Response to interpellation 2022/23:226 on the regiment in Kiruna

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Peter Hultqvist has asked me if I intend to take any measures to restore I 22 in Kiruna.

Initially, I would like to state that Kiruna already today, and also in the future, will have an important role in rebuilding and further developing Sweden's defense capability.

On 12 December 2022, I decided on the instructions for the Defence Committee's work. The Defence Committee's work shall take place in two stages.

In the second stage, the Defence Preparation Committee shall, based on the work in the first part, submit proposals for the continued direction and design of the total defense up to and including 2030 and, in this context, also address the period up to and including 2035. The direction established in the 2020 defense decision shall form the basis for the proposals. The second stage shall be presented in a final report no later than April 26, 2024.

Questions regarding the Armed Forces' future basic organization can, if the Defence Preparation Board so wishes, also be raised in this context.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister, for the answer! We are now living in a security environment that is extremely strained. The war in Ukraine naturally leaves its mark on the situation across our entire continent and also in the rest of the world. But it is also the case that the Arctic is a region that has a rather substantial underlying state of tension.

Dmitrij Rogozin was visiting Svalbard in the spring of 2015. He is a Russian politician, and he was interviewed on the Russian channel TV1. He said then: Last year we had the historical reunification between Sevastopol and the Crimean Peninsula.

It was, therefore, his comment in connection with the annexation and invasion of Crimea. He also said: This year we present a new view on a powerful prioritization of the Arctic. Fundamentally, it is about the same thing.

It is a quite controversial and direction-setting statement. This Rogozin was on the EU's list of sanctions. The visit to Svalbard was controversial to say the least. It was not something that Norway welcomed.

The Arctic is, of course, affected by the war ongoing in Ukraine but also by a potential future new cold war. It must be remembered that Russia has placed most of its strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by submarines in this area. The purpose is that they can be hidden under the ice and used as an operational environment.

Climate change exposes natural resources such as oil, and the Arctic is currently covered by eight Arctic states: Denmark including Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA. One must remember that 45 percent of the Arctic area is Russian territory. Much has also been invested in this area from the Russian side. Approximately fifty outposts from the Soviet era have been renovated. Extensive investments have been made, even though resources have now been diverted to Ukraine.

This is, therefore, an environment where many of the Russian interests in the Kola Peninsula meet northern Finland, northern Sweden, and northern Norway. It is an area that, from a Russian point of view, is hot and where they want clear knowledge of which military resources exist and what is moving in the area.

This is, therefore, the strategic background as to why we believe that reinforcements should be made in Kiruna. Kiruna is a municipality and an area in Norrbotten that is a gateway via Narvik when it comes to the host nation support. It will require preparation stations and potential forward storage. The Malmbanan is of central importance. The mining activity is a Swedish national asset.

This has been noted previously by the fact that Sweden, Finland, and Norway have a cooperation agreement regarding Nordkalotten. We shall take an increased responsibility for this jointly, and we have done this in many different ways, including with exercise activities. But it also requires planning. It is from that perspective, which I will return to later, that more support points were needed in the area. 22 in Kiruna is one such that would need to be re-established from the regimental group it is today, so that we can achieve a stronger and larger military representation in this strategic area.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I think Peter Hultqvist describes the strategic trend we have seen over time very well, namely that Russia is strengthening its military presence in the Arctic region and northern Russia. This can take different forms. We see, for example, that they are investing in runways, restoring airbases, investing in various weapons systems and, of course, also in radar chains. Russia is therefore obviously allocating significant resources to increasing its military presence in the Arctic.

Now we see that Russia, temporarily at least, is weakened due to the war in Ukraine, which ties up many ground combat forces. At the same time, the assessment from our side is that the Arctic in general and the Murmansk region in particular will also continue to be prioritized by Russia. They will invest in reconstructing themselves there, even militarily.

Our response to this must naturally be, on one hand, to strengthen our own national defense capability in northern Sweden, and on the other, to increase international cooperation, primarily with Norway and Finland but also within the framework of a future NATO membership.

In connection with the reinforcement of the presence in the north, this chamber made an important decision on December 15, 2020, namely the total defense decision. This has, for example, meant that we have re-established two regiments in Norrland, partly I 21 in Sollefteå, with a detachment in Östersund, partly K 4 in Arvidsjaur. We have doubled the number when it comes to the Army's hunter battalion or the Norrland hunter battalion. These are important matters that are moving in the right direction.

Alongside this, Peter Hultqvist in his previous capacity commissioned the Swedish Armed Forces to report on how the military presence in the north can be strengthened. There are a number of concrete proposals that the Swedish Armed Forces have presented within that framework, which also concern Kiruna and Kalixfors. I can return to this, but I note that the Swedish Armed Forces' advice is that there should be a detachment and not a regiment in Kiruna, linked to I 22.

Other dimensions in this are, naturally, the need to strengthen international defense cooperation, as said, primarily between Sweden, Finland and Norway. There has previously been a great focus on the air forces through cross-border training and a very extensive cooperation between Rovaniemi, Kallax and Bodö. We also see a strong emerging cooperation when it comes to ground forces, which we welcome.

The question is a high political priority for the government. I personally signed a declaration of intent together with my Norwegian and Finnish colleagues in Oslo on November 22 to deepen defense cooperation in the north. In combination with this, the prime ministers of Sweden and Norway and the president of Finland met together with the foreign ministers and defense ministers at Harpsund a few weeks ago to discuss how we can proceed in deepening the cooperation.

In conclusion, Madam Speaker, Sweden is this year the chair of the Nordic defense cooperation Nordefco, and it falls upon the Swedish chairmanship to develop a new vision for the Nordic defense cooperation, in light of the fact that we will all hopefully soon be allied within the framework of Nato and then have the opportunity to have a common defense planning.

Within this framework, I assess that the developments in the northern parts of Sweden, Finland, and Norway will be at the center.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! I believe that in the future we should expect to see more Russian soldiers, aircraft, and tanks, and overall more military activity from that state, especially in the Arctic region and on the Kola Peninsula.

There are also ambitions regarding the Northeast Passage. In conflict with international maritime law, one wants to control the Northeast Passage, who shall be allowed to use it and how it shall occur. I think this is worth noting, because if international maritime law does not apply, it will result in a system where the countries decide for themselves, which will become a major interference in the freedom of movement.

In the southwest of the North Atlantic, they are trying, as far as possible, in various types of military operations, to challenge the USA. This is also something that should be noted in the assessment of what intentions and maneuver and operation patterns look like. My view is that Russia strives to have a de-regulation zone between Nordkap and the northeastern coast of Greenland, and behind that line, the nuclear submarines shall be kept free from influence. This is seen from the Russian side as a kind of protection need.

There are many dimensions to the maneuvering that is taking place. To this should be added that China, as a non-Arctic state, is increasing its presence in the region. One example is that China has attempted to purchase a decommissioned Danish naval base in Greenland. They have also wanted to open an iron ore mine in Greenland, they have bought up large areas of land in Iceland with unclear purposes, and they conduct research expeditions to and from. All of this affects the interests of Sweden and our closest neighboring countries. It is therefore both Chinese and Russian interests that we see here.

I am aware of the proposal that has been put forward regarding a detachment. That was how the discussion began once upon a time when we were to have a regiment on Gotland, that one should start with a detachment. But we decided politically to build a regiment instead because it requires more military power than a detachment can achieve. I see it in the same way when it comes to Kiruna, against the background of what I said about the important host nation support and the Malmbanan's central importance.

Then we come to Nato, which the Minister for Defence touched upon. Here we must have a common planning that requires extensive logistical coordination, which requires coordination hubs, and which requires a lot of different common management and coordination systems. With that type of investment and commitment, interest in this area from the Russian side increases. It also means that we must have an increased military force there. Today we have conscription training at Kalixfors shooting range, where certain investments in infrastructure have occurred and are occurring, and then we have home guard battalions in several municipalities as well as a flight group that falls under the Lapplandsjägargrupp's domains.

The idea is that we are to have a brigade up there that we can coordinate with a brigade in Norway. We are also to have decisive roles in relation to Finland, so there is every reason for the Minister, before the incoming defense preparation, to give some thought to making a proper reinforcement with a regiment in Kiruna.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! It is true that we see increased coordination between China and Russia even in the military sphere. On a few occasions, they have also conducted exercises in our maritime near area.

We also saw that China and Russia on November 4 last year presented what is called a no-limits partnership, where China also expressed criticism of the NATO expansion. This goes against the cornerstone of the European security order, that all countries are allowed to make their own security policy choices. There is definitely an increased coordination between China and Russia which also affects the Arctic.

Regarding Nato, Peter Hultqvist also knows that a review of Nato's command structures is taking place. This is fundamentally about also reviewing the regional plans as well as the military force goals and the command and obedience conditions. This could very well affect northern Europe and Sweden, Finland and Norway, and increased coordination may also be needed at the division level. I would absolutely not rule that out.

Connecting to the question of whether this should be a detachment or whether it should be a separate regiment, I appointed a defense commission a couple of months ago. It has a large and important mission. It is to shed light on a number of areas. In the first report, one shall look, among other things, at the defense economy and at Sweden's role within Nato. One shall draw conclusions from the war in Ukraine, and one shall conduct a security policy situational analysis.

In the next step, I expect the Defense Preparation Board will look at what is called the war and basic organization. But this report shall not be ready until April 26 next year. Therefore, I think it is far too early to point out where individual regiments should be located. Let us start with the needs in the security policy analysis. Then we can take questions linked to the war and basic organization and whether it should be a detachment or its own regiment. I rule nothing out.

I can still state that in the investigation that the Armed Forces have pointed to, it is said that one has now re-established five regiments and that it is therefore natural for the Armed Forces to primarily grow at existing sites. The second thing is, of course, that it requires a great deal of power and energy to re-establish regiments. For example, a regiment needs things such as a guard building, office building, sports hall, defense health, training hall, exercise and care hall, service depot, ground workshop, sports hall, fuel facilities, outer facilities, shell protection, and so on.

Now, I, Peter Hultqvist, do not rule out that it could become a regiment or a detachment. But what I am trying to say is that I think it is a bit too early to decide on this here and now. I think that the Defence Preparation Board should be allowed to work in peace and first conduct its situational analysis and then look at the defense economy and finally land on different solutions when it comes to the war and basic organization.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! When it comes to the question of regiment or no regiment, I want to say that I initially tried to present a security policy picture, which I perceived that the Minister of Defence largely shares. This is, of course, something that we will also discuss in the Defence Preparation Board. I would be very surprised if what I have said here does not become some kind of main direction from the board's side. It is certainly early, but one must also be able to have views on directions even at this stage.

I am glad to be able to raise this issue already to plant the idea in as many as possible that this might be a reasonable development. The arguments regarding difficulties surrounding this type of investment also occurred in the previous round when we discussed the establishment of new regiments and also when it concerns Gotland. But here it is about us trying to achieve something that also realistically strengthens when it comes to the large needs that we have just up in the northern part of Sweden and in the Nordkalotten area.

We have quite good conditions at the Kalixfors shooting range. Investments are being made there in a training and care hall, a heating plant, a transformer station, and a fuel facility. A stronger infrastructure is therefore being built up in this area. It is well something that indicates that a future is seen for a stronger operation in just Kiruna.

Then I think that the arguments I have given regarding Kiruna's strategic role really speak for the fact that it must be something more than a detachment in the area.

The foreign security policy, Kiruna's role regarding a real situation of crisis and the buildup that has already taken place argue that one should also, when the time is ripe, eventually take a decision regarding a regiment.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I thank Peter Hultqvist for the debate. What the Armed Forces also mention in its submission includes, among other things, the reinforcements that are proposed to take place in northern Sweden. It concerns reinforcements in Boden, Luleå and Arvidsjaur and up to 400 more conscripts. Basic training is already conducted in Kalixfors. And the proposal from the Armed Forces is that they should increase to a hundred conscripts there as well. The Armed Forces thus have thoughts on also reinforcing the logistics base and investing in Kalixfors. Then one can, of course, discuss whether it should be a regiment or a detachment. What I think can be worth considering is that in that case, one secures the long-term personnel supply.

Now we have many new organizational units in Sollefteå. We have a detachment in Östersund, and we have re-established K 4. It is clear that many officers will be needed in many places. At the same time, we know that fundamentally it would be very good economically for Norrbotten and good for Sweden. It will naturally be a challenge to provide personnel.

I note that the Armed Forces are emphasizing that it is important to also increase the recruitment of conscripts in Norrbotten. I think that sounds wise given that we will also need to provide personnel for an ever-strengthening defense force there.

I take what Peter Hultqvist has said to heart. My message today, however, is that I think the question is posed too early. I look forward to receiving the Defense Preparation's final analysis of this in April next year.

The interpellations debate was hereby concluded.

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