Privacy protection in signal intelligence in defense intelligence activities
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
I believe that Sweden must be able to handle security threats in the digital age, which justifies a review of the signal intelligence law so that FRA can carry out its mission 1. M argues that intelligence activities should be permitted even when both the receiver and the sender are within the nation's borders 1 and that the investigation is important for securing citizens. S believes that signal intelligence is a necessary and organized part of Sweden's defense and that the competence must be maintained to preserve security, sovereignty, and freedoms 2 3. MP believes that effective intelligence activity is important to protect the democratic society 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Camilla Brunsberg (M)
Mr. Speaker! We Moderates take issues concerning our security with the utmost seriousness. Sweden must be able to have a capacity to handle security threats in the digital age.
In connection with the adoption of the signal intelligence act, the Riksdag instructed the government to once a year report on the review conducted by the activities covered by the signal intelligence act.
That review has resulted in a report, and we in the Defence Committee have stood behind that report. It is precisely that report and that review, together with a couple of motions, that we are going to handle here in the chamber today.
I also want to take this opportunity now to point out that a review of the signal intelligence law is underway. The interim report was submitted on September 1 last year. We will receive the final result during the current year, on September 1, 2024.
Since the Signal Intelligence Act entered into force, the security policy situation has deteriorated significantly in our country and in the world. We have a Russia that has carried out a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is a democratic country in our neighborhood. We also have a Russia that exhibits boundless brutality, this in combination with an extremely rapid technical development.
Different types of cross-border attacks are becoming increasingly common from foreign attackers. This applies to both state and other attackers. We can also expect even more advanced attacks as the tools the attacker uses become more numerous and more complex. The overall threat picture is also more serious today. I am thinking, among other things, of hybrid attacks, cyberattacks and influence operations. It is part of the everyday reality we face today.
Mr. Speaker! I mean that it is our, the legislative assembly's, duty to create the conditions so that we in Sweden can respond to and defend ourselves against the new threat. A fundamental prerequisite for us to be able to defend ourselves against the new threat is precisely that we have an effective and robust defense intelligence activity.
I would like to assert that the powerfully deteriorating security policy situation in the world, in combination with the fact that we are building up our total defense and the extremely rapid technological development, justifies a review of the current signal intelligence regulation so that FRA can properly perform its important mission.
First and foremost, Mr. Speaker, I would like to state here in the debate in the chamber that we are handling the signals intelligence act with great caution today. We do this to balance the protection of privacy and security aspects, but also to secure the individual's civil liberties and rights.
A major obstacle, in my opinion, is an issue that we Moderates have pushed for over several years. It is that it is not permitted today to conduct intelligence activities according to the signal intelligence act if both the receiver and the sender are located within the nation's borders.
Mr. Speaker! Let me come to one of the important aspects that I consider relevant in today's debate here in the chamber. It is that a review of the signal intelligence act is underway. We need to ensure that we have modern and purposeful legislation and regulation that is adapted to both the new security policy situation, which is very serious, and the rapid technological development.
I would still like to take the opportunity here in the debate in the chamber to account for a couple of the parts that emerged in the partial report following the criticism from the ECJ. I think they are extremely relevant. It concerns our privacy and our security.
The Court of Justice of the EU criticized that a couple of things were missing in the regulation. The authority has shown us that it is already applying what needs to be adjusted in the regulation. It is relatively easy to handle, but it is still worth mentioning them.
The first part concerns the fact that the Court of Justice of the EU established that improvement proposals were needed in the regulation itself regarding the obligation to destroy personal data deemed to lack significance for intelligence activities. The authority already does this today.
Furthermore, it was another sharp proposal where the court argued that in connection with international transfers of personal data, one must consider the principle of proportionality. The authority already does this today.
One could say that these are more or less expedition matters. We look forward to following the final result of the report and any adjustments to the legislation.
Now to the two aspects that are most important in the review of the signal intelligence law. The first is somewhat less sharp but worth mentioning here in the chamber. The second is an important change that we Moderates have pushed for for several years.
The first one is about the fact that we are now in the investigation looking at whether more agencies should be given an opportunity to focus their intelligence missions.
The first authority one looks at is the Inspectorate for Strategic Products. That authority has the support of the Armed Forces and the Security Service. It carries out export control and supervisory work in order to, among other things, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The question now is whether the Inspectorate for Strategic Products could also be given an opportunity to direct intelligence activities according to the Signal Intelligence Act. I look forward to following this.
The second authority is the Psychological Defence Authority. It is a newly established authority that identifies, analyzes, and provides support in countering improper information influence and misleading information directed at our country and our nation's interests. One could also consider looking at whether that authority should be given an opportunity to direct intelligence activities.
Now to the sharpest proposal that we Moderates have long spoken about. It is about the fact that, at present, it is not possible to conduct wiretapping and intelligence activities if both the recipient and the sender are located within the nation's borders. Is it really expedient that FRA today can only wiretap two people if they are not located within the country's borders?
Today, one can conduct intelligence activities against a person who may be a suspected terrorist or is a spy. But when that individual, the so-called recipient, enters our country, one is forced to discontinue the intelligence activities.
We Moderates will certainly follow the investigation, and we think that one should be open to looking at whether an interception can be initiated when both the recipient and the sender are initially located within the nation's borders.
I look forward to following the investigation and am also proud that we receive satisfactory reports, so that we have good integrity in our country.
I would like to conclude by moving for approval of the Defense Committee's proposal and rejection of the reservations, with reference to the review that is taking place of the signals intelligence act.
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! Signals intelligence in defense intelligence activities is about eavesdropping and distinguishing signals, transmitters, and systems. Signals intelligence, therefore, is about extracting information from electronic signals and capturing what is interesting from the signals, for example in radio communications or in signals that travel through cables or wires.
We conduct such activities in Sweden primarily to support Swedish foreign, defense, and security policy. We want to be able to map external threats against the country, and we do this, of course, to avoid atrocities and hostilities and to preserve our freedoms.
Signal intelligence activity is a necessary and integrated part of Sweden's defense and protection against terrorism. Sweden is an engineering nation and a knowledge nation, and signal intelligence is about cutting-edge expertise. We Social Democrats consider this to be an important capability and resource. Sweden has very good conditions within signal intelligence. We are far ahead, and we shall safeguard, develop, and nurture this.
All of this is also about personal privacy in balance with Sweden's total security. Simply put, our current signal intelligence legislation is rooted in the technical developments and the security policy changes that occurred during the 90s and 00s. More and more signals began to be transmitted, and they began to be transmitted via cable and wire and not just in the air.
The Act on Signal Intelligence in Defence Intelligence entered into force on 1 January 2009, and the first legislative amendments came as early as December of the same year. Through the legislative amendments, among other things, an intelligence obligation towards individuals was established as well as a new special court, the Defence Intelligence Court, which adjudicates applications for permits for signal intelligence. Permits are applied for by the signal intelligence authority - Försvarets radioanstalt, FRA - on behalf of the Government, the Government Offices, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Security Service, and the National Operations Department within the Police Authority, Noa.
A permit shall, among other things, state for which acquisition mission the signals intelligence is to be conducted, which signal carriers and search terms may be used, as well as what other conditions are needed to limit the intrusion into personal privacy.
After obtaining data, FRA processes and analyzes the signals and reports intelligence to the client and relevant authorities. Defense intelligence activities may only concern foreign conditions and external threats. The demarcation between police activity and defense intelligence activity shall be clear in a time when it occasionally becomes increasingly difficult to draw a line between what is a military threat and what is another type of threat.
The Swedish Defence Intelligence Inspectorate, Siun, is a government agency whose task is to ensure that defense intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with our laws and regulations. Siun is also the supervisory authority for the activities conducted under the Signal Intelligence Act. In signal intelligence, specific search terms, destruction, and reporting shall be audited. Furthermore, Siun shall, at the request of an individual, check whether their message has been obtained during signal intelligence.
In accordance with the Signal Intelligence Act, there is also a privacy protection council at FRA which shall exercise oversight to ensure privacy protection. The privacy protection council is a part of FRA, and the council's members are appointed by the government. If there are grounds, the privacy protection council shall report observations to the agency's management and, if necessary, also to Siun.
Personal data that is collected and processed can be of a sensitive nature, for example, what we talk about on the phone or what individuals write in emails. It rarely has to do with the mission in the defense intelligence activities themselves but is only a small part.
Mr. Speaker! Through FRA's intelligence activities, Sweden gains unique knowledge about foreign conditions. Reliable intelligence about the world around us is important for us in Sweden to be able to conduct an independent foreign and security policy.
Speaking of engineering prowess and signals intelligence, the Armed Forces' aircraft and ships also conduct signals intelligence for FRA. It can be mentioned here that the Defence Materiel Administration ordered two Saab-developed aircraft, Global Eye, in 2022, and Saab Kockums has now also delivered the new signals intelligence ship Artemis to the Navy. With these vehicles, Sweden's security is significantly strengthened. These are world-leading systems from Swedish engineers, for Sweden's security, and examples of modern, advanced surveillance and command systems.
Sweden has deep and long-standing expertise in signals intelligence that must be maintained and developed. We do this to uphold Sweden's sovereignty, our freedoms, and a more secure future.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I and the Social Democrats wish to express our approval of reservation l, A developed strategy for signals intelligence.
Camilla Brunsberg (M)
Mr. Speaker! I have a question for Member Markus Selin.
To begin with, I would like to state that it is reassuring that we seem to have a broad consensus on how important the defense intelligence capability is for our country and that we collectively consider that we have a reassuring defense intelligence operation that takes integrity and security into account. I hope that we are also in agreement when we eventually adjust the revision of the signal intelligence act in the future.
I can also state that the wording in the motion, as Markus Selin puts it, is appealing, and it is good that we have a consensus on this. I do, however, have a question, which I do not know if Markus Selin can answer now. I am not posing it to create a confrontational debate but rather out of curiosity.
As I said in my speech, we Moderates have long argued that it is relevant to be able to conduct intelligence activities within the framework of signals intelligence when both the receiver and the sender are located in Sweden - within the country's borders - and then also look at whether intelligence activities can be initiated within the framework of signals intelligence when both the receiver and the sender are initially located within the country's borders.
Does Member Markus Selin and the Social Democrats have any perception of this already, or is it part of the strategy that is discussed in the Social Democrats' motion? It could be interesting to, if possible, get answers to this already now. I think it is good that we have the parliamentary group and that we look at this jointly, but I am curious. Does Member Markus Selin have an answer to the question already now?
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! Member Markus Selin does not intend to answer that question just today. Just as Member Camilla Brunsberg from Moderaterna says, work is ongoing, and I personally sit in the reference group for this work.
At the same time, I can thank you for the question, as it is probably interesting for the public to already begin thinking in these directions and issues. With technical development, it is becoming more and more complex where the receiver and where the transmitter are in a signal transmission. The amount of data being transmitted has also increased exponentially. I would therefore like to thank you for the good question. I look forward to returning, probably later this year, when we have packaged the current work a bit better.
Camilla Brunsberg (M)
Mr. Speaker! Member Markus Selin did answer my question. He has no information at this time. That is something we Moderates must respect.
We have for several years been clear that we think it is really necessary to review this, and that is being done now in the investigation. There is not much more to debate here in the chamber, but I still want to point out once again that it is extremely important for our security and integrity that we can secure our Swedish citizens and eliminate terror threats and other types of threats. It is therefore welcome that the investigation is being conducted.
It is also welcome that we have such broad consensus. This is not an issue that we should have political conflicts over on an ideological level. It feels reassuring.
I must respect the answer from Member Markus Selin and await both the investigation and the notification from the Social Democrats.
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! I can only agree. Like Camilla Brunsberg from M, I as a Social Democrat can now thank for the good work and underline and highlight the importance of state-of-the-art and forward-looking signals intelligence in Sweden. As I said in my speech, Sweden as an engineering nation has very good conditions to be far ahead in signals and signals intelligence activities. We do this to preserve our common security, Sweden's sovereignty and above all our freedoms for children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
Emma Berginger (MP)
Mr. Speaker! As we all know, the security policy situation is more serious than it has been in a long time. It also underscores the importance of Sweden being able to conduct effective intelligence activities, not least with the help of signals intelligence. The purpose of this is, we in Miljöpartiet believe, to safeguard the open and democratic society, the free formation of opinion, as well as Sweden's freedom and independence.
It is particularly important that we have an independent intelligence activity that has the possibility to make independent assessments, both when it comes to, for example, early warning and in order to be able to make the trade-offs that we need to make in our security and defense policy. At the same time, it is important to ensure efficiency in signals intelligence and intelligence activity so that we detect the threats but do not risk unnecessarily infringing on people's privacy.
Signal intelligence is a very important tool that provides specific information that cannot be accessed in other ways. The information is close to the source and can therefore confirm such information received from elsewhere. The document we are dealing with today is important for monitoring and ensuring integrity and trade-offs in signal intelligence, and we think that is good.
Privacy protection in signal intelligence in defense intelligence activities
The threats against Sweden and other democracies come from many different organizations and states across the world. This makes cooperation between Swedish authorities and authorities in other countries important, not least now when Sweden is entering Nato. I therefore want to emphasize the importance of clear regulation so that broad cooperation in these areas does not become a threat in itself to privacy and human rights, but rather strengthens our safety and security.
To initiate collaborations, it is important to have the possibility of an independent review, even if the review itself probably must be carried out under secrecy. The international cooperation is important for combating terrorism but also for ensuring security in our immediate vicinity. The starting point for Swedish intelligence activities must be to safeguard and protect the open and democratic society, the free formation of opinion, as well as Sweden's freedom and independence.
With that said, I would like to move for approval of the Miljöpartiet's reservation 2 in this matter.
The deliberation was hereby concluded.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.