(cont.) Response to interpellation 2024/25:423 on Sweden's foreign and security policy regarding cyber issues and digital issues
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerned Sweden's foreign and security policy regarding cyber issues and digital issues. M argues that China's growing influence entails risks and that the EU's regulatory framework is central to ensuring reliable AI services 1. M emphasizes the importance of protecting democracy against improper information influence, which is achieved through cooperation within the EU and Nato as well as support for countries such as Moldova and Ukraine 2 3. M also emphasizes that authorities and private actors have responsibility for their own security work 1. S criticizes the government's strategy for being too scattered and lacking rigor 4. S advocates for a ban on anonymous accounts on social media 5.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Madam Speaker! There is no doubt whatsoever that China's economic and technological influence is growing in a number of areas. This development can entail risks and vulnerabilities even for Sweden and is something that we must contend with. We are therefore following the discussion surrounding applications such as TikTok and Deepseek very closely.
The EU's regulatory framework in this area is completely central. That AI services are reliable is a key issue within the EU and also a primary objective of the EU AI Act. The European Commission has also taken measures to ensure that digital services comply with the EU's regulatory framework and protect users' rights, even when it concerns personal data. In December, an investigation was initiated, among other things, to examine whether TikTok had taken sufficient measures to prevent election interference in the Romanian presidential election.
Regarding the public sector's use of generative AI, each individual agency has a responsibility to assess which measures need to be taken to ensure that operations are conducted in a secure manner. In the current security policy situation, it is more important than ever that agencies and private actors, especially those working with society-critical and security-sensitive activities, conduct systematic information and cybersecurity work. This can include decisions on which services and apps may be used.
For authorities and private actors conducting security-sensitive activities, the security protection legislation also applies. According to it, every operator shall carry out a security protection analysis, where security risks and the need for protective measures are identified.
Markus Selin (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Foreign Minister, for the contribution!
Why do I speak of this? Why, Madam Speaker, do I speak, for example, of a single Chinese social media platform? This is a frightening way for a totalitarian state to govern a large part of the Swedish population's behavior, thoughts, and feelings, gain full insight into time and place, and also control the media flow.
As I said in the introduction of my first speech, I do not believe in this strategy. And I also do not believe in the government's current work, where they are stacking different strategies on top of each other. I know that the government has delivered a general security strategy. I know that the government has also delivered a strategy for defense policy and space. I know that the national cyber policy strategy is very delayed; I am also waiting for it. And on this, we have the strategy that I and the Foreign Minister are debating here today.
What is it that I am looking for? I have read this strategy thoroughly. According to Chapter 1, Section 6 of the Instrument of Government, it is, Madam Speaker, the government that governs the realm. The government has excellent ways to illustrate and radiate norms, values, and positions. In my world, Madam Speaker, a strategy is a guideline, a way forward, and an expression of will.
The strategy we are now debating could be very good, but it is impregnated with important and, for me, very beautiful value words and writings about digitalization and the connection to our democracy and our free formation of opinion. It is about protection for democratic movements and protection against improper information influence. On page 10, private companies are mentioned that have an increasing influence on security and the mechanisms of democracy. On the same page, those who constitute a security risk are mentioned, in particular in relation to authoritarian states. All that we are debating is mentioned here. I could add more; it is, as said, 23 pages.
We unfortunately also have a domestic problem. The World Wide Web is by definition international; there are no national borders. The Sweden Democrats were exposed with their trousers down to their knees during last year's election campaign. They have run their own little troll factory. One might think that it is okay, which I think is completely insane and democratically reprehensible. But the problem linked to my work in the Committee on Defence and directly to the Foreign Minister's everyday life is that the Sweden Democrats' fake accounts and troll factories have spread – listen carefully! – Russian narratives. Then we have a domestic security problem, which on these 23 pages absolutely could have been addressed.
Therefore, I want a bit more rigor if we are to deliver strategies of this type, in combination with other strategies. This government is generally driving a cyber strategy that is very fragmented. Now we are up to seven ministers, including the Foreign Minister, who have some type of responsibility for cyber policy. I believe it is a result of this that we are now up to the fifth or sixth strategy.
I could put it like this: many strategies, many different ministers and very many uncertainties.
Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Madam Speaker! In order to protect the core of democracy, free freedom of expression must be secured at both the national and international level. Access to a free, open and secure internet is absolutely crucial to promote political and social participation.
The strategy Sweden in a digital world simultaneously establishes that a central issue is how democracy and its institutions and processes should be defended against improper information influence from ill-intentioned actors, while at the same time repressive demands for the limitation of free flows of information are countered. The strategy particularly highlights the importance of paying attention to improper information influence on electoral processes. A concrete example of this work is Sweden's extensive support to Moldova in order to strengthen their resilience in connection with electoral processes, not least to counter improper information influence and illegal party financing.
Sweden is working collectively against various forms of improper or harmful information influence. This applies regardless of which digital service or platform is used and regardless of owner. Nationally, not least the Psychological Defence Agency has an important role in identifying, analyzing, and being able to provide support in countering improper information influence and other misleading information directed at Sweden.
Internationally, Sweden contributes to several collaborations within both the EU and Nato as well as various multilateral organizations. For example, there is Swedish personnel seconded to Nato's center of excellence for strategic communication in Riga.
The EU's regulatory framework is central, as I mentioned in my previous post, and within the EU, several measures have been taken against disinformation and improper information influence. The EU Commission, as mentioned, has an ongoing investigation of the platform X and is examining, among other things, its measures to counter improper information influence.
I note that Markus Selin is very upset about the government's strategy and does not seem to think it is entirely sufficient. I would therefore very much like to hear what the S-government's strategy in the area looked like.
Markus Selin (S)
Madam Speaker! I am no more upset here today than I have been previously.
I do not intend to stand here and watch as others dismantle our shared democracy. As a Social Democrat, I will continue to push that we, for example, should ban anonymous accounts on social media platforms. The Foreign Minister has a clear argument there. I know that more Social Democrats in Europe are pushing such issues. One cannot use anonymity to attack our shared freedom of speech, for example.
When it comes to the strategy, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs stands behind, the Minister for Foreign Affairs says: "The strategy is not aimed at specific digital platforms or services." I intended to come back to this. It is completely fluffy.
It is not possible to point so cowardly. It is about norms, values, and expressions of will for the way forward. Our democracy is much more important than this.
To the Foreign Minister, it sounds as if the strategy is meant to tick a box in a protocol: someone else is going to do something somewhere else to safeguard our democracy – at another time.
I have only one question left tonight: Shall we keep the strategy in our pocket and take it with us on the way forward, shall we put it in the filing cabinet to store it, or shall we put it in the wastepaper basket? Without action and without standing up for democratic values and norms, we will end up in the latter: the wastepaper basket.
Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Madam Speaker! I intended to lift my eyes from the wastebasket and speak about the need to protect Ukraine.
It is in Sweden's interest that Ukraine strengthens resilience against external cyber threats and improves the capacity to strengthen its sovereignty in cyberspace. The strategy indicates the direction to develop Sweden's, the EU's, and NATO's cooperation regarding support to Ukraine in the cyber and digitalization areas, but perhaps Markus Selin does not consider that important either.
Continued Ukrainian resilience in the digital domain is crucial. Sweden participates, among other things, within the framework of the Tallinn Mechanism, which aims to coordinate and strengthen civil cyber capacity building in Ukraine. The EU has a cyber dialogue and extensive support for Ukraine in the cyber domain that Sweden also contributes to. This involves, for example, strengthening legislation and regulatory frameworks and supporting Ukraine in meeting EU rules as part of Ukraine's process toward EU membership. This is truly important. It is also about support through training and capacity building.
I note that the Social Democrats accuse the government of having overly extensive strategies. But Markus Selin did not answer why the Social Democrats did not even have any strategy.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.