the member states is not a particularly good idea, or are there still dreams among members of the European Council about starting new projects?

I have another question regarding the writings we have seen in the newspapers over the last few days about talks in the European Council on how, when, and to what extent one should have diplomatic contacts with Russia. Some seem to have jumped the gun a bit, and there is criticism that it is moving too fast. One must be careful about when this should happen and who from the EU should handle the diplomatic contacts. Does the Prime Minister have anything to add on that question?

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Statsministern Ulf Kristersson (M)

Madam Speaker! As I said a moment ago, we who were involved in the work with the previous budget remember how it was that time. Then it was quite obvious that the government at that time did not even have support in the Swedish Riksdag. It could not act at all; instead, it went to the EU summits tied hand and foot. It had no voice whatsoever. It is clear that it is completely paralyzing for a government that arrives at a summit of the European Council and says that it cannot think anything because it has no mandate from the Riksdag. It was only when we helped that government that it could vote yes, and finally, an agreement was reached.

I think it is worth noting that weak governments that are not in agreement get nothing done, not even in an EU context. That lesson Sweden learned from the old Social Democratic government.

But, but! Then there was the question of loans. That question was absolutely up. The same countries that are now critical of the budget volume are countries that are also critical of taking up new loans at the EU level. Germany is the most well-known example. They do not mince words on that issue.

Then follows always a discussion about that old loans also shall be repaid sooner or later. Only the interest burden with rising interest rates has naturally also done its part. It is the same discussion there.

A number of countries that think there is free money to be taxed also find it easier to take out loans, while we believe that every krona that we spend at the EU level is a krona that we cannot use in our own policy.

Then there can always be good reasons to think that we should do this together, but it is not the case that the money is free or free just because it lands in the EU budget. We often have the same view on joint loans. There is a deep skepticism toward this, and that discussion is not new either.

The reporting was hereby concluded.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)