Response to interpellation 2023/24:365 on civil defense
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
M argues that the government invests 100 million kronor annually in crisis preparedness and that the county administrative boards have received 60 million kronor from 2023 1. M emphasizes that the investigation into the municipalities' responsibilities is necessary 2, that municipal self-government implies a responsibility for municipal politicians to prioritize security issues 2 and that the government is investing historically much in general state grants 3. M argues that war organization means that one must prioritize socially necessary activities 4 and that civil defense is about redundancy and structures for society's robustness 3. M also argues that it is important to have constitutional preparedness 4. S argues that there is a lack of clarity in the strategic responsibility 5 and that municipalities with regiments need to take responsibility for deeper security analyses 5. S argues that what does not work in normal conditions does not work in a crisis 6, that there are insufficient resources for healthcare in the state budget for 2024 7 and that there is no law that allows healthcare to prioritize away civil healthcare 8. S argues that it is difficult to convince operations managers to break the law 8.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! Marcus Wennerström has asked me what measures I intend to take to ensure that the country's municipalities and regions receive the funds needed to meet the requirements of civil defense. Marcus Wennerström has also asked me whether I assess that the delay of the investigation Fö 2023:02 affects the municipalities' and regions' conditions to contribute to the development of total defense and how I, in that case, intend to work to minimize this impact.
The significantly deteriorated security situation and the experiences from Ukraine have clarified that the pace of the reinforcement of civil defense must increase beyond what was established in the government's bill Totalförsvaret 2021 - 2025. Municipalities and regions have a very important role in civil defense. The government has taken several measures to strengthen the municipalities' and regions' capacity and conditions to contribute to civil defense.
In the budget, the government therefore makes an investment of 100 million kronor annually from and including 2024 on increased grants to municipalities' and regions' work with crisis preparedness and civil defense. Also during 2023, the government invested 100 million kronor on increased grants to these actors.
The County Administrative Boards have an important role in supporting the local and regional levels in their work to develop their preparedness. The Government expects the County Administrative Boards to contribute to the development out in the municipalities, and to strengthen the County Administrative Boards' opportunities to support the municipalities' work with civil defense, 60 million kronor were added to the County Administrative Boards starting from 2023. The County Administrative Boards are responsible for the follow-up of the municipalities' work with crisis preparedness and civil defense.
Regarding the question of whether the delay of the investigation into the basic responsibilities of municipalities and regions before and during peacetime crises and high alert will affect the conditions for municipalities and regions to contribute to the development of total defense, the answer is largely no. Municipalities and regions already today have a great responsibility to live up to the legal requirements that exist. The purpose of the investigation is to create a clearer regulation of the preparedness work of municipalities and regions. It does not affect the importance of working expeditiously with the requirements that already exist in current legislation.
The Defence Preparation Board describes the direction of the total defence and the design of the civil defence in its report Kraftsamling. Later in the year, the board will submit its report on the military defence and the economic conditions for both the military and civil defence. I look forward to that presentation and see that it, together with other documentation, contributes important parameters for continued development.
The investigation into the basic responsibilities of municipalities and regions before and during peacetime crises and heightened alert will make an important contribution to the continued development within total defense. The extension of the investigation period to September 30, 2024, provides the investigator with the conditions to more thoroughly consider the needs for constitutional regulation that exist, as well as to propose a system that provides better opportunities to strengthen and develop the activities of municipalities and regions before and during peacetime crises and heightened alert.
The Government intends to return to the Riksdag during the autumn of 2024 with a bill on the continued direction and design of the total defense. The bill will specify the starting points for the total defense and also the design of the military and civil defense.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize what appears in the budget bill for 2024, that the government considers that the ongoing development of civil defense and society's crisis preparedness needs to continue and be accelerated during the coming years.
Marcus Wennerström (S)
Madam Speaker! I thank Minister Bohlin for the answer.
Sometimes it happens quickly but incorrectly, and in this case, it was I who made the mistake. In my first question to the Minister, unfortunately, a word was omitted. It was the word "goal". But I intend to rectify this in the debate by focusing on the goal.
The Minister highlighted in his response – which I also want to commend for being detailed; it is positive, and I appreciate it – that there is a direction for the total defense in the bill Totalförsvaret 2021–2025. On the other hand, I am not entirely sure that I share the picture the Minister gives of the government having made further large reinforcements of the municipalities' and regions' capacity to contribute. He is welcome to elaborate on this. Certainly, targeted funds have been provided for planning and exercise, and these funds have increased annually. On the other hand, for example, funds for climate measures have been removed. It becomes more planning and fewer measures.
But planning is important. The question, however, is: planning towards what? There, I do not quite share the Minister's view on the result of the investigation, which intends to propose a more purposeful and detailed regulation of what basic responsibility and what main tasks municipalities and regions have in preparations for and during both war and peacetime crises.
Since the mandate looks the way it does, it is reasonable to assume that the government does not consider today's regulation to be expedient. In that case, the expectation should also be changed.
But enough about that. Let us focus on here and now. When the agreement was finalized in recent days between MSB and SKR, it also became clear that there are no longer any prioritized municipalities in Sweden when it comes to the development of civil defense.
Previously, a few municipalities have received more funds and higher requirements to meet the needs of civil defense. Today, that order of priority is gone. This means that the state considers Gotland and Grums as financially equivalent. More concretely, it diminishes the importance of strategically important areas and leaves the responsibility for financing the development of preparedness there to the taxpayers in that specific municipality. In his now-famous speech from Folk och Försvar, the Minister highlighted a number of issues followed by a number of measures. He pointed out that many of us have roles in the system in different ways, but he also handed over the responsibility to find the goals to someone else.
When the investigation is pushed into the future, the goal is also pushed forward in time. The extension does not rhyme so well with the spirit of the speech the Minister held in Sälen. It also gives room for those who are proactive to act already now and risk creating fort but wrong. Perhaps it is better at this stage to urge people to keep a cool head and a warm heart.
To clarify, and to some extent perhaps reformulate, my original question, I would like to have an answer from the Minister on in what way the Minister intends to work so that the defense's need for a functioning civil defense is also reflected in the directions and funding of the municipalities' and regions' assignments.
Eva Lindh (S)
Madam Speaker! The SD-led government has on several occasions said that it is carrying out a historic upgrade of our civil defense. The reality, however, looks completely different. When Marcus Wennerström spoke about goals, I want to speak about resources – that which is important for building up the civil defense.
A fundamental part of civil defense is healthcare. It is one of the most important societal functions, and it is crucial that it functions effectively and can offer good care.
Sweden's civil preparedness is about the local community's ability to prevent and manage war and crises as well as to ensure the most important societal functions. Our hospitals have a crucial role in managing precisely the crises, disasters, and emergency situations. The Armed Forces are very clear when it comes to the regions' responsibility to secure healthcare capacity.
But now we have a healthcare system that is actually threatened in many places. Regions are forced into savings when healthcare should instead be equipped for better quality and reinforced civil preparedness. The underfunding of healthcare activities is now affecting Sweden's population in the form of poorer care and also risks jeopardizing our preparedness.
We have received a new security policy situation, and it affects us all. Our entire society is affected. Therefore, we must build up capabilities, not scale them down. This requires resources to build the foundation in our entire society, for example, healthcare. Our hospitals play a decisive role in civil preparedness and have a critical part in building the country's capability.
I want to conclude by building on Marcus Wennerström's speech. He mentioned the speech that the Minister for Civil Defence gave at Folk och Försvar. I want to conclude by repeating this speech: Are you the Minister for Civil Defence? Good. Have you taken responsibility? If not: Get started!
Hanna Westerén (S)
Madam Speaker! The People and Defence conference in Sälen was just mentioned. When it concluded, it was the serious tones we remembered from there. Perhaps most gravity-laden was that from the Prime Minister and from the Minister for Civil Defence. They clearly signaled that it is extremely urgent to expand civil defence capabilities because Sweden can be attacked and end up in war. The situation is apparently so serious that the Minister has difficulty sleeping at night. In many contexts, people point towards Gotland, my constituency.
The tone requires that the government takes a very clear responsibility for the expansion of total defense and preparedness throughout the country.
The investigation Kraftsamling was mentioned earlier, and it was submitted to the Minister for Defence before Christmas. There, Gotland is pointed out, and in the investigation, it is argued that there is a need to create a special emergency hospital. An emergency hospital shall be an acute hospital with a special capacity to increase the number of care beds, particularly for the care of trauma and other war injuries. The investigation argues that such a hospital shall have a fixed war organization with personnel, premises, equipment, and the capacity for adequate management, coordination, and decision-making, and preferably also have access to protected premises.
Today, state grants for building up civil preparedness are distributed to regions based on population size. This means that the region with perhaps the most strategic and vulnerable position receives the fewest resources for the build-up of the civil defense that is crucial for both Sweden and Nato. 61,000 taxpayers on Gotland cannot possibly provide the capacity build-up that is now necessary and expected from the government and the Armed Forces. Gotland's geographical location means that the preparedness needs to be built faster and with different force than in the rest of the country. Furthermore, Gotland, as is well known, is an island, and we always risk being completely cut off and therefore need special solutions and special responsibility. This applies to healthcare as well as our electricity supply, reserve port, supply and storage issues, and of course also access to the right competence.
Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly clear for those of us who live and work for Gotland that no authority considers itself to have the overall responsibility, let alone the mandate, to ensure Gotland's special conditions. That responsibility falls heavily on the government. Serious words like those we heard from Folk och Försvar in Sälen do not build preparedness. Therefore, I wonder how Civil Defence Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin intends to support those regions where the buildup of preparedness is most urgent.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! I can state, and state with confidence, that the speech in Sälen at least seems to have brought about a deepened interest among the Social Democrats regarding civil defense. We have debated three separate interpellations on the subject here tonight, and I appreciate that there is a great deal of engagement.
I can also observe that there is a certain tone of mockery in the undertone of some of the posts. I am not entirely sure that this is how one should approach the complicated security situation that Sweden is currently in. Sweden is in a time of seriousness, and it places higher demands on all actors in society. This applies to the government, but it naturally also applies to members of the Swedish Riksdag.
Let me, Madam Speaker, begin by correcting the claim from Marcus Wennerström that climate adaptation measures for municipalities would be scrapped. That is not correct. The Government allocates half a billion in expenditure area 6 for climate adaptation measures, which can be applied for by municipalities. It is as much as the previous Social Democratic government allocated for this purpose.
What Marcus Wennerström is possibly thinking of is that the appropriation for analysis measures at MSB is reduced by a few million kronor and the same applies when it comes to the county administrative boards. The mandate remains with the agency, however – an agency that receives an increased appropriation in total, so it simply does not hold water that there would be a lowered level of ambition in this part.
What is the point of my answer here tonight? Well, the point is that it is as we state: The investigation of municipalities' and regions' responsibilities during crisis and high alert is very necessary simply because it was not possible for the previous Social Democratic government to proceed with the proposals for municipalities and regions that were presented in the structural investigation because it was judged that the investigation did not hold sufficiently high quality in those parts. It was also criticized by Sveriges Kommuner och Regioner, which acted as a referral body. Therefore, it fell to the government to take on this issue.
It is important that we get this in place as quickly as possible. The point of my answer was that there are no missing tasks for municipalities and regions to tackle here and now, in the meantime, while waiting for us to get this structural change in place.
That was somewhat my point as well when I gave my speech in Sälen, as was referred to here, namely to concretely exemplify what is already today a municipal responsibility that one must work with. In that regard, some municipalities are very far ahead in the development, and other municipalities are further behind. I do not like to point out bad examples. I prefer to highlight good examples.
It is the case that we have a local self-government in this country that very few question. But the local self-government naturally comes with a responsibility, namely that local politicians have to prioritize these issues in competition with others. Then the point is that the worsened security situation requires everyone to make their contribution.
It naturally concerns the government. I have accounted for a number of the initiatives the government is undertaking that go further than the previous defense decision. We are therefore signaling a higher level of ambition.
I hear the questions from S but note no other budget proposal than the one the government presents on expenditure area 6.
Marcus Wennerström (S)
Madam Speaker! If I was part of what the Minister perceived as mockery, it was never my intention. These are highly serious issues, and we shall discuss them for what they are. Therefore, it is perhaps good to start by focusing where the Minister stopped, on local self-government.
It is of course clear that if we look at it from the perspective of crisis preparedness, municipal self-government and the principle of responsibility, the principle of proximity, and the principle of equality are very important parameters to weigh in the work that is to be done. That is entirely correct. But what I wanted to highlight in my first post, and where there is a real lack of clarity, is the strategic responsibility in the planning to also be a support resource for the military defense.
It is there that it becomes problematic when we equate Gotland's situation with that in Grums. Nothing wrong with Grums, but in my opinion, Grums has a different military-strategic interest and a different importance than Gotland.
To describe more concretely what tasks are landing on municipalities now when pressure is applied and things move fast and sometimes perhaps go wrong, it is the case that we have municipalities that, for example, have regiments within them. There, if not orders, come very clear expectations to transition much of the activity and ramp up in order to be able to work with host nation support based on the Nato application that we have undergone an all-too-long process for so that it will hopefully soon be approved.
It is about transferred threat images that - now also the Minister for Justice is here - the security protection needs to handle. This means that municipalities, as a result of having, for example, a regiment in the municipality, need to shoulder that responsibility, perform much deeper security analyses, and take measures that cost very much money if they are to be able to deliver necessary supplies to these regiments.
So, it is about transferred tasks from the state's will to be able to militarily defend the country that land on execution in the municipalities. That is where I don't quite get the pieces to fit together, and that is where I am truly concerned. Let it be that from a PR perspective there has been a lot of fuss regarding the Minister's speech in Sälen, but fear as a driving force to develop a civil defense in the country is not the right way to go.
I think it was a much better tone when we concluded the previous interpellation debate, where we spoke about the unity of the people. That is also where we need to shift the focus to land there.
My question, which underlies this interpellation, remains, as I still lack a clear direction from the government on how it intends to ensure that municipalities and regions are given the opportunity to shoulder the responsibility that they so willingly want to take. This is highlighted extra carefully in the posts we have heard regarding the conditions for healthcare, because it is not possible to separate the function of welfare in everyday life from the function of welfare when there is a crisis or war.
Eva Lindh (S)
Madam Speaker! No, we are not being hysterical. We are probably just trying to highlight an issue without appearing as upset as I, in many ways, actually am.
I am also trying to convey the message that quite a few people have asked me to convey to the Minister for Civil Defence. It is primarily people who work within healthcare.
If you ask others to take responsibility, you must also take responsibility yourself. That was what I was trying to say in my attempt to traverse the Minister for Civil Defence.
During the pandemic, we worked hard to take care of the country, which was in crisis. We learned several things. One of the things we learned was that what works before the crisis, in the normal situation, usually works in a crisis. What does not work in the normal situation, before the crisis, does not work in a crisis either.
It is therefore that many of us are concerned not only about the healthcare in its current state but because we have understood, not only after the speech at Folk och Försvar, that we need to build our civil defense. And when healthcare faces a healthcare crisis, we realize that it will also entail problems if there is a crisis or war. It is therefore that we raise this issue - because it is so important to focus on.
No, we may not have more money in expenditure area 6, but we have more money in expenditure area 25, that is to say, to build a strong healthcare system both in normal situations and in crisis and war.
Hanna Westerén (S)
Madam Speaker! Earlier this evening, we debated the households' preparedness in the event of a crisis or war. Then Minister Bohlin said that we should be able to agree that civil defense needs to become better. And yes, we agree that civil defense needs to become better. That is why we are here – because words must be followed by action.
Gotland has for a very long time emphasized the unique conditions that Sweden's smallest healthcare provider has. Fulfilling the mission of offering emergency care and maternity care around the clock in peacetime with 61,000 inhabitants is very challenging. At high alert, it is an impossibility given the economic conditions.
In the state budget for 2024, there are insufficient resources for healthcare. All over the country, regions are forced to lay off doctors, nurses, and nursing assistants because the budgets do not balance.
The situation in Gotland is not improving. Gotland, just like other regions, has decided on a budget with a negative result. Today, there are insufficient resources for healthcare in peacetime, given the Riksdag's ambitions. If we are also to expand our capacity and be fully able to support the Armed Forces in the event of war, a completely different level of ambition is required from the state.
The government must promptly announce what the capacity increase will consist of and who will pay for it. Solemn words and austerity budgets are not enough; on the contrary, they lead us in the wrong direction. Can Sweden's regions expect increased support to build up preparedness in the event of a crisis or war? This is, moreover, something that not only we Social Democrats are wondering about; among others, a Moderate regional council on Gotland is requesting the same announcement.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! I note that the debate and discussion on civil defense, when conducted by the Social Democrats, often tends to slide into a general welfare debate. The debate can, of course, be conducted in that way, but it means that it sometimes becomes superficial and that central perspectives regarding what civil defense is about are missed.
Let me just say, for the sake of having it said, that this government, alongside the investments being made in expenditure area 6 and other expenditure areas specifically concerning the buildup of civil defense, is investing a historically large amount in general state grants to municipalities and regions: 16 billion kronor for 2024. It is a record amount - just so that we have that framework clear for us.
But civil defense is very much about having the ability to choose what is most central to the operations that must be maintained. We must not forget that planning for the requirements of war places completely different demands on society than the management of normal operations or peacetime crises. This means in plain terms that under highest alert, total defense activity is all the activity that is to be conducted in society.
If one lives in the belief that this means that welfare will be available to the population in the way it normally is, one lives in an illusion. It is about making very hard and difficult prioritizations to channel all of society's resources to largely fulfill two things: first, to ensure that the most basic functions of a society can be maintained, and second, to channel all conceivable support to the military defense and ensure its conditions to fulfill its tasks.
This places completely different demands on our welfare apparatus than what we typically envision when we talk about welfare under normal conditions. It is about having planning prerequisites ready for war conditions. The Minister for Health and Social Affairs has given the National Board of Health and Welfare a number of assignments in this area. It is about ensuring that we have the equipment and resources to be able to handle this.
During the previous year, the government decided to procure a state national security stock of trauma care products. This has been completely missing in Sweden previously, since we decommissioned our supply readiness. Now we have acquired resources to be able to handle a mass casualty incident on Swedish territory.
But to speak plainly: The welfare as we know it will, in the event of an armed attack, not be available. It will be directed to those who absolutely need it to carry out our defense efforts - just so that we keep the magnitudes separate in the discussion.
Planning for civil defense is about having redundancy and structures to secure society's robustness and ensure that its basic functions can function and be maintained under highly disrupted conditions.
Marcus Wennerström (S)
Madam Speaker! I note the Minister's desire to lift the gaze away from welfare and think that it may well be so when one finds oneself in the middle of a healthcare crisis like we have not seen since the 90s. I also think it is important to remember that continuity in operations is built on a functioning everyday life. Robustness in a society is built on a functioning everyday life. War organization is built on everyday life, and much more.
When it comes to what the Minister seems to be giving a picture of, it is either that I do not understand or he is hitting his head against a brick wall. Today, there is no law that allows healthcare to prioritize only, for example, military healthcare. HSL still applies, regardless of whether it is heightened or highest alert. It is care based on need that applies, regardless of whether you are dressed in green or are a civilian and regardless of whether you are going to give birth to a child or have received a bullet in the leg.
Municipalities are faced today with planning where the priorities they need to make are illegal. We have a combined heat and power plant in Enköping. It has the possibility to produce electricity. If we would like to have the ability to produce that electricity even if the heat supply is shut down, we need to pump out water into the river - that is illegal. If we are to plan for this, I think it is important that the state clarifies what scope we are allowed to plan within. It is easy to say "do it!" but difficult to convince operations managers that they should break the law.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Madam Speaker! Now this debate is beginning to approach the heart of the matter, and I appreciate that Marcus Wennerström, at least in his last contribution, took it there.
Just what Marcus Wennerström points out is part of the structural problems with civil defense that we are currently working to rectify. It is about ensuring that we have constitutional readiness so that no one, as the interpellator says, should have to break the law. We have had overly complicated regulatory frameworks that have not taken into account security policy situations of this kind. It is precisely this that it is about.
Mr. Speaker, I just want to partially agree with the interpellator's claim that a war organization means we are to do everything as usual but even more or a little more. In reality, building a war organization is very much about defining what we should not do in the event of high alert. That is to say: What is not total defense in the event of highest alert? Which activities in the municipality or in the agency should we put on a low flame in order to reprioritize resources to focus on the activities that are completely socially necessary and war-critical in the event of an armed attack?
It is this type of planning prerequisites that one can only acquire in a purposeful manner under peacetime conditions. That is why the message to get started exists. That mission already exists. But despite that, we see that far too few municipalities and authorities have taken this responsibility.
Today, however, pleasing figures arrived showing that even more municipalities are currently doing exactly this. It possibly underscores the importance of strategic communication, which the Socialdemokraterni, for some inscrutable reason, seem to be turning against.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.