Response to interpellation 2023/24:106 on experiences of the war in Ukraine

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Peter Hultqvist has asked me what conclusions I have drawn so far on behalf of Sweden in connection with the war in Ukraine and whether I intend to take any measures based on these conclusions.

Russia's brutal attack on Ukraine has fundamentally changed and worsened the Swedish security policy situation. It has also led to a radical change in Swedish defense and security policy where Sweden has now applied for Nato membership. Sweden can neither nor should face this new world alone, but shall do so as a solidary member of Nato.

The war in Ukraine shows once again that war is brutal and bloody. It also places high demands on functioning logistics and maintenance. The Ukrainian people's will to defend is crucial for Ukraine's successful defense. This will to defend has been combined with a skillful ability to apply new and old technologies in an innovative way in the battles. There is undeniably much to learn and be inspired by from the Ukrainian defense.

For Sweden's part, it is therefore important to study and analyze what lessons need to be drawn for the development of the Swedish defense. On an overall level, the conclusions we have already drawn in the latest defense decision are confirmed. The military defense needs to be strengthened and needs to reach a better balance between combat units and support functions. Not least, the total defense in its entirety needs to be strengthened.

The war in Ukraine, however, means that we need to move faster. The Defence Preparation Committee proposed an advancement of the next defence decision by one year, something that the government supported in the budget bill for 2024. An important component in the Defence Preparation Committee's upcoming work will therefore be to analyze and draw lessons from the war in Ukraine in order to assess how these should influence the design of the Swedish defence.

The Government has tasked the Armed Forces, the Defence Materiel Administration, and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to report on what experiences and lessons can be drawn from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as how these can be utilized in the development of Sweden's total defense.

The Swedish Armed Forces' mission shall be carried out with the support of the Total Defence Research Institute. The Swedish Armed Forces submitted a partial report of the mission on 6 November, and the final report shall be submitted on 7 June 2024. These reports will be important, above all, for the Defence Committee's work and upcoming defence decisions.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! I thank you for the answer.

I would first like to note that I think all the inquiries that have been commissioned are good and necessary inquiries that can serve as a basis for future decisions.

The drone war, the cyber war, the hybrid war, the need for air defense, the importance of a strong popular will for defense, the importance of functioning civil defense, the influence operations, the disinformation, the Russian preparations for war with infiltration and death lists, where they wanted to kill the state leadership, members of parliament and persons who could be perceived as offering resistance, the importance of operational flexibility, the dominance of land warfare, the great importance of army units, the enormously great importance of personnel supply, mobilization and training of new soldiers, the return of trench warfare, the enormously great need for international support, the importance of European and transatlantic unity, the sanctions and the weapons support are crucial.

The great importance of leadership has also been focused on. And there is an insight that the laws of war do not apply, that international law does not apply, that the war can take a very long time and that this can happen in other countries in Europe. The war can proceed, spread and involve more. There is an insight that this ultimately is about a struggle and a war between democracy and authoritarian dictatorial rule.

We are, therefore, in a historically challenging time. It is a long-term challenge. How this will develop is difficult to have a concrete perception of, other than that we will live in a state of tension with Russia for a very long time. This is nothing that will pass. The war in Ukraine has left such marks on the country that it is a matter of decades. This is about our integrity, about international law, and about the European security order.

These are some points that obviously must be included when we are to make our decisions regarding both how we shape our collaborations and how we compose our defense force.

I think it is a very important point that one could already say at the outset, namely that our army needs to become larger. We need to have more conscripts, and we need to continue to develop the brigades. It is necessary so that we can have endurance in the national perspective, in the collaborations that we have and also within the framework of the NATO membership.

Our air force must also be developed in the long term with a new generation of Swedish aircraft. The Navy must be developed, among other things the underwater capability which is immensely important as a powerful weapon in naval warfare, and shall have a central and important role even in the future. And new steps must be taken.

We also see the cyber warfare and the intelligence needs. There are therefore many challenges here that we can take up in the continued debate.

But what does the minister say about all the points that I have now listed and about the introduction that I have presented here regarding some points for the future in the Swedish defense forces?

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I think that Peter Hultqvist in large parts gave an absolutely excellent list of many of the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities that exist, but also initial observations that can be made from this war. Then there is one thing which is observations from the war and from the battlefield in Ukraine. Another thing is which lessons should be transferred to the Swedish defense and how we design the defense with the specific conditions that we have to act from.

But Peter Hultqvist began with the security policy. I therefore only want to state, just as the Defence Preparation Board does, that we must contend with a Russia that is willing to take very large military and political risks and a Russia that shows a brutality and a bestiality in the warfare in Ukraine but which also shows evidence of a non-negligible endurance.

This is a war that, in large parts, is about very large volumes, where there are hundreds of thousands of soldiers gathered and where there are very large casualties on both sides. Russia has also signaled that they have high ambitions for the reconstruction of the Russian armed forces, which are now primarily weakened on the land combat side, where large parts are tied up in Ukraine. But when we analyze the development of Russian combat power development, we can note that the naval forces, the air forces, the nuclear capability, and the cyber capability are almost intact. This is what we have to contend with, and Russia is and will remain the dimensioning factor for our security and defense policy. Therefore, we need to both strengthen our national defense and become fully allied within Nato to enjoy the defense guarantees included there and, of course, also participate in Nato's joint defense planning.

I share Peter Hultqvist's view that the war in Ukraine undeniably demonstrates the importance of the land domain for the war. At the same time, no arena exists in a vacuum, and the land domain is also dependent on other domains - land, war and sea but also space and cyber. This is nothing new.

The war in Ukraine also reminds us that war, just as before, is terribly bloody and brutal. It is a reality. This is a different type of war and conflict than the one we had to deal with when we carried out international and expeditionary missions. Conducting war against industrialized states requires a completely different type of defense capability than the one that was focused on international missions. At the same time, the Defense Committee has emphasized that it is important that we maintain the capability to carry out international missions that we had during the time when the threat to our own defense was smaller.

With this said, the Armed Forces have also been tasked with identifying lessons from the war. In the partial report we received on November 6, it pointed out issues such as, for example, a stronger total defense and that cooperation between the military defense and the civil defense needs to become better. It also pointed out the importance of interoperability and the ability for systems to cooperate.

Regarding the development of ground warfare, the war in Ukraine largely confirms the direction of the 2020 defense decision, and the core of that is functional brigades. But they must also be able to be led. Therefore, divisional capability also becomes very important. The war in Ukraine also naturally points to the application of new weapon systems. Not least, this concerns unmanned systems, patrol robots, and sensors. I can return to this in the next contribution.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! We have a major problem, and it concerns both Pål Jonson, myself, and the Defence Preparation. We have received a statement from the Swedish Armed Forces regarding the status of affairs in the future planning. There, they speak of two brigades with priority until 2030. That was the ambition in the 2015 defence decision. It means that it is to be delivered in 2030 when it should have been delivered in 2025.

According to the 2020 defense decision, three brigades were to be delivered plus a reduced brigade by 2030. This has been postponed to 2035 according to the document from Försvarsmakten.

It is about two brigades by 2030 that will probably be prioritized and positioned in relation to NATO's various needs.

At the front in Ukraine today, Ukraine has approximately 70 brigades. The land war therefore requires enormous efforts, and it also requires that one can provide personnel and materiel continuously.

It is clear that if the objective is to end with us having two brigades, one can, based on previous defense decisions, think that it is very deviating. It is this that I mean places us before a very great challenge.

I understand that we have gone to Ukraine with significant material support, and it has also had an effect on the development of brigade capability in Sweden. It is something that one must respect, and it is something that decisions have been made about here in the Swedish Riksdag. But it does not change the basic fact that we here face a major problem that we must solve within the Swedish Armed Forces.

Now, what I say is not to be interpreted in any way as that we have made incorrect decisions, but I stand 100 percent behind all support for Ukraine that must continue in the long term. But that does not change our reality.

When I saw this document, I became very thoughtful in light of the previous parliamentary decisions. This must also have created some thoughtfulness in the minister.

I would therefore like to hear how the Minister views this part of the Armed Forces' statement. And what do we do concretely about this situation when it is said that two brigades shall be prioritized until 2030 and when we see the immense consequences, great needs and scale of land warfare in Ukraine?

I am well aware that scenarios can look very different, but in relation to, for example, the Finnish, the Swedish army is, so to speak, of limited size. We have commitments in the Arctic region, and we will have commitments all around Sweden. Here, there will therefore be great needs and great demands. Then we also have the conscription cohorts, which must be integrated into the strategy in a very clear way. We have a unit growth with war-stationed personnel who can be used strategically, but my view is that the two brigades now being proposed will rely very heavily on professional soldiers.

I believe, therefore, that there is a great need for real analysis and real reflection on how we are actually going to deal with this in the future, and it was with surprise that I received the statements. I would therefore like to hear the Minister's reaction to them.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I understand that the Committee on Defence will receive a briefing from the Armed Forces regarding the basis from November 6, and it is of course good because the Armed Forces can then further develop the positions and choices that have been made.

The Swedish Armed Forces take a stand, but there are a couple of things that I still think are important to take into account. One is that NATO membership will also come with expectations that we adapt the design of our defense capability to the requirements and expectations that will exist, not least in NATO's regional defense planning. This is based on Article 3, which says two things: First and foremost, one must have a basic national defense capability, and the second dimension is that that defense capability needs to be adapted so that the opportunity is given to act together with other allies.

Extensive work is currently being undertaken within Nato to strengthen the regional plans; one is moving from five plans to three plans, and they are being strengthened with significantly more military resources and capabilities. One of the things Nato points out as very important is, of course, the availability of available forces.

I interpreted the Armed Forces as wanting to focus on continuously employed soldiers and T-soldiers for the two standing brigades. The other brigades have not been written off, but it is discussed that they will, in that case, be deployed at a later stage than what was initially planned. This is, of course, partly linked to the fact that the support for Ukraine has affected the army in particular, which has carried a heavy load and performed very fine training efforts both in Sweden and in other places. However, much defense materiel has also been sent. It is therefore that assessment which underlies the Armed Forces' position.

I have appointed a defense commission because I want to find a broad agreement on the design of both the war organization and the basic organization as well as the defense economy, and I do not intend to anticipate here the work that the Defense Commission is to do and thereby, here and now, dismiss or endorse the Defense Forces' basis. It will instead be a task for the Defense Commission, naturally. That is my basic position on the matter.

I also note that the Armed Forces derive strength from some of the observations that can be made regarding the war in Ukraine. This is not least about being able to handle patrol robots, as Peter Hultqvist himself mentioned, and about various counter-systems against patrol robots. There are an enormous number of patrol robots and drones over the Ukrainian front, and I think that is good.

The space domain is also touched upon, which I think is wise. It is a task that has been carried out over the last two years, and it is clear that the space domain is important – not least has it been for the Ukrainians, as we saw with Starlink and the access to secure communications, positioning, and so-called targeting. The space domain is thus highlighted by the Armed Forces, and I also think that is wise.

Let me finally address the importance of endurance, which the Armed Forces also point out in its submission – the balance between combat units, that is, the spearhead units, and logistics and maintenance units or support units. It will truly be needed. It is also an observation from the battlefield in Ukraine, namely the need for endurance.

This also naturally leads us into the need for a strong defense industrial security of supply, not least when it comes to ammunition. The government is also currently working on this in an extensive way, both regarding the possibility of directing orders to specific companies over a long period – they should know that they will receive orders for, for example, artillery ammunition – and regarding extensive European cooperation within what is called ASAP, which I can return to.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! I am well aware of the content of Article 3, and the basic defense capability is, so to speak, basic in that context.

Postponing the brigades in relation to previous defense decisions affects the fundamental defense capability. I agree with everything that Pål Jonson says regarding endurance, and endurance is also very closely linked to the army units. I also share the view on logistics and maintenance, but two brigades – which also must be adapted to NATO's various needs – is a very clear prioritization. The question is whether that will be enough. Then there is the question of the two additional brigades, and in that case, we are talking about 2035 and about them also having a reduction in funding according to the proposal that has been submitted.

This is a major problem. I think one must be able to say it clearly and plainly. There is a lot of good stuff in the statement from the Armed Forces, and there is also what is wise. So, it is not about that. But we must be able to see this problem, and we must be able to discuss it.

I will do what I can as a member of the Defence Preparation Committee to get this on the table for proper analysis. It deviates from the strategy that the Riksdag has previously chosen because it is a reduction in the development of capability. I have previously said that I have respect for the decisions we have had to make, but we must also look at how we maintain the Swedish capability in a credible way.

We may have to look at the balances and at the economy, but this will not be able to be talked away. It will become a significant issue in the time ahead, and I believe the minister understands that. Then one can, of course, consider whether to say something now or later, but now my speaking time is over. I therefore thank you for the debate. I am glad that I have been able to bring this into the department's continued handling.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! One thing we can probably agree on, Peter Hultqvist, is that we will not resolve this issue here and now. This is something that the Defence Preparation Committee will work on, and at the ministry, we will of course do what we can to provide the Defence Preparation Committee with good underlying material. I know that you also have a secretariat that works with these matters.

The National Audit Office has audited the work regarding the construction of the brigades, and it has actually expressed some criticism regarding that. It has taken too long, and there has been a frustration there. That criticism was directed at the authority regarding some priorities at that time, as well as the underfunding, for which there is a long and broad responsibility on both sides of the block boundary. But it has actually also, to some extent, criticized the previous government for not acting quickly enough.

What we need to do, however, is to strengthen all branches of the defense in this serious security policy situation. We need broad and long-term agreements in security and defense policy. We have done things that I think have been good, not least the agreement on March 16 where we raised the ambition compared to the previous defense decision by adding more funds during the current budget year. We decided in broad political consensus that Sweden shall go up to 2 percent of GDP, and we increased the procurement authorizations. We also took a number of measures to address the deficiencies that existed regarding logistics and maintenance.

I look forward to working in an equally good and constructive manner as we did with the agreement from March 16, even though it was tough negotiations. I also hope and believe that even the Defence Preparation Board can find a broad agreement regarding the design of the long-term war and base organization and the economy, but I do not want to either endorse or dismiss the Armed Forces' basis here today. We will need to analyze it further.

The interpellations debate was hereby concluded.

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