Response to interpellation 2023/24:249 on nuclear power plants as threats or protection in a crisis situation
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerns the role of nuclear power for energy supply and society's resilience in crisis situations. M considers that a robust energy supply is a fundamental prerequisite for a secure society and the total defense 1. M emphasizes that nuclear power is of great importance for a secure electricity supply and is necessary to reach net-zero emissions by 2045 1 2. M argues that nuclear power is a foundation for maintaining resilience in society. M considers that nuclear power is necessary when it is dark and cold and is the only realistic solution for heavy synchronous electricity production in southern Sweden 3.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! Jan Riise has asked me on what facts and circumstances I have based my position on nuclear power plants as assets for Sweden in a situation with increased readiness or where our country is involved in an actual conflict, and whether I intend to develop my reasoning regarding the issue.
Since I took office as Minister for Civil Defence, the situation in our global environment has worsened. War in our vicinity affects our security, and it is my strong conviction that Sweden must stand firm in turbulent times. Our country must continue to function even in the event of high alert and, in the worst case, during an armed attack.
A robust energy supply is a fundamental prerequisite for a secure society. It is also necessary for the total defense. Sweden is one of the world's most electrified countries and is therefore to a large extent dependent on electricity being able to be delivered for the functionality of society as a whole. We therefore need to have a stable electricity supply across the entire threat spectrum.
In order to be able to supply a country with electricity even under the worst imaginable scenarios, high alert or even war, it is required that the electricity system possesses the right capabilities - i.e., electricity production and electricity grids with the right characteristics in the right places. This has been shown, not least, in the war in Ukraine. During an ongoing war, it has been absolutely crucial to be able to run a country's electricity system in so-called "island mode", to be able to quickly rebuild and repair the electricity system in several different ways, and in this way maintain the country's resilience and ensure that the most important societal functions continue to function.
The decisive factor is that robust, predictable electricity production is required to ensure critical capabilities. Ukraine's nuclear power has been of great importance for the country's electricity supply and for synchronization with Central Europe's electricity system. Different production sources have different conditions for contributing to a robust electricity system. Intermittent energy sources such as solar and wind power need to be complemented with other technologies to create a robust electricity system where electricity can be delivered where it is needed when it is needed.
A large part of Sweden's electricity supply comes from nuclear power. The Government intends to present an energy policy direction proposal in the near future, which includes a planning goal and a security of supply goal for the electricity system. The Government has already launched a roadmap for new nuclear power in order to be able to build more nuclear power plants in more locations than today. It is important that the expansion is carried out so that the electricity system becomes more secure in its supply and that it accounts for a high security of supply of electricity within the country.
Today, Sweden is import-dependent during the winter months, and our electricity system is vulnerable. Last winter, there was a real risk of forced disconnection of consumers. Based on the experiences coming from Ukraine and the energy crisis that all of Europe experienced during the winter of 2022/23, nuclear power is of great importance to have a secure electricity supply while climate emissions are reduced and net-zero emissions by 2045 can be achieved.
The person who has the permit to operate a nuclear power plant has full responsibility for ensuring that the facility is operated in a radiation-safe manner and that the personnel and the surroundings are protected against radiation. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority sets requirements for radiation safety and follows up that those who operate the facilities comply with the relevant regulations and other requirements. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is also an emergency authority with the task of being proactive within the national radiation protection preparedness, with a special responsibility during and in the event of high alert.
The Government follows the work taking place in the preparedness sectors.
Jan Riise (MP)
Madam Speaker! Many thanks to the Minister for the answer! Thanks also for yesterday's push on platform X for today's event! It brought about a number of additional questions, but perhaps we can take those at some later occasion.
I completely agree with the description of the problem, but perhaps not with the prescribed solution of nuclear power. It is well known what Miljöpartiet stands for in this context. An electricity grid with production and distribution in well-chosen locations is of the utmost importance in a potential crisis situation or, even worse, a war situation. My doubt concerns whether nuclear power is truly the best answer to the question of how this system should be designed.
Of the forty countries that have or have had nuclear power, it is actually only two - Russia and Ukraine - that have found themselves in war. There is admittedly a bit of give and take with countries like Iran and the like, but in principle it is only Ukraine that has experience of armed attacks. I still think that we can deepen the discussion a little bit.
I have three different perspectives on the reflections surrounding this. They concern the technology and research in the field and the local and global risk and security perspective, in light of, among other things, Russia's war and increased terror threats.
I am from Chalmers in Gothenburg and have spent some years there. I have worked with several of the major educational institutions for more than 30 years, not least with contacts with the business sector and civil society. That gave me no knowledge whatsoever regarding security aspects of nuclear power plants, but it gave me a lot of contacts, so I have taken to calling around to former colleagues. We discussed, among other things, outage and dead-network start, which came up during the presentation on November 2.
I take the other side first. It is naturally fully possible to power specific areas in Sweden from specific power plants. With the size a nuclear power plant has, the island in question becomes much larger than if one starts from my roof with solar cells. But one must remember that the technology is not fully developed. I believe the Minister was touching on that. We are not quite there yet. It requires a fair amount of software development to be able to connect in that way, but it is being done in many places. Let us assume that gets sorted out. If it were to become necessary to supply Sweden with electricity in that way, it would be fully possible within a reasonable future. It is also quite technology-neutral; it does not matter so much where the electricity comes from. I hope the Minister shares that view.
Both the Prime Minister and Minister for Energy Ebba Busch have spoken about the possibilities for so-called black start. If I understand correctly, it is about energizing an electricity grid from zero, for example after a major repair or an attack of some kind.
Black start shall be possible from any power plant. It has nothing to do with the way the electricity is produced. Just like for grid operation, it is the size of the system that differs, not what kind of power producer is used. But an uncertainty has emerged regarding whether it would be possible to start from a nuclear power plant, because a lot of electricity is required to ensure the cooling of the fuel elements during such a startup. It could even be illegal according to the Radiation Protection Act. One must, in all cases, be able to guarantee that both fresh and spent material can be cooled.
Against the background of that introduction, I would like to ask if the Minister shares my view.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! I perhaps did not perceive any very concrete question being asked of me, but it was more a general reasoning that I am expected to have some view on.
What one must start by stating, I believe, is that no matter how we twist and turn this, we will not get around the laws of physics, which exist at the bottom. If one does not have any electricity production to begin with, it is very difficult to supply a country with electricity. That is what underlies the fact that Sweden has an electricity system built around predictable electricity production. One only has to look out the window. We are at the beginning of December. It is cold in the whole country. It is calm and overcast. We are, therefore, dependent on the type of electricity production that we can control and manage so that the most fundamental and basic functions in our society can be maintained.
The point that the government made at the press conference that Member Riise refers to is that the government, in the event of increased alert, will naturally not begin by tying both hands behind its back by shutting down our nuclear power. The conclusion is therefore incorrect. That it is incorrect is shown to us by the experiences from Ukraine with all desirable clarity. It is quite true that Russia has acted in violation of international law, as pointed out in the interpellation. Russia has occupied one of the nuclear power plants in Ukraine. The laws of war have been violated in connection with this. But to therefore draw the conclusion that one should shut down production facilities that are not under Russian control is very strange.
Experience shows us that one of the reasons why Ukraine has been so successful in maintaining its resilience during this war is the dispatchable electricity production. Ukraine is a country that is almost exclusively driven forward by dispatchable electricity production. They primarily have nuclear and gas power. We all know what we have reason to think about gas power production - it is bad for the environment and creates security policy dependencies that neither we nor any other countries want in the long term.
The conclusion is naturally that what we need to do is to account for being able to use our nuclear power even in a deteriorated security situation. This is a matter of adapting legislation. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has a mandate that will be reported during the next year. It will likely lead to legislative changes. It places new requirements on the operators to take greater responsibility.
What we need to come back to is that we are all fundamentally governed by the laws of physics. Yes, there is a difference between electricity production and electricity production, because the way the electricity is produced also defines the electricity's properties in the system. In the foreseeable future, it will be in such a way that heavy synchronous electricity production is what constitutes the base and the foundation for our electricity production.
The chairman is welcome to try to build an off-grid system for his solar cell installation. He will realize that it becomes quite inconvenient, since his electricity production is intermittent in character. He therefore cannot himself control when he has or does not have electricity. For society, it becomes very difficult to build functionality on that premise.
Jan Riise (MP)
Madam Speaker! I thank you for the answer and the continued reflections.
I must first say that I have nowhere, at least not intentionally, suggested that we should shut down nuclear power plants during a time of crisis. My concerns have entirely been about the safety of these power plants during times of crisis or war. For the foreseeable future, if we think a few years ahead, it is the case that we have the power plants we have and the composition of power producers we have. We have some nuclear reactors and hydropower. We also have a growing number of wind turbines, so that changes quite slowly.
My concerns are entirely about the security of these power plants, and that is also what Sipri and others have discussed regarding Ukraine. Of course, electricity and the production of electric power is urgent during a time of crisis, whether it is cold or not and whether an attacker is standing at the door or not. It was not my intention to lead thoughts toward us closing anything for that reason.
When Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022 and occupied Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl, it was a matter of something that had never happened before, as Sipri has pointed out. Consequently, previous security thinking and policies were faced with an immediate need for discussions and updates. Since then, Russia has occupied a few more nuclear power plants in Ukraine, which has relatively many nuclear power plants.
Before the attack, it was primarily about terrorism and thefts. We have also discussed this in Sweden. The focus was directed towards groups and organizations, not countries. But with the full-scale invasion, a new, previously unknown dimension has entered the picture, where a nation attacks a country and takes over that country's power plants.
In the Defence Committee's report *Allvarstid*, which the Minister certainly is well aware of and which was released earlier this year, one can read: "As part of the warfare, Russia has also occupied and used the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the decommissioned facility in Chernobyl in Ukraine. Damage to the facility in Zaporizhzhia, personnel forced to work under difficult conditions, deficient maintenance and unwillingness to allow inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA) risk leading to serious releases of radioactive substances. Thus, Russia has threatened Ukraine and the world with a nuclear catastrophe."
The electricity supply is a likely primary target for an attacker. Without electricity, it stops functioning, just as we have spoken about and agreed upon. Extensive and prolonged power outages can be very demoralizing. The power system's central importance for society will increase further in the future, with the electrification of transport, industry, and heating. Nuclear power in itself entails great security risks both during operation and in waste management. It has become apparent, for example even with the nuclear deal with Iran, that what begins with nuclear power for energy can become the starting point for nuclear weapons. Civil nuclear power can be used to produce plutonium, for example in Korea.
We need to scrutinize how nuclear power is built and maintained. The availability of uranium is crucial for operation, and the construction costs are absolutely enormous. Russia and China have absolutely crucial roles in the financing of both construction and operation. The new reactors being built or planned are most often in one way or another dependent on financing from Chinese or Russian sides. It is no news that these anti-democratic forces now have an expansive geopolitical and economic agenda, but now nuclear power also plays a key role in the power strategy. That was the part I wanted to get at: the security risks for our existing nuclear power plants, especially those in operation.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! Russia's full-scale and unlawful war of aggression against Ukraine gives us reason to draw a long series of conclusions. I share the interpellant's view that it highlights that we need to build the society's resilience more clearly and more strongly.
I do not, however, share the implied conclusion. I perceive the interpellation to be written with the premise that nuclear power has no role to play in Swedish society and absolutely not during high alert. That is how I perceive the implied question. Let me then make one thing very clear: Nuclear power is a foundation for us to be able to maintain the resilience in Swedish society.
Madam Speaker! It is also in the sense that Russia indiscriminately bombs children's hospitals and theaters. That is not an argument against children's hospitals and theaters. It is an argument that society must see what Russia is. It is also an argument that we need to strengthen the robustness around critical infrastructure and around that which builds our civil society strong. The operational conclusion of this is that we must build a more robust electricity system.
Madam Speaker! We find ourselves in a situation where Sweden's electricity system has, for a very long time, been allowed to become anorectic and fragile in a way that, in the long term, risks harming Sweden. It is therefore that the government in act and meaning is now seeking to reverse that development. To build a more vulnerable electricity system is not only hindering our nation from a competitiveness perspective, but it naturally risks harming our national vital security interests.
From having twelve nuclear reactors as the basis of the Swedish electricity system together with hydropower, we are now down to six. We notice that every time we have an operational disruption in one of our reactors, it creates pressures in the electricity system. That in itself is not an argument against nuclear power. It is an argument that we need more availability of planned electricity production.
We note today, when it is cold outside, that Sweden has been import-dependent during the lion's share of this day. We are no longer self-sufficient when we need electricity the most, that is, when it is dark and cold in the country. We need to continue to build an electricity system that better accounts for this.
Intermittent electricity production can absolutely exist as part of the electricity system. But it can never become the base of the electricity system as long as we want to build an electricity system that is for the users and not the other way around.
Madam Speaker! I perceive that ultimately it boils down to the Green Party's war of delay against nuclear power. One may have finally realized that one has been wrong about nuclear power in terms of emissions. One may finally begin to realize that nuclear power is part of the key to solving the climate transition.
But then one moves on to the next aspect and implies that nuclear power does not have a role during high alert. My view is that nuclear power absolutely has a role when it comes to maintaining the resilience of our society. If we were to shut down nuclear power, we would lack the foundation for that which builds resilience. It would simply be to ignore the lessons that we have reason to draw from Ukraine.
Jan Riise (MP)
Madam Speaker! I share the opinion of much of what Minister Bohlin says. But I want to assert that it is the electricity that is decisive for our resilience and not that it comes specifically from nuclear power. It is certainly something we agree that we do not agree on.
I was not looking to shut down nuclear power plants. We have an agreement that those that exist shall continue to function until their economic and technical lifespan is over. I was looking at the security aspects that have been pointed out by Sipri and our own defense preparedness regarding that type of facility, which may be somewhat more risky than a hydropower plant or an offshore wind farm.
I had actually intended to bring up a couple more aspects here in the final stretch. I do not want to end up in a discussion about the existence or non-existence of nuclear power. I want to end up in a discussion about the safety surrounding nuclear power.
When we talk about nuclear power, we also have the question of uranium. Known reserves are not very large. New discoveries are being made in Australia, Canada, and Kazakhstan. We have some reserves also in Ranstad between Falköping and Skövde and in other places in Sweden.
We have the after-work, which perhaps is even more important. It should be said that as long as spent fuel elements are kept in fuel pools for cooling, for example in Ringhals near where I live, they are relatively easy targets to access.
Then it is shipped by train or in some other way to final disposal, or as has been done in Sweden until now to an interim storage facility while waiting for it to be possible to store the waste safely underground for 100,000 years.
This is deeply unsatisfactory regarding safety. No country has, after 50 years or more of nuclear power, created a safe system for nuclear waste. It is even to the extent that other countries look at Sweden and the idea of storage deep underground. In the meantime, the waste is transported around on trains and transported by ship not entirely without incidents.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! I also do not perceive any further specific question being posed to me this time. But I believe we need to ground ourselves in the fact that for our electricity system to function, predictable electricity production is required. Hydroelectric power is essentially as developed as it can be in Sweden. Then we have nuclear power, coal power, gas power, and oil power remaining.
The latter three are ruled out for easily understood reasons from both a security policy perspective and an environmental perspective. That leaves us with nuclear power as both an enabler for green transition and for the fact that we must ensure we have the electricity we need when we need it. It is also produced in such a way that the entire electricity system can function. We need heavy synchronous electricity production at the base for our power grid to function. This fact cannot be ignored. Everything else in terms of production is icing on the cake. We need to have this at the foundation.
We can observe that hydropower is not sufficient. It is primarily located in a part of the country where relatively few people live. To bring down the electricity production to southern Sweden, heavy synchronous electricity production is required in southern Sweden. That is where we have our nuclear power. There is nothing today that can realistically replace nuclear power, on the contrary. In order for us to be able to utilize more of the hydropower, we need more nuclear power in southern Sweden.
I completely agree that we need to take further security-enhancing measures linked to the geopolitical global situation we find ourselves in. But the conclusion that we should phase out nuclear power or shut down nuclear power for that reason, I believe and the government believe, is completely the wrong direction to go in.
That is why the government is now taking more measures so that we can build more nuclear power and have safer nuclear power in Sweden, even in the security policy situation in which we find ourselves.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.