A clear decision-making process for participation in NATO's collective activities for deterrence and defense

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! The security policy situation is such that the war in Ukraine continues with ongoing intensity. Europe is delivering weapons to Ukraine. It is important that we stand behind Ukraine in this difficult time and that we are unambiguous in our messages to them that they have us at their backs in the future we shall face together.

The Russian war of aggression has shaken all of Europe and created an entirely new security policy situation. It has caused old decisions for security policy to be reassessed, and Sweden has become a member of Nato together with Finland.

I believe that we will live with this situation for a very long time to come. Regardless of how the situation will develop in Ukraine, the situation in relation to Russia will be problematic and difficult. It is important that we build a common deterrence within the framework of Nato and within the framework of the EU. We must act in such a way that we can deter Russia from different types of provocations and war adventures.

We can already see that we are subjected to cyberattacks almost every day, every week, and every month. They target payment systems, authorities, and companies – a broad palette of attacks that we have to defend ourselves against. We have noted sabotage against submarine cables and IT cables. We have seen break-ins at water towers, and we have seen felled tele masts. At the Finnish border, we have seen refugee flows pre-organized in order to provoke and plant saboteurs and spies in both Finland and the rest of Western Europe.

We see a large shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea engaged in oil transport for Russia's account, and they constitute not only an environmental problem but also a serious security policy problem. We see extensive disinformation, and we see violations of borders in, among other things, the airspace.

This situation is not to be regarded as normal; rather, it is highly abnormal and testifies to a completely different security policy map today than, for example, 20 years ago. Therefore, deterrence is an important instrument for making an enemy, an antagonist, or an opponent refrain from attacks, aggressions, or escalation, or to refrain from spreading acts of war or provocations geographically. It is extremely important to carry that insight with you – that perspective.

It is also important that Nato has the capacity to strike back with full force if we see that there are plans to commit acts that violate international law and justice. The mandates must be clear and powerful. Nato must have a forward capability to meet hostilities against our territory at all levels and in all dimensions.

Right now, it is about the presence in NATO's eastern flank. There is, for example, the mission in Latvia and the mission in northern Finland. Furthermore, there is the ongoing NATO Air Policing activity, and furthermore, there are the contributions in the Baltic Sea due to the shadow fleet that exists there. Finally, there are also NATO's standing forces.

Sweden shall continuously contribute to NATO's activities for deterrence, but we must also regulate how this shall take place. The main rule shall, of course, be that it is the Riksdag that each year decides on the upcoming planned activities in a one-year perspective. This applies to special operations and other activities, and it applies to different types of demonstrations and exercise activities.

If special situations arise, that special needs arise on short notice where we must act without delay, and there is a risk that they involve harm to Swedish interests, the government must also have the possibility to take measures under those circumstances. It can be measures where we contribute a Swedish troop of up to 500 people, and a total of at most 1,000 people may serve simultaneously. The mandate can be valid for at most 90 days, and it shall apply to needs that arise on short notice. It can involve different measures considered necessary within the framework of the alliance. There must be a flexible view here on what it can be, but there must also be strong reasons for it to be about short notice.

Furthermore, there is a proposal to deploy a maximum of 1,000 people for a limited time of 60 days. It concerns the wording but for urgent Swedish interests. In practice, it is about averting a threatening situation for Sweden, that is, threats to the nation's security. It should be a question of a situation where we directly stand against an enemy or antagonist, and it is reasonable that the government in those contexts is given the flexibility that makes it possible to act quickly.

We are on our side prepared to support that regulatory framework. Every government that handles these issues must be clear and explicit that, in all instances, one understands the need for anchoring in the Riksdag. I am convinced that in such instances, regardless of who is in power, one is eager to engage in reasoning with the different parties in the Riksdag. But depending on how the situation develops, it may be important to have a certain flexibility so that one can make fast and immediate decisions. We must remember that the main rule is that a Riksdag decision is required to deploy a Swedish armed force for that type of operation.

We must also fundamentally understand that the security policy situation is radically changed from how it was once in time. A completely different type of thinking is required today than previously. Therefore, it is reasonable that we change regulations. NATO membership in itself is a major change, and what we are now discussing concerns how we should dispose of Swedish resources within the framework of the alliance Sweden is a member of.

I vote in favor of the proposal in the present report.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Madam Speaker and honorable colleagues! Hello to everyone who is sitting at home watching and listening!

Today we are debating an interesting but also somewhat complicated matter. It concerns, in short, whether the Riksdag should hand over power to the government to make decisions on certain military interventions within Nato.

We in Vänsterpartiet say no to this matter entirely and will vote no to the entire bill. I want to therefore already now move for approval of reservation number 1, Madam Speaker.

According to today's legislation, it is always the Riksdag, Sweden's highest decision-making body, that makes the decision that Sweden shall send armed military troops abroad. This order exists for several reasons. Such decisions should not be made lightly, and the decision must be able to be debated openly before it is made.

Sending Swedish soldiers on missions abroad always involves risks, sometimes quite large risks. Swedish soldiers have throughout history been on many difficult missions out in the world, in areas where there has been war. It is therefore reasonable that it is Sweden's elected members of parliament who make these large and risky decisions.

The main rule remains the same even after this legislative change: It shall be the Riksdag that makes the decisions when it concerns planned or long-term measures. We naturally think it is good that this main rule remains in place.

The government has, however, for a long time since Sweden joined Nato, spoken about wanting to give itself the possibility to make decisions on its own specifically regarding sending soldiers on Nato missions abroad, without having to go through the Riksdag. The argument has been that there are missions within Nato where decisions need to be made very quickly and under great secrecy. The government considers that the Riksdag cannot do that.

The government sets a limit for both time and number of soldiers regarding missions where one is to make own decisions: 60–90 days and 500–1,000 soldiers, depending slightly on the situation. And the government shall itself decide if a mission is so acute that the government can make decisions without the Riksdag's consent from the beginning. Vänsterpartiet considers that these are neither short missions, 60–90 days, nor small missions, when one sends 500–1,000 soldiers.

We have some arguments as to why we say no to this bill. For the first, this implies a shift of power from the Riksdag to the government, Madam Speaker. It is not appropriate, purely in principle, to make such a shift of power. Vänsterpartiet argues, as said, that in every case it should be the Riksdag that makes the decision to send soldiers abroad in peacetime. A Riksdag decision provides the greatest possible democratic and popular anchoring of such a decision.

That it is precisely the Riksdag that makes these decisions also sends a powerful signal. It is a signal both to the individuals whom we send out on missions and to the countries that receive our soldiers and, in fact, to the one we want to signal towards, our enemy. The signal is that it is the Riksdag that has made the decision and that we have done so in the most democratic way possible. Therefore, this is a matter of principle, that the power remains entirely with the Riksdag.

Secondly, Madam Speaker, we argue that the proposed amendment reduces both transparency and anchoring of these important defense and security policy decisions. It disadvantages the political opposition the most. And we can all be in political opposition at different times. There is a very great point in that it is all the parties in the Riksdag that together make these types of major decisions after joint discussions, not just the parties that sit in the government.

We work according to a principle of having a common political will and broad political agreements when it comes to defense and security policy in the situation we find ourselves in. Therefore, it is important that as many parties as possible can be involved and take a shared responsibility for these major decisions, even if all parties, of course, may not always say yes to all international missions.

Thirdly, Madam Speaker, the Left Party argues that the Riksdag can make decisions quickly. We have shown this at previous occasions, especially those of us who were involved during the pandemic. We have also seen it when we have made security policy decisions.

There are today opportunities to shorten the preparation and decision-making processes in the Riksdag. We have done so several times. Vänsterpartiet has asked the Riksdag's investigation service to look at the decisions that have been made regarding international interventions during the years 1990–2024. The fastest decision the Riksdag has been able to make from proposition to decision has taken two days.

The members of the Riksdag are always on duty, and we must be willing to review our own ways of working in order to be able to make this type of decision in a fast and good way. We who work with defense and foreign policy, and of course many other members in the Riksdag, understand the seriousness and the need to be able to make decisions quickly and to be available. We are aware of the seriousness that characterizes the area we work in. We also know that we can have a close dialogue between the government and the Riksdag when required, both in the committees and in the Foreign Affairs Committee.

We also assume that the government has a very high readiness to very quickly write propositions to the Riksdag that we can make decisions on.

Madam Speaker! I want to submit another idea that we in Vänsterpartiet have. It is a bit outside the matter, but I say it anyway. We mean that it would be good if the Riksdag could have a permanent joint defense and foreign affairs committee. Today, we appoint such committees for each individual matter, as we have done for this. But a permanent joint committee could mean that we could handle, for example, this type of Nato issue even faster and thus not get stuck in the committees' usual agenda-driven work.

Madam Speaker! Even though this matter is of a more administrative nature, I would like to conclude by extending a big thank you to all Swedish soldiers who are currently abroad on international missions and those who have been or will be in the future. We know that it involves great risks and great sacrifices for you yourselves and your families. We are extremely grateful that you take on these missions.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Björn Söder (SD)

Madam Speaker! This report on a clear decision-making procedure for participation in NATO's collective activities for deterrence and defense concerns one of the state's most fundamental tasks: to safeguard Sweden's security. It is about how we ensure a clear and functioning decision-making procedure when Sweden participates in NATO's collective activities for deterrence and defense.

After Sweden's entry into Nato, our defense is no longer solely a national matter. It is part of a larger whole. This entails both obligations and rights. But above all, it means that Sweden's own security is strengthened by being shared with others.

The Sweden Democrats support the government's proposal because it is well-balanced, well-considered, and takes into account two things that are central to us: firstly, the Riksdag's control and influence, and secondly, the state's ability to act quickly when the situation demands it.

The main rule in the proposal is clear: It is the Riksdag that decides on the overall frameworks for when Swedish armed forces are deployed. That is how it shall be, and that is how it shall remain.

But – this is important – we must simultaneously acknowledge the reality we are currently in. The security situation in our immediate vicinity is the most serious in decades. Russia's war in Ukraine has changed the European security order and created geopolitical instability even in our immediate vicinity.

It is rapid developments. NATO sometimes needs to act immediately to demonstrate readiness and deter. If Sweden were then to be the country that has to wait for a slow political decision-making process, we risk both our own security and our credibility as an ally. We must not become the partner that arrives too late.

Madam Speaker! That is why the proposal contains an arrangement where the government, in limited and temporary situations, can make quick decisions to deploy a smaller Swedish force for a shorter period. It is not, as some claim, a shift of power from parliament to government. It is a readiness tool. It is limited in size. It is limited in time. And it is referred back to the parliament if the participation is to continue. It is a solution based on Swedish caution, on the Swedish tradition of constitutional balance, but also on Swedish realism.

In matters of defense, we cannot have an order where we sit and wait while others act. We must be able to stand together with our allies, not as spectators but as a country that takes responsibility for its territory, its population, and its word.

Madam Speaker! There are reservations from parties who argue that everything can always be resolved through fast-tracking in the Riksdag. We are pleased that they at least acknowledge that the situation sometimes requires speed. But their conclusion is wrong. Of course, the Riksdag can act quickly, but not always quickly enough and not time and again in recurring situations.

We need structure, preparation and decisiveness, not improvisation as a form. And above all: We need to be able to defend Sweden when it is needed, not when the calendar allows it.

Madam Speaker! The Sweden Democrats want Sweden to be a credible and reliable ally, but we primarily want Sweden to be safe. This proposal enables both. It creates order and clarity, maintains the Riksdag's role, and gives the government tools to act when Sweden needs to act.

Therefore, I move for approval of the committee's proposal.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! As has been said before, the security policy situation is very serious. We and our neighboring countries experience it. Above all, Ukraine experiences it every minute, every hour, and every day. It is naturally a matter of a change that we must adapt to.

Russia's war of conquest against Ukraine is ongoing, and Russia's hybrid war is also ongoing against us. We do not know exactly what happened in Belgium last night, but de facto airports have been affected there as well, as in Denmark and other neighboring countries. Much suggests that there is a pattern and that a state actor is behind it: Russia.

Sweden's security policy situation has thus changed in reality. We have strengthened our security and our neighbors' security through the decision to join Nato. This naturally affects how we must relate to our neighbors. It is of course clear that we need to change the legislation that applies. We cannot, as a Nato member, make decisions based on the premise that it is a special event every time we send Swedish military to other countries. That is no longer acceptable. It is crystal clear that the legislation that has applied so far must be changed.

It is naturally also for that reason that we move for approval of a fundamental part of the bill. From the Center Party's side, however, we have some differing opinions. This concerns primarily the part that deals with pressing Swedish interests.

We could previously, for example, hear that Peter Hultqvist interpreted it as a matter of warding off direct threats to Sweden. But others can, of course, interpret it in a different way. What constitutes pressing Swedish interests can from time to time, and from one government to another, have different meanings. It is said that this must be developed over time, just as is the case regarding the relationship and the information to the Riksdag. For our part, we believe there are reasons to review this. I therefore move for the approval of our reservation number 2.

It is possible to return and clarify what is meant, so that no doubt arises about what it is about or that it becomes a discussion about what constitutes important Swedish interests. Today we experience that different countries interpret national interests very differently. This naturally affects us as well, because we are a member together with other countries that may choose other paths than what we consider reasonable. There we have a differing opinion.

The question of information to the Riksdag has been raised. The Government clearly sees that there is no formal obligation to inform or consult with the Riksdag in matters of the mentioned nature, but that it is customary to do so. That it is important is clearly expressed in the committee's position – it is important that the Riksdag receives information. From the Government's proposal, it appears that the relevant committees shall be kept informed about Swedish participation in operations and activities when these are decided by the Government, even when it has occurred with the support of the Government's mandate for urgent cases. But then the decisions have already been made. I want to emphasize that there are reasons to receive information in advance. It is an important part, even from the starting point that this is more of an exception. The main rule is that decisions shall be made by the Riksdag.

When it comes to the question of the time limit for this type of decision, we think there are grounds for the government to review how the legislation is formulated. We base this largely on a change in the legislation regarding the government's mandate in a crisis. The government cannot make decisions in a crisis today, but it is something we expect will become possible in the future. The question is how long the time should be for that type of decision-making, but also how the Riksdag can verify or stop that type of position if it is seen that the government has gone too far. We think there are grounds to adapt the legislation in this part to what applies in a crisis.

We are not in a state of war right now in Sweden. Nato is not in a state of war. But we say that we do not have peace either. We are in this gray zone. Then one needs to find a common picture of this when it concerns both this legislation and a potential change of the constitution. Such a change will come, as we see it.

Madam Speaker! I vote in favor of reservation 2 of the Center Party and otherwise vote in favor of the bill.

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Lars Püss (M)

Madam Speaker! Russia's irresponsible and reckless behavior in our neighborhood has expanded and intensified and constitutes a serious threat to the security interests of Sweden and our allies, including with violations of Polish, Romanian, and Estonian airspace. At the same time, Nato has acted decisively and quickly. These events have once again shown the need for Sweden, as an ally, to also be able to act quickly and decisively in order to be able to respond to the threat that Russia poses.

Sweden has been an ally in Nato for just over a year and a half. The defense of Sweden is part of the collective defense within Nato, and participation in Nato's operations for deterrence and defense is now a natural part of the Armed Forces' activities.

As stated in the Armed Forces' instructions, the Armed Forces' main task is to defend Sweden and allied states against an armed attack based on the collective defense of Nato. This means that national operations and operations outside Sweden's territory that take place within the collective defense of Nato will transition into and out of each other seamlessly. When Sweden participates in operations for deterrence against Russia under SACEUR's leadership, it is not the same as when the Armed Forces carry out an international mission far away. The collective defense is the defense of Sweden.

The provisions in the Instrument of Government regarding the deployment of Swedish armed forces in this particular case are not adapted for the recurring decision-making in the type of continuous activity that NATO's concept for deterrence and defence, i.e., Concept for the deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area or DDA, constitutes.

In the same way as the Armed Forces must be able to act quickly in the event of violations of Swedish territory, the Armed Forces must be able to act quickly to maintain deterrence against attacks and protect the collective territory of NATO countries. It is therefore important that even when it concerns the protection of our allies, there is a possibility to act quickly. It is crucial for Sweden's credibility as an ally but also for our own security.

I want to emphasize that the government's intention and the general rule according to the proposed provision is that it is the Riksdag that determines the framework for the Swedish participation, whether it is in the form of a one-year proposition for several different operations or activities or if it concerns a specific effort. The government's ambition is also that such a proposition should be able to cover operations or other activities that arise during a fiscal year but which the government can still foresee without knowing its specific details. Urgent needs may still arise that are not already covered, and it is for these cases that a government needs a limited mandate to act.

The serious security policy situation implies an increased need to be able to quickly initiate new, often short-term, operations that could not be foreseen and described in the long-term proposition. Here, it needs to go fast, and it is not possible to take into account all possible contributions in the long-term propositions in advance. Sweden must be able to provide notice to SACEUR on very short notice if Sweden can provide, for example, a warship for increased presence in the Baltic Sea.

The Government's assessment is that in order for Sweden to be able to act with sufficient speed and flexibility, the Government should have a mandate in law to deploy a limited number of Swedish armed forces in such situations for a limited period of time. The proposed decision-making powers are therefore assessed not to be more extensive than what is necessary.

I want to emphasize here that for participation with larger numbers or over a longer period, also in these operations or activities that could not have been foreseen, it is proposed that the Riksdag's consent shall still be required. This may then be obtained through a special proposition.

With those words, I move for approval of the committee's proposal.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Ulf Holm (MP)

Madam Speaker! Yes, the security policy situation in our immediate vicinity is, to say the least, serious and complicated. Russia's illegal and violation of international law invasion of Ukraine means that the map is being redrawn around us. Sweden has become a member of Nato, which means that we in Sweden participate in more and larger security policy structures than before.

In a time when the security situation is unstable in our immediate vicinity with drone and IT attacks, it is important with determination and clarity. This situation also undoubtedly requires that we in Sweden increase the state of readiness.

Madam Speaker! In this government bill, a new regulation is proposed which specifies the closer frameworks regarding how decisions shall be made to deploy Swedish armed forces in NATO's regular activities.

The proposals are in most cases completely reasonable and entirely in order, but on one important point, we in Miljöpartiet believe that the Riksdag should say no to the government's proposal. This concerns the point that it should be the government and not the Riksdag that shall have the authority to deploy Swedish armed forces in certain urgent situations, which are defined as between 500 and up to 1,000 people for 60–90 days.

Madam Speaker! One must be careful about moving power from the Riksdag to the government. If one is to do so, it must be clear that there are very good reasons to do so, for example, that the Riksdag has not been able to make decisions quickly and that it has led to a misfortune of some kind.

Is it the case that the government and the Tidö parties in the Riksdag think that the Riksdag cannot make quick decisions or that the Riksdag has made a mistake in some case that has resulted in a threat to Swedish security? Let me then remind you that the Riksdag, on several occasions over the last few years, has in the highest degree demonstrated the ability to act, often in less than a few days. This was done on a large number of occasions during the pandemic a few years ago, but also not so long ago, for example when, in only two days, a decision could be made to send a Swedish troop to Sudan to evacuate Swedish citizens.

The Riksdag has shown to the highest degree that quick decisions can be made because there is a framework in the Riksdag with both the capacity and the tools to handle unforeseen and urgent decisions. If you in the government and the Sverigedemokraterna are not satisfied with this, have you tried to come up with proposals on how the parliamentary rules of procedure can be changed to enable even faster decisions in the Riksdag? The parliamentary rules of procedure are not set in stone. Even those can be changed. The Riksdag's way of working in some cases may perhaps also need to be reviewed.

Madam Speaker! Furthermore, the government's bill is unclear regarding what is meant by needs arising on short notice or by what is intended to be of considerable but urgent Swedish interests. These ambiguities in the bill can lead to excessively far-reaching flexibility for the government's possibilities to make decisions on its own.

Regardless of party affiliation, I believe it is of great democratic importance that it is the Riksdag that makes the decision to send Swedish military troops abroad. It ensures that the mission is carried out in accordance with international law, that the decision is in line with Sweden's interests, and that a proper impact assessment has been made.

Broad parliamentary support can also strengthen the legitimacy of the government's decisions in difficult situations. Instead, it appears in this proposal from the government as if one does not trust the Riksdag and wants to keep proposals secret etcetera. It is never a good way forward in a difficult situation, regardless of party color.

Madam Speaker! I therefore consider that the Riksdag should reject the government's bill as far as paragraph 1, second and third sentences of the Act on Operational Military Support concerns. That is to say, I move for approval of reservation 3 under point 2 in this report. In all other respects, I support the government's proposition.

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Mikael Oscarsson (KD)

Madam Speaker! Today we are debating the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence's report 1 A clear decision-making process for participation in NATO's collective activities for deterrence and defense. Let me begin by moving for the approval of the proposal in its entirety and the rejection of all reservations.

As we have already heard here from the rostrum, we have this discussion and debate in a severely deteriorated security policy situation. Regardless of whether you are sitting here in the chamber or in the gallery or watching on TV right now, I believe we all know it. We have the toughest security policy situation since World War II. And this, Madam Speaker, is no pit of air. This is nothing that we can foresee will pass over in a short time. This is for a foreseeable future.

That is why it is so important that we have a strong defense and that we have a NATO membership in place. It is also important with what the report is about – that we as a country can do our part and act quickly if necessary.

The Russian war of invasion has now been ongoing for three and a half years. It is a terrible war, where Russia breaks all rules. There are rules in war too, but here it is shown that they disregard the laws of war. They attack elderly care homes, shopping centers, power plants, and civilians. We currently have open data on approximately 700,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine. Sweden continues to provide support. But this also has consequences for our own immediate vicinity. We know that very many of these soldiers may end up near our own immediate vicinity at the end of the war.

The Baltic countries have a defense, and they have help in the form of Nato. But I think it may be worth reminding that they have a very small operational depth – between 200 and 370 kilometers.

With Sweden as a member, Nato is a functioning operational unit; Sweden is an area of deployment and has an important task, which we will discuss and debate in other ways. This is, however, a reminder that while presence is important, we will in the future need to look more at how Nato as a whole, but also Sweden and our neighboring countries, can take greater responsibility. As has been pointed out earlier in the debate: Given the violations of airspace we have seen from the Russian side, as well as cyberattacks and other attacks, we understand that we could end up in a situation where Russia wants to test Article 5.

What we are discussing today is real. We have a good defense and are making a strong upgrade where we go from just over 1 percent to 3 ½ percent militarily and an additional ½ percent on the civil side. It is necessary, but we must see and understand that the situation will not only require the upgrades we are making but also means that we do not have all the time in the world. Svenska Must and the Russian intelligence service have said that we must be prepared for a regional war within a couple of years and a larger war within five years.

When we now discuss this, I want to say that this is for real, Madam Speaker. Hot air and beautiful words hardly impress Russia, and the only thing that works is military capability – truly trained and well-equipped. That is why it is so important now, and that is what is so pleasing about the fact that we in the Swedish Riksdag have a consensus on, in any case, the main features regarding rearmament, as well as the NATO membership.

Here today's report comes in as an important part: We must be able to act quickly. The Riksdag shall, of course, be informed and make important decisions, but the sitting government must be able to act quickly. That is exactly what this report deals with, and that is why this is an important part of a strong defense both today and tomorrow. Given the violations we have seen just in the last few weeks, we understand that it is necessary that this possibility exists.

Once again, Madam Speaker, I move for approval of the committee's proposal in its entirety.

(Applause)

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Joar Forssell (L)

Madam Speaker! Russia's aggressions in the country and our immediate vicinity constitute a historical continuity. It is a bit like waking up in the morning, eating breakfast and brushing your teeth; it is ongoing constantly and always and has been so for a very long time – actually since the founding of Russia.

What distinguishes today from yesterday is that it is no longer solely Russia's warmongering and war machine that is dimensioning the threat against Sweden. Russia has allied itself with other powers of the axis of evil in our time. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating to neutralize what we call the liberal democratic world order.

Russia's war against Ukraine – Russia's full-scale invasion – is a threat to Sweden, to Europe, and to the liberal democratic world order. Ukraine must win, but Russia must also lose. This is especially important, Madam Speaker, because the axis of evil of our time – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – who cooperate so deeply and deliberately to destroy our way of life, must suffer a clear defeat.

This is about a common thinking – not regarding socialism, communism, Islamism, fascism or anything else that each country stands for, but about revanchism and shaking the world order that has held back these countries' tyrannical ideologies. It is about a common thinking about being against our democracy. That is why the support for Ukraine is so completely crucial, and that is why it is so crucial that we here in Sweden ensure that we have the military, economic, political and legal means to stand against the threat.

The debate we have here today is about the legal means. We have obtained the political means by becoming members of Nato. This year marks 30 years since the Liberal Youth Association – then the Folkpartiet's youth association – became the first youth association in Sweden to demand that Sweden should join Nato. In hindsight, I thought the Nato process in our party was quite long. I wasn't particularly old when that happened in 1995, but the process took four years. It took four years for Folkpartiet to pick up this policy, and since then we have pushed for Nato membership. Those who say that the Nato process was short are therefore wrong; it took 30 years from the time the first political entity in Sweden made the decision until Sweden became a member.

Madam Speaker! It took a full-scale invasion of Ukraine for the slumbering social democracy to reach the wide-awake realization that we need NATO membership. I regret that. Now we are there, and that is good. But let us not have a situation where when we need to act – when we need to be agile, active, and quick-footed – it becomes a process as long and drawn-out as the NATO process! Let us learn from the long, complicated political processes we have seen. Vänsterpartiet said from the rostrum that the Riksdag's record for fast processes is two days. Two days is quite a long time when things really get tough, Madam Speaker. Let us instead have the opportunity to have fast processes!

Madam Speaker! It has sounded in the debate as if this is primarily about moving power from the Riksdag to the government. One can argue that; at first glance and with a rather simplistic view of the committee report, that is what it is technically about. But actually, the committee report – and this everyone understands except perhaps the Vänsterpartiet – is about whether we want it to be Sweden's government or the government in the Kremlin that makes decisions on how we shall live our lives here. This is what it is about.

Therefore, I move for approval of the committee's proposal.

(Applause)

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 17.)

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