Defense policy and total defense

Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I would like to begin by, for the sake of time, moving to approve the committee's proposal in report FöU6. The Sweden Democrats have also submitted a special statement regarding intensive training of conscripts and certain measures to safeguard the Swedish defense industry.

In my speech, I will comment on, among other things, the part concerning the intensive training of conscripts, and my colleagues will then, in their respective speeches, talk about the support for the defense industry.

We are debating today FöU6, which in practice concerns the implementation of the 2020 defense decision with the additions that all parties in the Riksdag agreed upon in March 2022. Simultaneously and in parallel, the Defense Committee's work is currently underway to produce a basis for the upcoming defense decision, which is to enter into force on 1 January 2025. That report, with the committee's final position regarding basic and war organization, is to be submitted on 26 April. It is therefore then that we shall lay the foundation for the growth and development of the total defense. Today's bill, FöU6, therefore concerns the completion of what has previously been decided, and it is this that we move for approval of.

Mr. Speaker! Many people have repeatedly stated for a couple of years now that it is now serious for real and that there is now an urgency. But not so much has happened in practice. Words have actually only since the change of government in 2022 begun to be followed by powerful action, and there is now to be more of that kind.

But it is not just a matter of doing things right, but also of doing the right things, in the right way and at the right time. One of these things is to give clear signals to Russia that Sweden can, wants to, and will defend itself. We show this to Moscow through a substantial increase in defense spending, where operational effect takes precedence over symbolic politics and talk.

Mr. Speaker! The Sweden Democrats are pushing for the intensive training of conscripts, where more cohorts are trained in basic soldier skills and combat over a shorter period so that they can constitute an effective local defense and a quickly available personnel reserve for the field army and the mechanized units. When new materiel is gradually added, these cohorts can then be called up for extra training. In this way, we increase the availability of local defense units, and in the somewhat longer term, we can also provide personnel for the expansion and replacement needs of the field army.

It should therefore, with the support of volunteer reserve officers as well as instructors from the Home Guard, the Defense Trainers, the Voluntary Defense Organization, the Vehicle Corps and all the other voluntary organizations, be fully possible to, in existing units, for example, train three cohorts of local defense conscripts in approximately two years. The outstanding result of the training of Ukrainian soldiers and units, among other things in the United Kingdom - what we call Interflex - as well as here at home in Sweden, has shown that this is fully possible, if one only wants it. It will absolutely cost money, work, sweat and perhaps even tears, but it will also require new thinking, flexibility and not least favorable service conditions.

Defense policy and total defense

Uncertain times require decisiveness and clarity. Now is the time to stop talking and start practicing and training instead.

This, Mr. Speaker, leads me into what I shall speak about next, namely the next step after FöU6. It is very tempting for a politician to start playing with some kind of military Lego by putting together military building blocks and believing that one is building an effective defense force – or, even worse, to exploit the strengthening of the Armed Forces for regional political vote-fishing.

We Sweden Democrats believe that politics should point out overarching priorities and directions and then let those who are professionals have as much freedom of action as possible to design the war and peace organization. Then it may be necessary to make principled assessments, and only then should we politicians step in and start stirring the pot. Between 1995 and 2020, we have seen how it has gone when politics has interfered and started to micro-manage the defense. Let us not repeat those mistakes!

Mr. Speaker! Ahead of upcoming defense decisions, Sweden faces an entirely new situation. We are no longer alone, but are part of a defense alliance where Sweden's defense begins by supporting Ukraine in its struggle for freedom as well as solidarily defending our allies along their borders and on their territory. At the same time, within our own borders and within adjacent sea and air areas, we must be able to protect allied forces' buildup as well as our neighboring countries' and our own supply lines.

This means that we cannot use old yardsticks and foundations for how defense decisions have been designed historically, but now we must think from a new perspective, that is, an alliance perspective. What complicates the situation is that we also must factor in the time factor. How much time do we have, and how do we utilize that time in the best way? The problems can no longer be pushed into the future but must be handled directly, here and now.

Mr. Speaker! During the past year, the Defence Committee, in both its reports Allvarstid and Kraftsamling, was very clear that it was urgent and that in the planning we must base it on the most dangerous but not necessarily the most likely development.

The Sweden Democrats consider the most dangerous development to be that the war in Ukraine ceases in the near future in some way and that Russia has not lost. This would in turn mean that Russia can continue to arm itself at the current pace. They allocate more than 40 percent of the state budget to fund war efforts and rearmament, that is, a total mobilization of the Russian war machine. At the same time, we in the West continue to dither around with 2 percent of GDP.

This mathematics means that within four to seven years from an end to the war in Ukraine - or perhaps even in a shorter time - Russia can reach a point where, from a Russian logic, they judge that an attack against the West could succeed, albeit with a large degree of risk-taking. Given what we have seen during the last fifteen years, risk-taking is not foreign to the Russian state leadership. This assumption must form the basis for our planning and our preparations.

Can we then predict the course of events over the next five to ten years? The answer to that question is indeed no – we cannot, because we do not have crystal balls. But we must dare to establish a common planning basis so that the entire total defense works under the same conditions and can thus move in step towards the same goal.

Mr. Speaker! First, during 2025, we will receive the alliance's capability goals, and our integration into the common defense planning can then seriously begin to take shape. What are the conclusions based on this reasoning?

Firstly: We must maximize the readiness and combat capability of our existing units - again, here and now.

Secondly: We must start from the premise that in the worst-case scenario we may need to defend the alliance - but also be defended by the alliance - before 2030.

For the third: In the upcoming design of the total defense, we must take into account our new role in the alliance's defense planning. This means that in the upcoming defense decision 2025, we must have the flexibility and readiness to adapt the new war and basic organization as that role becomes clearer. We therefore must not lock ourselves into traditional thinking and traditional patterns of action.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! Describing what has happened in the Swedish Armed Forces over the past years nevertheless requires one to try to be accurate. In 2015, we made a defense decision that gave us a completely new direction. We moved away from international missions toward national defense. Following that, a reactivation of conscription was also carried out.

In 2020, we made another defense decision, which meant that we continued to build on the capability increase that had been carried out since 2015. The budget increased by approximately 100 percent between 2014 and 2025. If one reads the various documents that have come from, among others, the Armed Forces, we see that this has also been combined with military capability increase.

The 27 billion that is added in the latest budget is based on previous budgets and previous agreements. What is added is in practice 700 million kronor, and it is not particularly much in this context.

I can also note that there is a political consensus here. Why then describe it as if nothing has happened until the last year? It is also to undervalue the various defense agreements that have been made over a period of eight years. I do not think that is a good way to describe what has been.

I think it has been good that we have been able to rely on a broad consensus in the Riksdag. I also see that we have achieved significant changes in a positive direction. Then it is another matter that much more needs to be done. But it is important to have a correct description of reality with all the reorganization and all the delivery that has occurred in the Armed Forces. It is very reasonable to take this into account when describing the situation.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I do not doubt that what we are talking about has been described in words and decided. What has happened, however, is that it has not been fully funded. When we talk about documents, we can mention that there are, among other things, various investigations, for example SOU 2018:7, where it clearly appears that the defense budget has not allowed for any room for maintenance of materiel in sufficient extent.

In the report Värnkraft from 2019, palpable deficiencies are pointed out regarding maintenance, for example when it comes to spare parts, ammunition and exercises.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! The major problem regarding the deliveries to the Armed Forces has been that the build-up of brigades that is planned has been complicated by the fact that we have delivered large amounts of materiel to Ukraine. Extensive materiel deliveries to Ukraine have been made, and that naturally affects the situation that we now have to take a stand on.

But there is no doubt that large quantities of also spare parts, new equipment and ammunition, and also the base platform of the Armed Forces, have been delivered to the Armed Forces. Then we can agree that this is not sufficient, but one should not downplay and deny that it has occurred. The deliveries to Ukraine have also occurred. I can also note that the Riksdag has been completely in agreement on this.

This leads to us having a major challenge in the defense preparation we both are part of when it comes to somehow compensating for this. There are, to some extent, plans for how this is to proceed, and orders have also partially been placed. But there is also an uncertainty about how the deliveries will take place, how the economy will be affected, and what the time intervals will look like.

Then we will certainly never reach a position that corresponds exactly with what we now believe to be the final price for the material system and the final delivery. We will probably never reach a point where we achieve this. I believe that Lars Wistedt is well aware of this after all the years in the Försvarsmakten.

It also applies to politics to provide a picture of this that is as realistic as possible. We will have to struggle with economic challenges during the coming years, just as we have done during the years that have passed. But do not say that nothing has happened! A fundamental reorganization of the Swedish defense force has occurred in a very positive direction, which has also resulted in higher capability. But it is not the same as the challenges having ceased.

(Applause)

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Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I can state that in that part we agree that much remains and that much needs to be done. A great deal of work lies ahead of us in the Defence Preparation Committee.

But I want to emphasize again that when it comes to the implementation of previous decisions, the public inquiries have pointed out clear deficiencies in the financing of what can be implemented. Management, control, and follow-up have not been sufficient, and this has concerned both civil defense and a part of the military defense.

But there is much to do, and I completely agree with Peter Hultqvist regarding the issue of the price level. We can see, for example, that the price of an artillery shell has increased by 400 percent. This means that even if we invest much more money, it does not necessarily mean more shells. This is also something that we must take into account in the Defense Committee's continued work.

In the same way, it costs a great deal to organize new units. For example, there has been talk about creating a couple of new organizational units, a couple of new brigades. One must remember that the cost to establish a new organizational unit lies between 1.5 and 2 billion kronor, and in that case, it is a peacetime organizational unit we are talking about. To this are then added war units, where equipment must be purchased with long delivery times and high prices, and just as Peter Hultqvist says, it is increasing prices.

According to a calculation from 2017, a mechanized brigade would cost 600 million at the lowest, and with high readiness, which is what we want, approximately 3 billion. This was, therefore, about seven or eight years ago.

Furthermore, we will need to purchase 60 to 70 new main battle tanks, and the delivery time for all such materiel is very long. It will therefore be difficult to establish new brigades in the near term. This is one of the reasons why we are talking about intensive training of those subject to local defense conscription. I mention this as a small parenthesis.

(Applause)

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! We find ourselves in a situation unique in Swedish history if one looks at what has happened since the Second World War. We have a great instability in our immediate vicinity. We have the war in Ukraine which, if Russia is successful, can lead to Georgia and Moldova coming under acute threat. We see what is happening at the Finnish border with refugees who, in a hybrid attack, are trying to disrupt Finnish society in various ways, and we have seen it previously in the Baltics and in Poland.

The Baltics, Finland, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea and, by extension, Sweden are also areas that we must see as being under great tension and under risk of a threat in the event that Russia is successful in Ukraine. We therefore have a completely different and fundamentally different security situation than before.

We must, therefore, be successful in Ukraine. Russia says that it is at war with the collective West. This also means that we must continue with our material deliveries, our training support, and our civilian support to Ukraine.

Part of this is also that we must build a strong defense - a strong total defense both on the military side and on the civilian side. When it comes to the military side, it is, just as on the civilian side, about a step-by-step increased capability. It is about materiel, about war stations, and about basic recurring exercise activities.

It is about the mobilization power of the entire society. That is what total defense is about. The civil part in such a context is about how we manage buildings, infrastructure, transport, cybersecurity, repairs, production, warehouses, protection of civilians, and refugee flows. The military part is about how we can in different ways defend Sweden nationally but also as a part of Nato.

Our area of operations extends from the Arctic in the north to the Norwegian west coast, the Swedish west coast, the entrance to the Baltic Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland and Germany's borders towards the Baltic Sea. It is also about how we, together with the others, manage this and how we dimension our defense forces so that they can provide maximum support to each other in a sharp situation.

I believe that one must have this operational overview clear in mind when assessing how we should build the Swedish defense. We therefore have a common area of operations, and it shall then be supported by Nato in various ways. This is what our military planning must proceed from. This is also what is currently being worked on in many parts, but we cannot do it fully until we are members.

When it comes to how a military organization should be organized, we as politicians cannot start from the principle that it is something that should be completely handed over to the Armed Forces. Politically, we must be able to have a standpoint, a view, and a guideline.

If we had not, for example, had a guideline when we shifted the Armed Forces from international missions to national defense and been able to endure the consequences—that is, that one then must build this from the ground up with army units, air units focused on Swedish conditions, and a navy that is to be controlling and able to protect the open sea lanes—it simply would not have happened. Sweden's Riksdag is the highest decision-making body. We cannot have a political dimension that abdicates in these contexts. I just want to say that, by reason of the previous statement.

When ÖB in the military council proposes two brigades, we should therefore have the following clear to us: If one is to deploy a brigade, for example in Finland, it must be deployed very quickly. In that case, one has an additional 1 billion to deploy. Everyone who knows anything about this knows that it can go quite fast and that it is not the peak of endurance. Finland, Sweden and Norway will have a joint responsibility in the Nordic Cap, and there will be a need for more than two brigades.

I believe that the Defence Preparation Board and also the Riksdag must consider how we make reinforcements in such a way that we, so to speak, have more than this to dispose of in the year 2030. I think it is a fundamental task for us, and one cannot simply say that one refers it to the Armed Forces. It is ultimately a political question. The defense of Sweden is fundamentally a political question.

I must also say that for our part, we want to increase the number of conscripts - it is a matter of at least 10,000. This is also something that a political party must be able to have a clear position on; one cannot simply abdicate and say that the Armed Forces can handle it.

New organizational units can vary in cost level; it depends entirely on how one chooses to organize them. Naturally, there are those that have a standard calculation regarding what it costs, but it can be done in slightly different ways. I will not go into the details of this, but when we propose Kiruna as a new organizational unit, it is based on the Malmbanan's essential importance. It is based on the host country support's essential importance, it is based on the mine and LKAB, and it is based on Esrange. It is also based on the agreements we have between Finland, Norway, and Sweden to protect the Nordic region together.

We see it as necessary to have further force growth in the area. Here we must, so to speak, position ourselves based on all the facts that exist. Who, for example, is going to handle the forward deployment when it comes to the host nation support? It is clear that it will require a number of resources. It is clear that Nato will enter into it, but it will also require more from us.

Something else I would like to raise is that it is actually possible for the Riksdag to have the view that the air defense should be expanded in our country. We should have long-range capability. We must draw conclusions from the drone activity in Ukraine.

When we talk about Norway, Sweden and Finland, I also want to emphasize that what we should build in the Nordic region is, in practice, a common army between Norway, Sweden and Finland. That is what must be the outcome, and it will require coordination of various kinds. Even the combat readiness of the units - that we truly see an increase in it - ultimately becomes a political question.

When it comes to aviation, the previous defense decision states both that we shall have more missiles and increased ammunition supplies and that we shall have increased dispersal at air bases. This is stated as a political objective. Was it wrong to do so? Absolutely not. At the same time, the ambition for more dispersal, that is, that one should be able to utilize different air bases and road bases, is something that remains.

When it comes to the ammunition supply, I think it is important that one as a politician can signal that it is important to prioritize. We should also start looking at the next generation of combat aircraft after the Gripen E, because these are very long processes. Here, work has been started together with other countries, but it has not proceeded at all in the way or at the pace that it should.

We must also be able to have an understanding of the navy's development. An analysis should be initiated regarding an additional submarine. Why that? Yes, the submarines are a weapons system that is very effective and deterrent for an enemy. It is also very central when it comes to intelligence gathering. It is actually possible to have a political opinion even on this.

When it comes to Ukraine, the great challenge is ammunition in various variants. What has been done so far is not enough. The EU took an initiative where Sweden is also involved, and where it is said that 1 million artillery shells are to be delivered to Ukraine. So far, they have reached 520,000, and the continuation is, so to speak, uncertain in this context. We see that Ukraine largely signals the need for more ammunition daily in one form or another. What we need are clear state guarantees.

It is about credits for production and about long contracts, and it is about the state having to be able to invest directly in the production line in existing industry. But it must also open up for production for our own needs. We need a unified idea and a unified plan for how we replace what we have donated to Ukraine.

When it comes to the essential security interests, it is to the highest degree a political question. This is the core of the Swedish weapons systems and in Swedish production. The Riksdag has decided on combat aircraft, underwater, crypto, and sensors. We should also decide on the availability of ammunition, that is, that it is included in the package of essential security interests. It is important that it is the Riksdag that states this, and it is important that the Riksdag thereby receives feedback on what is happening in this area. It is in that case a purely political initiative that is very important, and I think we should have the courage to mark it.

We must also realize that the defense industry is a sector that is in constant change and where a lot is happening. It can be about changes in corporate management, it can be about ownership structure, and it can be about the direction of the operations. It can be about international cooperation constellations that risk leading to changes in direction and ownership.

Is it the case that this affects the Swedish essential security interests – which for many, many decades have been financed by the state making orders – and that it risks being changed in such a way that we do not have it under Swedish control, then there must also be a readiness from the state side to have an ownership engagement within the defense industry. It is about being able to guarantee the Swedish national profile on the security interests we have decided upon.

It is also the case that this is about jobs. It is about research results and about long-term competence. We cannot have a creeping process that is uncontrollable and where production and knowledge move abroad, to something that we do not control.

The Social Democrats stand behind all of the party's reservations, but for the sake of time, I move for approval only of reservation 8, which concerns precisely the national security interests. It concerns the Armed Forces' access to ammunition and the preparedness for a direct state ownership involvement in the defense industry.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Alexandra Anstrell (M)

Mr. Speaker! I thank the member for the speech.

I must nevertheless dwell on the idea of Kiruna. I understand the idea of a regiment or similar there, but in reality, Mr. Speaker, there are major problems precisely in Kiruna.

Already today, there are 1,000 vacant jobs but no housing. Given the primary industries which make it impossible to attempt to build anything that takes up a large space up there, how does the member intend for this to be solved in reality?

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! I would like to thank Member Anstrell for the important question.

I would suggest that the government contact the municipal management and the chairman of the municipal executive board, Mats Taaveniku, in Kiruna and sit down and say that due to the reasons that exist regarding the Malmbanan, Esrange, the host country support, and Kiruna's strategic role in relation to Finland and Norway when it comes to the defense of the Arctic region and the activity that is necessary at the border, we actually have the ambition to plan a regiment here and a long-term unit growth. How shall we fix this together to be able to arrange all the facilities around Kiruna?

I believe it is the very heavy and important military-strategic reasons that must determine what ambition one has. But then, as a politician, one can naturally start with the list of obstacles and then conclude that something is impossible.

I believe that one can both look at how to solve the personnel supply in the long term in a specific area through separate discussions within the Armed Forces and its leadership, and I believe that one can solve very much together with Kiruna municipality.

After many years in politics and above all with many years of regional political involvement, I can state that there is usually a conservative opposition and above all a right-wing opposition to things concerning relocation in different contexts, with exactly these arguments in the housing issue: How are people to be made to move there? Is it possible to live there? Is it interesting? Is it attractive?

These questions always come up, so I am not surprised by Member Anstrell's question in this context.

But it also requires something called will, and it requires something called consideration of the realities. In this case, it is about the military-strategic realities. We have also previously had a regiment in Kiruna, so it is not exactly news. But it is a strategic outpost where it is well justified for military reasons to do this.

(Applause)

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Alexandra Anstrell (M)

Mr. Speaker! The chairman of the municipal board in Kiruna, as the member mentions, himself raises the issues that exist up there. It is not about it not being attractive to live in Kiruna, as the member tries to highlight, but it is about the fact that it is actually not possible to build given the reindeer husbandry.

There are 1,000 vacant jobs but no housing. Today, there are no homes for those who work at LKAB, Esrange and the like. They must be flown in and live temporarily in barracks. Ishotellet has no housing for its staff. It is a problem.

Then I think: Is it not better to spend the money on people in the defense than on expensive buildings that would take at least ten years to get in place?

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! I happen to have spoken with the chairman of the municipal executive board in Kiruna about this on a number of occasions, and it is not the case that he thinks there are any doubts regarding the possibilities of doing such a thing if the will exists and the policy at the central level considers it necessary. In that case, Kiruna municipality is, of course, prepared to fully cooperate on this. To use the chairman of the municipal executive board in Kiruna as an argument against an establishment, I therefore believe is fundamentally incorrect.

Furthermore, we already have quite a few military installations in Kiruna. We have a large facility outside Kiruna that today is used for conscript training and for receiving international units. There is, therefore, an established military infrastructure in the area.

We should not create a list of only obstacles, but one must also see the opportunities and also have the stamina to realize that it is the military-strategic perspective that is so important. I have myself been in an area that is pointed out as a possible future regiment area. To arrange a unit growth in this environment, precisely in this area, is something that would strengthen the defense in the Arctic region in a clear and substantial way.

(Applause)

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Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I would just briefly like to comment on the previous exchange where we talked a bit about economics.

When it comes to defense and money, one perhaps does not talk so much in crowns and öre when it concerns growth, but one talks about percentages of GDP. We can observe that in 2014 it was approximately at 1.2 percent of GDP, 2015 at 1.1 percent of GDP, and 2019 at 1.2 percent of GDP. There, it was therefore not any violent growth. In 2024, it will be at 1.8 percent of GDP according to the Swedish appropriation model, and that is somewhat interesting.

I would also like to comment on what Peter Hultqvist says about us abdicating. It is not called abdicating, it is called goal-setting. If Peter Hultqvist had listened a bit more carefully, he would have heard that we spoke about allowing the Armed Forces to have views to the greatest extent possible and to the greatest extent feasible. They are, after all, the professionals, not us politicians.

I therefore want to ask the question to Peter Hultqvist, who obviously has also heard ÖB's advice: What is wrong with them? What does the policy know better than ÖB when it comes to the design of the military units?

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! One can try the feat of describing reality in the way that suits oneself best. But regardless of how one tries, the fact remains that a 100 percent increase in defense expenditures between 2014 and 2025 is a fact.

I also said very early on that when it comes to the military part, we will not reach 2 percent until 2027-2028. At that time, the other parties were talking about 2025. When it comes to the military part, the assessment that we made from the beginning remains, and that is what is now being discussed in public from the government's side.

If one then adds this to some other things, one can of course increase the figures. But I also want to remind that we have been in broad agreement in the Riksdag regarding all these decisions, so it is actually nothing new that has happened other than that one has added 700 million, which is a marginal sum in this context.

I have some experience with precisely target management, and it can happen that the politics becomes so general and moves in such thin layers when it comes to formulating goals and directions that one, in practice, abdicates from direct political influence. The balance between the so-called target management and what is sometimes called micro-management is therefore very important to have if one, as a politician, intends to be involved in deciding in some sense. Politics is, in the end, about power.

I am not over-ruling the military council, I am merely noting that the Chief of Defence Force himself time and again underlines precisely the word "council". But if it is the case that we politicians cannot have any opinion on this, then we might as well abolish the Defence Investigation. Then we do not need to have this debate. Then we can, so to speak, close the shop, because they are the ones handling this!

I actually think that the politicians should be able to have an opinion and also believe that they can contribute something. That is how the interaction looks between the Armed Forces and the politicians.

(Applause)

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Lars Wistedt (SD)

Mr. Speaker! When we talk about oxygen-depleted rooms and the Defense Preparation, I have full understanding of that, but what we have called for from the Sweden Democrats' side is to be clear, among other things, when it comes to timeframes. There we have said that we must be clear when it concerns, for example, what starting position we have and what target position we are to have. We must be in agreement on this. There, not least Peter Hultqvist has been very clear in saying that this cannot be predicted and then not had a clear opinion on the issue, something that I find a bit strange when one talks about target management and detailed management.

The counterargument, when we have talked about goal and detail management, has been that one has entered for a long period, from 1995 onwards, and to a very high degree managed in detail and not listened to the profession. There we think now that a clear difference was needed.

When it comes to daring to have an opinion, it is actually the Defense Commission's task to have that opinion, and that is what we are currently working on and what we will report on on April 26. I really look forward to Peter Hultqvist being very clear about what we in the Defense Commission will come to and what objectives and what starting points we shall have for the upcoming planning.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! I do not think that Wistedt needs to look forward to any clarity from my side, because I have already been clear in the Defence Preparation Board section by section. I believe that is known. Long before the Defence Preparation Board began its work, we have also published orientations that we consider important.

You do not need to doubt our ability to produce perceptions. It is based largely on the cooperation we had with the Armed Forces during our years in government. The government that resigned in 2014 was largely in confrontation with the Armed Forces. They questioned each other, and there was a mistrust. Unlike that government, we succeeded in building a cooperation based on trust, where opinions could be exchanged and things could be turned over and analyzed. Thus, common positions could be reached. It could also facilitate an eventual implementation.

For my part, it is about finding that balance. The politically theoretical discussion about the fact that it is now goal management that applies, I mean in reality is a side discussion that at most suggests that one is not used to handling the political leadership. A combination of goals and views on details was needed. Otherwise, one unfortunately abdicates from the political influence in practice.

If we do not maintain our ambition to also be able to have views on what is stated in the military council, I do not know if we take the political task seriously enough. There are so many problems surrounding all these matters – it concerns time, economy, and what is right – that one must do a job collectively. And ultimately, it is the government that must be held accountable. If one does not succeed with these matters, the National Audit Office will come, and there will be discussions in the Riksdag. We must, therefore, have a situation where we also have the capacity to have views on a number of details in these contexts.

(Applause)

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Lars Püss (M)

Mr. Speaker! First, I would like to express my approval of the committee's proposal in its entirety. It has been only a few days since it has been two years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war continues with great suffering for the Ukrainian people. The losses are enormous, with hundreds of thousands of injured and killed on both sides.

Russia has broken almost all international agreements and treaties and has not even hesitated to attack civilian targets, for example hospitals. The Russian regime does not seem to hesitate in anything when it comes to subjugating Ukraine. Therefore, it is important not only that Ukraine triumphs in this war but also that Russia loses.

If the Russian regime feels that it emerges victorious from a future ceasefire, the Russian bear will rest only for a short time and thereafter set its sights on the next country. This must obviously not happen. Therefore, we must continue to stand behind Ukraine and furthermore continue to work on getting the rest of the world to unite around support for a free Ukraine.

Mr. Speaker! In 2023, the Government launched an initiative to increase the capacity and pace of innovation within the defense industry. The defense innovation initiative shall create added value through increased and deepened cooperation within and between the business sector and authorities in several different sectors. The purpose is to strengthen Sweden's defense and security capability as well as to increase the competitiveness in the defense industry.

Work is now being done to identify which prerequisites and tools need to be developed to further strengthen the defense industry in Sweden by increasing the capacity for innovation. Examples of issues being raised are procurement, Nato, cooperation factors, testbeds and EU funding instruments - so that we can then be able to make concrete political decisions. A logical continuation of this is now to work on developing a defense industry strategy for how we, together with the industry, shall work to strengthen Sweden's defense capability.

When it comes to essential security interests - that is, what today includes combat aircraft, underwater technology as well as crypto and sensors - it is obvious that this must be expanded, not least by reason of what we see from the war in Ukraine. But to anticipate the Defense Preparation's final report does not feel like a good way to go. This is too important for one not to be able to wait until April when the report arrives.

In the area of research and development, a total reformation was needed, not least regarding the view on the defense industry as a whole. Sweden has both a right and a duty to defend itself against external threats. In order for that to be possible, we need defense materiel. To then, as some activist fund managers do, actively refrain from investing in the defense industry, I find highly remarkable. I wonder how many fund customers or pension savers are aware of this strange prioritization.

The need for a strong and vital defense industry has never been greater. In large part, all countries in Europe need to re-equip their defense forces. At the same time, Ukraine is in continued great need of weapons and ammunition. The industry's biggest problem right now is that it cannot meet all demands.

New factories must be built. More people must be hired. The rapid expansion requires capital from banks and other risk-tolerant investors. This is not facilitated by the fact that there are still managers, authorities, municipalities, and regions that boycott this important industry.

In that context, it is also important to point out both our legislation and our various agency processes.

In recent years, peace has been the norm, and I am gladly the first to say that I sincerely wish it could continue to be so. But unfortunately, reality does not look that way. The war in Ukraine is the clearest evidence that we must be prepared for something else. In military contexts, we speak of three levels of conflict: peace, war, and the gray zone. The clearest is war. The boundary between peace and the gray zone is considerably more difficult. The gray zone is the situation that applies between war and peace, where we are exposed to various influence operations intended to disrupt our society in different ways.

The legislation we have is largely adapted to peace and, moreover, a lasting one. We also have legislation in the event of war, but we have none for the gray zone, where we find ourselves right now.

We are working full-scale to strengthen our defense capability. At the same time, neither our laws nor, perhaps even more importantly, our processes for handling an armament on-site are [sufficient]. I have been told that a new construction within the Armed Forces can take up to ten years from conception to the point where it is possible to move in. The ammunition manufacturer Nammo announced some time ago that it could take five years to get a new production line in place. At the same time, I want to remind you that World War II was over in exactly five years.

These processes must be accelerated. Our authorities must review their routines and begin prioritizing better, so that our defense capability can be strengthened today and not in ten years.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker: The defense budget has doubled in four years and tripled since 2014 - from 40 to 60 to 126 billion. It is strong and shows the direction we need to go in. But now is not the time to pat ourselves on the back. Now we must continue to convert these funds into increased capability and strengthened resilience and preparedness. The pace of the capability increase must be accelerated, primarily in civil defense. Municipalities, regions, and the business sector must be on board. That is how we build Sweden strong again. That is how we build Sweden safer, greener, and freer.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! I reacted to Lars Püss's reasoning regarding the essential security interests. The impression was that they are to be expanded, but that this is so important that we cannot discuss it now or have any conception of it. Instead, it is to be done in the Defence Preparation Board.

I think, however, that one can take the liberty of saying already now that ammunition is a vital security interest, and I think it is the Riksdag that should decide on this in order to mark it. The other parts are marked in the parliamentary decision.

Why is it then important with the ammunition side? This largely determines the endurance in the actual battle. What we have sent to Ukraine naturally means that there is a recovery need on the Swedish Armed Forces side. It is not certain that it is exactly what is sent away that one should replace with, and the price picture can also be completely different today than when the ammunition was purchased at one time.

Access to ammunition is essential for the basic function of the Armed Forces and the endurance in a potential combat situation. This brings us to the second part, namely to review the authorities' routines and that this would be the difficulty when it comes to providing increased deliveries to the Swedish Armed Forces. Is it really that simple that this is just about the authorities' routines? In that case, long contracts and clear orders are required. It also requires that the state is prepared to step in and invest in direct production lines in existing factories, partly to be able to provide continued support to Ukraine, and partly so that we can supply ourselves. That is how it actually looks.

You think that this should be discussed in the Defence Preparation Committee, but are you prepared to have some kind of opinion today? I do not think it is so incredibly difficult.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lars Püss (M)

Mr. Speaker! I have no problem with identifying ammunition or other sectors, as I believe it is necessary. I believe we need to expand this quite significantly. What I would have a problem with is if we were to make a decision in the chamber today to identify ammunition or other areas as essential security interests. I oppose making a decision and preempting the result from the Defence Investigation.

When we look at what is happening in Ukraine, it is quite obvious that ammunition is completely vital in order to be able to wage war, or rather to wage the war that we thought belonged to history but which has come back.

I believe it is very important that we give clear signals to the defense industry. Here and now, their order books are full to the breaking point, but they lack the long-term perspective. There, I believe we must become clearer. I do think, however, that even this issue is something that should come from the Defence Preparedness Committee; it is not something that we should make decisions on in the chamber today.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! The positive interpretation of this is that we are largely in agreement. The other interpretation could be that the unfinished always has some form of obstacle.

This is so clear, and it has been so for a longer period. We have, in relation to the government, raised this regarding state guarantees both for Ukraine and so that one can get started more here in Sweden. We have also raised that the EU production that initiatives have been taken for is not holding - it is not enough. We have pointed this out for a longer time.

The need for extensive investigation work on one or the other can be discussed. I hope that the Defence Committee will eventually come up with something that we can agree on, but it is also possible to do things in the Riksdag if one wishes.

This is clearly justified in the various proposals that we have submitted. Today, I have explained what this means in a concrete sense and what we want to be opened up for. These are not proposals that are in any way unrealistic – they have been delivered previously in a government context.

It appears in some way that there is a desire to delay the processes. Above all, the part concerning Ukraine is not something that actually needs to be handled in the Defence Preparation Committee, but this needs to be handled immediately in the government and the Riksdag.

I think Püss is opening up for a protracted process that is not necessary. If we had been listened to, this could have been resolved significantly earlier. It is of essential importance. In the international debate - especially in the European one - it is not only us who are saying this, but it is said in parliament after parliament around Europe, especially from the forces that want to support Ukraine.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lars Püss (M)

Mr. Speaker! I believe we are in agreement, and I really want to believe that. This area is too important for us to have overly large differences of opinion and not be in agreement on the direction to be taken.

I move on to financing and long-term perspective. If we are to be long-term, we must also allow it to take some time. That is why I return to the Defence Preparation Committee. Let us find consensus in the Defence Preparation Committee and reach an agreement broadly between all parties instead of making decisions on an individual motion in the Riksdag.

I believe much more in the fact that we will reach an agreement in the Defence Committee than that we will do it here in the chamber, because here we do not find the common solutions. Not least, I would say, is the fact that we do not look at the whole. We cannot pick out parts and start changing them when we miss the entire picture.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mikael Larsson (C)

Mr. Speaker! It is about you and me. Total defense concerns everyone and affects all of us in Sweden. It is a restless time, with the war in Ukraine, and then the question of total defense and defense policy perhaps becomes the most important one to unite around and invest in.

We are debating defense policy and total defense today. I will set out the Center Party's view on these issues.

Like the Defense Preparation Board wrote in its latest report Kraftsamling, we in the Center Party want to see the business sector play a central and even more important role in strengthening the total defense. This could, for example, involve that preparedness measures are financed through compensation to the business sector for maintaining a service or readiness for certain goods or services, based on various agreements that take supply security into account during high readiness and war.

Storage is important and will be important now as the total defense is being built stronger, but it is important that we design the whole thing in a way that guarantees good turnover and distribution possibilities. We need to build a modern readiness warehouse that shall be adapted for the 2020s and beyond.

Sweden's total defense capability shall be developed so that the entire country can be defended through increased availability and improved operational capability. The civil defense shall be built stronger among municipalities, regions, and all of Sweden's inhabitants. This includes the voluntary defense organizations and, of course, also civil society at large, with everything from the Church of Sweden and study associations to the sports club and the local community center. This is, as said, something that affects us all, and everyone must be involved in the work.

Mr. Speaker! The upcoming NATO membership, hybrid warfare, gray zone issues, the military-technical development, and Sweden's military-strategic position in an increasingly important Baltic Sea region place new demands on the Swedish defense, including regarding endurance, readiness, and increased combat readiness.

The war in Ukraine constantly makes the security policy situation unstable and very unpredictable. A Swedish NATO membership will increase the security policy predictability in our immediate area as Sweden becomes part of a larger defense policy whole.

Combat readiness must increase across all branches of the defense forces. The Centre Party considers, in line with the 2020 defense decision, that in the short term, it must be ensured that the army receives increased combat readiness. But we also need to be able to defend Swedish territory at sea and in the air by having high capability in submarine hunting and naval warfare, through our air combat forces, and through a developed air defense capability in a broader perspective in the Jas system. Not least, changes to the defense capability will need to be made along the Baltic coast, in the Arctic, and also along the west coast to protect trade flows to and from the port of Gothenburg. This is a development that will need to occur over time, and we need to be responsive and active in the NATO cooperation we are to enter. The Armed Forces shall, for example, continue to be developed at the locations where the authority is located today, and the new establishments that have been started must be completed in accordance with the 2020 defense decision.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden must have the means to actively be able to protect critical Swedish interests also in the digital arena. The connection between infrastructure, psychological defense, the society's total defense capability, and the digital arenas is crucial, and these issues are interconnected. Sweden is attacked digitally every day, perhaps even now, and it is high time that we gain the ability to meet the threats we are exposed to daily. Sweden needs, for example, an active defense capability to be able to protect important assets, track attackers, disrupt attackers, and strike back against attackers. The Armed Forces today have the responsibility for this when it concerns state actors attacking Sweden and can carry out both defensive and offensive operations. The Center Party sees that Sweden needs to have the ability to protect both public actors and the business sector's digital arenas as well as, of course, private individuals. This protection must therefore be developed strongly moving forward.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden needs a supply of necessities worthy of the name. We are dependent on the rest of the world for it. But we also need to have an increased self-sufficiency rate of important necessities. This constitutes an important component in the buildup of our total defense. Here, the connection to the business sector and the green industries becomes extremely important. The green industries can strengthen our society's fundamental resilience and at the same time contribute to a more sustainable society. Self-sufficiency rate, the competitiveness of agriculture, logistics and storage of necessary food and strategic input goods, as well as the individual's own preparedness, constitute important input values for developing our total defense. Reduced regulatory burden creates better conditions for domestic production of both food and other goods.

Centerpartiet wants to see that Sweden has a good supply capacity for socially important goods and services throughout the country in the event of crisis and war, where the country's inhabitants, public actors, and the business sector have an important task based on their respective roles. It is important that the regional and local perspectives are included so that the country's collective supply capacity is not limited by the availability of large central warehouses gathered in one place. Increased self-sufficiency of important supplies is perhaps the most important component in the construction of a total defense.

Mr. Speaker! Shortly before Christmas, the Defence Preparedness Board submitted its latest report, Kraftsamling, which clearly describes how the different parts of civil defense should be strengthened in our society. It is a good report that truly takes off from the fact that this is our time's most important issue.

We in the Center Party are extremely pleased with the passages in the report concerning food supply, food preparedness, domestic production, and food distribution. Seeing the entire chain from farm to fork is important for the preparedness issue and food production across the whole country. It is not possible to think that food is produced on the shelves of the food retailer, but everything begins on the farm of the local farmer. That the Defense Preparedness Committee so clearly points this out in the important work to be done strengthens our country in both peace and war.

Mr. Speaker! The Defence Committee is now working on its final report on how the military defense should be developed in the coming period. As I have previously said, the Center Party considers it extremely important that the decisions made in the 2020 defense decision are fulfilled. But we also see a need to strengthen all branches of the defense, not least the navy given our position and long coastline. The Center Party will be a constructive voice in the continued work, and we see that the issue of defense and total defense is important for all of Sweden and all of Sweden's inhabitants.

Mr. Speaker! I move for the approval of reservation 2.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Hanna Gunnarsson (V)

Mr. Speaker, and hello to everyone listening at home! The consideration and the debate concern some of the motions that were written during the general motion period. Vänsterpartiet has no motion of its own, but I take the liberty of saying a few things anyway.

We find ourselves in a serious global situation. The war in Ukraine has now been ongoing for almost two years. Many refugees from there have come to Sweden, and just like many other refugees, they live under difficult economic conditions with a compensation of 71 kronor per day. We must do something about this together. There is also a war ongoing in Gaza with great destruction and many dead civilians. In addition, there are other threats. For example, we have recently had several large cyberattacks against Sweden. Climate change brings about major problems. Where I live, there are now floods, which cause major problems both in the infrastructure and for the residents. Furthermore, we are constantly met with propaganda and influence campaigns that aim to influence our view of the world and our decision-making.

Mr. Speaker! I shall make some observations on how the Left Party views the total defense, and I do so from a broad perspective because the total defense is a very broad area.

As a Left Party member, I always start with the welfare. Healthcare has a very large task in the total defense, and if we do not have a functioning healthcare system in normal mode during peacetime, we will not have it when everything becomes much more difficult during major crises or, in the worst case, war. The healthcare we have now is the one that is supposed to function during crisis and war, minus all those in healthcare who need to do something else. We also need to have a preschool that functions better, even when the situation becomes very serious, and we need to have a social work that provides a much more secure population than what we have now in order to be able to hold together if something serious happens.

Mr. Speaker! Investments are also a part of the total defense. This includes, among other things, energy and the very important railway. I was in northernmost Sweden a few days ago, and there the Malmbanan is out of service again due to a derailment. We need much better infrastructure for the entire total defense to function.

We must also do something about the privatizations. We need to have much more public ownership and public governance in activities of societal importance. The activities must be able to be coordinated in major crises, and we must be able to see the whole and have control over healthcare, elderly care, and other things that are important in major crises and, in the worst case, war.

When we have privatizations with masses of different actors involved in the welfare sector, it is very difficult to manage this if it becomes a serious situation. The same applies to foreign ownership. We have a good deal of socially important activity in Sweden owned by foreign interests. It is a major problem, especially if we end up in a significantly more serious situation. It is a major problem purely democratically today, but it will become much harder if we actually end up in major crises or wars.

Mr. Speaker! We need to do something about equality in Sweden. We live in a country where we see large and growing gaps. I read an article recently about the increased homelessness for children, that is, for evicted families with children who do not have a secure home. If we are to build a society where we have a high will to defend ourselves and where we can defend our country in major crises or, in the worst case, war, then we need to have a population that feels solidarity and belonging and where we have equality, otherwise we will not be able to be the secure country that we need to be.

When it comes to the military defense, Mr. Speaker, we must address personnel issues for real. It is about wages, about the work environment, about continuing to work against harassment in various ways, about ensuring that we have working conditions that function, and about getting rid of the strange twelve-year rule that prevents soldiers from working for more than twelve years.

Above all, it is about solving the issue of personal equipment. We are in complete agreement on this within the parties, but somewhere there are problems that mean one cannot purchase thermoses, skis, gloves or boots - things that one needs. It is incredibly strange, and this must be resolved.

To this is added the overseas service which will increase, or change, with a potential future NATO membership. We know that we will have quite a few employees on overseas assignments, and we need to ensure that the conditions work for entire families, not just for the one who goes out.

Mr. Speaker! Finally, I want to highlight commitment. The will to defend requires a commitment from people in many different ways. It is not about everyone having to join the Home Guard, but it is about the voluntary defense organizations, which we really must highlight all the time, but also the rest of civil society. We have large sports clubs and organizations, such as the Scouts or Friluftsfrämjandet, that need to be able to participate and help out during major crises and, in the worst case, war.

Mr. Speaker! We have a great deal to do ahead of us. In the Defence Committee, we will be sitting for full days for a period of time to come. We need to be able to help each other across party lines in order to be able to resolve these issues in the best possible way.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I want to begin by saying that we in Miljöpartiet stand behind all our reservations, but in order to save time during the voting, we move for approval only of reservation 16 under point 10 Civil Defence and Capability.

Too many people speak of the war as if it were already a fact that Sweden will end up in war. But the purpose of our defense is and remains to preserve peace. Yes, Sweden and Europe find themselves in a very serious security political situation after Russia's appalling and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly two years ago. But the defense shall always be deterrent and peace-preserving. Therefore, we need to have a strong total defense. By increasing our readiness, both civil and military, we can influence the risk of war breaking out.

Sweden is entering NATO, which affects both our security policy situation and how we should build up our defense. The Supreme Commander draws the conclusion in his military council that the risk of a conventional attack on Swedish territory decreases. At the same time, the Supreme Commander also notes that the probability – or, as I would like to say, the risk – that Sweden is engaged in conflicts outside our immediate area increases with NATO membership. Furthermore, I can state that the risk of hybrid attacks and threats is not a risk but a reality, which we can note, not least through the cyberattacks that Sweden has been hit by in the recent past.

Miljöpartiet emphasizes the importance of having a broad view of security. The threat landscape today is both broad and complex. Both military threats as well as non-military threats and hybrid threats exist in parallel. We need to have a preparedness to meet both the military threats and other threats, such as climate change and natural disasters, pandemics and cyberattacks. We therefore need to have a preparedness to withstand both crises and war, and in the worst case, at the same time. This means that the preparedness we build up must be able to handle many different types of threats.

Miljöpartiet has for several years supported a faster and more comprehensive build-up of the total defense - both the military and the civil defense. We support the agreement from the spring of 2022 that 2 percent of GDP shall be allocated to the military defense as soon as possible. We also support all support packages to Ukraine.

At the same time, the balance between investments in military and civil defense must be improved. Therefore, Miljöpartiet wants large investments in civil defense and crisis preparedness. The military defense cannot function without a strong civil defense, and the capability that is built up within civil defense also contributes to strengthening society's resilience against crises other than military ones, for example against nature-related crises and disasters in the wake of the climate crisis.

Mr. Speaker! We also need to have a preventive approach. The preventive work is crucial for a well-functioning total defense. The resilience of societal functions must increase, and more interventions need to be made to prevent crises.

Crisis preparedness and civil defense need to be linked. Civil defense is rather a significant reinforcement of crisis preparedness than something separate that is to sit in the closet until the day high alert or war prevails. When we strengthen civil defense, we also strengthen crisis preparedness and vice versa. In times of societal upheaval, it is crucial that society can stand strong and contribute to security and confidence.

Even though much focus is now being placed on building up the civil defense's capability in the event of high alert and war, the civil defense's resources must also be available to handle crises in peacetime or in a gray zone situation. That we as a society can withstand and meet crises and hybrid attacks, regardless of whether we know that an antagonist is behind it or not, is important for the stability of society.

Miljöpartiet wants to specifically increase investments in civil defense in order to achieve a balanced total defense. Therefore, we are the party that currently allocates the most money to defense, as in our shadow budget we have a major investment in civil defense with, among other things, funds for municipalities' and regions' preparedness, climate prevention measures, rescue services, civil protection, supply preparedness, and voluntary defense organizations.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that civil defense ultimately relies on us having a society and a welfare system that functions in peace. Therefore, Miljöpartiet views with great concern how the current government's cuts affect school, healthcare, and elderly care. That healthcare functions, that children can go to school and preschool, and that the elderly are safe within elderly care is important even in the event of a crisis or, in the worst case, war, so that our defense and our resilience can remain strong. I also want to mention the lack of investments in the railway, which risks our ability for sustainable and redundant transport, something that is extremely problematic.

The Defence Preparation Committee submitted a report focusing on civil defense to the government shortly before Christmas. The report concludes that civil defense needs to be built up as soon as possible. At the same time, a majority of the committee wanted to change the goals for civil defense by removing important goals. We in the Miljöpartiet consider this problematic.

It concerns the goals that civil defense shall have the ability to maintain necessary supplies, contribute to strengthening society's ability to prevent and manage severe stresses on society in peacetime, and with available resources contribute to the ability to participate in international peace-promoting and humanitarian operations.

A goal indicates a clear prioritization and direction. That is how we politicians steer operations and agencies. Removing goals in the way the committee proposes signals that these tasks receive a lower priority. Riksdag-bound goals are followed up in the budget process, which makes it possible for politics to get a picture of the development regarding the fulfillment of the goal.

In the same way as the removal of a goal signals something, it signals a lower priority when one proposes a relocation of the goal to protect the civilian population from having been the first goal to become the third goal for civil defense, even though the goals themselves are said not to have an internal prioritization.

Mr. Speaker! We face a world that risks being powerfully changed due to climate change and the biodiversity crisis, something that not only affects countries far away but also, to the highest degree, affects us in Sweden. The world is interconnected, and when crises and conflicts increase in our global environment, it also has consequences for us.

Climate change leads to an increased risk of conflicts and to the aggravation of already existing conflicts. When water and food become scarce and people are forced to flee, we know that tensions arise. When societies are hit by crises, we also know that antagonists can take the opportunity and exploit weaknesses.

I mean that we must therefore do everything in our power to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and at the same time adapt society so that it can withstand the pressures of a changed climate. In this way, we can contribute to a safer world but also create a robust and stable society here at home.

By transitioning society to fossil-free and investing in renewable energy sources and fuels, Sweden's resilience is increased both against fuel shortages and against political pressure from oil states. The Armed Forces must be part of the green transition and contribute to the society's ability to develop renewable electricity production, for example wind power, and at the same time take responsibility for its own climate transition. A defense that does not keep up when the rest of society transitions will be a vulnerable defense.

An increased organic production of food provides better conditions to produce food in the event of a crisis or war, as organic production is not dependent on inputs such as artificial fertilizers and chemical pesticides in the same way that conventional agriculture is. These we must import today.

Securing access to clean water and protecting our lakes and watercourses is crucial for human survival, whether we are hit by extreme heatwaves or acts of war. A sustainable society is simply robust and resilient.

I apologize, Mr. Speaker, for exceeding my speaking time slightly, but I have much important to say.

Mr. Speaker! We also need, as far as is possible, to apply diplomacy and conflict prevention work. At the same time, we need to have a total defense, both military and civil, which acts as a deterrent to war and which, in the worst case, can defend our country, our population, and our democracy in war. Having a good preparedness is, as said, peace-promoting.

The Defense Commission is now working on the final report where we are to present proposals on how Sweden's military defense should be developed. Miljöpartiet contributes actively and constructively to the work and strives for us to be able to reach a broad agreement.

We in the Defence Preparation Board are drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine while being aware that the conditions look different in Sweden. Sweden is entering Nato, and the defense needs to be adapted based on the fact that we, together with future allies, will build a defense that deters attacks. It is therefore important to think wisely regarding our common defense resources. What unique capabilities does Sweden have to contribute, and how can we make our defense fit with, above all, the defense of our Nordic and Baltic neighbors? How do we build capability both here and now and, at the same time, endurance and redundancy in the long term?

The Defence Preparation Board notes in the security policy report *Allvarstid* that Russia poses a long-term threat to European and global security. We therefore cannot, in our eagerness to arm ourselves quickly, allow ourselves to be deceived into sub-optimizing and undermining the ability to have a strong total defense, both military and civil, that stands strong and redundant even over time.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mikael Oscarsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! We are debating the Committee on Defence's report number 6, Defence Policy and Total Defence. Let me begin by moving for the approval of the committee's proposal in the report in its entirety.

Mr. Speaker! This debate takes place in a very serious security policy situation. As has been pointed out previously, the war in Ukraine will enter its third year in a few weeks. Several of us here in the chamber had the opportunity to visit Ukraine a couple of months ago, and some of us saw the war for ourselves and spoke with those who are part of the leadership.

What we see, Mr. Speaker, is that Russia does not care about the laws of war and that they are targeting civilians and, not least, the power supply. We understand that the war will likely be protracted. We must take these experiences into account when we are now to make a new defense decision. Our work in the Defense Preparation Committee shall be finished in April, and then a new defense decision shall be made in the autumn.

When it comes to the experiences from Ukraine, the first thing we must say is that we must continue to help Ukraine. We have a moral obligation, but it is also something that affects our own security. If Russia were to win, it would have direct consequences for our country, so we have every reason to continue to help with what we can.

What we also need to incorporate are the experiences from the war in Ukraine, and there we see, among other things, the importance of drones used in Ukraine both as weapons and for directing fire. It is also important to be able to protect oneself against drone attacks, and this we must implement in a completely new way compared to what is happening today within the Armed Forces.

We must also understand ammunition. The peacetime forecasts for Sweden's situation and for Europe's situation have proven to be far too low. We must now ensure that we get a completely different production of ammunition to manage both the defense of Sweden and the defense of Europe, but also to continue helping in Ukraine.

Regarding our own role, we look forward to receiving approval shortly so that the NATO membership can be finalized. We understand that we need to ensure that the gaps that exist in our part of the world are filled. We must, among other things, help ensure that there is a completely different possibility when it comes to the army. We need to ensure that the defense decision from 2020 is not delayed but rather accelerated.

In addition to ensuring that the decision taken is not delayed, we need to have the three brigades in place by 2030. We need to add more, because we need to be able to assist with army combat forces for the defense of Finland but also of the Baltics. This is a responsibility that we need to take, because we know that there is a shortage of ground combat troops in our part of the world. We can ensure that it is strengthened there. As the nearest neighbor, we must look at ourselves in the mirror, and if the worst were to happen and a war were to break out, Mr. Speaker, our resources enable us to get help from other NATO countries.

We also need to strengthen our navy. It is about the fact that we need more surface combat ships. We need to ensure that we can, both in peace and in crisis, and in the worst case war, protect trade in the Baltic Sea, both to the Baltics and to Finland. The port of Gothenburg is the most important port not only for our country but also for the Nordics. There is still more to be done here to be able to respond, both for our own country and as members of Nato.

Mr. Speaker! We have a good air force, but we need to ensure that there are more weapons and ammunition and also that the base system functions fully so that we can move out our aircraft and have base troops so that we can use our Jas planes in the best way, as needed.

All this will cost a lot of money, and we see that defense spending needs to continue to increase. We have underperformed for a long time and stayed at around 1 percent, and now we see how our neighboring countries in the Baltics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – are at 2 ½ percent, while Poland is at over 4 percent. They do that because they see that there is a danger in delay. It may be so that we, as they suggest, only have three, four, or five years.

That is why it is important that we now ensure an increase in defense appropriations. And what we can say with certainty is that 2 percent will become the floor and that we will likely need to raise the appropriations so that we can pay for the investments that are required.

Mr. Speaker! With these words, I wish to once again vote in favor of the committee's proposal in the report in its entirety.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! There was much that was interesting and that I agree with in Mikael Oscarsson's speech, above all the view on the army. It is also important to emphasize that the military advice that has now been given does not match the parliamentary decision of 2020. It moves, so to speak, the perspective when it comes primarily to the brigade development to perhaps 2035.

A fundamental question to resolve for the future is, of course: Do the parliamentary decisions we have made apply, and in what way do we ensure that we carry them out if so?

Everything costs, as said, money. And it is quite large sums of money that we are discussing when we talk about expanding the military capability. Therefore, we have submitted a proposal for a readiness tax that would have a redistributive profile covering primarily capital gains and high-income earners. I can only mention that we have been able to note profits in the banking sector of 155 billion kronor last year. Those are large sums of money that are there.

Could you, from your side, Mikael Oscarsson, in a future agreement on defense and its financing, be open to a readiness tax so that we get more money for this and so that we do not end up in a situation where this is pitted against schools, healthcare, and elderly care, which would not be a good discussion to have? This is about such large amounts that we must also have new sources of financing.

So what do you say, Mikael Oscarsson, about a preparedness tax?

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mikael Oscarsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! I thank you for the questions.

It is pleasing that we have a consensus regarding the fact that we need to make substantial investments in defense, and not least in the army, which we need to ensure we strengthen both for our own sake and to be able to respond as members of Nato. It is not least about the responsibility we have in the Nordic region together with Norway and Finland to respond there, but also in the Baltics.

Mr. Speaker! We must also ensure that we make priorities. If we, for example, were to need to make investments in schools, we do not believe, for our part, that we should introduce a new school tax, but we must make priorities.

The member may perhaps clarify a bit more concretely how much this proposal will actually yield. It has been said in various contexts that it could be used as some kind of all-round remedy regarding the investments that one wants to make. Can the member explain in more detail what the Social Democrats' proposal should look like and what revenues he sees coming in? And are there more areas where the member believes special taxes need to be introduced to fulfill the requests that, for example, the Social Democrats now have?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Mr. Speaker! I previously mentioned the term the unfinished's hindrance. By this is meant that in different contexts, one is not prepared to take the necessary steps to produce the proposals that are reasonable given the reality we have.

We have today, for example, a situation where the government delivers 16 billion kronor in increased state grants to the municipal and regional sectors. The regional sector alone has a deficit of 24 billion kronor. We are therefore facing major cuts in this area, which will affect ordinary people's opportunities for healthcare, care, and nursing.

I visited Vilhelmina municipality the other day, and I can only state that they are struggling with a deficit and are finding it difficult to make the finances balance. At the same time, representatives of the current government constellation think that these 16 billion kronor are sufficient.

The needs are, therefore, great. It inevitably becomes a matter of one thing being weighed against another. And because we prioritize the defense issue and do not want it to come into conflict with the other areas where the needs are great and the funding is under-dimensioned, we take the step and say that we are actually prepared to introduce a special tax, a readiness tax, in order to be able to manage this.

Earlier in history, special efforts have also been made to build up the defense in different contexts. I therefore do not think this is particularly controversial. It is a way to be able to achieve something in practice without creating too many fields of tension and problems in relation to other sectors.

At the same time, we believe that the economic gaps have increased in our country to such an extent that the richest have had such a development that they can actually contribute to an increased extent, and in that case, defense is a very appropriate area. Then one can call the one thing and the other thing whatever. But the most important thing is that we get increased revenues.

Will you propose any form of tax increase for anything at all that is to be financed? A readiness tax is for defense.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mikael Oscarsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! I believe that defense should be seen as a home insurance. One must have it, and one must ensure to pay what it costs.

I heard the member speak about Vilhelmina and some other things. But the fact remains, namely that we see it as the wrong way to go to introduce special taxes. I mentioned, for example, a school tax because special investments need to be made in schools. This is about making priorities.

We have for a long time, as I said in my speech, underperformed. We have been at around 1 percent. That has meant that we have not been able to pay, and it has created deficits. We have not been able to implement the defense decisions in the time and to the extent that we would have. There must be a change in this. We cannot leave footnotes for future generations, but we must ensure that we manage to build up both a military and a civil defense in the way that is required. Therefore, it is important that in the budget we provide the money required so that we can obtain the defense that is absolutely necessary and make the investments required for the army, for the navy, for the air force and for the civil defense.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Anna Starbrink (L)

Mr. Speaker! It has almost been two years since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine. Words are not quite enough to describe what the people in Ukraine have been forced to live with during these years. What words can describe the sorrow, the fear, and the anxiety for the future?

The poet Julia Musakovska writes: The words we reach for to preserve even the slightest equilibrium when the ground is snatched away from under our feet like a wobbly stool.

Mr. Speaker! It is a somber time we live in. The second anniversary of Russia's bloody, full-scale invasion of Ukraine is approaching. But no end to Russia's horrific attacks can be discerned.

The gloomy developments in the world also affect our security. Many different hotspots exist where people are hit hard, and it also leaves an impression in our country. Russia constitutes the most serious and most direct threat to European and Swedish security in both the short and long term. The threat includes both military and non-military means. Russia has targeted a long-term conflict with the West. We need to strengthen our total defense and prepare for the development to become even worse.

The Defence Preparation Board has stated that an armed attack cannot be ruled out. It could become war even here. Let us hope that it does not become so, but not only hope; let us act so that it does not become so! Let us work for peace! But let us also prepare for the worst that can happen - not today and not tomorrow but in the future, because it cannot be ruled out.

The most important thing we can do now is to continue supporting Ukraine, which is fighting its aggressor, and ensure that Russia loses its war. Several speakers have already expressed this. I think it is important that we stick together on this issue, because it is great values that are at stake. Is it the right of the strongest or a rules-based world order that shall characterize the development forward?

Ukraine is not only defending its own country and its own freedom. They are also defending ours. Be so sure - if Russia wins the war, they will not be satisfied with Ukraine.

As soon as we are admitted as members of Nato, we will ensure that we become an active and constructive ally in the development of Nato's deterrence and defense. Nato is the most important organization for peace. Leaving non-alignment to participate in that defense cooperation is the largest and most important security policy change that Sweden can make. Alone is not strong, but together we become strong in Nato.

Sweden must continue to build up a strong total defense where both the military and civil defense stand ready to meet great difficulties. This implies a need for large resource additions and that other conditions for both a strong defense and good preparedness work are in place.

That the defense has been neglected for many years is obvious. Now there is a broad consensus that this shall be reversed. This applies to the military defense and to at least the same extent the civil defense - collectively, the entire total defense.

In this context, I also want to point out the defense industry's great importance and opportunities. They must be provided with the best conditions to deliver, not least ammunition.

Many of the motions we are debating here today contain constructive and wise ideas that are also on the agenda in the Defence Committee's work to prepare the upcoming defence decision. They should, of course, be carefully weighed together into a whole that makes our country better equipped both civilly and militarily.

My view is that we should not preempt the work that all eight parties are participating in. It is taking place, I would like to add, in a very constructive spirit. Therefore, Madam Speaker, I move for approval of the proposals in the committee's report.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Björn Söder (SD)

Madam Speaker! Previous governments bear a great and heavy responsibility for the fact that our country today is so poorly equipped to meet the threats that are at the door. One reasoned roughly as if we were to take down all fire alarms and security systems and cancel the home insurance because it still hadn't burned down or there had been any burglary since we built it. I believe that no one would reason like that if it were about their own house, but it obviously went well when it came to our common house, Sweden. Nothing had been learned from history and the defense decision of 1925. The same mistake was made again. And they did not listen to us, who warned of what was to come.

Already in the late 90s, when I wrote the section on defense policy in our youth organization's first principle program, I warned that the development in Russia could quickly come to change. I wrote: "To then decide on a disarmament of the Swedish defense, with regard to what happened after the defense decision of 1925, is insane. A disarmed defense takes years to build up again. That time is not available in the face of a threat of war in modern times."

Nor did they listen when we entered the Riksdag in 2010 and from this rostrum warned of the consequences of the defense policy being pursued. It was instead called a special interest.

After the change of government in 2014, there was indeed a positive shift towards a restoration of Sweden's defense, but how that activity has progressed we see today in reports from the Swedish National Audit Office. There, low priority, underfunding, and no follow-up are described despite the warning signals that became more and more numerous and stronger.

It took the previous government five or six years before they even began to act and appoint inquiries. That is the explanation for why Sweden is so poorly equipped today. Regarding civil defense, practically everything was phased out when the invasion defense was to be replaced by the intervention defense during the 2000s, in contrast to the military part which maintained some kind of minimum level. That is also the reason why we stand at square one today when it comes to civil defense.

The civil defense is now, thank goodness, on its way to being re-established. For the military defense to be able to function at all, a civil defense is required, and it constitutes a vital part of the total defense. A credible and functioning total defense requires that the civil part, just like the military one, is well-coordinated and funded. But it also requires that clear goals for all parts of the total defense are set even in peacetime.

To re-establish a credible and well-functioning civil defense, extensive investments will need to be carried out. The civil defense shall have the capability and planning to provide support to the military. Furthermore, the civil defense shall strengthen society's collective ability to prevent and manage severe stresses in both peace and war.

Unlike the threat situation that prevailed during the Cold War, today's situation is more complex and unpredictable. In addition to war, the threats to our security today consist of, for example, cyberattacks, information warfare through disinformation, threats of the use of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, sabotage activities, and infectious diseases. For the civil defense to manage to fulfill its tasks based on this threat situation, it must have broader competence, knowledge, and capabilities than was the case before. In practice, this means that extensive investments in exercises, equipment, and personnel will be required, as well as the ability to handle situations with insufficient decision-making basis and scarce resources.

The goal is that civil defense shall be able to fulfill its task for at least 90 days. The requirement on the individual will hereby become significantly higher. In order for Sweden to manage future crises, it is of utmost importance that every citizen in this country consciously takes great personal responsibility and prepares so that he or she can manage without support from society for at least one week.

The upcoming NATO membership means that Sweden has a far-reaching commitment regarding the reconstruction of civil defense with reference to Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, which means that Sweden, on its own, but also in cooperation with other countries, ensures a sustained total defense.

Against the background of a series of fateful decisions taken during the 2000s, the majority of the functioning routines and processes that the old system was built on were phased out. This means that everything must be built up anew, and as it stands today, many of the country's 290 municipalities do not have the prerequisites to handle this important assignment in a satisfactory manner.

In the rearview mirror, we have the migration crisis and subsequently the pandemic, which has meant that a large part of the municipality's daily operations within school, elderly care, and urban planning have been brought to their knees in recent years. The requirements of the various principles mean that the state, which is ultimately responsible, has limited means to demand a minimum level when it comes to crisis prevention work. The investments that are now being made in the area to complement the peacetime crisis preparedness in order to be able to meet the conditions of war are welcome.

The government's proposal to introduce a financial planning framework for civil defense, which is intended to contribute to creating long-term perspective and improving the conditions for a strengthening of civil defense capabilities, is good. But at the same time, we know that many municipalities and especially regions are on their knees with enormous deficits. The municipalities that have now come furthest with preparedness issues are those that are more economically well-off, which have the means and resources. It cannot be decisive for the upgrading whether a municipality or region has the money for it or not. In order to raise the minimum level from nothing at all to something better, one-time investments will be needed in many different areas.

What I mean here is that we should consider whether the state, which has a historically low national debt, should through borrowing provide the resources required to raise the minimum standard across the entire country. It is not about financing inefficient municipal or regional politics that may have led to the economic deficits that exist out in the country, but rather about one-off investments to raise the minimum standard and ensure that all our citizens, regardless of where they live, can receive basic protection. Money and resources must be provided quickly. We do not have time to let basic measures drag on due to a lack of resources. When should we borrow money for our defense if not now?

To equip civil defense, many actors need to be involved, and there is a great need for developed leadership and coordination. In the Defense Commission's partial report from December, attention is drawn precisely to this with clear roles, mandates, and coordination. The Defense Commission argues that coordination during high alert and war requires clear leadership and that it is necessary for decisions in such a situation to be made decentrally, as close to the operations as possible. It is only when an actor within given frameworks and with the resources at its disposal cannot solve its task that a higher authority should be engaged. Furthermore, the Defense Commission notes that sector-responsible authorities and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas may also in peacetime have a need to drive, for example, the planning of other preparations through regulations.

The new structure for crisis preparedness and civil defense that has been in effect since 1 October 2022 is a good step forward but must be clarified when it comes to the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the actors within civil defense and society's crisis preparedness. The Defence Preparedness Board states in its report that a central administrative authority is needed to support the government's coordination of civil defense and proposes that this be implemented by reshaping MSB. Regardless of whether it is an existing agency that is reshaped or a new one that is established, this is welcome and is in line with what we Sverigedemokrater have advocated for many years.

Madam Speaker! There is much to raise regarding civil defense, but I would particularly like to focus on security of supply and emergency stocks. Civil defense and the nation's crisis preparedness are in need of emergency stocks. For some products, national and regional stocks are required. For others, large-scale central storage complemented by local stocks is required. The target value should be that the emergency stocks are capable of covering at least three months of consumption. If the development of events calls for the emergency stocks to be used, domestic production must be able to be increased or put on a war footing within three months so that the availability of these specified products can be ensured. The timeframe for converting the industry shall be seen as an initial target value. In the long term, the industry shall be able to be converted in a significantly shorter time.

In order to improve and ensure our ability to cope with future crises, the self-sufficiency level of, for example, food, medicines, as well as protective and medical equipment, also needs to be significantly increased. Swedish preparedness stocks shall, in normal cases, be stocked and financed by market actors within the different segments, for example, the actors within the food and pharmaceutical industries.

To ensure that competition neutrality is maintained, legislation and rules need to be developed. In cases where small local businesses in rural areas are unable to meet the established requirements, or if any market actor considers that competition neutrality has been compromised, they shall be able to apply for state support to manage to meet the established requirements.

All municipalities, regions and private actors within healthcare shall be regulated by legislation to, in their daily operations, place date-sensitive articles and goods into the emergency stockpiles, for example medicines. The content of the emergency stockpiles is determined by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency in cooperation with relevant authorities. Requirements for the storage of equipment and goods that are critical for the total defense need to be regulated in law, and the specific companies that are to carry this out shall be able to do so without it affecting the market.

The storage must also be spread out geographically. Today, we have a situation where the three largest food wholesalers have their warehouses for the entire southern Sweden in a single block. Everyone hopefully understands how vulnerable we are by having it this way. It is completely unacceptable.

The current government has taken hold of many of the matters that previous governments mismanaged and disregarded. The expansion of warehouses for fuel, food, medicines, ammunition, spare parts, and exchange units is underway with the aim of expanding emergency stockpiles, but it must be accelerated.

Madam Speaker! The goal of civil defense shall, among other things, be to have the ability to ensure the most important societal functions, maintain necessary supplies and contribute to the military defense capability, but also contribute to strengthening society's ability to prevent and manage severe stresses on society. The military and civil defense are mutually dependent on each other, and both the civil and military defense must be designed and dimensioned based on the requirements of war and the worst imaginable scenario.

We must realize that time is running out. Things must happen here and now, and all citizens need to realize the seriousness of the situation we find ourselves in. It is not about scaremongering but about the state of reality. I would therefore like to offer a tribute to both the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Civil Defence for speaking plainly during the People and Defence parliamentary conference last month. There were certainly some out there who were somewhat shocked, at least in the newsrooms, and thought it was somewhat exaggerated. But those are the ones who still have not realized the seriousness and what we actually face. We are now facing exactly what we Sweden Democrats have warned about for 20 years. Had we been listened to earlier, we would probably have found ourselves in a completely different starting position than the one we are in now when time is so short.

Madam Speaker! We have a number of motions in the committee report. We naturally maintain the views expressed in these, but we have chosen to refrain from moving for their approval. Instead, we have submitted a separate statement. I move for approval of the proposal in the committee report. I would also like to apologize for exceeding my allotted speaking time.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Johan Andersson (S)

Madam Speaker! I have been sitting and listening to the debate, which has been exciting and from which there is much to be gained. I intended to dwell on one point, namely defense materiel, which will be decisive in the future. There are three parts that will be decisive for whether we will succeed with the buildup that we have now started. It is about resources, personnel, and materiel. All these three parts are interconnected.

I have enjoyed reading through the report dealing with the decision taken in 2020 regarding the current period for material supply. There, several of the bourgeois parties that now sit in government positions referred to the importance and value of a defense industry strategy. I thought that Member Püss exemplary described how that part is viewed from the Moderaternas side. I would also like to hear the Kristdemokraterna express themselves on that. There was a reservation at that time, which has been said. But I can note that the Member from Kristdemokraterna has left the chamber, so I will have to take it at another occasion.

It will naturally be very crucial that we have a strong Swedish defense industry linked to this. We have an industry that has grown and developed successively when it comes to exports. We have large orders that will be coming in the future. Member Hultqvist made an exemplary drawing of the expectations in those parts and the discussions that are held regarding the future needs of materiel. It is then natural in the discussion to also include how this can look in the future, how it will be financed, how we can ensure that there will be materiel and how we will ensure that there is technology, that development occurs and not least that there is personnel.

Then it is a matter of reflecting on and raising the discussion that we have sparked regarding a greater state responsibility for the upcoming defense industry and the industry as a whole. In our reservations, we have pointed out the importance of this, and it would be interesting to hear how the other parties view it. Nothing has been said about that here in the debate. In what way could one participate in a decision to support state ownership of the defense industry, or in any case a part of it?

Madam Speaker! With those words, I intended to return a portion of the time that has previously been drawn from the speaking time. I move for the approval of our reservation number 8.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Alexandra Anstrell (M)

Madam Speaker! I want to warn that I may go over my registered speaking time by a few minutes. Johan Andersson gave a few extra minutes, so we shall see how it goes.

Defense policy and total defense are very important issues. I intended to focus on civil defense. The buildup of civil defense is central if Sweden is to be able to have a functioning total defense. Here, our voluntary defense organizations are important to make the whole thing work. They are like the glue in the total defense.

If you who are listening now at home feel that you want to help out in the total defense, my best tip is to join one of our 18 voluntary defense organizations. There, one can be involved in everything from Svenska Lottakåren to Frivilliga Flygkåren, Bilkåren and Svenska Blå Stjärnan. There is something for most interests and something one can feel they are a bit good at.

Madam Speaker! I also intended to highlight the issue of preparedness. It concerns food preparedness, fuel preparedness, medical supplies, and so on. I have just this morning had a meeting with LRF Mälardalen and just spoken about the importance of their role in the total defense. They say that they are prepared and willing to help.

That we have farmers who both cultivate crops and have livestock is central for us to expand and strengthen Sweden's self-sufficiency. The world is more uncertain and restless than it has been in a long time, and unpredictability is increasing. The importance of security of supply in the event of crisis and war is something that cannot be sufficiently emphasized.

A secure supply even during high alert is central. The Minister for Rural Affairs has just received the investigation Food Preparedness for a New Era. I look forward to a government bill on the issue that we may also get to speak about here in the chamber. It is precisely the idea of a new era that we must carry with us. It is about how we are to set it up now in a modern Sweden in 2024.

An important factor in that, I believe, is the total defense's business council. We cannot do this without Sweden's entrepreneurs. I am glad that the business council is finally up and running, since it was investigated three times during the last parliamentary term.

When it comes to our upcoming membership in Nato and civil defense, civil preparedness within Nato is a national responsibility but also a collective commitment among allies.

Sweden is already participating as an invited state actively in the civil preparedness work within Nato. The committee could already last year in report 2022/23:FöU6 state that Nato has identified seven civil capabilities that shall contribute to ensuring societal functions and maintaining the alliance's collective defense capability.

Since these capabilities are particularly prioritized by Nato to strengthen civil resilience, they will naturally constitute a central starting point in the national work here in Sweden to develop the crisis preparedness and the civil defense for Sweden as a member country.

The structure for the society's crisis preparedness and civil defense that entered into force on 1 October 2022 now constitutes a framework and a support in the work, and that is good. The Government has emphasized the importance of relevant authorities, municipalities and regions as well as the business sector having to take measures for an increased capacity.

We must prepare for war. Even if we do not want war, we need to prepare for war so that we can handle everything along the way in the form of various crises. We therefore cannot sit here and wait. None of us can. Everyone who does not need any major support from the public sector must prep at home so that one can manage for at least seven days. This applies to water, food, heat source, and so on. You have all prepped at home, haven't you? All authorities, municipalities, organizations, and individuals must take their responsibility.

A lot of very good things are happening in the area regarding civil defense now, and I think that is good. With that, I will keep my speaking time and move for approval of the committee's proposal.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Sara-Lena Bjälkö (SD)

Madam Speaker! I want to begin by moving for the approval of the committee's proposal in report FöU6 in its entirety. I also want to mention that we have a specific statement in this report. Very good things have been said from the rostrum this morning by everyone. It bodes well for our future and our defense.

Madam Speaker! In my speech, I have intended to touch upon two or three important pieces of our defense a bit more deeply.

In the current situation, we politicians must truly do our utmost to provide authorities and voluntary organizations with the economic conditions required to create a robust civil defense and crisis preparedness.

The voluntary defense organizations play an important role for Sweden's crisis preparedness. We who are sitting here in the chamber now know that there are 18 voluntary defense organizations in Sweden that contribute to the country's civil and military defense.

The organizations recruit and train volunteers for a wide range of different tasks. I myself, Madam Speaker, am a member of the Voluntary Motorcycle Corps and in the Defense Trainers. We can all contribute.

Each organization has specialist expertise within these different areas. Through courses and training, the organizations ensure that the specific expertise is preserved. The organizations also place a number of people in specialist positions within the total defense. The civil defense shall be developed, practiced, and led in close cooperation with the military.

Madam Speaker! The Home Guard is also an important piece of this. Today, the Home Guard consists of approximately 23,000 ordinary people who defend Sweden after work, and I am one of the Home Guard soldiers. In the Home Guard, one gets the opportunity to develop and grow while simultaneously participating in protecting, monitoring, and supporting society during a crisis.

For Sweden's part, it will be of utmost importance that the entire society transitions. The military defense, municipalities, regions, authorities, companies, and voluntary organizations are central actors in preparing Sweden for a potential war.

Another important piece of the puzzle is food preparedness. We need food and drinking water for our society to function. Food preparedness is about ensuring that we have access to food and water even during other types of crises and, in the extreme case, in war.

Madam Speaker! Many need to contribute to this work. It is everyone from authorities, regions and municipalities to food companies and private individuals. The goal of Sweden's food preparedness is that everyone shall have enough water to drink and wash with and food to eat in a crisis and war situation.

Defense policy and total defense

But, Madam Speaker, it is not as simple as just building up a food stockpile. We have heard that here today when we have talked about different preparedness stocks. Preparedness needs to stand on several legs such as energy, transport, money and financial services. Food preparedness is, as you understand, also dependent on other parts of society functioning.

The fundamental goal is not that Sweden should return to a model adapted for a time that no longer exists. Instead, we shall build a new modern total defense concept for the future, and in that, all citizens must take their responsibility.

Madam Speaker! Before I conclude my speech, I shall take up a question that we received in the chamber from the Social Democrat Johan Andersson. I do not see him in the chamber now, so he will have to listen to my answer in another way. His question concerned the state component. We are positive about long-term orders to ensure an industrial issue if one dares to invest in the increased production conditions. We do not see that the state should enter into direct ownership in the industry today. It is mostly about the professional aspect – that one can manage supply and demand when it comes to this issue. But we are, of course, open to listening to how the Social Democrats think.

Madam Speaker! Now we take action together and ensure that civil defense and crisis preparedness in Sweden are strengthened!

(Applause)

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 12.)

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