Defense policy and total defense
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
1 M believes that Sweden faces a historic upgrade of the total defense and Nato integration 1. M wants to provide voluntary defense organizations with better conditions for training 1. 2 S argues that Russia is the threat and wants to build a high military threshold 2. S wants 10,000 conscripts, a regiment in Kiruna, civil service, and a preparedness tax 2. S argues that large efforts and prioritizations between defense and welfare are required 3, and that welfare risks being affected if the funding is stopped 4. 5 SD requests the Nato planning 5. 6 SD wants Nato's planning to come first, training places in Kiruna, and to discuss the preparedness tax 6. 7 SD argues that Sweden faces an existential threat, wants to reduce bureaucracy, increase self-sufficiency, and sees the two percent goal as a floor 7. 8 SD considers civil defense to be the backbone of the will to defend, wants a stronger grip on food supply, and wants to encourage voluntary organizations 8. 9 V wants to see a total defense with broad public support, an end to cuts, and that the state has greater responsibility for infrastructure 9. 10 V proposes that the state owns critical infrastructure and that the role of companies during crises is clarified 10. 11 L argues that Sweden must provide strong support to Ukraine, that Nato membership is important, and wants to see increased resources, developed civil defense, and the reintroduction of civil service 11. MP considers civil defense to be at least as important as military upgrades and demands state responsibility for preparedness stocks and domestic production. 12 KD considers the defense force to be too small and needs more money, ships, aviation divisions, and conscripts 12. KD wants to strengthen civil defense and proposes an agency for cyber defense 12. KD argues that the organization must be reviewed and prioritizations made without special taxes. 13 KD argues that the fundamental issue is protection against internal and external threats 13. C emphasizes investments in broadband. 14 C argues that Sweden needs long-term thinking, strengthened food preparedness, strong cyber defense, and that the military should not play police 14. C wants the state to coordinate the connection between the private and the public.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Speakers (21)
- Helena Bouveng (M)
- Johan Andersson (S)
- Lars Wistedt (SD)
- Johan Andersson (S)
- Lars Wistedt (SD)
- Johan Andersson (S)
- Håkan Svenneling (V)
- Niels Paarup-Petersen (C)
- Håkan Svenneling (V)
- Niels Paarup-Petersen (C)
- Håkan Svenneling (V)
- Lars Wistedt (SD)
- Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
- Johan Andersson (S)
- Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
- Johan Andersson (S)
- Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
- Niels Paarup-Petersen (C)
- Martin Melin (L)
- Ulf Holm (MP)
- Sara-Lena Bjälkö (SD)
Helena Bouveng (M)
Madam Speaker! With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Putin regime shows that Russia is ruled by a government that lies, oppresses, murders, invades, occupies and deports both adults and children. This is an unprovoked and unjustifiable war that is also conducted in an illegal and contrary to international law manner. Russia attacks civilian targets that lack military purposes.
With a major war in Europe and the European security order seriously damaged, we find ourselves in the most insecure and dangerous times since the end of the Second World War. Russia's actions have resulted in a fundamentally deteriorated security situation in our immediate vicinity which will certainly persist for a longer period of time.
Defense policy and total defense
Madam Speaker! We therefore face three historical tasks for our country's security and defense policy. For the first, we shall support Ukraine so that the country can emerge victorious and regain its full freedom and territorial integrity. For the second, we shall carry out the largest reorganization of Sweden's security and defense policy in modern times by successfully integrating Sweden into Nato. For the third, we shall carry out the largest upgrade of our total defense since the 1950s.
Madam Speaker! With a strong total defense, both a military defense and a strong civil defense are needed, spanning many areas, not least those that concern each one of us. In 1961, the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander, former Minister for Civil Defense, formulated and signed the following in the brochure *Om kriget kommer* (If War Comes): "Every citizen must be prepared to do their part in the total defense to the utmost - within the armed forces, civil defense, war production, public supply, healthcare, in the homes. Each one must also know how to protect themselves against the dangers that a modern war entails, and realize how essential it is to also maintain calm and composure in critical situations."
Madam Speaker! Despite the time that has passed, the words hold their truth and validity even today. And despite that, as we all know, the view on civil defense has over time been more than shifting. If we compare ourselves with Finland, we have quite a bit to work on. Being wise in hindsight is easy but can also be costly. Something that is difficult is a word that is actually my brother's favorite word and which consists of thirteen letters; I am not talking about Systembolaget, but I am talking about foresight.
Shortsightedness is difficult, but if handled correctly over time, it is less costly. For if we decide, Madam Speaker, what the ultimate consequences are that our civil defense shall be able to handle, perhaps it will be easier for those who come after us to realize that the strength in the civil defense needs to be as enduring as Erlander's description of the civil defense's mission.
Madam Speaker! There is a link between the civil defense that was phased out and that which is now to be rebuilt: It is those who never stopped, the unsung heroes who did not take a strategic time out when we politicians and the public Sweden did. Some of these heroes I meet as the union chairman of Försvarsutbildarna Norra Småland, and they are just some of the 350,000 Swedes who are engaged in our voluntary defense organizations.
Ensuring that these organizations are given good conditions for education and training is central, as is having a clear and defined role towards the public during high alert. There is more to be done here. Ensuring this is one of the things that builds up our increased capability.
Madam Speaker! Hopefully, Sweden will, in the near future, together with Finland, become a member of the defense alliance that for over 70 years has been the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security. Through membership, Nato becomes Sweden's most important defense policy platform.
A Swedish NATO membership will also improve the conditions for deepening our bilateral defense cooperation with the USA. We are moving from being close partners to allies in international politics. This implies a major transition and, not least, a completely different mindset – we are talking about a 360-degree transition. The agreement will affect a large number of areas. Norway has already entered into such an agreement, and Denmark and Finland have initiated negotiations.
Our NATO membership also lays the foundation for a strong Nordic defense cooperation in peace, crisis, and war. The entire Nordic region will then become part of the chairmanship in Nordefco during 2023 and the new vision for the cooperation that the government will present by the summer.
Madam Speaker! The new government has taken office in a difficult time characterized by crises and war in our immediate vicinity. The government shall lead Sweden into Nato, while Sweden took over the presidency of the EU on January 1. It will be a presidency characterized by precisely war and crisis.
The defense commission appointed by Defense Minister Pål Jonson in December will not be idle. It is a defense commission that has a very important task ahead of it. It shall chart the course and provide thoroughly worked-out proposals for the upgrading of the total defense and Sweden's integration into Nato.
The Defense Preparation Committee, with its broad political composition, is a strength and a guarantee for creating a long-term Swedish defense policy. Since today's reservists are included in the Defense Preparation Committee, I take for granted that their reservations will be discussed there. There are many important points to be raised.
Madam Speaker! Despite reservations, historical investments in total defense are now being made in broad political agreement. This bodes well for the future.
Johan Andersson (S)
Madam Speaker! Today we debate and decide on the committee report FöU6 Defence Policy and Total Defence. The report deals with approximately 70 motions from the general motion period.
I would like to begin by referring to the fact that the Social Democrats stand behind all of our reservations, but that for the sake of time, I move for the approval of only three of them, namely reservations 1, 3 and 5.
The international security situation has changed drastically in a short time, about a year, since Russia began the war against Ukraine. For us as a small nation, this means a completely new focus on our defense capability in the event of an attack.
Sweden has applied for membership in Nato together with Finland to be able to stand ready in the event of a potential armed attack against our country. How this process will proceed is difficult to predict at the current stage. There have been many turns regarding this, but one can state that many believe that the war will continue for a long time. If Ukraine is not successful, it means that peace in other democratic countries is threatened. Therefore, there is no other alternative than to support Ukraine in its difficult struggle. This is something that Sweden does and, I assume, will continue to do.
For a very long time to come, Russia will be the dimensioning threat for Sweden. Russia does not want us to join Nato, not strengthen our cooperation with the United Kingdom and the USA, not support the Baltic republics, not deepen cooperation with Finland and the rest of the Nordics, not work for unity in Europe, not support oppositionists in Russia and Belarus, not support Ukraine and not criticize Russia's violations of international law.
To all this is added the demand for a Russian sphere of influence that also encompasses Sweden and Finland, recurring disinformation, recurring revealed espionage, and systematic mapping on Swedish territory aimed at preparing antagonistic actions and cyberattacks.
If anything, this shows that the arguments for strengthening Swedish defense both in the short and long term are very strong. We must never lull ourselves into a false sense of security that the worst cannot happen. It also means that thoughts of business as usual with Russia must be over for a very long time to come. Speculating about anything else risks playing into Russia's hands.
The same applies to the speculations about what happens if Putin disappears. Nothing indicates today that we will see anything other than a brutal and authoritarian Russia in the future. We must remember that there is no popularly rooted democratic tradition in Russia. The conditions for carrying forward a democratic system of government in Russia are very weak, almost non-existent.
We must, together with others, build a high threshold of military capability that simply deters Russia from future military adventures. Ukraine shall have full support until victory is a fact. After that, the support for the reconstruction of the country must be clear. Ukraine shall in the future be a part of the democratic world.
Together with a future NATO membership, a deepened Nordic cooperation is important and natural. Therefore, we from the Social Democrats have proposed a joint Nordic defense commission with anchoring in all Nordic parliaments. It was therefore pleasing to hear Helena Bouveng's contribution on this, and hopefully we can find a consensus on these parts. It is about creating common guidelines that concretely deepen the cooperation but which are also clearly democratically anchored.
The entire Scandinavian whole from the Arctic, the Norwegian-Swedish west coast, the Baltic Sea inlets and the Baltic Sea constitutes the security policy environment to be analyzed. Future threat pictures, situational analysis, total defense planning, effective resource utilization, production of materiel, command functions, cybersecurity and hybrid threats are such things around which common positions can be developed.
A thoughtful and long-term Nordic action is not only an important security policy signal, but it is also a strength for Nato. But this does not reduce the need for a strong Swedish national defense. According to Nato's charter, every member country shall have the capacity to defend itself. Nato is about receiving protection when it is necessary but also about providing protection to others.
What the Social Democratic governments did during eight years is something we are very proud of. We shifted the Armed Forces from a focus on international missions to the national defense of Sweden, reintroduced conscription, doubled the defense's financial resources between the years 2015 and 2025, carried out a comprehensive investment in materiel, and established a new regiment on Gotland and in five additional locations. We concluded some thirty international cooperation agreements. This developed the possibility of functioning interoperatively with other countries and acting jointly in a crisis situation. A significant deepening occurred in relation to Finland, the USA, and the United Kingdom. This became a very good foundation for the upcoming NATO membership.
From our horizon, I will send along some important main points for the future.
Our next milestone is an increased number of conscripts to at least 10,000. And the war organization shall by 2030 amount to at least 100,000 soldiers.
We want a continued investment in the army's brigades. More brigades should be the focus, as land defense is important for long-term endurance.
We want continued reinforcement on Gotland with artillery, air defense, maintenance, command and communications.
A new regiment is to be established in Kiruna with reference to the increased state of tension in the Arctic, the cross-border cooperation with Finland and Norway, and with consideration of the security needs for the Malmbanan, LKAB's mining, the Esrange space base, and the host nation support HNS. Today, the Lappland Jaeger Group is stationed in Kiruna. The conscription training is conducted at Kalixfors training and shooting range. And within the framework of Nato, there is also an increased interest in the Arctic as a strategically important area.
A step-by-step commitment to the buildup of civil defense shall be made. It shall be dimensioned based on the requirements of war. With the requirements of war as the basis, we will also manage the civil crises. Civil duty should be introduced.
We must safeguard Swedish competence and expertise when it comes to combat aircraft and submarines. We possess world-class technology and expertise that are of great importance to other industries. There is no combat aircraft system that is as well-adapted to Nordic conditions as the Jas Gripen system. The same applies to Swedish submarines in relation to operations in archipelago areas and in the Baltic Sea. These are Swedish security interests that must not be overlooked. NATO membership can open up new opportunities for export and development.
But this is not free. Large sums of money must be invested. We propose a readiness tax to be paid by the most well-off in our society. The economic inequality that has increased in our society is not acceptable. The highest-paid can contribute so that investments in defense do not reduce or displace investments in other important welfare such as school, healthcare, and elderly care. Fair distribution is important. One cannot live on expenditures alone; it also requires income.
So, as for our reservations. In reservation 1, we demand that the government takes the necessary measures to ensure that there is a defense with popular support and strengthens the total defense.
In reservation 3, we point out the importance of coordinating the different combat forces that are grouped by viewing the entire Scandinavian area from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea as an operational whole.
I reservation 5, we emphasize that the government ensures that the civil defense is built up and strengthened to meet tomorrow's needs.
Lars Wistedt (SD)
Madam Speaker! It was interesting to hear this exposition. I also see all the preparations that have been made for NATO membership since 2015. It felt like you had something in the works, even though you expressed yourselves very negatively about NATO until the week after the invasion in Ukraine. It is also gratifying to see the broad consensus that we have on the buildup of the defense.
But there are a couple of things that I would like Johan Andersson to comment on. Already now, it feels like we have decided on a continuation with Jas. But then the question is: What will the upcoming Nato planning entail? Will it mean that Nato requests Jas or some other combat aircraft system? It depends very much on tasks and capacity if one compares it with F-35 and so on.
The chairman also mentioned a regiment in Kiruna. That goes a bit against ÖB's advice. He has spoken about not wanting new administrative units. He would rather build training sites to be able to train more people.
The conclusion regarding a readiness tax. The best ordered, who are they? That is what I would like to know. Is it those who earn 200,000 kronor, 500,000 kronor and have incomes or assets at a certain level? It is probably quite interesting for the Swedish people to find out.
Johan Andersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I thank the member for the questions. When it comes to Jas, it is a matter that naturally needs to be included in the respective member countries' upcoming orders within Nato.
We point out that Sweden has a combat aircraft that is very well-functioning and that is fully possible to develop into newer versions, which would also enable a further development of the export. We also get a broader market with Sweden's entry into Nato.
Regarding a regiment in Kiruna, I have seen what ÖB has said in this part. Exactly how it will be designed remains to be seen. The important thing, which I refer to in my speech, is that one still strengthens the functions in Kiruna precisely based on the threat risk that exists in the northern part of Sweden and not least with the company establishments, transports and other things that I also pointed out.
We have not decided exactly how the defense tax shall be designed. But we point to it as a way to be able to finance the expansion of the defense, this in order to not have to make drastic cuts to the welfare, which is at least equally important when it comes to school, healthcare, and elderly care. Exactly how it shall be designed we will have to return to if we see that there is support for it in the chamber. And I look forward with anticipation to hearing the Sweden Democrats' reactions later on.
Lars Wistedt (SD)
Madam Speaker! Jas or not Jas, as well as exports and money, are quite important. But again, I want to assert that NATO's planning is what must come first. The advantages of Jas we are all aware of. One can temporarily base Jas on other than real airports and so on. But they have very limited weapon capacity if one compares them with other fighter jet systems. Therefore, I would still like to keep the door open there.
Regarding the regiment in Kiruna, it is once again a peaceful educational institution and not a part of a defense planning. It takes a very large number of people to administer an organizational unit. Therefore, it is something that we do not support primarily, but we want, for example, educational sites where we have a minimal participation from administrative personnel.
The preparedness tax is also interesting. We are, of course, very interested in being involved in the discussion of it. In the end, we probably want to have a say.
I thank you for the answers which have given some meat to the bones.
Johan Andersson (S)
Madam Speaker! It is nevertheless pleasing that there can be a consensus on the financing going forward. We will have to see in what way the government will return to how this shall be financed in the long term. We have a readiness tax as an alternative in this financing. It is possible that there may be something else.
But I still want to be clear in declaring that we also see the great needs that exist regarding the welfare initiatives that must be made. This must happen in parallel with us also expanding the defense, and then we end up in the financing discussion that we need to have properly.
I look forward to seeing how this can be resolved. We will see what we return to.
Håkan Svenneling (V)
Madam Speaker! The Committee on Defence is debating its first block of motions today. There are some of us here who are guest-playing from other committees as a meeting in the Defence Preparation Board is currently ongoing.
Vänsterpartiet has no own motions in this report, but we naturally want to say a few words about the important issues that are raised here.
I can begin by stating that we live in very serious times. A full-scale war in Ukraine has been ongoing for almost a year, but we all know that the invasion began much earlier than that. The war of invasion is, of course, completely unacceptable and contrary to international law, and Ukraine shall receive all the support needed so that Russia does not win this war and take over Ukraine as a country.
For a number of years now, the Swedish total defense has been growing again. We have begun to get a more robust total defense that can defend Sweden in various crises and, in the worst case, in war. We know that the civilian threats against Sweden are great. It concerns things such as climate change, different types of influence campaigns, and cyberattacks. But it is also about our society becoming more and more unequal. Many people do not feel that they belong to society because of the gaps that exist between people.
This is serious. We know that equal societies are safe and secure societies. In a welfare state where the staff are already on their knees in normal mode, one rarely manages to gear up sufficiently when a crisis arises. Civil defense is the whole of society. All parts of society - the public, the private, and the non-profit sector - must be prepared to handle crises and, in the worst case, war.
Madam Speaker! Vänsterpartiet wants to see a total defense with very strong public support. Everyone shall participate in the defense of Sweden in different ways. It is about everything from defending the country militarily to securing food and water, taking care of the elderly and the young, as well as securing communications and infrastructure.
Here, the voluntary defense organizations and other large organizations, such as the Red Cross, play a very important role. We have seen during this past year's war in Ukraine that all these parts are important. It is therefore important that the reinforcement of the total defense continues - that the entire society trains and further educates itself, and that cuts and privatizations cease.
A large part of our society-critical infrastructure is today owned and operated by private actors, sometimes with owners in other countries. Vänsterpartiet sees this as a major risk. During major crises, it is important that society has control over all resources and can use them in the best way. During the pandemic, we saw how much more difficult it became to manage the serious situation when many different actors were involved. It is also from a security policy perspective incredibly important that the most important infrastructure in society is owned by all of us together and is not privatized or sold off.
Sweden is today a very digitized society. In many ways, this is good - digitalization is a natural part of our society. But when so much of our infrastructure and our systems are digitized, we must be careful to have secure digital systems that withstand various forms of cyberattacks. This must have high priority moving forward, and it must be a core activity for both companies and public operations.
Sweden's defense is now facing changes. Vänsterpartiet is against Swedish Nato membership, but it is important that even when we become members of Nato, we continue to have our own control over our own total defense. Our interests, wishes, needs, and knowledge shall guide the development of the Swedish total defense. We politicians need to be careful to listen to the profession regarding what they wish for and need. It should not be a hunt for percentages of GDP but a long-term sustainable build-up of a total defense that can defend Sweden in the best possible way.
Madam Speaker! I would like to conclude by saying a few words about the terrible earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria on Monday morning and during the morning.
The world must now immediately step out to provide support to help those affected in the area we often call Kurdistan. Primarily, it is about saving lives in the rubble, but it is also about building shelter and housing in the ongoing cold winter and then rebuilding what has been destroyed.
I had the privilege last week of visiting the MSB authority's large crisis preparedness warehouse in Kristinehamn in Värmland. Much of Sweden's crisis preparedness is located there, but actually also a part of the EU's warehouses. Even though activity was high already last week, I suspect that the activity at the warehouse now is feverish. Sweden has, in fact, many resources that can be put to use: UN-approved tents, mobile command centers, and water treatment plants - all packed in boxes ready to be sent out immediately to those in need in Kurdistan.
I welcome the decisions regarding aid that the government has now made. It is good that the government realizes that there are more crises than the war in Ukraine and that the resources that the government cut from aid are now missing as the needs grow.
At the same time, we must all keep a watchful eye on Turkey's despotic president Erdogan. He has for far too long led Turkey in an authoritarian direction and shrunk the democratic space. When he now introduces a state of emergency for three months, right up until the Turkish election, it can lead not only to the mobilization of society's resources but also to him using the time to strengthen his own presidential power. We shall help the people in Kurdistan, not authoritarian leaders.
Niels Paarup-Petersen (C)
Madam Speaker! As Håkan Svenneling correctly said, we are some substitutes here today. I will therefore not be too harsh regarding what was said, but the member specifically mentioned that infrastructure is absolutely crucial for our capability in civil defense. That is obviously true, but the member also mentioned that this infrastructure shall be publicly owned.
We have today a sector that is completely crucial for us to have a functioning society, and that is the telecommunications sector. The member said that digitalization is crucial and mentioned some parts themselves: It is crucial for payment, for welfare, for companies etcetera. The telecommunications sector, which is therefore crucial for us to be able to talk on the phone, use our networks etcetera, is privately owned. The masts that are everywhere are privately owned.
At the same time, I would say that this is by and large the most well-functioning and redundant infrastructure of all infrastructures. We have an almost always functioning coverage almost everywhere in Sweden - even where there are no roads. It can become much better, and Centerpartiet is presenting proposals in this chamber regarding money to make it even better. But this is one of the most well-functioning and redundant infrastructures we have in this country.
Therefore, I wonder if it is the case that Håkan Svenneling and Vänsterpartiet want to nationalize this sector. In that case, I think it would be a good message to give the citizens in this country – that one wants the state to take over all masts from the companies.
Håkan Svenneling (V)
Madam Speaker! Niels Peter Paarup and I come from somewhat different parts of the country, and I believe that our view of the mobile network is therefore somewhat different. The Riksdag switched from one large, partially state-owned operator to another, privately owned operator, and I can say that during the election campaign, it happened a number of times that I shouted on the phone about how poor the coverage is in this country. I believe it is important to remember that Sweden does not just look like the inner city of Stockholm.
We could build up society if we had a clearer division between the private and public sectors. I believe, of course, that the telephone subscriptions that Niels and I would use would still be with a private actor, but there could be a point in the state also owning the infrastructure behind the private one that we as users do not see.
Vänsterpartiet proposed that when the 5G network was being expanded in Sweden, one could have looked at a state model where the state had had a greater responsibility and where the companies were part of the expansion. We believe that would have led to a more stable infrastructure, but it was a proposal that no one else really bit on.
We can look at another factor that has a very great significance for the telecommunications networks, and that is the broadband expansion in Sweden. Fiber cables are basically required for the masts to have a good supply connected to the mobile network. In that regard, the state today has ownership in two or three different companies. It is very fragmented. One owns certain types of cables while others are private. This creates a certain confusion and lack of clarity in the market.
Increased state ownership does not mean that we are to nationalize the masts that exist today, but rather that we should think about the future. Which cables need to be state-owned? Which masts need to be state-owned? Where should the line be drawn?
Until now, we have believed too much in the path of privatization. I believe that we need to shift the focus. I also think I hear this from the conservative side, and I welcome that.
Niels Paarup-Petersen (C)
Madam Speaker! My name is Niels Paarup-Petersen. I know it is difficult to say; the member is not the only one who has some challenges with it!
I have changed my subscription myself precisely because it does not work everywhere. It also does not work between Malmö and Stockholm, which is the route I travel most.
We are in complete agreement that many different suppliers are needed. In that case, it is a prerequisite that there are also private suppliers. I am pleased that Håkan Svenneling says that it might be good that there are many different suppliers and that the private sector also has a large role to play; it is not always one hears that type of statement from Vänsterpartiet.
It is actually just what I am looking for - that Vänsterpartiet acknowledges that the private sector is completely crucial in this and that the state therefore needs to take a greater responsibility to coordinate so that the connection between the private and the public can function better. In that case, it is good that the starting point is an acknowledgment of the great responsibility that many private providers take instead of standing at the rostrum and threatening to nationalize certain parts of the infrastructure that already exists today.
We also need better coverage. There is, as said, no party in this chamber that has invested more than the Centerpartiet in broadband, better coverage and higher speeds across the country – not least where Håkan Svenneling lives.
We can certainly agree on much when it comes to these issues.
Håkan Svenneling (V)
Madam Speaker! I appreciate Niels Paarup-Petersen's remarks on dialogue and discussion and on finding the way forward both regarding the connection to the business community and regarding the public sector's role. The Defense Preparation Committee is currently meeting. I think this is one of the important issues that the Defense Preparation Committee needs to reflect on and discuss.
Sweden had something called K-companies, if I remember correctly. Companies that had special significance for society in a crisis or, in the worst case, war were designated. We perhaps should not go back to this, but we can clarify the companies' role, how they can meet the state and how the state meets the companies. I believe this could be good.
Above all, it is a matter of understanding in the long term that the focus may need to be shifted slightly and that the state needs to own critical infrastructure to a greater extent.
This is what I take away from this discussion.
In other respects, I shall become better at pronouncing Danish names. I also believe that the Great Prayer Day should be preserved.
Lars Wistedt (SD)
Madam Speaker! Honored members and citizens! We in Sweden face a possible existential threat that we have essentially not faced since the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940.
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and a short period of political thaw over there in Moscow, we were led to believe that war in Europe would not be possible within the foreseeable future. Think how wrong we were!
Extensive closures began in the mid-90s, and defense was reduced to a special interest and a budget regulator. Despite some efforts during the mid and late 2010s, we were essentially in the same position in February 2022 as in April 1940.
Didn't we see it coming? Why did we not, for example, notice the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014? Was it too far away? Did we indulge in wishful thinking?
Madam Speaker! It takes time to turn a supertanker. Sweden has now embarked on a restructuring, which all parties gladly support. However, the parties have somewhat different views on the way forward.
However, this is not the only obstacle in the way. Bureaucracy, slow decision-making and procurement processes, insufficient national production capacity, often rather naive legislation and regional political maneuvers do not contribute to a purposeful and rapid buildup of the defense. A rather rigid management of qualified personnel, for example when it comes to our pilots' pension and wage agreements, erodes the defense capability even further.
Madam Speaker! The Sweden Democrats view very positively that much is happening within Sweden's international cooperation, for example within Nordefco, JEF and Nato, and not least through the bilateral cooperation with Finland. We are convinced that cooperation is important to manage the current unstable situation in Sweden's immediate vicinity. This naturally applies not only to Finland but also to the other Nordic countries, as the Social Democrats pointed out earlier. As the security situation looks today, with a large and aggressive neighbor in the east, it feels quite secure to be surrounded by reliable friends.
From the Sweden Democrats, we are also clear that we see the two percent goal as a floor and not a goal in itself for the future development of the Armed Forces. What must be decisive are the capabilities that one judges the defense should have in order to be deterrent and dissuasive.
Then the question is who or whom it is we should deter. Within a foreseeable future, since we will probably soon be part of the defense alliance Nato, there is actually only one possible military aggressor in our immediate vicinity. It is Russia.
Then the question is: Which Russia? Is it the Russia of yesterday - of 1991 - or another Russia? As we see it, the danger is that it becomes a reborn and revanchist Russia where legends of backstabbing and great power dreams of a new Soviet Union or a new tsardom flourish, and that the new dictatorial elite stands behind this.
Madam Speaker! Even if Russia, as we all hope, loses the ongoing war and Putin's dictatorship is replaced with something else, the probability is high that it will not become better but rather worse. The new regime will likely, just as we do, analyze the war in Ukraine thoroughly and subsequently completely restructure its military power to technically and tactically create as large an advantage as possible over the West.
Russia will focus even more on what is called indirect warfare, where the goal is to paralyze our ability to make decisions in time as quickly as possible and thereby weaken our will to resist so that we actually give up without a single shot being fired.
The methods that we see Russia using today in Crimea, in Donbas, and in the rest of Ukraine will be developed and reinforced. This includes, among other things, paralyzing the internet and digital services, knocking out radio and TV and replacing these with their own broadcasts, and carrying out long-range attacks or terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure such as energy supply and national leadership.
We will see the use of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles but also unmanned weapon platforms as part of the combat forces, both in the air and on and under the water surface. There will certainly occur threats of deployment of chemical and nuclear weapons. We will also see the use of sabotage units appearing without uniforms or even in Swedish uniforms.
First, then, or in the second instance, we will be able to see the deployment of regular troops to occupy territory, and they will not respect the laws of war.
It is this reality that we must plan for in future defense decisions, not today's or - which would be even worse - yesterday's war.
Thus, Madam Speaker, I come to the Sverigedemokraternas two reservations, numbers 13 and 16 respectively, which I move to approve. I will only say something brief about them.
In order to be able to build up and maintain the national defense capability, Sweden's self-sufficiency must be increased significantly. This applies, among other things, to defense materiel. When I think of this, I am not only thinking of armored vehicles and ammunition, as is usually done, but also of a multitude of daily consumables needed for both civil society and the military society. It can be power generators, winter equipment, uniforms, storable food, and everything else that we should not have to order from far away. It must be produced at home. The list can be made very long.
This production must be ensured already in peacetime. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that we already now prioritize procurement from, primarily, Swedish manufacturers. If the foundation exists in peacetime, it is significantly faster to increase the production rate during a crisis or war. We see this, not least, in Ukraine. There, they have started their own qualified ammunition production in a very short time. But necessity knows no law. And there are not nearly as many troublesome legal spaces to take into account when the Russian is at the door.
Madam Speaker! In Sweden, we fundamentally believe well of everyone. When it comes to the country's security, it is perhaps a bit too naive to do so. An example of this is the sale of the deep-water port area at Fårösund, where we previously stationed the coastal artillery. And in the newspapers, we now read that people are allowed to buy properties and land around the naval base at Muskö, right at the entrance. It is not just about counting ships coming in and out. It can also involve sabotage preparations and the like. We must stop being naive when it comes to this.
All these areas can have a direct, decisive, negative impact on our defense capability, both militarily and civilly, and thereby weaken our resilience. Finland has already realized this and has taken measures. We should follow the Finnish example and do the same. And it must happen now, not in five or six years. We must not again be naive and refuse to see it coming.
Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
Madam Speaker! Today we are debating the Committee on Defence's report number 6 Defence Policy and Total Defence. Let me first move to approve the committee's proposal in its entirety and reject the reservations.
Friends, you who are sitting in the gallery, you who are following the debate via television and colleagues here in the chamber! A Russian war of conquest is underway in Europe. In two weeks, it will be one year since Russia entered with troops into its neighboring country. We see an indescribable brutality. Such scenes we have not seen in Europe since the time of Hitler and Stalin.
It is of the utmost importance that we continue to support Ukraine with weapons. We see that Swedish-made weapons that we send, such as Carl Gustaf, NLAW, armor plates and Stridsfordon 90, are of great importance. The intention is that we will eventually also send Archer.
When it comes to us, we must see that it is a war that is ongoing in Europe. It is an intensified security policy situation. It is no pit, not something temporary, but it will likely be for the foreseeable future. We must now see to it that we strengthen our defense. Our Swedish defense force is good, but it is too small. It needs to be developed.
The Defense Committee is meeting right now – I left to take part in this debate – and I have an important task: to look at the future in both the short term and the long term. An important part is to invest the money that is required. It has been neglected historically. It is actually as simple to understand as when it concerns a house where one neglects the maintenance for 20 years. Eventually, a bill will arrive. In the same way, it is with our defense force. It has been neglected for a long time. Now we must invest the money.
We must agree on the organization we need to be able to defend ourselves and to contribute as a NATO member. It must be governing. NATO's Secretary General has pointed out time and again that 2 percent is not a ceiling; it is a floor. Probably, in certain periods, we will need to invest more. But we must first agree on what organization is required. Then we can add the money.
It is a bit like in a household. One has planned a fantastic trip. But if one has problems with water damage in the house foundation, one must invest in that. Now we have a situation in our country where we must make special investments to rebuild our defense. If we do that, it is good that the risk decreases because we need to use it. Therefore, it is so important to invest in this.
When it comes to our defense forces, we as Natomedlem, which we hopefully will become eventually, will likely receive an increased responsibility to keep the sea lanes open in the Baltic Sea. For that, more surface combat ships will probably be required.
We also need to invest in and expand our air force. We will likely need to go from six to eight divisions.
We also need to invest in and expand our army. Today we actually only have two and a half brigades, but we are going to go up to three and a half. We probably need to increase by at least one more brigade. Sweden is a large country. We must be prepared to help out to the north, perhaps in the Nordic region, but also with defending the Baltics.
All this means that we need to increase the number of conscripts. Now we have approximately 5,000. But we need to go up to 10,000, probably 12,000, in order to be able to fully fill the units. When we have filled the units, we can practice on that which produces an effect. Therefore, it is important to ensure that we have a defense force that functions fully and is filled with personnel.
In this report, we also address civil defense. It is very important. A chain is not stronger than its weakest link. If we have problems and challenges regarding military defense, we have even greater challenges regarding civil defense. Here we have much to learn from Finland. They sometimes say that they learned about civil defense from Sweden, but they were wise enough not to abolish it.
The Defense Preparation Board already submitted its report on civil defense in 2017, spanning 250 pages with concrete proposals. Not much has happened. Now we have a special minister and are investing in civil defense. But we can learn a lot from Finland. The Defense Preparation Board was there a little over a week ago. It is impressive to see that, in cooperation with the business sector, they have emergency stockpiles so that they can manage for up to half a year when it comes to, for example, fuel. They also store medicines and ingredients for food production. We have much to learn from Finland to speed up that process.
Cyber defense is also addressed in the report. We in the chamber know that it is increasing in scope. A few years ago, MSB and FRA stated that the number of cyberattacks from foreign powers was 10,000 per month. Since then, they have not wanted to follow up on exactly how it is developing. But it has been said that there are more and worse ones, and that it is foreign actors and countries standing behind them.
In that regard, we must now strengthen. We are making investments. The Christian Democrats have for a long time been a champion for strengthening cyber defense. Now, the National Cybersecurity Centre exists. Our view is that it has taken too long to build up. Now an evaluation is to be made. We believe it would be better with one agency instead of four agencies, as it is today. It would be better with one agency that receives the main responsibility, as it is in, for example, Great Britain. We think that FRA could be given such a main responsibility.
In summary, we are in a serious situation. Now it is important to speed up the process, so that we can achieve a stronger defense, both civil and military.
Johan Andersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I have a question for Member Oscarsson. The Member's party is part of the government base, and what I understand is that discussions are ongoing regarding the future financing of the defense. It was interesting when Oscarsson mentioned that 2 percent is a floor and in no way a ceiling. This means that quite large efforts will be required in the future. These are necessary changes that must be made.
We Social Democrats have very clearly pointed out which opportunity we see for funding – that part is not finished, however. I elaborated on that in my replies to Member Wistedt.
My question now is how the Christian Democrats view the continued financing regarding the defense's future needs. In what way shall it be carried out? How shall we prioritize? It will be this chamber that will have to prioritize between the different areas of expenditure, for example, the needs for expanded welfare and the consequences of changes in demographics – i.e., the proportion of young and old. It would be very interesting to hear.
Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
Mr. Speaker! Thank you for the question, Johan Andersson!
It is important, when it comes to all politics, not least defense policy, not to leave footnotes. Time and again, we in this chamber have witnessed rosy calculations and that insufficient funds have been appropriated. So we cannot have that when it concerns something as important as our defense. We must ensure that we rise to the occasion!
Johan Andersson's party has previously been opposed to membership in Nato, but after the outbreak of the war and the fact that Finland quickly wanted to join - because it is no longer possible to trust the Russian neighbor - they have changed their minds. It is good that we now have a consensus. Sweden cannot defend itself on its own. We know that. We need cooperation in general and with Nato in particular.
If one wants to join Nato, this matter of 2 percent is something that was established already during Barack Obama's time, which the member knows. Until now, America has accounted for a very large share of the cost, but they are now saying that they also have other things to consider and that they have difficulty justifying this. They say that those who have problems with security and the challenges in Europe must look at themselves in the mirror and remember the idea of solidarity with 2 percent of GDP.
We Christian Democrats believe that one must first and foremost review the country's organization, likely in the same way as has been done historically. During the days of the Cold War, Sweden invested significantly more than 2 percent of GDP in defense. However, no special education tax or defense tax should be introduced; instead, this is about priorities that need to be made.
Johan Andersson (S)
Mr. Speaker! I can only state that I did not receive any answer from Mikael Oscarsson on the question of what the future financing will look like. I did, however, receive an answer on what one does not intend to do, i.e., introduce tax switching or anything else. I note that this is assumed to be stopped in the general hole. The risk is then that other measures that are necessary for welfare will have to take the hit.
Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
Mr. Speaker! An excellent question was just asked here in the chamber where Member Johan Andersson was given the opportunity to elaborate on this, but then I thought it became remarkably quiet. It was only said that it was a thought and that one would return to how it should look. There were questions about whether it should apply to the one who earns 200,000 or 400,000, but nothing was said about that.
It is important to see that politics is first and foremost about priorities. I believe, Mr. Speaker, that the Swedish people expect us to make necessary priorities. As I and the Kristdemokraterna see it, it is about the most fundamental things: protection against internal threats, i.e., a functioning police force, and protection against external threats, that is to say a functioning defense force. That is where we must begin. That is what we must prioritize.
Then, of course, there are other things that need to be done. But as I said in my speech, it has been sloppy, historically speaking. The investments that were required have not been made. Therefore, for a period of time, special sacrifices will be required.
Niels Paarup-Petersen (C)
Mr. Speaker and everyone listening to this! I can begin by saying that the Center Party, of course, stands behind all its reservations, but I specifically move for approval of reservation 12.
Right now, the Defence Preparation Committee is sitting and trying to reach an agreement on the long-term development of our defense. It can be stated that Sweden is in need of long-term thinking regarding defense. It is something we have not really excelled in during the recent decades. That we have a debate now while the Defence Preparation Committee is working also clearly indicates that we in this chamber need to think more long-term and plan better.
We began trying to get into Nato first with the Russian knife at our throats. Only then did Sweden realize the importance of a full-fledged defense. We need to think more correctly moving forward and do it much earlier. We need to let the defense focus on the defense's tasks. The military, for example, should not play police on streets and squares, as the government has wanted. Let the police be police and the defense be defense! It is best for both parties and for the population. But enough about that.
Let me proceed by stating the obvious: that the upgrading of the defense needs to continue. This applies to all branches of the defense. A substantial part of our capabilities is now going to Ukraine to support in the defense against Russia. It is an absolutely necessary support. Centerpartiet has been driving and continues to be a secure partner when it comes to strengthening Sweden's support to Ukraine in this extremely difficult moment.
It is good – but it puts pressure on the defense, and Sweden must act to move further forward in the queue on the international market when there is now high demand for everything from advanced weapons systems and ammunition to everyday items such as underwear and boots. There is more to be done, and the Center Party is always ready to be a constructive conversation partner to the government to secure Sweden's and Europe's security. We appreciate that the government has initiated the Defense Preparation.
But it is important, in connection with this, to clarify the state's responsibility to defend the entire country, from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea. This is absolutely crucial. But the military does not stand alone. If society does not function, the defense does not function. State governance needs to be clarified in a crisis and become sustainable within civil defense. It is against that background that I today want to focus on two things: total defense and cyber defense.
It is crucial that the needs of civil defense are included in the Defense Committee's work, not least because the entire country must be able to be defended. But in order to achieve the goals for civil defense - to protect the civilian population, ensure the most important societal functions, and contribute to the Armed Forces' capability in the event of an armed attack or war - more needs to be done, as the work is still in its infancy.
The municipalities' and regions' opportunities to contribute to a strong total defense must also be strengthened. In that regard, the Center Party, currently as the only party, has allocated specific funds. One must not forget that the state is important, but there are also others in our country who do not always have the same enormous resources. One actually needs to think in several stages and on several levels, and the state has not always been so good at that.
Nato, which we are hopefully on our way into, has identified seven civil capabilities that they call baseline requirements for national resilience. They are strategically important for a functioning society even during crisis and conflict, and they are also addressed in the report. Of these, energy and food are two factors highlighted as being completely decisive. The military defense is dependent on the civil defense, not least in the areas of electricity supply and food supply.
When it comes to the energy sector, C specifically invests in strengthening the ability to withstand cyberattacks. This is included in our budget. Unfortunately, no other parties have seen this need.
In Ukraine, we have seen that the energy sector is a strategic attack vector for Russia. It is where they strike because it is what affects society the most if it disappears. You cannot pay out pensions, provide welfare, or heat food. In Sweden, we cannot pay either; everyone uses Swish.
Securing the energy sector is therefore absolutely crucial. More people need to get into the game there. We regret that we have not been able to convince the Riksdag to take the necessary steps in this area.
Centerpartiet has submitted 40 proposals that will be included in a report later this spring. I hope that we can come together a bit better. Last year, this was handled the week before the Russian attack on Ukraine, and therefore it did not amount to much. I hope that this year we can talk more about how we can together take more steps forward in this area.
Some of the things that the Center Party has proposed in today's report will also be included in the cyber report. This includes, among other things, strengthening both the defensive and offensive capabilities for Sweden. They are needed. It is simply a matter of realizing that the war has created a new arena. Several have mentioned it previously. The Center Party is the party that has put forward the strongest proposals in this area. The Moderates have also been somewhat involved, but otherwise, we must realize that there has been very little focus on this.
We also need to strengthen the strategic competence within all areas of the defense. Therefore, we also need to investigate cyber defense as a separate branch of the defense.
Something else I want to bring up in this context is that it is time for Sweden to speak as it is. When Russia, for example, attacks our friends in the Norwegian parliament and Norway says that it was Russia that did it, Sweden cannot stand aside and remain silent, Mr. Speaker. Then Sweden must also speak out that it is an attack on one of our partners, our Nordic friends, and also say that it was Russia that did it. We must be able to stand by each other's side in cyberattacks just as if it had been a physical attack. We do not do that today. I hope that we can learn from this and take it further.
In order for us to be able to defend ourselves and have a society that functions in a crisis, total defense is, of course, absolutely crucial. It is perhaps not particularly surprising that as a member of the Center Party, I have a focus on the food supply. It has major vulnerabilities. The potential is great, and the Center Party has presented proposals for a long series of sharp reforms so that Sweden will become less dependent on importing food and goods. Today we are self-sufficient in certain basic commodities, for example grain, but on the whole we are dependent on imports of both food and input materials.
The truth is that the shelves in Swedish stores would be gaping empty after just a few days in the event of a major trade blockade or disrupted import routes if we do nothing about it, and we must do something about it.
The starting point for the Center Party is various investigations that have been conducted over the years but which have so far not led to solving the deficiencies within Swedish food preparedness. No authority today either has an overall responsibility for the whole when it comes to specifically food preparedness.
One might hope that it will be resolved at the EU level, as we sometimes do in certain areas. But neither is the EU ready for this. Sweden should push for this now that we have the presidency, Mr. Speaker, so that we achieve a strategic readiness and so that the EU's self-sufficiency of critical goods and services can increase, for example within the energy sector.
Resilience must be built now. The entire chain from production to consumer must be reviewed. Better logistics flows, long-term financing, and strengthened competitiveness are needed so that food production can increase, together with investments in personnel and technology. The green industries must simply be strengthened so that our total defense can be strengthened.
Martin Melin (L)
Mr. Speaker! The security policy situation for our country and for Europe has changed rapidly and deteriorated significantly. The terrible war of aggression that Russia is subjecting Ukraine to is completely unacceptable. In the long run, it is not only a great danger for the Ukrainian people but also a threat to peace and freedom in Europe.
We have all taken note of the violence that Russia subjects the civilian population in Ukraine to - torture, rape, and looting. And every day, soldiers who defend their country and actually also defend Europe are dying. But we also see reporting on the Ukrainian courage and the successes in defending their country. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that Sweden acts with force so that Ukraine will also in the future receive strong support so that the will to defend remains and the defense capability also in the future remains high.
Sweden's many and large military and humanitarian support packages are important and must be followed by more. It is particularly urgent that Sweden fulfills the plans to send Archer to Ukraine and continues, in cooperation with other countries, to plan for expanded and sustained support to Ukraine and, in the long term, also for the reconstruction of the country when the war is over and Ukraine has triumphed.
Today we are dealing with a long series of motions within the area of defense and security. It is pleasing that there is broad political support today to strengthen our defense capability. It has not always been that way.
For a long time, the Liberals stood alone on the issue of a Swedish NATO membership. Of course, it would have been better if we had applied for membership already 20 years ago, which we Liberals wanted. But now we are pleased that there is broad support even from other parties that have understood the importance of joining the defense alliance. We Liberals are extra grateful for this.
Sweden must cooperate with other countries to strengthen security in our part of the world. Our impending Nato membership is an important step, not only for Sweden but also for Nato. Even though there are some obstacles on the way for our Nato membership, it is necessary that we from the Swedish side continue to prepare our entry into the defense alliance, for we will one day become members of Nato.
I also welcome what has long been the Liberals' line in security policy, in addition to NATO membership, namely a substantial increase in resources for the defense and a developed civil defense. That more people participate in civil and military service, something that only a short time ago seemed unthinkable but is now being implemented at a rapid pace and with an ever-broadening consensus in the Riksdag, is pleasing.
However, it does not mean that we can lean back. The ambitions in the defense area must continue to increase. The large disarmament of Swedish defense that has been ongoing for decades has made us vulnerable. Therefore, it is important that the new defense commission now develops concrete proposals to create the conditions to significantly strengthen Sweden's defense.
NATO's recommendation that member countries should allocate 2 percent of GDP to defense spending is a reasonable goal. But how these 2 percent are to be calculated is an open question. The Liberals argue that in the end it is not the percentage that is the most important, but rather our defense capability and what it requires in terms of economic investment. We assess that in the short term a larger investment may be needed to quickly strengthen our defense so that we can then land on a more long-term sustainable level.
Mr. Speaker! Let me say a few words about civil defense, which unfortunately has also been severely neglected for a long time. It is important that the government now prioritizes strengthening and developing also the civil defense of our country. I want to point out an important change that the government has signaled and which we Liberals have pushed for and wanted to see return for many years, namely civil service. It is to be reintroduced now, primarily within the municipal rescue services, which have an important function not only in war but also during high alert and in peacetime.
We must be equipped on all fronts and be prepared for the worst. The total defense must be strengthened. The day when the worst happens, it is too late. With civil service, Sweden will be significantly better equipped and better prepared for war and disasters.
Mr. Speaker! As has been said, many motions have been submitted concerning defense policy, which we have addressed here in the Riksdag. It is good that the commitment to these issues is great and that many interesting proposals have been presented.
The major changes that the new security situation in Europe and the upcoming NATO membership entail mean that there are reasons to review the goals and resources for the military defense. In the Defense Committee's continued work, many of the issues will be highlighted, and we perhaps should not anticipate today the important discussion that will be conducted. We Liberals, however, would like to see a broad agreement for a stronger military defense. Together we can safeguard our freedom and our future.
Ulf Holm (MP)
Mr. Speaker! In this report on defense policy and total defense, motions from the general motion period last year are addressed. I want to particularly highlight issues regarding civil defense and security of supply.
It is undoubtedly the case that the security policy situation in Sweden and our surrounding area has deteriorated. Russia's invasion of Ukraine almost exactly one year ago dramatically worsened an already poor security situation in Europe and entails a shift with far-reaching consequences, also for Sweden.
In the debate on Swedish defense, a great focus has fallen on the military buildup. But at least as important is the civil defense. The civil defense shall contribute to strengthening society's ability to prevent and manage severe stresses on society in peace, but also to prepare civil activities for war.
In times of societal change, it is crucial that society can stand strong and contribute to safety and confidence. A strong civil defense is required. When we strengthen civil defense, we also strengthen war preparedness and vice versa. From Miljöpartiet's side, we want to see a well-planned and well-functioning civil defense and a deepened work with a preventive crisis preparedness that is fast and effective.
Weaknesses in Sweden's basic infrastructure, supply, and other important societal functions imply vulnerability to both attacks and other disruptions. Events in other countries can directly and indirectly affect Sweden in various ways, as our economy and our trade are clearly internationally intertwined with others.
Mr. Speaker! The situation in Sweden cannot be compared to the suffering people in Ukraine have endured during Russia's brutal war of aggression, which is currently ongoing, but the war also has effects in Sweden. It has, among other things, caused price increases on energy and food with increased inflation as an effect, which obviously affects the whole society.
But we also saw how vulnerable our society was during the pandemic, with shortages of everything from healthcare products to imported food. Problems with closed factories in other countries caused the industry in Sweden to face shortages of components for a long time, and the transport systems failed.
It is against the background of these current events that we believe the government must do more. It is good that the government has appointed a specific minister responsible for civil defense, but it is not enough. The preventive work with civil defense is crucial for a well-functioning total defense. The resilience of societal functions must increase. More efforts must be made to prevent crises, and civil defense needs to be strengthened.
Rescue services and supply preparedness are two areas within civil defense where international cooperation is of great importance. Sweden benefited from this when, for example, severe forest fires occurred in among other Västerbotten, Jämtland, and Gävleborg counties in 2018. The tragic experiences from this event clearly show that our crisis preparedness needs to be further strengthened.
Mr. Speaker! Yes, civil defense received more funding in the 2021 defense decision, which we in Miljöpartiet strongly advocated for. In the current situation, however, there is still a great need to strengthen the civil parts of the total defense for many years. More simply must be done, and there is still an imbalance between military and civil defense, even though both parts are strongly dependent on each other.
Mr. Speaker! Something that I and many other citizens have been alerted to is the lack of emergency stockpiles for goods and products. Just as I mentioned earlier, the insufficient stockpiling of medical supplies was evident during the pandemic. From the Miljöpartiet side, we therefore demand that the state takes a clearer responsibility for building up emergency stockpiles and, together with the business sector, municipalities, and regions, ensure that the stockpiling in society-critical supply chains is sufficient to withstand both crises and war.
The previous government, of which the Green Party was a part, appointed an inquiry in September 2021 to propose a function responsible for national coordination of supply preparedness. That inquiry is to be submitted to the government later this spring. But the government cannot sit with its arms crossed and await this inquiry. The security policy situation has changed at decisive points since the inquiry was appointed, given that Russia has attacked Ukraine and is waging a brutal war.
From the Green Party's side, we therefore expect the government to accelerate the work and take further initiatives to, among other things, be able to build up emergency stockpiles. The Green Party also sees a need for the government to investigate the possibilities for increased goods supply through domestic production, which could contribute to increased self-sufficiency and thereby reduced vulnerability.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to raise the issue of critical infrastructure under point 10 in the report. Miljöpartiet considers that Sweden should retain control over critical infrastructure and limit the possibilities for other states to influence the infrastructure through control of companies with operations in Sweden.
Food, water, and heating regulation are basic needs that always need to be met. In order to be able to do this for the entire population, society is dependent on functioning electricity supply and transport, and to an ever increasing extent on functioning internet connections and telephony. A robust infrastructure is crucial for society's stability and the preservation of people's everyday lives in the event of attacks.
The government has now announced that it will return to the Riksdag as early as May with certain proposals regarding the review of foreign direct investments. We will have to return to what the proposals may contain, but I and Miljöpartiet hope that the government returns with proposals for a regulatory framework to limit foreign ownership of socially important infrastructure.
Mr. Speaker! I naturally stand behind all of the Miljöpartiet's reservations, but for the sake of time, I move for approval of only reservation 7 under point 3 in the report.
Sara-Lena Bjälkö (SD)
Mr. Speaker! Today we are debating the motion report Defense Policy and Total Defense. It has a very great breadth, as we have heard during the debate, and includes international defense cooperation, strategic material supply, hybrid threats, and defense economy.
Mr. Speaker! In my speech, I will touch upon civil defense and crisis preparedness. But I would like to begin with some reflections regarding the general security situation.
It has almost been a year since the last chamber debate, and much has happened since then. Large parts of eastern Ukraine, where the Russian army has advanced, lie in ruins. We have heard stories of everything from mass graves to rape and merciless violence against the civilian population. The civilian population in the larger cities, including Kyiv, is repeatedly subjected to pure terror bombing. It is a war that has truly shown what kind of superpower we are dealing with.
The bombings of recent months have specifically focused on knocking out the country's power grid to put pressure on the population and reduce the country's will to defend itself. But from what we can see, it has had the opposite effect. The Ukrainian army and civil society still stand firm against the world's second most powerful army.
Mr. Speaker! Before I proceed, I want to briefly jump back to how things looked a year ago. When I listen back to the debate from last year, it is with mixed feelings. Everyone was well aware of the seriousness of the situation. There were probably many who, until the very end, hoped that in some way it could be possible to avoid a new major war in Europe.
Already then we could state that the security situation in Europe had changed for the foreseeable future. This was not only against the background of the large troop movements but also against the background of Russia's unreasonable demands on Sweden on December 17 of the previous year.
Mr. Speaker! As it stands today, we will have to live with a significantly deteriorated security situation for a long time to come. The reconstruction of civil defense and crisis preparedness has seriously gained momentum, and there is much to be done.
Decades of savings and cuts have led to the fact that the only thing that more or less remains of the previously well-functioning total defense is the framework. The pandemic and two forest fires showed that civil defense today is extremely strained and limited. A war of a similar scale as we see in Ukraine, with remote attacks on power grids, sabotage activities, crime, failing healthcare, and so on, would have been devastating for the Swedish population.
In some parts of the country, it seems that everything needs to be reinvented again. It concerns processes, crisis preparedness plans, communication channels, joint meetings, new services to be launched, stocks to be replenished, and more. It is obviously positive that it is happening and that it is happening quickly now. But at the same time, it is very unfortunate that what so often happens when it comes to Sweden is at the last second.
The defense policy that the Sweden Democrats have been talking about for many years now is becoming a reality. But as I have previously mentioned from the rostrum, I would have wished it were under other circumstances, Mr. Speaker.
Defense policy and total defense
When it comes to the reconstruction of civil defense and crisis preparedness, we believe that responsibility, equality, and proximity must be guiding, in combination with a central coordination from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.
Dear members! Today there are 290 municipalities and 20 regions where everyone has different conditions when it comes to the work with preparedness planning. The war in Ukraine has shown that a well-developed and functioning civil defense is the backbone of the will to defend. That which does not work in peacetime will not work in wartime either.
That is why we also need to take a stronger grip on, among other things, the food supply and our emergency stocks. This is against the background that Sweden is not completely self-sufficient, but also because in the event of a crisis or war, we might not be able to receive the help we need with necessary food, medicines, etc.
Mr. Speaker! One of perhaps the most important aspects has been touched upon here during the morning. It is the critical infrastructure with, among other things, heat, water, and primarily electricity. Svenska kraftnät, representatives from the Energy Agency, and not least the Swedish Security Service have pointed out an increased threat profile, in particular against our energy supply.
At the same time, it is pointed out that the companies operating in this area must take increased responsibility for their own security, which is strongly hindered by both a lack of resources and the availability of trained and qualified security personnel with good local knowledge.
Mr. Speaker! Here we see the Sweden Democrats see an opportunity for greater participation from the voluntary defense organizations, which is a participation that we want to encourage.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I naturally stand behind all the Sweden Democrats' reservations, but I move for approval only of reservations 13 and 16.
The deliberation was hereby concluded.
(Decisions were made under § 14.)
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.