Response to interpellation 2024/25:412 on analysis of geographical conditions and needs in defense planning
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerned the analysis of geographical conditions in defense planning. M argues that the government, through orientation decisions and assignments to MSB and the Armed Forces, is working to translate the total defense decision into concrete measures 1. M emphasizes that the capacity in civil defense is increasing, even if the pace is too slow. M argues that municipalities must work with their crisis organization regardless of the geographical analysis. S requests a clear geographical analysis of critical sites for logistics and protection 2. S argues that geography requires different measures in different regions 3 and requests how unified advice and reporting from the many preparedness authorities should function 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Mr. Speaker! Lena Johansson has asked me whether I and the government, in view of the experiences from the war in Ukraine, have conducted an analysis of geographical conditions and needs within the framework of defense planning or assigned any authority the task of conducting such an analysis and, if the answer is yes, what measures the government has taken.
Let me begin by saying that Sweden and Europe are in a very serious security policy situation where an armed attack against Sweden or our allies cannot be ruled out. Just as Lena Johansson emphasizes, the lessons from the war in Ukraine are an important part of Sweden's total defense planning. Both the Defense Preparation's reports and the total defense decision for 2025–2030 are largely based on experiences from Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.
In December, the government finalized a total of three orientation decisions aimed at translating the total defense decision into concrete measures for both agencies for military defense and preparedness agencies within civil defense. From the orientation decision for civil defense, it appears that the preparedness agencies shall contribute to achieving the goal for civil defense, which includes ensuring the most important societal functions and the protection of the civilian population.
Furthermore, it is specified what the authorities shall do during the defense decision period. For example, the preparedness authorities shall, within the framework of each authority's tasks, work to ensure that actors responsible for society-critical activities ensure access to necessary goods and services as well as create the possibility to establish or convert production and distribute necessary goods and services.
The Government has also given the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB, and the Armed Forces a joint mandate to continue promoting advanced and coordinated planning within total defense. The purpose is to support the preparedness agencies and the agencies within the military defense in their planning and preparations to achieve the overall goal for total defense. Part of the mandate is to define assumptions regarding possible developments of events before and during high alert, including consequences for society.
The Government has also tasked MSB and the county administrative boards with carrying out an overall planning of protective measures to strengthen the protection of the civilian population. The protective measures included in the assignment are primarily shelters, evacuation, and associated accommodation. In order to be able to carry out this overall planning, a geographical prioritization is needed, among other things based on which areas are assessed to constitute likely targets in the event of an armed attack. The authorities shall, based on the geographical prioritization, identify which protective measures are suitable for each respective area. The assignment will be partially reported at the end of March and final reported in December.
I can conclude that in the regulatory letters for 2025, the government has tasked a majority of the preparedness authorities to ensure the ability to act proactively and decisively in both peacetime crisis situations and in war and the threat of war. In addition to the requirements set out in the ordinance (2022:524) on state authorities' preparedness, the authorities shall also train and exercise their staff as well as ensure the strengthening of a culture and a way of working based on the requirements that war imposes. The government will follow up and evaluate how well the authorities live up to this mandate.
Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown that the civilian population and civilian infrastructure are being deliberately attacked. Sweden's total defense planning encompasses the entire society and is based on the fact that we all collectively contribute to society's resilience.
Lena Johansson (S)
Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Minister, for a very detailed answer!
I note, however, that the Minister refers to decisions, assignments, and documents that are already known, for example, the Defence Committee's reports, the total defense decision, and various orientation decisions. But what I am calling for is not the government's general work with total defense, but whether a clear analysis has actually been made, in light of the war in Ukraine, of the geographical conditions and needs we have in our country.
We know that geography plays a decisive role in modern warfare. It is not just about which places are likely targets, but about which places are critical for supply readiness, logistics, evacuation, and the protection of the civilian population as well as society-critical infrastructure.
In the response, it is mentioned that MSB and the county administrative boards are to carry out a geographical prioritization of protective measures – so I have received an answer on that – and that the partial report will arrive in a few weeks. It is therefore an ongoing, not a completed, work, but in any case, they have started it. The question then is: How has the government weighed in the geographical risk and needs analyses in the decisions that have been made until now? Without such basic risk assessments, it is indeed difficult to know if the measures actually make a difference where they are needed most.
There is also a danger that the government might settle for the fact that a lot of work is underway when what is actually needed is clear steering, prioritization, and follow-up. This applies not least in a time when time is short. The Minister has often been quoted regarding what he said about there being danger in delay and that the time for action is now. Still, a certain amount of time has passed, and even though much has been done, the question is whether it has been done geographically correctly, given that the geographical assessment has not been made yet.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Mr. Speaker! It is a bit unclear exactly what the question was. I experience that the interpellor is pursuing several different tracks simultaneously.
It is argued that the government should report on things that are not yet known. It is naturally difficult for me to know what is known and what is not for the Member of Parliament, but I have tried to give a relatively complete description of the work that is ongoing in different places. This concerns both that which connects to the previously decided, i.e., the current defense decision, and that which connects to the additional assignments that MSB has had to include geography as a component and a planning prerequisite. It is naturally important and urgent to get this in place as soon as possible, and that is why the agency has been tasked to report on it partially already in March.
Let me also take the opportunity to reflect and say that I believe it is important that we understand that we need to raise the level of civil defense across the entire geography. Even though one can make assumptions based on geographical planning conditions, which can be well-founded, it is required that we have a basic robustness in the entire society so that we can, so to speak, absorb the fact that reality does not always manifest as the planning work provides. That is what we are trying to achieve in this defense decision.
To agree with what the interpellator says, Mr. Speaker: I am rarely satisfied with the pace. I think it should go even faster with most things, and I think that against the background of how serious the security situation in our global environment is. But what can be noted here is pleasing is that the capability in the Swedish civil defense is now beginning to increase palpably. In MSB's latest capability assessment, which arrived in February, MSB notes that they have carried out twice as many capability-building measures in the civil defense during 2024 as during 2023. That is fundamentally good. The capability is increasing in all ten readiness sectors, even if it is going too slowly in many of them.
It would therefore need to go even faster. I believe we have political consensus on that, and we will, of course, continue to work on it.
Lena Johansson (S)
Mr. Speaker! I absolutely believe that we are in agreement on the fact that it is urgent. We also have agreement regarding the fact that more needs to be done, and we have agreement regarding the fact that the geographical analysis is extremely important.
There are two parts to this. One has been started. It does not exist yet, but nevertheless, municipalities, regions, the business community, civil defense organizations, and civil society have received a request to work. I think this request becomes a bit problematic if one does not know exactly what to do. One should naturally stick to one's own area; that is what we agree on. What works in normal conditions should also work in crisis and war.
If, on the other hand, regarding the second part, one looks at Ukraine – that was my starting point – one sees that it is not the same situation across the entire country. We have a rather elongated country. We have, for example, the Mälaren region and Norrland, which have different geographical conditions and different population densities. Not everyone can do the same thing; instead, different regions and municipalities and different areas in the country need to do different things.
My question is therefore: Is the focus on the right thing today? It costs municipalities money to do certain things. I do not know if Skinnskatteberg is the first municipality that needs to build shelters, if the Minister understands what I mean. There may be variations between different municipalities when it comes to the need for preparedness-enhancing measures. I believe in the geographical analysis, because then MSB and the county administrative boards can help with the analysis and assist in another way.
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Mr. Speaker! Without repeating myself too much, I want to say that I agree that this is an important component. I believe, however, that one makes a great mistake if one thinks that one needs this answer to start and work.
In many respects, everyone needs to do roughly the same thing when it comes to continuity planning for the activities they normally are responsible for, for example, elderly care or childcare. Then the solutions can look different depending on what type of municipality it is. If you are a small municipality, you can cooperate with surrounding smaller municipalities.
In individual cases – for each respective municipality – the solutions may look different, but the overall task that the municipalities must tackle depends on the geographical analysis. It is clear that we want to be able to contribute additional precision to the planning conditions, but many municipalities have still not come far enough with the obligations they have according to current legislation regarding peacetime crisis preparedness.
I believe that one makes it far too easy for oneself if one sees this as a reason not to start and work. My view is that the message that one should start and work with one's own crisis and war organization and with one's own continuity planning is beginning to reach out. We shall, of course, drum even harder to ensure that this becomes the case.
Lena Johansson (S)
Mr. Speaker! I understand exactly – it is clear that Skinnskatteberg should have shelters for its elderly if that is what is needed. It is clear that there should be food supplies and that one should take care of its elderly if the crisis comes. In that part, we are in agreement.
My question is rather about whether there is any kind of movement in society in the aggregate that has already been analyzed in some way today and which would assist municipalities, regions, and the business sector. It concerns ports, infrastructure, and several other things.
The Minister mentioned a few things in the assignments to certain agencies. We have 61 preparedness agencies, if I remember correctly. That is many. Will there be any unified view on this, and will there be any unified advice? Does every preparedness agency have the possibility to report to MSB and the county administrative boards? How is this intended to become understandable at an aggregated level, so that one can deploy and allocate resources in another way? I do not know if this was understandable!
Statsrådet Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M)
Mr. Speaker! I am not entirely sure that I understood the question correctly. What can be said overall is that the general direction for the planning of the total defense is found in the direction decisions for the military defense, the civil defense, and the total defense. I dare say that this is uniquely clear when it comes to the target image, depth of intention, and level of ambition in relation to the previous defense decision. There should be no room for doubt as to what is the goal in the work for all agencies responsible for preparedness.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.