Strengthened system for coordination numbers
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
S wants to strengthen the population registration to counter crime in the labor market and proposes that Skatteverket takes over identity checks 1. V wants asylum seekers to receive coordination numbers to facilitate their lives 2, but argues that biometric data needs privacy protection 2. SD argues that the system has flaws that lead to welfare crime and wants biometric data to be shared between authorities 3 4. C wants biometric data to be able to be stored to counter multiple identities 5 and motions for a three-year renewal 6. M argues that lack of control constitutes a security threat and wants to use biometric data to combat crime 7. MP argues that increased reporting obligations risk making people afraid to seek care 8. KD supports Skatteverket performing identity checks with fingerprints and facial images 9. L considers double identities to be unacceptable 10.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Sofie Eriksson (S)
Mr. Speaker! We should have some oversight of which people are located in Sweden and who are in our systems? Our population registration must simply work. It is not about control for control's sake, but about securing safety and trust that our registers are correct and up to date.
We Social Democrats have implemented a change of course in the work of regulating the population registration. This took its starting point in the reintroduction of the population registration offense in 2018.
Since then, several important steps have been taken to create order and clarity in the system regarding both population registration and coordination numbers, including through legislative tightenings that entered into force last year. Now, for example, coordination numbers can be declared dormant, which meant that Skatteverket was able to clear away more than 600,000 old coordination numbers at the turn of the year.
Today we are debating the Committee on Taxation's report 4 Strengthened system for coordination numbers, which is another step, after several previous ones taken, onto this new course.
Mr. Speaker! Why is this important? A problem that I particularly want to highlight is the labor crime that has spread in our country. In sectors such as construction, cleaning, restaurants, and welfare services, we have seen how people have been grossly exploited and even held under slave-like conditions. Many have testified to this – trade unions, employer organizations, and journalists.
It is low wages and dangerous working environments, which affects already vulnerable people. It also destroys the basis for healthy competition in the labor market as a whole. The decent companies are being competed out. The same happens to all workers who rightly demand wages and conditions in accordance with collective agreements. I mean: How can one compete with wages of 20 kronor per hour? Examples of such wages have been found within the construction industry in Grängesberg, where I live. How can one demand safe scaffolding, reasonable schedules, work boots, and breaks when there is labor that is forced to work without all of this? No, Swedish wages and conditions shall, of course, apply to everyone in the Swedish labor market! We take this most seriously.
Strengthened system for coordination numbers
Combating crime in the labor market naturally requires measures in several areas. But population registration and coordination numbers are part of it.
The purpose of coordination numbers is that they should function as alternatives to personal identity numbers for persons who are not or have not been registered in the population register in Sweden. They are needed, for example, when one needs to be in contact with authorities. A coordination number does not in itself grant the right to work permits, benefits, or other things, but unfortunately, over time, the coordination numbers have become a door-opener for criminal and unscrupulous forces in our society. It can involve criminals starting home care companies and construction companies, and the coordination numbers are used as part of misleading or abusing the system.
Mr. Speaker! The matter we are debating today significantly tightens the legislation and gives the authorities more powers. What does this proposal mean then?
Firstly, the system of coordination numbers shall be regulated in a separate law, and the Swedish Tax Agency shall take over the responsibility for the identity checks.
Secondly, the coordination numbers shall be able to be assigned at three different levels depending on which identity check has been performed before the assignment. The most secure number is assigned to the person who has verified their identity at an identity check with physical presence.
Thirdly, the Swedish Tax Agency shall also be able to check biometric data such as fingerprints or a facial image in an identity document during the identity check itself.
For the fourth, all authorities shall notify the Swedish Tax Agency if they suspect errors in the population registration regarding persons with coordination numbers.
These changes give the coordination numbers higher status and increase their usability in society. The basis is actually that the coordination numbers should be an asset, both for authorities and for the people who need them and receive them. Then we must have a proper system that makes these numbers reliable.
Mr. Speaker! Everyone must be able to trust our systems. Order and regularity are important to counter crime but also to promote trust, security, and development in society. We shall, of course, not have slave-like conditions on our labor market.
Ilona Szatmári Waldau (V)
Mr. Speaker! The bill we are now to debate contains proposals aimed at strengthening the system of coordination numbers. Vänsterpartiet has submitted a motion with four different demands.
The first point concerns the government's proposal that the automated processing of personal data shall take place in the population register database. Facial images, fingerprints, and the biometric data derived from these shall therefore also be processed in the population register database. Once the check has been completed, the data shall be destroyed immediately.
The Government therefore makes the assessment that fingerprints, facial images, and the biometric data that have been obtained in connection with the identity check do not entail any need for changes in the public access and secrecy legislation. But this assessment, that secrecy protection for biometric data is not needed, meets criticism from several of the referral bodies.
Among other things, the Court of Appeal in Stockholm considers that a protection of confidentiality for biometric data should be considered. According to the Court of Appeal, it cannot be ruled out that biometric data are not always destroyed immediately after a completed check, for example due to oversight. In such cases, the data will appear in public records without confidentiality applying to them. Such an arrangement risks leading to the individual suffering if the document containing the data is requested.
Vänsterpartiet shares the referral bodies' criticism regarding the need for confidentiality protection when handling biometric data and therefore proposes, together with Centerpartiet and Miljöpartiet, in a reservation that the government shall return with proposals on confidentiality protection for biometric data.
Mr. Speaker! The Government makes the assessment that coordination numbers should not be assigned to all asylum seekers in connection with the asylum application - this despite it being the commission's proposal. The commission proposes that asylum seekers shall be assigned coordination numbers upon request from Migrationsverket. The commission also proposes that coordination numbers shall be assigned to asylum seekers upon request from Migrationsverket even if the need for coordination numbers does not exist in Migrationsverket's operations.
Almost all referral bodies support the commission's proposal. Giving asylum seekers coordination numbers facilitates their life in society - in contact with authorities, healthcare providers, and many employers. The Swedish Migration Agency seems to be almost the only referral body that is critical of the proposal. The Agency believes that the benefit of the proposal will be limited and that coordination numbers instead may give a misleading picture of the person's connection to Sweden. But explaining the significance of and the limitations of coordination numbers for the person who is granted one should be seen as a self-evident part of the granting itself. It is therefore very strange that the majority of the Riksdag will follow a single referral body's line in this case instead of the commission's proposal. Giving asylum seekers coordination numbers would facilitate both for the asylum seekers and for the actors who have contact with them. Therefore, we stand behind the commission's proposal on who should be able to receive coordination numbers.
Mr. Speaker! The investigation proposes that secrecy should apply in cases concerning the allocation of coordination numbers to the persons covered by the Act on the Reception of Asylum Seekers with Families, but the committee and the government make the assessment that there is no need to introduce strengthened secrecy in cases concerning the allocation of coordination numbers. The government argues that, since they are not following the investigation's line, there is no need to strengthen the secrecy. But since the Left Party advocates for – and motions for approval of – the investigation's line regarding coordination numbers for asylum seekers, we naturally also argue that a strong secrecy is needed.
Mr. Speaker! Our fourth motion concerns the reporting obligation regarding persons with coordination numbers. Here, the committee, as does the government, proposes that an obligation should be introduced for all authorities to notify the Swedish Tax Agency if it can be assumed that an entry in the population register database, regarding a person with a coordination number, is incorrect or incomplete. It is fundamentally a proposal that the Left Party does not object to, but it is also included in the proposal that the authority does not need to provide any notification if specific reasons speak against it.
The referral bodies have several views on the proposal. They request, among other things, clarifications on what specific reasons may be. And several referral bodies, including Region Stockholm, Sveriges Kommuner och Regioner, and Riksföreningen Sveriges Stadsmissioner, highlight the risk that the expanded reporting obligation complicates individuals' contacts with health and medical care because it can affect people's willingness to seek care.
The proposal also means that more responsibility is placed on individual case officers at agencies, who have varying competence regarding identity information. There is a risk that trust in agencies will decrease and that it will create a clear conflict of interest between agencies and individuals. Therefore, Vänsterpartiet, in line with most referral bodies, argues that the exemption provision should be specified in such a way that it is clarified that contact with health and medical care shall be included in the exemptions from the reporting obligation.
We think that the proposal is good in large parts, but just when it comes to asylum seekers, many of the proposals seem to lie more in line with both the previous government's and this government's strive to reduce the reception of refugees and to make it more difficult for asylum seekers. That has been baked into this matter.
I support all of the Left Party's motions but choose to move for approval only to reservation 2, which therefore concerns the allocation of coordination numbers.
David Lång (SD)
Mr. Speaker! This bill represents a step in the right direction towards addressing the chaos that has arisen with coordination numbers. It has gone so far that a market has emerged where people are paid to arrange coordination numbers for others.
The investigation into organized and systematic economic crime against the welfare system has, in its report, conducted a mapping of the crime directed at several paying actors. The report states, among other things, that several authorities have noticed that false information is submitted for the purpose of obtaining coordination numbers which in turn can lead to payments from the welfare systems. This can, for example, occur in the form of wage guarantees. It occurs that payments are made to employees who perhaps do not exist at all or whose identities have been hijacked.
It also occurs that false identity documents are used to create false identities. That, in combination with the fact that it has emerged that there are major knowledge gaps regarding the difference between a coordination number with verified information and one based on unverified information, also entails a risk that the actors who use these numbers as a basis for decisions do not check necessary information. If a person receives an unverified coordination number to, for example, be registered in the taxation database, there is a risk that it is used to apply for welfare benefits without the identity or identity information being verified.
Several authorities have stated that a coordination number is often used without further verification of whether it is based on confirmed or unconfirmed information. It can be difficult for the actors who are to use a coordination number to understand the difference between a person's identity being considered established and a person's identity not being considered established, and what consequences that can have in different contexts.
That a large part of the coordination numbers have been assigned without the person's identity being considered established, and that the users do not always know the difference, also affects the confidence in the entire system. There are indications that many have the incorrect impression that Skatteverket, by assigning a coordination number, has guaranteed that the information linked to the person is correct and that no further checks are needed. This applies to identity details, information on address, as well as permission to stay and reside in the country. That there are coordination numbers does not guarantee that any of these details are correct.
Failures in the identity check during the assignment of coordination numbers have resulted in incorrect identities being created and entered into the population register database. These incorrect identities can then be used for the purpose of obtaining incorrect payments from the welfare systems - I previously mentioned the wage guarantee, where it occurs that payments are made to fictitious employees who may not exist at all.
False identities can also be used for the purpose of concealing who the actual representative of a company is. Lack of identity control can also lead to one and the same person obtaining several coordination numbers. This can lead to a person gaining access to multiple welfare benefits - double, triple, or perhaps even more.
Mr. Speaker! We have had the system of coordination numbers for just over 20 years, alongside the regular system with personal identity numbers. An enormous number of individuals have come to Sweden during this time and been assigned coordination numbers for the purpose that they should be able to function in society, which has led to serious consequences for our control over who stays in our country.
When it turns out that the system of coordination numbers carries major flaws and that the system has been abused on a large scale, the matter becomes even more urgent. It is about welfare crime and fraud against the welfare system, and circumstances have also emerged that suggest that the identity behind an assigned coordination number is fabricated or that the same person has been assigned several coordination numbers which then form the basis for different identities.
The problems with multiple identities are significant, which the Swedish Tax Agency has also noted for a long time. The Swedish Tax Agency has stated in a report that as many as 30-50 percent of asylum seekers have multiple identities. This was stated by the Swedish Tax Agency's coordinator against ID-related crime, among other places, in a news segment. As an example, it is mentioned that a person with three identities can start a company with one identity and thus be granted support for starting a business, while simultaneously being unemployed in another identity and taking out loans in a third identity.
It has already emerged previously that the perpetrator behind the terrorist attack on Drottninggatan in 2017, Rakhmat Akilov, has used at least two different identities in Sweden. When he applied for a residence permit, he did so, for example, under another name. At the same time, one of his identities has been used by at least one additional person who used the identity Rakhmat Akilov with the associated coordination number when he took a job.
Mr. Speaker! The Tidö Agreement places requirements on the government, with the support of the Sweden Democrats, among other things, that work shall be carried out to prepare a large-scale national census. It also states that coordination numbers that are not confirmed in a reassuring way by the holder shall be revoked in the long term. Cross-authority assignments shall be given in the work to prepare the practical implementation of such a census. In connection with the census, consideration shall be given to revoking and terminating coordination numbers that are not confirmed in a reassuring way by the holder.
The proposition we are discussing in the committee report involves, among other things, that the responsibility for identity checks when issuing coordination numbers is placed with an authority, the Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket). It is proposed that the person who has a passport, identity card, or a corresponding document shall, upon request, hand over the document for inspection. The authority performing the identity check shall be given the opportunity to check biometric data stored in the documents to be handed over for inspection. The person subject to the identity check shall be obliged, upon request, to allow the authority to take fingerprints and a facial image. Furthermore, an obligation is introduced for all authorities to notify the Swedish Tax Agency of suspected errors in the population registration database regarding persons with coordination numbers. Finally, coordination numbers shall not be assigned to all asylum seekers in connection with the asylum application.
This is, as I began with, a step in the right direction. I therefore move for approval of the committee's proposal for a decision.
Helena Vilhelmsson (C)
Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Member David Lång, for the speech!
This is a question that we have discussed a number of times just during the last parliamentary term when both David Lång and I have been members of the Committee on Taxation. One thing that has been discussed in connection with both population registration and coordination numbers is the question of biometric data and also the storage thereof.
Here we have, frankly, made a shift, and in our reservations and accompanying motions to the bill, we write that we think it is important with confidentiality protection and also to actually be able to store biometric data precisely to address the problem of multiple identities as David Lång so creditably describes.
Looking back at the debates that have taken place, we see that the Sweden Democrats as recently as June were in favor of being able to store biometric data. My question is quite simply why you are not now. Is there any other reason why you do not actively write, in connection with this bill, that there should be an opportunity to store biometric data?
David Lång (SD)
Mr. Speaker! It is not we who have written the bill; we are not part of this government and were not part of the previous one either.
When it comes to the storage of biometric data, I think that the Center Party is opening a bit of a door. It appears from the bill that the government believes there are reasons to return to the issue, which is exactly what is stated in the Center Party's reservation – that the government should consider the issue and return to it.
Centerpartiets reservation is therefore actually the same as what is stated in the bill, so I would say that it is to leave a door open.
Helena Vilhelmsson (C)
Mr. Speaker! The member may name my question in the way he wishes, but I still interpret the answer as that the Sweden Democrats, together with the government, are prepared to actively return to this. Multiple identities are truly a problem that must be addressed, as both the Swedish Tax Agency, authorities, and the member himself have stated, and that storing biometric data is therefore of the utmost importance.
I then understand it as that the government, with the help of the Sweden Democrats, will return to this.
David Lång (SD)
Mr. Speaker! I can at least guarantee that I completely share Member Helena Vilhelmsson's view. Of course, multiple identities are one of the absolute biggest problems in this context. I very much welcome that biometric data is stored and can be shared between authorities, and I am pushing for the government to return with further legislative proposals to address the problems, just as we have taken a position previously in most committee proceedings regarding these matters.
Helena Vilhelmsson (C)
Mr. Speaker! Today we debate and make decisions on the question of how we strengthen the population registration in our country via what is called the coordination number. Much is based on an investigation that was commissioned in 2019 and which submitted its report in 2021. Since then, the question has been raised on several occasions in this chamber.
A coordination number is, as we have heard, an identity designation for persons who are not or have not been registered in the population register in Sweden. The purpose of the coordination number is that authorities and other societal functions should be able to identify persons even if they are not registered in the population register in Sweden. If a person who has been given a coordination number is later registered in the population register, the coordination number is replaced by a personal identity number.
Like previous and partially remaining deficiencies in the population register, the deficiencies in the handling of coordination numbers have also led to increased crime, for example fraud, cheating with residence rights and other identity-related crimes. It is clear that strengthened control and quality are needed both when it comes to the allocation and handling of coordination numbers as well as when it comes to personal identity numbers in the population register.
With this bill, we are one step further. It concerns a new law for coordination numbers which are assigned in three levels with different degrees of strengthened identity behind them. The Swedish Tax Agency will be responsible for control, and personal appearance to be assigned a coordination number applies in most cases. The person to be assigned a coordination number shall submit identity documents and provide biometric data in cases where such data exists from before. Likewise, the reporting obligation to the Swedish Tax Agency is strengthened when errors are detected in the population registration database, where information on coordination numbers is also registered.
Mr. Speaker! Is this enough? No, not quite. In recent years, we have seen an increase in crime linked to missing information in the population register and coordination numbers, despite improvements. It could involve money laundering, black market work, tax crimes, fraud, cheating on residence rights, and other identity-related crimes. We can probably conclude that the institution of Sweden has been somewhat poorly equipped for what we call welfare crimes.
The question of confidentiality when checking biometric data of an individual is addressed in the bill. The issue is sensitive. While it concerns the sharpest form of identity control that can reveal if a person has dual identities, it is also a question of privacy.
The Government argues that since this law, which we are about to make a decision on, stipulates that the biometric data shall be destroyed immediately after the check, the question of confidentiality protection is not relevant. The Center Party argues, however, just like several referral bodies, that it cannot be ruled out that biometric data, for example due to oversight, are not always destroyed immediately after the check has been performed. This would in that case mean that biometric data could appear in public records without confidentiality applying to the data. This would risk leading to the individual suffering if the data are disclosed, but the question is also whether this is compatible with the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation regarding integrity and confidentiality.
Mr. Speaker! Another reason to introduce confidentiality protection for the biometric data is that it then becomes possible to save them. A number of referral bodies have noted the need to be able to store and compare biometrics. According to the proposal in the bill, it is possible to link the physical person to an identity document, something that contributes to enhanced control of both the authenticity of documents and that the person invoking a document is the person the document refers to.
But if reference data, that is, biometric data, is not stored, the authorities are left without the possibility to check whether the physical person, for example, appears as registered in the population register or has had a coordination number since before. Such a possibility, if it were to exist, would significantly reduce the risk of incorrect data being registered in the population register database and contribute to preventing multiple identities.
I really look forward to the government returning to the issue. But pending that, we move for approval of reservation 5.
Finally, the Centre Party considers that the time period for when a coordination number should be renewed should be shortened. The renewal procedure for coordination numbers introduced in 2021 means that if an application for renewal has not been received by the end of the fifth calendar year after the year the number was assigned or last renewed, the number shall be declared dormant.
We mean that five years is a long time. Probably most who receive a coordination number need such a number for a limited period. We further mean that a period of three years would mean that the information retains a relevance that can contribute to increasing the reliability in the system and also could contribute to reducing the risk of companies being used as tools for crime. The Government should review this issue and then return to the Riksdag.
Boriana Åberg (M)
Mr. Speaker! Sweden is plagued by serious and system-threatening crime. Shootings, bombings and gang settlements usually receive only a small notice in the media; so common they have become in recent years.
There are parallel societies where clan leaders carry out their own law enforcement and undermine the state's authority. Vulnerable people from poor EU countries are deceived into coming to Sweden. Then they are sent back to their home country after they have received a coordination number, and this number is used to commit various crimes. It involves money laundering, welfare fraud, fake companies, and so on. The lack of control over who stays in the country is one of the causes of crime and also a factor that complicates crime fighting.
The Moderates went to the election with the intention of getting Sweden in order, and in the Tidö Agreement that we entered into with the coalition partners, it stands clearly and distinctly that our authorities shall have control over who stays in Sweden. This shall be achieved by preparing a large-scale national census as well as recalling all coordination numbers that are not confirmed in a reassuring way by the holder.
The Moderates have long championed the issue of order and clarity in the system for coordination numbers. As has already been mentioned, a coordination number is an identity designation for persons who are not or have not been registered in the population register in Sweden. The purpose of coordination numbers is that authorities and other societal functions should be able to identify persons even if they are not registered in the population register in Sweden. To obtain a coordination number, it is currently not required to have either a residence permit or an address in Sweden, and the person applying does not need to visit any of the Swedish Tax Agency's offices. These low requirements have paved the way for various frauds. Therefore, it is urgent to have a new law on coordination numbers and that the Swedish Tax Agency takes over the responsibility for, among other things, identity checks during the allocation of coordination numbers. And it is not a day too soon.
If the Speaker permits, I shall give a brief retrospective.
When the system of coordination numbers was introduced about 20 years ago, it was different times. The international mobility of people was significantly less than today, likewise the improper exploitation of the Swedish welfare system.
It is simply a matter of stating that the laws have not kept pace with developments. Laws and rules for the common good cannot be built on the assumption that everyone is honest - because not everyone is honest.
The Swedish Tax Agency has for several years warned about systematic abuse of coordination numbers.
In the report "An analysis of coordination numbers for taxation purposes," it is stated that the coordination number has received "a different meaning than intended, both unintentionally and deliberately." Furthermore, companies and individuals, but also authorities, have the incorrect impression that by assigning a coordination number, the Swedish Tax Agency has ensured that all information regarding the person is correct and that no further checks are needed from their side.
In the autumn of 2017, the Swedish Tax Agency's legal department stated that they would tighten their routines by, in many cases, also requiring a work permit in order to issue coordination numbers. Despite this, it could be observed that the abuse of coordination numbers had not decreased, but rather increased. The system had created a shadow society in which people are exploited. Billions disappeared, and still disappear, into the pockets of fraudsters and criminals.
The lack of control also constitutes a security threat. A cross-authority national risk assessment from 2019 identified coordination numbers as a risk factor for money laundering and terrorism financing. In the same year, TV4's Kalla fakta showed a report about a single person who, for payment, had helped 1,100 individuals, mainly Uzbeks, obtain coordination numbers in what was called an "ID factory" in the report. Ironically, one of these individuals had obtained a job as a cleaner for the border police at Arlanda. It is a workplace where security screening is required. Fortunately, it is not the security industry that has been most exposed, but rather the construction industry. There, coordination numbers have, among other things, been exploited to start shell companies and fake invoicing companies.
Mr. Speaker! Last year, the Riksdag made a number of announcements to Magdalena Andersson's government regarding coordination numbers. Three of these are considered addressed in the report we are debating today, including the announcement on the use of biometric data upon moving to Sweden and upon the allocation of coordination numbers.
The use of biometric data is fundamental to stopping the exploitation of multiple identities and the use of identity documents belonging to another person. This is an issue that the Moderaterna have championed for a long time. It is about combating crime and addressing the leaking sieve that Swedish welfare has developed into. That people behave correctly and that the systems function and are just are two basic parts of a welfare state.
Marielle Lahti (MP)
Mr. Speaker! It is the first time in this speaker's chair for me.
A number of speakers before me have described the advantages of the proposal contained in the bill. I also think that there are very many advantages with this proposal. Of course, there should be better order regarding the coordination numbers - we should know which ones exist in our country and what they are.
Even though I obviously stand behind all our reservations, I move for approval of only reservation 4.
I intend to raise a question that has not been mentioned as much from the rostrum so far, namely the one regarding the duty of intelligence for all authorities. Why do I reserve myself on this question? Well, as many have hinted – or said straight out – there is a shadow society where very many individuals suffer, and the duty of intelligence as it is currently formulated risks to worsen the situation for precisely those we say we want to protect. It is about persons who risk suffering in the shadow society. They risk being subjected to crime, being harmed, and being subjected to abuse.
We are afraid that these individuals will not dare to seek care if the proposal passes in its current form. It has also been pointed out by referral bodies that the risk is that the expanded reporting obligation complicates individuals' contacts with health and medical care. Therefore, it needs to be specified that contact with health and medical care shall be exempt from the reporting obligation. Otherwise, we risk making it more difficult for those we say we want to protect.
Cecilia Engström (KD)
Mr. Speaker! The Christian Democrats support what is proposed in the Committee on Taxation's report on a new law for coordination numbers.
Coordination numbers have existed since the year 2000. Persons who cannot be registered in the population register in Sweden are instead given a coordination number. This in itself entails no rights or obligations but facilitates the identification that may be needed in society today.
Unfortunately, the trust in the system that we would need has not existed, and it has also not functioned as intended for those who have been assigned a number. The Christian Democrats have for several years fought to have these deficiencies addressed, and an investigation was commissioned which has now shown which systems could be addressed moving forward.
Mr. Speaker! This bill contains many good proposals and goes clearly in the right direction. Skatteverket is given the responsibility – it is they who shall perform identity checks – and there is personal appearance. One is also allowed to check fingerprints and facial images. That it becomes an obligation to appear physically at a tax office also means that trust in the system increases.
Even though people must provide biometric data, it is not intended according to the proposal that these should be saved. The numbers will be linked to the data when they are issued, but the data is not saved for future checks. We consider this to be a deficiency, and we hope to be able to return to this in the future. There is, after all, a risk that a person can have multiple identities, and that is something we would like to return to.
Mr. Speaker! According to the proposal, coordination numbers shall be able to be assigned at three different levels depending on which identity check has been performed at the time of assignment. It is important that the person receiving the coordination number receives clear information about which assessment was made when the number was assigned. Whether the identity that has been established is probable or improbable can be good for the receiving party to know.
We also think it is very good that all authorities are obliged to report to Skatteverket when they discover inaccuracies in the population register or with coordination numbers so that errors can be corrected and accessibility can be improved in the future.
Mr. Speaker! We Christian Democrats want even more, as said. A coordination number can be obtained for various reasons, and today there are no different durations for the coordination numbers. We think it would have been good if the number could be assigned based on the need the person has. When it comes to what duration you need on your coordination number, there is a difference between buying a car and buying a summer house, which will remain.
According to today's proposal, coordination numbers shall be declared dormant after five years, which many have raised. We think it is a bit too long a time, and therefore we want that in the future it is reviewed what can be done to improve this.
Mr. Speaker! We Christian Democrats stand behind the Committee on Taxation's proposal, and we look forward to more measures that can come from the new government ahead.
Cecilia Rönn (L)
Mr. Speaker! It is very good that there is now a government bill on the table for us to make a decision on, in which the system of coordination numbers is strengthened. The provisions will be regulated in a new law, and the Swedish Tax Agency will take responsibility for the allocation of coordination numbers.
Strengthened system for coordination numbers
Mr. Speaker! There have been several problems with coordination numbers that we will now be able to rectify. In January 2022, the Swedish Tax Agency, as several have said here, took the unique decision to lapse over 600,000 coordination numbers that should not have been active. 16,000 of them were considered to be duplicates, which enables a person to appear with separate identities before the authorities. It is completely unacceptable.
At the same time as today's system has shown itself to be unsustainable, the waiting times are also unacceptably long for people who are actually in need of a coordination number. Therefore, it is very good that this is finally being implemented now. The state needs to ensure who is staying in Sweden to ensure that the authorities can carry out their obligations.
As liberals, we want the state to take its responsibility and secure its commitments towards the individuals in society based on the rights the state grants. For the state to be able to uphold its part of the social contract, it needs to know who is staying in Sweden.
The opportunities to cheat with coordination numbers have also fueled organized crime, where advanced schemes involving double identities and false population registration have become an increasingly important source of income and erode the state's finances and our welfare system. We believe that the state should do everything it can to combat fraud and errors in the welfare system. Tax money should end up in the right places and go to those who need it. The fraud both erodes trust in the state and feeds the criminal gangs. For every tax krona that disappears in incorrect payments, a krona is taken from healthcare, school, and care. So we cannot have that.
Mr. Speaker! That is why it is now very important that those who need a coordination number should be able to obtain it in the best way. For those who want to exploit the system, we are now closing a door, and I am very happy about that. Therefore, I stand behind the committee's proposal for a decision.
The deliberation was hereby concluded.
(Decisions were made under § 13.)
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.