Privacy protection in signal intelligence in defense intelligence activities
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerns privacy protection and efficiency in signal intelligence within defense intelligence activities. M argues that signal intelligence is crucial for detecting threats and that Sweden has a comprehensive system of control mechanisms, including judicial review and oversight, which creates a good balance between security and personal privacy 1. S considers that the current system works and that the controls are fundamental 2. S emphasizes, however, that the government should take clearer initiatives to ensure that Sweden remains at the forefront by developing expertise in cryptology and cybersecurity, as well as conducting an inventory of organization and responsibility to maintain long-term strategic capability 2.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Camilla Brunsberg (M)
Mr. Speaker! We live in a time when the security situation in Europe is the most serious since the Second World War. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered the European security order. At the same time, we see more aggressive intelligence work against Sweden, extensive cyberattacks, and systematic attempts at influence directed against our democratic institutions.
In such a situation, access to qualified intelligence is crucial. We in Sweden must be able to understand the world around us, detect threats in a timely manner, and provide our decision-makers with the best possible basis. Here, defense intelligence activities play a central role, and within those activities, signals intelligence is one of the most important tools.
Signal intelligence provides information about military capabilities, about cyber threats, about terror-related activities and about the actions of foreign powers. That information can be crucial both for protecting Sweden and for contributing to security in our immediate vicinity.
At the same time, Mr. Speaker, it is obvious that an activity such as signals intelligence must be surrounded by strong privacy protection. That is precisely why Sweden has built up a very extensive system of control mechanisms around signals intelligence. It concerns several different levels of legal certainty and supervision.
Firstly, permission is required in advance. Signal intelligence may not be conducted in any way but must be tested by a special court. Secondly, there is a specific supervisory authority that continuously monitors the operations. Thirdly, reporting occurs to the government and to the Riksdag regarding how the legislation is applied and how the protection of privacy functions.
The communication we are considering today is precisely such an account. It is part of the system for democratic control that the Riksdag has previously decided upon.
Mr. Speaker! It is important to remember that the legislation on signal intelligence has emerged over a long period and through broad political agreements. The regulatory framework has also developed successively to strengthen privacy protection. We therefore have a system that gives our authorities the opportunity to obtain necessary intelligence information and which at the same time sets clear limits on how the activity may be conducted. It is, fundamentally, a good balance.
On the one hand, we need effective intelligence work in an increasingly insecure world. On the other hand, we must safeguard personal privacy and the civil liberties that are fundamental to our democracy. In today's security situation, it is important that we do not pit these two values against each other – on the contrary, both are necessary. A society that cannot protect itself against external threats risks having its freedoms eroded, but a society that does not safeguard its civil liberties risks losing that which we ultimately want to defend. That is why the control systems surrounding signals intelligence are so important. They ensure that the operations are conducted within the framework of the law and that privacy protection is upheld.
The Committee on Defence notes in its report that the government's account meets the requirements that the Riksdag has previously set. The Committee therefore proposes that the Riksdag add the communication to the records. It is an entirely reasonable position.
Sweden needs a strong defense intelligence operation. It shall be conducted under democratic control and with respect for individual privacy.
With this, Mr. Speaker, I would like to vote in favor of the committee's proposal.
Markus Selin (S)
Mr. Speaker! The security situation in our global environment has changed rapidly and fundamentally. We see an increasingly aggressive Russia, an increasing number of cyberattacks and information influence directed towards our open society. At the same time, technological developments mean that threats can be directed at us long before a military attack is even relevant.
In that reality, knowledge of the world around us is one of the most important security policy resources a country can have. That is why defense intelligence activities, and not least signals intelligence, play such a central role for Sweden's security. Signals intelligence provides both the government as well as the Armed Forces and other authorities with the information required to understand threats, make decisions, and protect us in Sweden.
In a democracy, it is not enough for the operation to be efficient, it must also be legitimate. Signal intelligence can involve an intrusion into personal privacy. Therefore, it is crucial that the operation is clearly regulated, as in Sweden, and that there are strong control mechanisms.
In the communication addressed in this report, the government presents the follow-up of signals intelligence during the entire year 2024. It shows that the supervisory authority Siun, i.e., the State Inspectorate for Defence Intelligence Activities, conducted about thirty audits and that no improper measures were identified. It is a good and fundamental finding. It shows that the control systems that the Riksdag – we – have built up are functioning.
Sweden today has a system where signals intelligence is combined with judicial review, independent oversight, and political accountability. It is a model that safeguards both security and personal privacy. At the same time, technical and security policy changes are moving very fast. Intelligence activities today are not only about traditional military intelligence gathering but also about cyberattacks, influence campaigns, information influence, and advanced technical systems where signals intelligence, data analysis, and artificial intelligence are increasingly interwoven.
It is in this context that the Social Democrats' reservation in the committee report should be understood. It is not about criticizing the activities that Sweden carries out today, Mr. Speaker. We want to emphasize that it is about ensuring that Sweden also has world-leading signals intelligence tomorrow. Intelligence capability is not built up in a crisis; instead, it is built up over time through research, competence, and strong institutions. This responsibility ultimately rests with the state and with us here in the Riksdag.
We mean that Sweden should not only have a functioning signals intelligence operation but also ensure that it remains at the forefront even in the future. Reliable intelligence about the world is crucial for Sweden to be able to conduct an independent foreign and security policy. Therefore, we Social Democrats believe that the government should take clearer initiatives to maintain and develop Swedish competence and capability within the signals intelligence field. This is about more than just budget basis and budget items. This is about strategic capability.
Firstly, it is about competence. Sweden must be able to educate and retain some of Europe's leading experts in cryptology, cybersecurity, and data analysis.
Secondly, it is about technological development. Technological development is rapidly changing how information can be gathered and analyzed, and Sweden must also be at the forefront here.
For the third point, it is about organization and responsibility. We believe that an inventory should be made of how the work is currently organized and what the responsibility for security, development, and robustness looks like within the signals intelligence area.
This is fundamentally a question of the state's long-term capacity and capabilities. Sweden is a small country, but we have historically been strong in advanced technology, research, and intelligence analysis. Sweden is an engineering nation. We must build upon that tradition.
For me as a Social Democrat, this is also a question of a responsible security policy. The state must have the ability to understand threats to the country and analyze them, and also have institutions that are capable of doing this even when the security situation deteriorates.
Our task here in the Riksdag is to safeguard both security and privacy. Therefore, a strong defense intelligence capability, clear laws, effective oversight, and a long-term strategy for Swedish expertise in signals intelligence and signal processing were needed.
I therefore stand behind the reservation to safeguard and develop Swedish signals intelligence activities. It is ultimately about Sweden's security, independence, and democracy.
The deliberation was hereby concluded.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.