Response to interpellation 2024/25:79 on the strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with civil society
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
M believes that the new model creates an open and transparent application procedure that ensures that the exercise of authority takes place at an authority 1. M argues that the previous system lacked transparency and that the funds should go to the most vulnerable rather than to expensive conferences or lobbying 2 3. M emphasizes that more organizations can now go directly to Sida, which makes it easier to track tax money 4. V argues that the termination of agreements created uncertainty and that it would have been better to let them expire 5 6. V believes that restrictions make it difficult to reach vulnerable groups 6 7.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Benjamin Dousa (M)
Madam Speaker! Lotta Johnsson Fornarve has asked me a number of questions concerning the new strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with civil society 2025-2029.
The first question is whether I consider it would have been better to have let already entered agreements run their course.
The government has presented the new model for the implementation of the strategy with the ambition to create an open, transparent and inclusive application procedure for organizations that wish to participate in the funds through the CSO strategy, to ensure that the exercise of authority takes place at just one authority, and to ensure, through fewer transaction links, that it is possible to follow who and what the support goes to.
To create predictability, the government's ambitions were clarified as early as when the reform agenda was presented last year. That the government was working on this entirely necessary reform was clarified through the decision on 1 February this year regarding the new CSO strategy for 2024. In February, a decision was also made to increase the civil society organizations' own contribution from 2025 - an important step to increase the organizations' independence. In September, more than three months before the reform begins to roll out, the government made a decision on a new strategy that included the new distribution model.
The government has also had a close dialogue with Sida to ensure a responsible transition to the new model from the agency's side. This makes it possible for all parties to adapt their operations to the new model while the conditions for the success of the government's aid policy priorities are improved. With this, the government has provided as good conditions as can reasonably be expected for all parties to adapt their operations to these completely necessary changes.
It is also appropriate to point out that all agreements Sida has entered into with CSOs within the CSO strategy have a three-month notice period. All organizations have signed this.
The second question concerns whether it is my intention that civil society organizations that receive a share of the funds should not have the opportunity to influence or audit countries and companies that are not recipients of aid.
The Government welcomes debate, dialogue, and scrutiny of aid, including Swedish aid. That being said, it is the Government's view that Swedish tax-funded aid should not go to recipients in Sweden or other non-ODA countries whose intention is to conduct lobbying towards the decision-makers who distribute these funds. The aid should instead go to actual aid activities. If actors wish to engage in advocacy work, they are free to do so – we live in a democracy – but then financed with other, their own, funds and not the funds that are earmarked for humanitarian aid and development aid.
The third question expresses a request for me to clarify which of the Swedish interests are mentioned in the CSO strategy.
The government safeguards the independence and autonomy of civil society. Development cooperation is an important foreign policy tool to promote and safeguard Swedish interests as well as to meet the challenges that we and the world face. Within the framework of this very strategy, the government's priority to protect and strengthen the space for an independent and pluralistic civil society in partner countries is naturally promoted, something that is clearly expressed in the reform agenda for aid.
It must be crystal clear that all organizations receiving tax funds via the aid budget support the rules-based world order and distance themselves from all non-democratic activities. These are central Swedish foreign policy interests.
The fourth question is whether I support civil society in its own right or only if it acts in accordance with the government's priorities.
I want to begin by clarifying the definition of civil society. By civil society, is meant an arena, distinct from the state, the market, and the individual household, where people organize themselves and act together based on common interests.
Civil society organizations are important partners in humanitarian aid and development cooperation, not least through their collaborative relationships and their local presence. It is important to remind oneself that there are civil society organizations, even those operating within aid, that never accept a single krona of state grants, precisely in order to manifest their independence.
Through the CSO strategy, the government intends to improve the conditions for civil society actors to act independently, among other things through strengthened local ownership, support for civil society's democratic room for maneuver, and diversified funding. The government contributes to diversified funding through the requirement for increased self-financing and the possibility to apply for funds from the strategy for financing of own contributions for, for example, EU applications.
The fifth and final question concerns whether I stand by the position that the implementation model of the new CSO strategy implies that funds shall only be paid out in more than one stage in exceptional cases.
The answer is yes. In the new implementation model, it is stated that forwarding through more than one link should generally be avoided. It also appears that well-motivated exceptions may be granted. The Government has identified challenges with the previous system regarding the number of links through which the support is forwarded. The possibilities for transparency and external review have thus been limited, which stands in contrast to the requirements for authorities' publicity. Citizens have a right to transparency and should be able to be certain that tax-funded aid goes to the right purpose and makes a difference for the world's distressed.
Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)
Madam Speaker! I thank the Minister for the answer to this interpellation as well.
It is good that the strategy emphasizes that civil society organizations are important partners in the Swedish aid work.
The Minister says in his response that the transition from the old strategy with SPOs, i.e., strategic partner organizations, has been responsible. I and large parts of civil society do not agree with that; I can actually promise you that. That entered agreements were terminated before they expired created great concern and confusion. Even though the agreements have been extended by a few months, it still remains true that all the 1,750 organizations that previously had agreements with Sida must now discard existing plans, cancel ongoing and planned work, and lay off staff since job security no longer exists as a result of the terminated agreements. This applies, for example, to organizations with multi-year agreements.
Now, instead, the organizations must put in a lot of work to write new applications. Much work has been lost, and confidence in Swedish aid has also decreased. This has, of course, hit activists for democracy and for women's and human rights all around the world particularly hard. They were suddenly completely or partially without funding.
It would have been better to at least let the existing agreements, i.e., multi-year agreements, run out and thereby avoid unnecessary uncertainty, ambiguities, and extra work. The new strategy actually leaves many question marks regarding agreements, budget, and the new application process, and these need to be clarified as soon as possible.
The strategy also contains several other ambiguities. In the strategy, the government writes that the funds cannot be used for influence, information, or lobbying work directed towards non-ODA countries. It is a highly remarkable phrasing. The Minister also confirms this in his response here: Aid shall therefore not be used to influence non-aid countries.
This shows that the government does not quite understand how modern rights and democracy work. For example, a climate agreement would not exist if we did not have conferences, cooperation, advocacy, and dialogue between actors in the EU, in Sweden, and elsewhere. How are we to work with credibility on problems with predatory exploitation of raw materials in, for example, conflict-ridden Congo if we are not allowed to talk and influence in the EU and Sweden regarding how we can create more effective legislation on conflict minerals? How are we to be able to cooperate with human rights activists in Cambodia if we are not allowed to influence the EU's trade agreement with Cambodia regarding how the agreements should be able to handle human rights violations?
I can go on for as long as I want and give plenty of examples of when cooperation, collaboration and influence are important. Civil society must be given the right to influence; it contributes to making aid more effective.
Aid does not exist in isolation within national borders. In the government's instructions to Sida regarding support to civil society, it is not only stated that UD wants to be involved in steering the decision-making process, but there is also a provision that activities must not counteract Swedish interests. What then are Swedish interests? Who assesses this and on what grounds?
In the agreement concluded between civil society and the government, which concerns joint commitments, it is emphasized that the government shall support civil society in its own right even if it may in some points be critical of the government's policy. Is civil society now to be more bound by the government's leash? That would be extremely unfortunate and, in the long run, a threat to our democratic society. Civil society must have the right to act in its own right.
Statsrådet Benjamin Dousa (M)
Madam Speaker! I believe it is necessary to repeat why we proceeded with this reform from the very beginning.
It was thus 17 organizations that had a particularly privileged position towards Sida, which in addition has received criticism from organizations that have not been allowed to be one of the 17 organizations. When one talks about there being a great dissatisfaction among civil society organizations, I think one must consider which selection of these organizations one is talking to and meeting. I myself have met many organizations that are very positive about this change, because they have not been one of the 17 specially selected organizations that have been allowed to share these 1.8 billion kronor annually. These are, therefore, no small amounts in the grand scheme of things.
Criticism has also come from the Swedish National Audit Office and the National Property Board regarding the fact that there has not been an open application process. It has been shrouded in mystery why exactly these 17 organizations have been selected, and there has been limited insight and transparency. There have been very many links, and one has wondered: Where does this tax krona end up out in the field? Does it go to bureaucracy and administration along the way, or in the worst case even to corruption or extremism in some way? It has therefore been difficult to follow that tax krona when there have been four, five, six, or perhaps seven different links.
This is the background to why we are pushing through the reform. It cannot have come as a shock to anyone who follows the Swedish aid debate. Two years ago, we received the trust of the Swedish people to reform the aid. That we were going to do so, we said both before and after the election, and now we are doing it.
In this specific issue, the discussion has been ongoing for over a year. To ensure as smooth a transition as possible, the old and the new system will also be able to run in parallel during a large part of next year, and Sida is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the transition becomes as smooth as possible.
So, regarding the question of lobbying. Perhaps it is an ideological question whether Swedish tax money should go towards lobbying Swedish and European politicians or towards actually improving the situation for the world's most vulnerable people. I know where I stand on that question. I think that Swedish tax funds should primarily go to the most vulnerable people on the globe and not to expensive conferences, luxurious meetings, and expensive trips to Sweden and other rich countries.
Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)
Madam Speaker! Reforming the support for civil society organizations may not be wrong, but it must be done in a good way so that the aid is not affected. That is not how you do it when you terminate entered agreements prematurely, something that has affected hundreds of organizations around the world who suddenly stand without funding, which is extremely serious. That the aid has not functioned is not true, rather it has functioned very well. The organizations have accounted in detail for how they have used the aid funds. This can, among other things, be clearly read on Openaid.
The best thing would have been if this change had been made in a better way so that these human rights organizations with several [branches] around the world had not been affected so severely. It would have been much better if one had let the entered agreements expire.
One of the government's key principles for aid is transparency. Unfortunately, it does not seem to apply at home because they first reduced the information grant and now seem to be withdrawing it entirely, thereby closing the possibility to apply for funds to carry out advocacy and information work directed towards non-low-income and middle-income countries, including Sweden. This is extremely concerning and shows that the government does not understand how modern rights and democracy work go about. Cooperation and collaboration between countries, which also includes rich countries, is required to achieve change. Climate work is an example. We will never achieve a solution without cooperation and collaboration, and here civil society plays an important role as a driver and as one that makes issues visible.
When it comes to the wording that the activities must not counteract Swedish interests, I wonder which interests are referred to beyond those mentioned in the strategy, namely democratic values, human rights, and not providing support to violent extremism or activities that oppose the rules-based world order. Which other interests beyond those listed are intended?
It is regrettable that the government stipulates that it should only be possible to pay out funds in multiple stages in exceptional cases. It makes it difficult for organizations that use multiple stages to operate. Many times, it is completely necessary with more than one stage to be able to reach local or particularly vulnerable organizations. The risk is that the possibility for exceptions is interpreted so restrictively that it becomes practically impossible to run certain types of projects. Transferring large sums of money to a local organization with weak structures in a country with widespread poverty is risky from a corruption perspective. In the same way, unstable social structures and institutions can mean that the money does not arrive. Additionally, there are countries whose legislation restricts transfers, which makes it difficult or impossible to limit the number of stages to a single one. Taken together, for example, a larger regional partner or another party may be necessary for the money to end up in the right place and reach the greatest possible benefit.
Finally, I am also critical of the fact that the government risks undermining a number of smaller aid organizations with the requirement that at least 15 percent of the funds must be collected by the organizations themselves. This represents a major challenge for many small organizations and could in practice mean that non-profit organizations that do not have the possibility to collect money quickly could be forced to shut down their aid work, something that would have major consequences for thousands of local organizations around the world.
Statsrådet Benjamin Dousa (M)
Mr. Speaker! Lotta Johnsson Fornarve paints a picture of hundreds of organizations losing their funding. It is rather the opposite. Hundreds of organizations will now be able to avoid having to go through 17 specifically selected organizations and can instead go directly to Sida, and smaller actors will receive help with the application process. In the long run, we also hope to be able to take the help of our embassies around the world so that even local or regional organizations that fight for people in need or are activists against authoritarian states and regimes will be able to receive a share of these funds, funds that previously only went to 17 specifically selected organizations—a system that has been relatively static since the 70s. This should not be an ideological issue. We are keeping exactly the same amount of money as before, but more will be able to share in it. It will also be easier to track where the taxpayers' money ends up.
This issue of multiple levels is a question of legitimacy towards the taxpayers. One simply cannot follow where the tax krona ends up if there are too many levels.
When it comes to Swedish interests, it concerns relatively uncontroversial matters such as democracy, human rights, the view on children and women's rights issues – important Swedish interests that I hope the Left Party can also stand behind.
I do not agree that the CSO database and Openaid have been sufficiently transparent. In the CSO database, it is very difficult to see where the money ends up in the end, and therefore we have tasked Sida with improving transparency for journalists, politicians, and the Swedish people so that one can see where the money ends up in the end.
Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)
Mr. Speaker! The reorganization has created much confusion and concern out in the world. Even if the agreements are extended by a few months, it still remains that all the 1,750 organizations that previously had agreements with Sida must discard existing plans, cancel ongoing work, and lay off staff. This has caused much concern, and the transition could have been handled in a better way.
Let civil society organizations act on their own initiative and stop trying to micro-manage them.
Let civil society influence and criticize non-ODA countries as well, such as Sweden and other EU countries. It serves everyone in the long run. Cooperation and collaboration between countries, including the rich countries, is required to achieve change. Here, civil society plays an important role as a driver and as one that makes issues visible.
Do not be so harsh that it should only be possible to pay out funds in more than one stage in exceptional cases. It could derail many important projects.
Do not cut the legs out from under a number of smaller aid organizations by demanding that at least 15 percent of the funds must be collected by the organizations themselves. It could mean that non-profit organizations that do not have the possibility to collect money quickly will be forced to shut down their aid work, something that will have major consequences for the work of thousands of local organizations around the world.
Let civil society act in its own right and do not force it to go into the government's shackles. It would be extremely unfortunate and, in the long run, a threat to our democratic society. Civil society must be an arena separate from the state.
Statsrådet Benjamin Dousa (M)
Mr. Speaker! I hope to be able to reassure the interpellator Lotta Johnsson Fornarve with the statement that Sweden remains a democracy even with the new CSO strategy. We continue to have freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, and freedom of demonstration with the new strategy. It is about where Swedish tax money should go. Should it go to expensive trips to Sweden, luxurious conferences, and those types of communication efforts to lobby against us two? Or should it go to making a difference for the world's poorest people and to activists who fight for democracy and freedom?
The entire state budget is a question of priorities. Neither of us two has a secret money tree that we can go to and fetch a few more thousands from. One must choose. That is the government's clear view: that money does the most good out in the field, not here at home to finance lobbying efforts.
The new strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with civil society aims to contribute to a strong civil society in developing countries and to ensure that an increased proportion of support reaches local organizations. Civil society organizations constitute an important part of a country's democratic foundation. We have seen this, not least in recent decades. They are also important partners in the implementation of Swedish humanitarian aid and development cooperation, not least through their local presence and anchoring.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.