Response to interpellation 2023/24:493 on the Defense Forces' brigades

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Peter Hultqvist has asked me what conclusions I draw from ÖB's military advice regarding brigade capability and what measures I believe should be taken in relation to this.

The core of our defense capability is personnel and materially equipped and self-sufficient war units. As a result of the latest defense decision in 2020, with defense against armed attack as the Armed Forces' main task, the Armed Forces' war organization is undergoing reorganization and growth in the period up to 2030. The war organization is growing from approximately 60,000 to over 100,000 positions plus reserves. It is nearly a doubling and requires that the personnel and material supply functions. It also places demands on the basic organization to have the prerequisites to be able to produce war units.

The army is also growing and being reorganized. According to the submitted defense decision, the army shall primarily consist of three mechanized brigades, a reduced motorized brigade, and an augmented mechanized battalion 2030. In addition to this, there will be a number of independent and supporting units. The army is also developing the capability to fight in a division where several brigades are included.

The Supreme Commander submitted a military advice on November 6, 2023. In this context, it should be mentioned that it is precisely an advice and an important part among several other reports and documents to provide a consolidated picture of the current situation. In his advice, the Supreme Commander proposes a delay in the intake of the decided war organization until 2035. This is primarily with regard to the fact that the global situation with associated readiness, the condition of the materiel, the upcoming membership in Nato, and the extensive support to Ukraine affect the possibilities for war unit production. The authority notes that the starting point, among other things, involves a delay in the establishment of the brigades. According to the information I have from the Armed Forces, the main reason for the delay of the brigades is based on the availability of materiel.

In view of the global situation and our membership in Nato, we now face a new defense decision, where the government will submit a total defense proposal in the autumn. With the Defense Committee's ongoing work and reporting, as well as the Swedish Armed Forces' input, the government is continuously gathering information ahead of the upcoming defense decision.

The possibility of war material production is a priority issue, not least because Nato as an organization does not carry out any such production, but it falls on the responsibility of the member countries.

There is a broad political consensus on our security and defense policy and on the need to strengthen our defense and thereby the collective defense within the framework of Nato. It is also of the utmost importance that we continue our support for Ukraine and the country's capabilities to defend itself against Russia's war of aggression and illegal attacks.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! Thank you for the answer, Minister for Defence! We now find ourselves in this security policy situation, which has not been this bad since the Second World War. We thus have an unpredictable Russia that is waging a war in Ukraine.

Until 2030, it is six years. It is difficult to have an idea of what will happen during those six years. I believe one should be cautious about having overly certain assessments on that point. On the other hand, the unpredictability of the Russian regime is definitely a reality, and what happens in the rest of Europe and in surrounding countries can be closely linked to how the Russian warfare in Ukraine proceeds.

We would then have two brigades by 2030. We can look at the Nordic region. Norway has one brigade. We have one brigade up there. Finland is to possibly have something similar - one brigade. This is then the defense concerning the Nordic region in a scenario with an attack from the Russian side or some form of conflict.

A brigade that subsequently has the possibility of being relieved by another brigade is not the power required in such a situation. It can be a rotation time that is quite short. One can look at how long the warfare in Ukraine is.

We must realize that this is an issue that must be noticed and carefully discussed both in the Defence Preparedness Committee and at the Ministry. It is clear that it is a matter of a holistic view when one puts together a defense force and a defense decision. But when one sees points that can be perceived as weaknesses, one must also look at how we can seriously address this. What should a Swedish territorial army look like beyond these two brigades? Is the Home Guard the organization that should take responsibility for the rest of Sweden?

I mean that we must look at how we can secure additional resources on the army side until 2030, beyond what is in ÖB's advice. It was positive that the Minister for Defence, in his response here below, underlines that it is precisely an advice. But it is also the case that the Defence Preparation Board, beyond this, has full possibilities to make its own considerations, and then it is the question of what pressure the Ministry and the Government Offices exert on parts of the board on the issue. I consider that this is a point that is, above all, not satisfactorily resolved today.

There are variants on how one can produce different troop resources. One can imagine reduced brigades, lighter brigades, and different dimensions and levels when looking at how such a question can be solved.

I am quite sure that we need more than these two brigades in 2030. Regarding the fact that it is pushed back as far as 2035, it could also be that the process might not be carried out with the efficiency stated in a potential decision.

So here we have a common problem, and it would be interesting to hear what the Minister for Defence has to say on that point.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Let me then be clear about what is stated in the ÖB's advice and what is not. It is not a question of a reduction of ambition in volume but a reduction of ambition in terms of time. What is being said is that Sweden needs three brigades plus also the fourth brigade and also a reduced combat group. What is also being said is that it will take longer than until 2030 to complete this.

It is therefore not just that we have two brigades and then nothing more. I want to be clear about this so that what ÖB has said is not misinterpreted.

The reasons why ÖB has said this are actually two, and Peter Hultqvist is aware of them. One is that the support for Ukraine, which I perceive that we are fundamentally completely in agreement on needing and should be strong, naturally affects the Armed Forces' growth. It would be strange otherwise. It affects the Armed Forces' growth because we have carried out extensive training efforts for Ukrainian soldiers both in Sweden and abroad, and then it is more difficult to train new units. But above all, it affects the materiel side. We have, for example, donated 50 combat vehicles and a number of Archer pieces and main battle tanks, so it is natural.

The second thing that ÖB points out is that with the NATO membership, we are of course not only expected to defend Sweden, but we will also participate in NATO's collective defense. In that regard, ÖB has pointed out that two of the brigades must be completed first and ensure that they also have strategic mobility, that is, that they can be moved outside of Swedish territory.

The delay in the completion of the war organization is fundamentally about this. As an adaptation to the NATO membership to strengthen the two brigades, but naturally also to handle replacement acquisitions on the materiel side due to the donations we have made to Ukraine, it will not be finished until 2030 but until 2035.

I have appointed the Defense Committee. I do not intend to anticipate the Defense Committee's conclusions, because if I go out and point out that this and that we must address, or that this and that regiment we shall have, I create exactly the constraints that Peter Hultqvist speaks about.

He asks what pressure the government exerts on parts of the Defence Preparation. We exert no pressure. If, however, I were to go out and endorse or dismiss different parts of the ÖB's military council and thus lock the Defence Preparation, I believe I would create poorer conditions for the members of the Defence Preparation to find a broad consensus regarding security and defense policy and the upcoming war and basic organization.

Let me just say one thing that I consider to be fundamentally important and that I try to return to in all my speeches. It is that the core of our defense capability consists of materially and personnel-filled combat units. There are deficiencies there, especially within the army. For far too long, the army has found it too difficult to obtain material allocation, and when it comes to the units, I want to see established type units so that we know how many main battle tanks and how many combat vehicles are to be included in each brigade. We have had that order before.

There are also other challenges linked primarily to the ground forces and the army when it comes to personal equipment. I will return to that.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! I am fully aware that it is about a delay, and that is why I say what I say. It is, therefore, about a delay of five years, which will be eleven years from today's date. In a situation with war in Ukraine and uncertainties all around us, it is quite a big deal.

It sounds as if Pål Jonson is trying to argue for the implementation of ÖB's advice. One almost gets the impression that it is the government's position. Then it is said that one should not get stuck on this. But I have not asked for any locking. What I have asked for is that one can focus and discuss a problem that, in any case, I and perhaps someone else perceive as quite large, namely that we are to have two brigades in 2030. The scenario I drew up here is not an unrealistic scenario. If we have such a low level in such a conflict situation, we have problems, and if the Home Guard is to constitute the remaining territorial defense, it is not sufficient.

Well, one should look at fast tracks to produce forces in different ways. You don't need to have the total level of the brigade with all types of weapon systems and systems within systems, which also cost very much. One can easily imagine simpler forms to reach something that makes us have a larger army in 2030 than what this ÖB-council now implies. It is something that at least I seriously intend to discuss in the Defence Preparation Board, and I hope that those who represent the government side there do not feel that they cannot be part of such a discussion.

It is said from all possible sides that the Arctic region constitutes a major problem and that the Russians have ambitions in that area. This concerns, for example, how one views the proximity to Murmansk. What need does one consider that they have to control northern Finland, northern Sweden, and northern Norway? That is the Russian perspective, which is linked to the operational parts out in the Atlantic from Murmansk and other ambitions in the Arctic.

That is how this problem looks, and that is why I mean that something more than this was needed by 2030.

Then we naturally have air forces, and we also have naval forces. There are some different theories. Some argue that the battle will not take place on land but in other contexts. I don't know. Many military theories and strategies regarding Ukraine have indeed turned out to be completely incorrect. There we now have a war that very much resembles the first and also the second world war in its design. Therefore, one must not think away precisely the land dimension, and it is from that perspective that I want to point out what I perceive as a weakness.

I understand the entire discussion regarding the totality of the Armed Forces and so on, but one still cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that eleven years is a long time. A lot can happen in eleven years. A lot can happen in a year as well, and a lot can happen until 2030. But now we must look at how we solve this situation somewhat better than what exists in the council.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Let me then be clear on two points.

Do I prefer that the entire war organization is completed by 2030 or by 2035? It is very simple – just like Peter Hultqvist, I would prefer that the entire defense organization is completed by 2030. It is crystal clear. We need a stronger defense capability. But I listen to and take the impressions of the profession, and I believe that ÖB, along with several others, has a well-elaborated advice. That does not mean that the Defense Commission must follow it, but I think it is an important starting point for the Defense Commission's further work. I know that people have worked hard within the Armed Forces to produce this basis. They have conducted war games on it and evaluated it. Therefore, I think it is an important input to the Defense Commission's work. But, again, it is the Defense Commission that will come with the proposal based on its assessment of how it believes the war and basic organization should be fulfilled.

What we might possibly have differing views on is whether we should establish new brigades or whether we should complete those we have started. I think there has been too much within defense policy regarding us having new brigades without finishing the work in the brigades we have. We know today that we have deficiencies regarding our brigades, not least concerning logistics and maintenance, availability of ammunition, and to some extent also strategic mobility. I think it is important that one completes the brigades one has before pointing out new ones. There is an imbalance that the Armed Forces have pointed out between combat units, that is to say the maneuver units, the main battle tanks and the artillery, and such as logistics and maintenance.

When I say that the core of our defense capability consists of materially and personnel-filled combat units, it means that the brigades must also be materially and personnel-filled. I think that is important. We can talk about how many brigades we want, but if there is no personnel fulfillment in them, they do not have the defense capability and the deterrent capability that we strive for. That is why I think it is important that type units are established so that one knows how many main battle tanks and how many combat vehicles should be included in a brigade.

What I also feel concern about is the issue linked to personal equipment, because it indicates deficiencies. Personal equipment is a problem and something that negatively affects the basic training for conscripts. It is also an indication of our ability to mobilize. There, the government must decide that the Armed Forces are allowed to come and report on how the work with organizational regulations, materiel, and personal equipment is progressing. I believe it is necessary so that we get order and clarity and better conditions for growth, not least within the army. I believe that Peter Hultqvist and I agree that the ground forces have been very important and central during the war in Ukraine.

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Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! First and foremost, I think Pål Jonson is avoiding the core issue of what I am raising here – whether it is a sufficiently strong organization that is presented to meet the challenge that I tried to describe in a scenario.

Of course we should listen to the profession. The advice from ÖB covers very many pages of text across a long range of areas. I am pointing out one area now. And we cannot set up the defense policy considerations in such a way that if the profession, that is the Armed Forces, has said something, it is almost legally bound that one is not allowed to change this. The entire argumentation for the Minister for Defence becomes, in some way, as if the government has decided that it is ÖB's advice that applies and that it is difficult to shake it.

I am well aware of all these things that the Minister of Defence brings up regarding logistics, ammunition, mobility, and personnel supply. But in a situation such as the one we see when we look at what is happening around us and in Ukraine, and when we look at other historical conflicts, it has been shown that beyond what is, so to speak, the ordinary nomenclature for how such things are produced, a great deal can be done if both the political will exists and the imagination and creativity exist.

That is why I bring up this point that it could be possible to arrange other types of units that could complement the two brigades without following all parts of the regular pattern. It could be seen as a buildup of those units until they are full brigades.

This can be seen in many different ways. But unfortunately, it is the case that when it comes to the entire military discussion, one often becomes bound by all these nomenclatures, and in the end, no one has the strength to push forward properly. But there I mean that we can help each other.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Very good! Defense policy is a team sport. I am happy to do this together, and the way we handle it is by appointing the Defense Committee. This is something we in the government have prioritized. I can state that the Prime Minister was present when we presented this, and it is an expression of our desire to find these broad agreements linked to security and defense policy.

I believe that the Defence Preparation Committee should be allowed to work in peace without me, as the responsible minister, intervening and pointing out parts of the Defence Preparation Committee's military advice as wrong or right, because if I do that, I believe it will become more difficult for the Defence Preparation Committee's members to find consensus.

I do not want the Defense Preparedness Board to be directed; instead, I want it to be allowed to act independently. I do not know if Peter Hultqvist has experienced that we have tried to influence the world situation analysis or the design of the civil defense. I think the Defense Preparedness Board has served us well, and it has partly done so because it has been allowed to work independently. That is what I intend to continue to safeguard.

Since it is not the case that we have nothing else besides two brigades until 2030, the work continues with the third brigade and also the combat group that is to be on Gotland. They exist and are existing. The assessment that ÖB made was that NATO membership will affect the military geography and that it is then more important to have strategic mobility in the two brigades so that they can be deployed outside Sweden and that one first finishes them and later focuses on the other two brigades.

This is a recommendation. I am not locked into it, and I do not believe that the Defence Preparation Board is locked into it. I only wish for the Defence Preparation Board to find a broad agreement linked to the defense economy, the basic organization, and the war organization. It is good for Sweden if we can find those agreements.

Thank you, Peter Hultqvist, for the interpellation!

The interpellations debate was hereby concluded.

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