Response to interpellation 2024/25:269 on coexistence between the Armed Forces' activities and expanded wind power
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
M argues that the military defense must be strengthened quickly due to the deteriorated security situation 1. M considers offshore wind power in the Baltic Sea to be problematic under the current security policy and technological situation 2. M argues that the government prioritizes security and rejects wind farms due to unacceptable security risks 3. M wants a more predictable process with an allocation system 3. S considers the energy supply to be an important part of the total defense 4. S argues that wind power can be established relatively quickly 4 and suggests that one should work with technology to solve problems 5. S wants every project to be tested individually.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! [The member] has asked me whether the government has taken note of the Total Defence Research Institute's report "Opportunities for coexistence between the Armed Forces' activities and expanded wind power" and whether the report has been presented to the government. Heléne Björklund has also asked whether the government is aware of the proposals and conclusions presented in the FOI report and whether these have been considered in the government's work to balance the Armed Forces' needs and the expansion of renewable energy.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed and worsened the security situation in our part of the world. This means that the military defense must continue to be strengthened and that the buildup needs to occur at a faster pace.
At the same time as the total defense is to grow, an energy transition is underway with a continued strongly increased need for fossil-free energy. To achieve a long-term sustainable expansion of the energy system, it is required that consideration is taken of other affected interests, including the military defense. The Armed Forces and other defense authorities are dependent on being able to use land and water areas, facilities, and infrastructure in a purposeful manner.
The Government is very familiar with the report that the interpellator mentions. Indeed, a study was reported which FOI had carried out on behalf of the Armed Forces and the Swedish Energy Agency. The assignment is based on tasks that the Government has given to the Armed Forces in previous regulatory letters and to the Swedish Energy Agency in the agency's instructions.
FOI's report also constitutes one of several bases for the Armed Forces' reporting of task 19 in the regulatory letter for the 2020 budget year. The task was to analyze the experiences of comparable countries and neighboring countries regarding functional coexistence between the Armed Forces and heavily expanded wind power within the same geographical area. The Armed Forces were to provide proposals on how the Swedish system can be improved in that respect.
The FOI report provides suggestions on how future decision-making can be changed to increase the possibilities for coexistence and reports the need for continued development. It also leaves a number of suggestions for questions for future research. The report cannot, however, be used in the preparation of specific applications for permits for wind power.
Heléne Björklund (S)
Madam Speaker! I thank the Minister for Defence for the answer.
The questions arise from the fact that this very substantial report was presented to the Committee on Defence in December. We asked many questions about this then and were very engaged. Two of the questions were whether the government had requested a presentation and received a copy of the report. The answer to these two questions was no. The government could, in itself, have received a copy of the report without FOI having come and presented it.
It is a solid analysis and solid proposals. I am well aware of the problems that establishments can entail, but it is the Försvarsmakten's own agency and its own experts who have conducted this investigation and report. They have very many good proposals.
They have also taken a European perspective and looked at how other countries resolve this coexistence. The countries that have been analyzed here, in addition to Sweden, are Finland, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In these countries, there is a much clearer and stronger connection and a clear mandate for the defense forces and the energy producers to cooperate. I lack that mandate in Sweden. In all these countries, there is also a national group working to find solutions and which has a clear mandate from the state to find coexistence solutions. It is also common that the countries' defense forces participate very actively in this planning process.
Of course, there are many security interests involved here, but the energy supply is also an important part of our total defense. We need several different types of energy. We need more energy production, and wind power is a type of energy that can be established relatively quickly.
It is therefore very surprising that the government says no to large investments and establishments across the board. Then we can ask ourselves whether the government has truly focused on giving mandates for coexistence as clearly as has been done in the neighboring countries.
I would like to ask a follow-up question. When we now say no to wind power in Swedish waters, the establishments will occur somewhere else. Is it not better for the Armed Forces to have insight and the possibility of planning, monitoring, and development—which is the case if the establishment occurs in Swedish waters—than for this to end up somewhere else and we thereby lose control?
In conclusion, I would like to ask if there is any plan to establish a national coexistence group or to give a clearer mandate on coexistence.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Heléne Björklund is a very experienced Member of Parliament in defense policy, so I will not talk about the deteriorating security situation in the world and that it requires a faster buildup of the total defense. I just want to mention the national security strategy, where it is very clear that the government's most important task is to safeguard Sweden's security and thus also to strengthen internal and external security. This is, therefore, a conscious prioritization that we have made in the national security strategy.
Sometimes conflicts of objectives arise in different types of coexistence issues. The Armed Forces said that it would lead to unacceptable security risks if we built 13 wind farms in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, the government reached the same conclusion as the Armed Forces. I wanted to give a recapitulation of this.
I have actually read the FOI report. I think it is good and lively. The first thing one should establish regarding this report, however, is that it cannot be used as a basis for evaluating these 13 rejections, which FOI has also stated on its website, but rather that this is a way of thinking about how one can develop the cooperation capacity further ahead. I have the privilege of later having a debate with Adrian Magnusson on how we can further develop that model.
The FOI report arrived in April 2022, and it was therefore not this government but the previous government that received it. As I recall, the previous government did not request any presentation of the report, but that does not necessarily mean that any shadow should fall over the previous government. It is actually quite unusual for a government to receive a presentation of an FOI report. On the other hand, FOI often comes and presents its reports to the Government Offices.
What made it all a bit different this time was that it was not a request from the government or the Government Offices, but a request from the Armed Forces and the Energy Agency. It is good to know the background to the report.
How do we see the way forward regarding this? We do not have a particularly good process. We want a more predictable process, and we want faster and clearer decisions linked to the offshore wind farms.
The investigation that arrived on December 13 is very central regarding this. It addresses an auctioning system that is fundamentally about an allocation system. I believe it is the right way to go, and the Armed Forces also point out in their submission that it is much easier for them to enter these discussions in the planning phase rather than in the permit phase. That is what we are all striving for as well, Madam Speaker, in order to achieve faster and more predictable processes.
Regarding whether the offshore wind power should be in Swedish or foreign territory, one must weigh the advantages against the disadvantages. What the Swedish Armed Forces have pointed out is, naturally, that there would be problems with accessibility if one were to have compensatory measures, that is, if one were to install radars in offshore wind farms. If it is a private actor, and especially if it is a foreign actor, that disposes of these wind turbines, it could be a threat linked to intelligence gathering. This must be taken into account.
The second dimension is that it is clear that the offshore wind turbines then also become more worthy of protection. Someone therefore needs to take measures to protect them from various thefts, and they must also be monitored during crisis and war situations so that they do not become attacked.
Heléne Björklund (S)
Madam Speaker! I am pleased that the Minister for Defence is sincere, honest, and committed, and that he has taken part in this report. I am, of course, well aware that it was commissioned and arrived during an S-led government. I am also well aware that much has happened in the security policy situation since then. We must have great respect for that, and I do.
I also posed a question regarding the fact that the energy supply is also an important part of the total defense. I am well aware that problems can arise with offshore wind power, which we do not need to go into in detail, not least in our region in the Baltic Sea. Other countries—I will not go into every country, but the countries that are analyzed here—have indeed developed technology or are working with technology to remove these problems. I think, at least, it would be a very pressing issue to continue working on.
I can only give as an example that we here in Blekinge have a meeting place called Blue Science Park - I actually believe that the Minister for Defence has been there - which works with precisely underwater technology and which gathers the private business sector to continue working on such issues. To work with such technology, whether one intends to use it or not, I think would be an excellent assignment to give in order to develop it. There are also large companies that have said they possibly have solutions.
When it comes to the energy supply in general, we have seen in Ukraine that a strategy in Russia's war of aggression - they have changed strategy several times - has been to attack the energy supply in Ukraine. If one looks at Sweden, it is also appropriate that we have many different parts in the energy supply that work together.
I know that the government would like to establish a lot of new nuclear power, and I am personally in favor of that. We Social Democrats have also said yes to building new nuclear power, but then in the existing areas. There also arises a question when it comes to whether we should establish new nuclear power in new areas, instead of offshore wind power. It will also involve great security risks both around these nuclear power plants and for our total energy supply.
There will be a new question in this round: How does the Minister for Defence and the government view building new nuclear power as a risk? I actually do not believe I received an answer in the previous round to the question of whether any work is underway to form a national coexistence group that is given the clear mandate to find solutions.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! I appreciate that Heléne Björklund mentions Blue Science Park. We have also proposed that Blue Science Park, together with a number of other sites in Sweden, should become what are called testbeds for Nato's defense and innovation initiatives. This is due to the unique capability one has within both civil and military infrastructure. This is, of course, a very important competence these days. It is therefore good if this can be further developed, and I gladly welcome a discussion with Heléne Björklund linked to a specific mission there. It is a unique Swedish competence that we can also contribute as Nato allies.
I think the FOI report is good. It is thought-provoking and worth reading. It is more of a research report than a traditional investigation, and that is how it should be when it is FOI producing reports.
Connecting to what is called compensatory measures, I want to say again that it matters where the offshore wind power is based. We had a presentation of this in November, and the offshore wind power that, so to speak, faces in Sweden's direction towards Kaliningrad is problematic to set up. That is because it naturally affects the Defense Forces' radar and sensor chain.
There is technology that could potentially handle and compensate for this to some extent. What it cannot solve, however, is primarily the need we have for sonars, i.e., identifying underwater threats. There is no solution for that. This naturally affects the Armed Forces' operations, and I just want to remind everyone that it also affects the Defence Radio Establishment's operations. The compensatory measures are therefore not uncomplicated. As Heléne Björklund knows, it primarily concerns the problems we have with being able to identify incoming ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. If there is sea-based wind power in the way, it could significantly shorten the warning time. There are therefore several aspects that need to be weighed in regarding this.
The question I did not answer in my previous post concerned coexistence. I have had the privilege of having an interpellation debate with Adrian Magnusson where he also requested a reference in the regulatory letter to the need for coexistence. At that time, I said no to this; it is, in fact, in the Armed Forces' instructions. Now, however, an investigation arrived on December 13 which showed a guidance system and the way forward. In this regulatory letter, for 2025, it actually states that the Armed Forces shall continue to work on coexistence issues together with other relevant actors. We think that is good.
In light of the new documents we have now, we believe that there is an opportunity to move forward in this, not least when it comes to the processing of the investigation we received on December 13. We are preparing it at the Government Offices, so I will not anticipate that – it usually takes some time. There shall be referrals to the Council on Legislation and so on on it, but I hope that is the way forward. In light of the investigation that has now been presented, I want to say that there is also a mandate for the Armed Forces in the regulatory letter to continue working on coexistence issues.
Heléne Björklund (S)
Madam Speaker! The fact that this provision was removed by the current government has sent clear signals that wind power is not as in demand, and likewise that the system for compensation to wind power companies has been worsened. There is also no clear system of compensation to municipalities. In this report, it is also stated that we could see more wind power projects if we had a compensation system where the municipalities also became winners by participating in the planning for these. It is a side effect.
The Minister for Defence said in his second contribution that we do not have a good process for these permit examinations. That can be agreed with. I personally have contact with several companies that have wanted to establish themselves here in Blekinge, and for some, it has taken 10-15 years and several million in investments that simply go to waste when a "no" is received. It is therefore also a desire for early dialogues, early notifications, and preferably a plan that shows that one can invest here and that it will work, even if there may be some problems with coexistence.
Based on the measures we have discussed here, including clearer governance, more innovations and new solutions but also very individual assessments, where I want to emphasize that each project should truly be assessed individually, I hope for a solution and that we can agree that the energy supply is also an important part of the total defense.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Heléne Björklund, for the debate!
The assessment that was made regarding the 13 offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea, which were affected by the decision in November, has the current technological situation as its starting point. If this situation were to change and new technology arrives that creates better conditions for coexistence, we will, of course, have to assess that, but under the current security policy and technological situation, it is the government's assessment that offshore wind power in the Baltic Sea is problematic. An individual assessment will always take place in every case, but this is the collective assessment that we have made.
I note what Heléne Björklund said regarding what signals it gave that we removed the wording in the previous regulatory letter. To be clear: The reason we did this was that the Armed Forces presented a way forward in October 2023, which they were requested to do in the regulatory letter.
They were very clear that it is in the planning stage, not in the licensing stage, where the greatest benefit can be made. At that point, we thought that the Armed Forces had delivered what they were tasked to do and that we would not routinely include anything in the regulatory letter.
With this said, and based on the information and the investigation that has been received, there is now once again a reference in the Armed Forces' regulation letter that they shall also continue to work on coexistence issues, together with what is in the instruction.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.