National security strategy
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
I welcome that the government has established the national security council 1. I believe that Russia constitutes the most serious threat until 2030 and that Sweden must strengthen the ability to meet hybrid threats, cyberattacks, and influence on critical infrastructure 1. I emphasize the importance of total defense, Nato membership, and securing the food supply 1. SD welcomes that the government establishes the most serious security situation since World War II 2. SD believes that climate change is not an existential threat 2. SD believes that national security is a matter for the entire population 2. SD argues that everyone can contribute to the country's defense by voluntarily contributing to Ukraine's resilience or joining a voluntary defense organization 2.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Stefan Olsson (M)
Madam Speaker! Since the previous national security strategy was adopted in 2017, the situation in our global environment has changed dramatically. We have a full-scale war of aggression on our continent and thus in our own immediate vicinity. Rarely has the world been so divided between democracies that uphold the rules-based world order on one hand and autocracies that challenge it on the other.
Therefore, it is absolutely central that we work in a systematic and strategic way to strengthen our security and resilience, and it is very welcome that the government since the election has established the National Security Council, which is led by the National Security Advisor.
Madam Speaker! In the national security strategy, three focus areas are mentioned: a secure Sweden, a safe, open and cohesive Sweden, and a resilient and competitive Sweden. The strategy describes Sweden's conditions for the work on national security and provides an overall description of the current security situation. The strategy further describes the priorities and guiding principles that form the basis for the continued work. Furthermore, the government's goals and direction for the work within the three focus areas are presented.
In the government's white paper, it is described how the Swedish choices for security and freedom are shaped by two obvious threats: war and crime. The threats to Swedish security from the outside world and from within Sweden are so closely intertwined that the threat picture must be seen as a whole. Therefore, Sweden needs to strengthen its ability to prevent and meet various threats and risks at a high pace. The strengthening of national security in the current situation shall be attributed great importance when trade-offs are made between different societal interests. Of particular importance are the buildup of the total defense, Sweden's integration into Nato, and the fight against organized crime that threatens the system. The national security strategy is written for a time horizon that extends to 2030.
The document states that Russia constitutes the most serious threat to our national security during the period up to 2030. An armed attack against Sweden or our allies cannot be ruled out. The security policy situation for Sweden has been fundamentally reshaped by the Russian attack against Ukraine, which Russia conducts with direct or indirect support from Belarus, Iran, China, and North Korea.
Our economic security can be further threatened through attempts by foreign powers to gain access to protected information, Swedish defense technology and knowledge, as well as control over society-critical activities and infrastructure, for example transport and digital infrastructure, through legal or illegal means. Sweden is also vulnerable to unilateral dependencies when it comes to the supply of, for example, important components, medicines and certain raw materials.
Madam President! Sweden's foreign and security policy constitutes the first instrument for strengthening our cooperation, preventing conflicts, and meeting external threats to our security. A strong total defense is a fundamental prerequisite for protecting and maintaining Sweden's security. An effective security policy presupposes that a number of instruments can be coordinated, including diplomacy, strategic communication, aid, economic, legal and military instruments, as well as that society is resilient.
Sweden's membership in the defense alliance Nato, with its binding mutual defense commitments, represents a paradigm shift in Swedish security and defense policy and for all parts of the Swedish total defense. EU cooperation constitutes Sweden's most important foreign policy arena and a community of values, while at the same time the EU is a significant security policy actor to safeguard peace and freedom in Europe.
In the national security strategy, total defense is described as the activity required in peacetime to prepare Sweden for war, while total defense during high alert encompasses all societal preparedness that shall be conducted at that time. The upgrading of total defense is a complex task that involves a great effort for the entire Swedish society and which brings into focus trade-offs in relation to other societal interests. The difficult global situation means, however, that activities of importance for total defense shall be accorded great significance when such trade-offs are made.
Madam President! Sweden is increasingly being subjected to threats and attacks from state actors. This occurs with both civil and military means through, for example, cyberattacks, influence operations, disinformation, attempts to influence critical flows and critical infrastructure, strategic investments, infiltration of, for example, educational institutions, as well as theft of technology and innovation. The Government intends to strengthen the ability to identify, manage, and counter hybrid threats and attacks.
One can say that we are, in many ways, in a gray zone between peace, war, and conflict. Both companies and public actors are exposed to hybrid threats from state actors, for example cyberattacks, and we see large state-supported influence and disinformation campaigns aimed at Sweden. The LVU campaign is an example of this.
Even important infrastructure such as cables and wires on the seabed has been destroyed several times – something that is relevant right now. Therefore, it is so important that we build up a resilience and also do not show ourselves weak or susceptible to pressures of that kind. The entire society must be prepared and united to meet these difficult challenges. This strategy will therefore be important for authorities and other important actors to have a direction to work towards within each area that it covers.
An important dimension in the new national security strategy is to secure the food supply. It is about ensuring, on one hand, that Swedish agriculture is competitive and thereby also increase Swedish self-sufficiency, and on the other hand, that we have food storage and preparedness.
Another important point that the committee emphasizes is that the Swedish defense industry is central to our resilience and defense capability. Even though Sweden is a small country in an international context to the population, we still have our own defense industry.
Another thing that we also note in the committee's position is that environmental permits and other interests often stand against the defense's possibility for training activities. This concerns, for example, shooting exercises and flight exercises. Here, adjustments are needed so that both the defense and the environment can coexist.
In conclusion, I would like to vote in favor of the committee's proposal for a decision.
Yasmine Eriksson (SD)
Madam Speaker! It is with a heavy heart that I stand here just two days after my colleague, as well as the deputy chairman of the Committee on Defence, Lars Wistedt, passed away suddenly during an ongoing working trip to Canada with the Swedish parliamentary delegation. My other colleague who was on site would actually have taken this debate, but for understandable reasons, he abstains from such a heavy day. So, therefore, I stand instead on short notice now before you to deliver the speech he would have given.
Madam Speaker! I begin by moving to approve motion reservation number 11.
The Sweden Democrats welcome that the government has now produced a new national security strategy. The last one was from 2017, and since then, the security policy situation has deteriorated radically. However, it is important to remember that even in 2017, there was a deteriorated security policy situation, and we had experienced Russia behaving increasingly aggressively. The warnings regarding the current serious security situation have, in fact, been many and clear. Therefore, it is now welcome that the government is clear and states that we are in the most serious security policy situation since the Second World War.
Madam President! The warnings have, as said, been many, and Russia has, at least since 2007, that is ten years before the previous national security strategy was presented, been clearly on an aggressive path. In 2007, Putin gave his infamous speech at the security conference in Munich, and in the same year, Russia resumed its patrols with nuclear-armed strategic bombers.
The most serious matter from a Swedish perspective, however, was that Russia withdrew from the CFE Treaty in the same year, that is, the agreement that limited conventional forces in Europe. This agreement ensured that no state could concentrate large forces for surprise offensive operations in Europe, which is precisely what Russia carried out against Ukraine in 2022.
In the same year, the Defence Preparedness Committee submitted its report Security in Cooperation, which stated that the Russian actions towards the countries that previously were part of the Soviet Union will be a litmus test for which path Russia chooses moving forward.
In August the following year, Russia then attacked Georgia, and the lacquer test that the Defense Preparation wrote about clearly showed its result. In 2013, Russia then carried out its exercise with strategic bombers against Sweden, which likely aimed to practice nuclear attacks against us. In 2014, the current war in Ukraine broke out when Russia occupied Crimea and Russian-backed separatists initiated hostilities in eastern Ukraine. It is the war that in February 2022 came to be greatly expanded when Russia carried out its large-scale invasion of the country.
Madam President! The warnings were there early, and the security policy development has been serious and is now almost to be described as catastrophic. However, previous governments, both conservative and social democratic, have failed to prioritize the armed attack as a dimensioning threat.
When the previous national security strategy was adopted in 2017, the then Prime Minister Löfven wrote the following: "Security issues must now be seen from a significantly broader perspective than before. Security for people in Sweden is not solely about arming oneself to meet military threats and armed attacks - even though this remains as a core task for the state."
Of course, it is the case that there are more security issues than just the armed attack, but to continuously bring up other issues and turn them into security threats hollows out the armed attack as a dimensioning threat.
Madam President! The national security strategy that we are discussing today is significantly clearer, and the armed threat is dimensioning in it. It is also clear that support for Ukraine is prioritized, not only because it is morally right and important to support a democracy that is subjected to armed aggression in violation of international law, but also because it so clearly serves Sweden's interests.
The Sweden Democrats also welcome the writings stating that the support for Ukraine needs to continue as long as it is needed. Sweden needs to be a reliable party over a long period against Russian aggression, and if it is something to be discussed moving forward, it is that the support for Ukraine needs to increase. It is also pleasing that there is great unity on this in Sweden's Riksdag and among the Swedish people.
Madam Speaker! The Government is also clear that the security situation may deteriorate further ahead and that the conflict in Ukraine could spread. This is an important message, because we must not be naive regarding the security policy developments. Unfortunately, despite the signs having been present for many years, it has been naivety that has characterized security policy. As we now look forward, it is important that we account for the most likely but also the worst scenarios, and these include that weapons of mass destruction are deployed against Sweden or our allies. The nuclear threat from Russia has unfortunately become increasingly tangible, and the country still has a strong superiority over Nato regarding tactical nuclear weapons.
Madam Speaker! Migrants and threats from migration flows are also something addressed in the strategy, which is welcomed. We have seen how these constitute a threat to our society, especially when they are allowed to arrive in practice unregulated and from cultures that differ greatly from the Swedish one. It has led to great division and a sharp increase in crime and violence in our society, and it is very welcome that the government now addresses this issue so that we never again end up in a situation like that during the migrant crisis in 2015.
However, no scenarios or priorities are met effectively without authorities and those responsible having the ability to act and take initiative even when deficient decision-making bases are present. Therefore, it is pleasing that the government is now highlighting that the ability to act and make decisions under uncertainty needs to exist, just as it is urgent to increase the capacity in several areas and that processes or regulatory frameworks must not constitute obstacles for the work to be able to proceed with efficiency and pragmatism.
Madam Speaker! I can only regret that the government has unfortunately chosen to write the following: "In the longer term, climate change constitutes an existential threat to humanity." This is a very far-reaching phrasing, and no similar phrasing is found in the Defense Preparedness Committee's reports. There, climate change is also highlighted as a threat, but not as an existential one.
It is factually incorrect to so definitively state that climate change is an existential threat to humanity. It can also have serious consequences for how we prioritize the armed threat we face today.
Environmental regulations have in many cases constituted and continue to constitute an obstacle to military activity. This can involve environmental requirements linked to training and shooting ranges and to the establishment of wind farms. If one writes in that it is an existential threat, there is a risk that the armed threat is not as prioritized. Prioritization of environmental consequences can have direct negative consequences not only for Sweden's security but also for our ability to support Ukraine. For example, weapons from all over Europe that are to be sent to Ukraine are tested in Sweden, and environmental requirements may come to constitute obstacles for this testing activity.
Madam President! Finally, I want to agree with the strategy's writings that Sweden's national security is a matter for the entire population. No other issue can be more urgent than securing the country's continued existence in the worst security policy situation since the last world war. Each one of us needs to consider what exactly we can do to strengthen our security. It can be anything from voluntarily contributing to Ukraine's resilience to joining a voluntary defense organization and contributing to the country's defense. Regardless, everyone listening can make an important contribution to the country's defense.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.