Response to interpellation 2022/23:282 regarding the cost calculation concerning the migration and asylum pact
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerns cost calculations for the migration and asylum pact. M argues that it is challenging to make forecasts for asylum seekers and contributions to a solidarity pool when the provisions are not fully negotiated 1 2 3. M believes that the pact will likely reduce asylum pressure and lower costs 1. M emphasizes that Sweden needs to contribute to ensure the union's security and control at external borders. SD argues that it is important for taxpayers to know the costs 4 5. SD believes that the government cannot follow the costs without calculations 5 and that the solidarity mechanism is a penalty fee 5.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Mr. Speaker! Nima Gholam Ali Pour has asked me if I intend to produce a cost calculation for how the proposed migration and asylum pact's solidarity mechanism and other provisions will affect the state budget, and whether I will work to ensure that an economic analysis serves as the basis for Sweden's approach toward the proposed migration and asylum pact.
Initially, I want to emphasize that the negotiations currently underway are based on a concept paper prepared by the Czech presidency. This means, among other things, that the proposal for a solidarity mechanism has been significantly revised in relation to the proposal that Nima Gholam Ali Pour refers to, with greater freedom for the member states to choose what they want to contribute to the solidarity pool that is proposed.
Carrying out the calculations that Nima Gholam Ali Pour requests is challenging for two reasons.
Firstly, it is very difficult to make forecasts for how many people will seek asylum in the EU - even more so under a new regulatory framework. In parallel with the solidarity mechanism, expanded responsibility rules and mandatory border procedures, as well as screening and registration in Eurodac, are being discussed. The outcome of all these negotiations, especially those regarding border procedures, will have a major impact on future migration pressure and the need for solidarity measures.
Secondly, it is associated with great uncertainty to calculate from these forecasts how much Sweden needs to contribute in the form of solidarity. Nor can it be calculated at the current time how large the solidarity pool that is proposed will be.
The Government's assessment is that the proposals in the Migration and Asylum Pact as a whole will likely result in a clear reduction of the asylum pressure on Sweden. This would mean lower costs for asylum processing and reception compared to what would be the case with the regulatory framework that applies today, in line with the objective for Swedish policy that the Government and the coalition partners have agreed upon.
Nima Gholam Ali Pour (SD)
Mr. Speaker! The questions I have asked the Minister for Migration fall within an area that is usually important for the voters. It is about how large a burden will fall on the taxpayers if Sweden joins a migration and asylum pact within the European Union. The Minister for Migration argues that it will vary from year to year and that it is not possible to assess how burdensome the costs will be for the state budget and the taxpayers.
Despite the fact that there are forecasts for the development of migration based on, among other things, the political situation and the demographics in different countries, it is not possible to make an assessment of how much the migration and asylum pact will cost Sweden and the Swedish taxpayers, according to the Minister for Migration. The Minister for Migration does not even want to provide information on how much Sweden will be forced to pay for each asylum seeker that we do not want to receive through the solidarity mechanism that will be imposed on us through the European Union's proposed migration and asylum pact. This is highly remarkable, as already in 2016, the European Commission presented a proposal with a specific figure for what member states would pay if they did not receive asylum seekers from other EU countries.
An article in Politico from May 2016 shows that the European Commission has presented a proposal where EU countries shall pay 2.8 million kronor per asylum seeker that they do not accept from other EU countries, through EU redistribution. The EU Commission has thus given a statement: 2.8 million kronor for every asylum seeker that Sweden does not accept. Here is a statement. Then one wonders what the Migration Minister's statement is.
If the fee is not 2.8 million kronor per asylum seeker that Sweden does not accept, what is the fee then? If one says that the European Commission's decision from 2016 does not apply, then one must have another decision. There must be a figure that the Minister for Migration knows. Otherwise, one must assume that the proposed fee still stands at 2.8 million kronor for every asylum seeker that Sweden does not accept from other EU countries.
The fee that EU countries are to pay according to the solidarity mechanism when they do not receive asylum seekers from other countries is intended to deter EU countries from refusing to accept asylum seekers. The purpose is, therefore, to deter from not accepting. The fee can thus not be so low that it does not deter, since the purpose from the very beginning has been to deter EU countries from not accepting asylum seekers. That is why I become worried and concerned when the Migration Minister gives no answer when I ask some simple questions. How much will this solidarity mechanism cost Sweden? How much will the taxpayers be forced to pay for the immigration?
If the Minister for Migration for some strange reason does not know how much this will cost, will the Minister for Migration then produce a cost calculation for how the proposed solidarity mechanism will affect the state budget?
Statsrådet Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Mr. President! As I said initially, the negotiations now, under the Swedish presidency, are based on the Czech concept paper that was drawn up when Czechia was chair. It is therefore not the same proposal that Nima Gholam Ali Pour refers to, which the Commission submitted. It is also not the case that all parts of the mechanism are fully negotiated. If that were the case, it would be easier to know which pieces of the puzzle we have to work with. The Pact is under negotiation.
An analysis such as the member requests would need to include a large number of provisions—provisions other than just the solidarity mechanism—which are also not finished. Not least, mandatory border procedures would need to be included. If robust border procedures are established, which I mean is completely central, that is to say fast-tracks at the external border for the examination of applications where there is a low probability of them being granted, the number of unfounded applications and secondary migration would likely decrease significantly.
The analysis would also need to consider the great advantages that all member states would derive from the introduction of an effective screening procedure for all those who cross the external border irregularly and an increased access to information in the Eurodac database.
Through the revised reception and return directives, the Member States would also be given greater scope in a number of respects regarding the design of their asylum management, which is relevant for Sweden in particular. It will also affect the cost picture. All in all, I make the assessment that such a calculation as Nima Gholam Ali Pour requests is not possible to make at the current stage, but I simultaneously draw the conclusion that the reforms will contribute to not only significantly reducing the inflow to Sweden but also improving the possibilities in reception in a number of different ways.
Negotiations are, as is well known, a give and take, and in order to reach a greater responsibility at the outer border, Sweden will also need to contribute in some way to the solidarity being negotiated. As long as the whole is judged to be in line with Sweden's objectives, the government will, of course, continue to work towards the pact.
Nima Gholam Ali Pour (SD)
Mr. Speaker! I represent a party that does not want the Swedish people to pay too much for immigration. That is the case. Once upon a time, the political direction was condemned. Today it is called common sense, and more and more parties have apparently joined that line.
It is completely natural that I stand here as a representative for the Sweden Democrats and want to know how much the European Union's proposed migration and asylum pact will cost the taxpayers. It is important for the Sweden Democrats' voters, and actually quite many Swedes, that their tax money finances primarily the welfare and not the immigration.
The debate on whether welfare is more important than immigration is over. Several parties have changed their direction because we reached the conclusion that welfare is more important than immigration. It is therefore important for us to know how much the migration and asylum pact will cost and how it affects the state budget and the taxpayers.
It is obvious that if the costs for the migration and asylum pact and especially the solidarity mechanism become too great, the welfare and the basic services that the state, regions, and municipalities are to provide will be pushed back. That is why it has been important to have an immigration to Sweden whose costs are reasonable and whose negative consequences are preferably non-existent, and that is why we must know how much different migration policies, for example the migration and asylum pact and its solidarity mechanism, actually cost.
There was a time when we let the costs of migration run away because there was a conviction that immigration would enrich Sweden. It is a general opinion that immigration did not enrich Sweden. It is a bad idea not to know how much different migration policies will cost. We must know how much the European Union's migration and asylum pact will cost the taxpayers.
A cost calculation must be produced that the public and its representatives in the form of the Riksdag can rely on. We cannot buy a pig in a poke and support a migration and asylum pact whose economic consequences for Sweden are unknown.
The current government has received a mandate from the Swedish people, but the mandate is conditional. Previous governments' mistakes with immigration policy shall not be repeated. It is a condition for the mandate. We shall have an immigration policy that prioritizes Sweden's interests. To see if the migration and asylum pact safeguards Sweden's interests, we must see how much it affects the state's budget. This should be understood by the Minister for Migration.
Statsrådet Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Mr. Speaker! The question of cost is, of course, something that is followed very closely, but it is not possible to see the cost of solidarity completely in isolation, which I tried to show in my previous contribution. Therefore, one must look at the policy as a whole, and that policy is under negotiation. We do not know where it will land, so therefore it is very difficult to make a cost calculation. But we follow, as said, the question of cost very closely.
The keyword in the government's policy is sustainability, something that is reflected both in the national reforms that we carry out together and in the international collaborations that Sweden participates in. What can be said about today's EU-common system is that it is, to a large extent, completely unsustainable.
A reasonable starting point is that those who come to the union should, as a rule, have their case examined at the union's border. Today, almost the opposite applies. A large part of the asylum applications are submitted in member states that do not have an external border, and it is naturally a completely unreasonable situation. Many are never registered when they cross the external border irregularly, and an ever-increasing number of people are in shadow societies throughout the EU's member countries.
As a result of the large migration pressure and the many secondary movements, we have border obstacles unlike anything ever seen in the union. A number of member states, perhaps primarily Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, find themselves in a situation that, from a Swedish perspective, can only be compared to that of 2015. Despite repeated attempts, it has not been possible to make today's regulatory framework function to handle today's migration, and therefore we must have a new regulatory framework.
In the negotiations on new legislation, the government works from three primary starting points. Firstly, it is a prerequisite for our participation that we can achieve a reduced pressure to Sweden compared to what we can achieve with the current regulatory framework. It is the entirety of the reform that is then central. Secondly, one must naturally uphold human rights and basic dignity in the reception of asylum seekers. Thirdly, a mandatory redistribution of asylum seekers is not feasible. Even though Sweden has limited opportunities to openly pursue its line now as chair of the Council of Ministers, corresponding starting points are shared by a number of members of the Council.
Nima Gholam Ali Pour has asked me if I can produce a cost calculation for the proposed solidarity mechanism as well as other provisions. I have understood that he means the proposal being negotiated today. But it is, therefore, under negotiation, and it is very difficult for me, if even possible for anyone, to make calculations for something that does not yet exist.
Nima Gholam Ali Pour (SD)
Mr. Speaker! The Minister for Migration says in her statement that the costs are being monitored closely. I wonder how they can be monitored if not through cost calculations. But the Minister for Migration means that she cannot produce these cost calculations.
The EU's member states are about to enter into a migration and asylum pact. This month, the proposal will be addressed in the European Parliament, and after that, it will proceed to final negotiations between the EU countries' governments. We must find out what the consequences of this proposal will be for Sweden.
My party colleague in the European Parliament, Charlie Weimers, calls the proposal an expensive redistribution of migrants. I have no reason to doubt Weimers' assessment. It is unfortunate that the Minister for Migration has not produced a cost calculation for this proposal, which is now being processed and is considered a proposal that will proceed and be adopted.
What I have tried to argue for here today is that we must see economic consequence analyses of how the migration and asylum pact will affect Sweden and our taxpayers. It is unfortunate that the Sweden Democrats need to continue the work of convincing other parties to first find out how much the immigration policy costs before it is implemented.
The solidarity mechanism within the migration and asylum pact is fundamentally about a penalty fee that is ultimately intended to convince the member state to accept asylum seekers according to the distribution determined by the EU. Previously, it was parties on the left wing that imposed the costs of immigration on Sweden. Now, it is the EU that is doing it. The Swedish people have the right to know the costs of the European Union's migration and asylum pact.
Statsrådet Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)
Mr. President! Parliament has now taken a position. The whole thing is under negotiation in the Council. After we have reached a Council position, which I hope we will do during the Swedish presidency, there will be negotiations between Parliament and the Council in so-called trilogues. We therefore have a long way to go. We are not finished with the negotiations in the Council. Very many pieces of the puzzle are on the table, and we shall try to fit them together.
What I am trying to say here – though I feel that I am not quite getting through – is that it is not about a punitive fee, but this is a way of stating that we are in a European Union with external borders. It is in Sweden's greatest interest to ensure that we gain control at the external borders. It is clear that not all member states are in the same situation as, for example, Italy does at the Mediterranean. We therefore obviously need to help each other to ensure that we get control at the external border.
We are in complete agreement that we should not have a mandatory redistribution of asylum seekers, but we need to contribute to ensure the union's security through a secure external border. It is certainly in Sweden's interest. And it is something that I know will cost Sweden very, very dearly if we do not contribute to control at the EU's external border.
I think that even the Sweden Democrats should keep this in mind in their politics. It is precisely the situation we had in 2015, when people streamed through all of Europe to get to Sweden, that we must avoid through the negotiations that we are currently conducting.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.