Response to interpellation 2023/24:360 on crisis preparedness and telecommunications
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
KD argues that the government takes the situation in Älvsbyn seriously and is working to strengthen security in the communication networks through regulation, supervision, and funding 1. KD emphasizes that the sector is a priority and that a bill has been presented for a national telecommunications cooperation group where PTS can mandate actors to participate in total defense planning 1. KD argues that they protect Sweden through preparedness fees and state funds 2. KD emphasizes that the government has decided on a mandate for PTS to protect against hybrid attacks and that cooperation in the telecommunications cooperation group shall become mandatory 2. KD argues that telecommunications operators want robust networks 3. KD argues that PTS is a robust authority and that through the bill, greater responsibility is placed on the operators to prepare, exercise, and restore infrastructure 3. KD emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the public and private sectors 4. KD argues that there are no concrete proposals for changes to the time limits for backup power, but that they are open to innovative proposals 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! Linus Sköld has asked me how I intend to act to strengthen access to telecommunications in a crisis and if I intend to take any initiatives to tighten the requirements on telecommunications operators.
The Government takes the situation that arose in Älvsbyn at the beginning of January seriously. Our societies are dependent on functioning electronic communications both in normal conditions and during crises. The responsible authority, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, PTS, has worked for a long time to strengthen the security and robustness of the communication networks, both through regulation and supervision as well as through funding of measures that go beyond what can be required of the individual operators to undertake on their own.
PTS collects an annual readiness fee from the larger operators, which shall finance measures that strengthen electronic communications against serious threats and stresses in peacetime. The State provides additional funds used to ensure that electronic communication is robust and can withstand stresses both in peacetime and during high alert.
The government has identified that electronic communication is a sector where the state of preparedness must be raised. As part of that work, the government submitted the bill A telecommunications cooperation group for peacetime crises and increased preparedness (prop. 2023/24:60) on January 18.
The national telecommunications cooperation group has existed since 2005 and has been based on voluntariness. According to the government's proposal, PTS shall be able to decide that certain actors shall participate in the total defense planning. This includes the planning and coordination of measures before or during peacetime crisis situations within the preparedness sector for electronic communications. The proposal also gives PTS the authority to mandate actors to support the work to restore the infrastructure for electronic communications in connection with events during peacetime crisis situations or heightened readiness through cooperation. The government believes that this will give Sweden better conditions for robust crisis management and preparedness within electronic communication.
The work to strengthen the socially important digital infrastructure continues, and the government intends to take further measures in the area when and if it is deemed necessary.
Linus Sköld (S)
Mr. Speaker! I thank the Minister for this opportunity to debate such an important issue at such a late hour.
For the sake of clarity, for those who may be listening to this debate, I intended to clarify what happened in Älvsbyn on January 4th this year.
It was cold, one could say. It was very cold, down towards -40 degrees, in Älvsbyn on January 4th. So a transformer station burned right in the middle of the village, and several thousand households were left without power - in -40 degree cold. It lasted for a few hours, and then Telia's backup power in the telecommunications mast ran out and the mobile coverage died for the majority of Älvsbyn's residents - so also for the crisis management in the municipality, for the home care service's alarms, yes, in short, almost everyone were left without the possibility to communicate outside the room they were in.
Those who examine this a bit more closely will discover that what governs how long the telecommunications operators need to keep their masts running during a power outage is the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority's regulations 2022:11 - they were therefore decided as late as 2022. In Chapter 11, Section 10, it states: "Providers of mobile communication networks and mobile communication services shall, with reserve power systems, ensure that faults in external power supply do not cause disruption or interruption in communication networks and communication services provided or reduce the coverage area of communication services, for at least one hour in urban areas with more than 8,000 inhabitants and four hours in other locations."
So: In urban areas with over 8,000 inhabitants, the backup power shall last for one hour. In rural areas, it shall last for four hours. The reason is that it can be assumed that the intervals between power outages are longer in rural areas than in the city.
Now, this was an accident. As far as is known, there was no one who, with malicious intent, started the fire that led to the power outage. But play with the thought that someone with malicious intent would want to cut off the electricity supply in Älvsbyn. After four hours, the mobile coverage would die. The question that then arises is: How long can someone keep us without power, and how long would we in that case be without telecommunications?
The questions I asked the Minister were how he intends to act to strengthen access to telecommunications in a crisis and whether he intends to take any initiatives to tighten the requirements for telecommunications operators to maintain reserve power. The Minister's answer leads to many more questions than clarifications.
There is a financing of measures that goes beyond what can be required of the individual operators by charging a standby fee from the larger operators and by the state providing funds to the Post and Telecom Authority. But where, in that case, was the Post and Telecom Authority when Älvsbyn was left without mobile coverage on January 4?
There is also a tele-cooperation group. Certain actors can be required to cooperate in order to restore the infrastructure in the event of an outage. But Telia will not be able to cooperate to start up Vattenfall's electricity supply.
What is the government actually wanting to do to strengthen access to telecommunications in a crisis?
Marcus Wennerström (S)
Mr. Speaker! I shall try to be brief.
It is important, just as Linus Sköld highlights in the debate, to remind oneself that it was also precisely in these days that the Minister for Civil Defence stood in Sälen and spoke about urgency and that the war is coming. The serious times are here and now, he said, and there is no time to wait.
I and Minister Slottner had a debate last autumn regarding the Transport Agency's failure when it comes to helping Heby with a small situational overview of how it looked on the state roads there when the town flooded. I think it would be appropriate if the government also took on the role and sees that there is a state responsibility to shoulder in this situation, which is very serious.
From that perspective, I think it is heart-wrenching that Linus Sköld is submitting just this interpellation, as many socially important actors in the country are very strongly dependent on telecommunications.
This time it was in Älvsbyn. Next time it will be somewhere else. The only thing we can know with great certainty is that it will happen again. Therefore, I think it is reasonable, just as Linus Sköld emphasizes, to consider whether it is not time for the state to step forward and become a clearer demanding party that also updates the requirements for the socially important services, for example telecommunications, and provides clearer guidelines on time for redundancy to create robustness also for other dependent systems.
It is so incredibly many parts that are dependent on telecommunications, and when the fixed networks are also being dismantled as we go, it becomes so incredibly much more important that we have redundancy in the mobile networks. It is them we will be dependent on, regardless of whether it is war or a crisis that occurs.
Statsrådet Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! I believe you are trying to manufacture contradictions that, in the name of honesty, do not exist.
We naturally see what is happening in Sweden. We see what is happening in our global environment in the form of cyberattacks, attacks against telecommunications and internet services, that is, electronic communication in general, and we are and are becoming increasingly vulnerable the more digitized our societies become. This type of targets is also becoming increasingly important in warfare. We see this not least in Ukraine. To disrupt different types of electronic communications is important for warring countries and will probably become increasingly important in the future.
That is why we need to strengthen the protection for electronic communications and the electronic infrastructure, and we will need to strengthen civil defense in general. This government has begun that work, but it is a task that takes time, and the government has been in office for just over a year. This is nothing that is done in a heartbeat, but the work has begun. I can also say that on Thursday we took a government decision on several assignments to the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, where they shall return with proposals on how Sweden can be better protected against so-called hybrid attacks.
An interpellation debate should also answer the questions that are asked. I will not get stuck in a debate about individual events and dates. That is not what I want. But the answers to the questions that have been asked are that we protect ourselves, among other things, through the annual readiness fee that all operators are obliged to pay to PTS so that electronic communications can be strengthened precisely during serious threats or pressures. Furthermore, the state also allocates its own funds to civil defense within the electronic communications sector.
We have the national telecommunications cooperation group which has existed since 2005 but which is a voluntary cooperation. There, the government took a decision as recently as a week ago that this shall now become mandatory. The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority shall be able to order both private and public actors to participate and be helpful in this cooperation group in order to be able to restore destroyed infrastructure, including that of competitors, and to prepare, cooperate and exercise ahead of potential crises and potential destroyed infrastructure.
The government is, therefore, taking actions. We have presented new measures, but we will definitely, and I am sure of it, need to return with more measures to strengthen civil defense in general and electronic communications in particular.
Linus Sköld (S)
Mr. Speaker! I only meant to illustrate a concern when I mentioned it on January 4th. Älvsbyn can be an example. Let us assume that a lasting power outage occurs in Ödeshög tonight. Would the Post and Telecom Authority then come there with reserve power to keep telecommunications running for longer than four hours, since it is a requirement that obviously goes further than the requirement one can place on the individual operator?
The question is principled in its nature, and I do not think the Minister should try to avoid it by claiming that one cannot speak about the individual example. I think the Minister can apply himself to answering the principled question I am asking.
I also think there is a conflict here between bourgeois conviction and what will build a strong society. We saw it in an interpellation debate here in the chamber earlier today when we debated the banks' excess profits with the Minister for Finance. The measures the government is taking to do something about unreasonable excess profits in these expensive times at the banks are to place the responsibility on the customers. We will make it easier for customers to change banks in order to strengthen competition, says the Minister for Finance.
No - politicians must take responsibility for the social system and for building a society that is robust and resilient in crisis and in war!
It is evident when Carl-Oskar Bohlin gives his speech, which Marcus Wennerström mentioned earlier in the rostrum, where in his 15 minutes in the spotlight, "with the authority of the office, less wrapped and with an unvarnished clarity," he speaks about the fact that there could be war in Sweden.
He asked questions that read as follows: Are you a senior official in a preparedness authority? Are you a municipal councillor? Are you an employee? Are you a private individual?
Not a single question was asked: Are you a teleoperator?
He is therefore demanding individual responsibility, and for those who want to know what he asked the private individuals, the question was: Have you taken responsibility for your home preparedness?
Those who want to know what Civil Defense Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin requires in home preparedness can go to Expressen, New Year's Eve 2022. Quite concretely, he writes: "Prepare to be able to manage without society's help for a week, but preferably longer."
From me as an individual, my parents, or any individual person, the government requires a week without electricity, without heat, and without food. From the telecommunications operators, one requires an hour. Is that reasonable, Erik Slottner?
Marcus Wennerström (S)
Mr. Speaker! In order not to become an all-too-long echo of Linus Sköld's powerful contribution just now, I intend to try to keep it brief.
I still think it is worth repeating that we have Heby, we have E22 and we have Älvsbyn. These are just the "individual incidents," to borrow the Minister's words, that have occurred in recent times. Society has been disrupted due to unwanted events. In none of these incidents is there, as far as we know, any foreign power involved. But what all the events have in common is that the state has undoubtedly shone with its absence.
That is why it is so incredibly important that we, just as Linus Sköld emphasizes, reflect on where we place the responsibility when we are to build further and move forward. Do we place it on the individual? Yes. Should we then also place it on the state authorities? Yes. Should we then also place it on the responsible minister to coordinate the state authorities? Yes.
That is why it becomes so important to take the debate beyond individual incidents. They are only part of another pattern. The Minister must answer how they intend to actually remedy the structure that is quite obviously not working.
Statsrådet Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! After hearing Linus Sköld's contribution, I can almost recommend writing an interpellation to Minister for Civil Defence Carl-Oskar Bohlin. He seems to arouse a great interest in the interpellator. Instead of debating other ministers' statements, debate contributions, and any meetings, whom he has or has not met, it is better to take the debate with the minister concerned than for me to stand here and speculate and comment.
I think I answered the interpellation in my previous post, and I will continue to stick to this. My assessment is that the telecommunications operators are very interested and concerned about their networks holding up. There is no telecommunications operator that deliberately neglects or is casual. It is clear that they want robust networks that can withstand attacks, weather phenomena, or whatever it may be. But we know that that type of communication - which I said in my first post - is vulnerable and is subject to attacks today in the world we live in. They are more, so to speak, legitimate prey for foreign powers in a way that we must be vigilant about.
The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority is a robust agency that works well and has several assignments in the area, and I am absolutely not closing the door to further assignments coming. They have received a number of assignments, which I have accounted for, including through the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group, which will place greater demands on teleoperators to prepare and practice as well as to restore when something does occur. We are therefore placing increased requirements on the operators through the bill. It is not at all a matter of placing responsibility on individual individuals, as has been claimed here, but here we show that we want to place greater responsibility on the operators. It will be necessary because we must prepare for the fact that there may be more attacks ahead.
Linus Sköld (S)
Mr. Speaker! The Minister for Civil Affairs urges me to interpellate the Minister for Civil Defence. I will, of course, do so and convey my regards from the Minister for Civil Affairs in that interpellation debate.
The question has been posed to the Minister for Civil Affairs today, who is responsible for mobile telecommunications: Does he intend to take measures to strengthen access to telecommunications in a crisis?
In this context, with the examples I have given, I wonder if he is prepared to place higher requirements on the teleoperators to provide backup power or redundancy for longer than one hour in urban areas and four hours in rural areas. These are the current regulations from the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. The answer that the Minister for Civil Affairs seems satisfied with is that the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority has the money to do what one cannot demand from the individual operator. Does that mean, Erik Slottner, that the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority has the money and the responsibility to supply the mobile masts with backup power if the power outage lasts longer than four hours?
The answer is that one can require teleoperators to cooperate to restore the infrastructure after an outage. But Telia still cannot cooperate to restart the power supply from Vattenfall. I do not think the Minister for Civil Affairs' answer is sufficient. Is he prepared to set stricter requirements than four hours on the teleoperators?
Statsrådet Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! I must return to the specific question that was asked at the end. There are no such proposals now, and I will not spontaneously say that it is a good idea. No changes have occurred during this government; it is the same as what applied during the Social Democratic government over the last eight years. What we have done from the government's side is to set requirements for the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group. We set higher requirements for operators to prepare, practice, and be helpful in restoring downed or destroyed infrastructure. And they shall be able to help other operators. It is a matter of establishing a cooperation between the public and the private sector, which is important not least in these cases.
If it is a question of one hour or four hours, there is nothing concrete now. But I am not closing any doors. We will need more measures from the government's side to protect, among other things, that type of critical infrastructure. All innovative proposals that can strengthen the protection for Sweden, I gratefully accept.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.