Response to interpellation 2025/26:236 on conscription
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerns the conscription and the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel supply. M considers that conscription is the basis for personnel supply and that the war organization needs to be adequately staffed 1. M argues that 12,000 basic-trained personnel per year from 2032 is sufficient 1 and that the war units need to become stronger and more numerous 2. M emphasizes that cost is crucial in questions regarding more brigades 3 and that direct training is a good instrument for increased availability 3. S demands 12,000 conscripts by 2030 4 5 and argues that 10,000 per year provides limited endurance 4. S considers that there must be more brigades than what is currently decided 5.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Peter Hultqvist has asked me what measures I intend to take to increase the volumes, beyond the existing agreements, regarding the number of conscripts.
Conscription constitutes the basis for the Armed Forces' personnel supply and is a prerequisite for maintaining a defense dimensioned to be able to defend Sweden and our allies against an armed attack.
The war organization according to the 2024 defense decision entails a need for personnel reinforcements. The total number of positions in the war organization is estimated to amount to approximately 130,000 plus reserves by 2035. The war organization is then expected to be fully staffed.
The Armed Forces assess that 12,000 basic-trained conscripts per year from 2032 is sufficient to provide the decided war organization with conscripts. The implementation of the 2024 defense decision continues to form the basis for the Armed Forces' capability development.
The Swedish Defence Readyness Authority (Försvarsmakten) will recruit nearly 10,000 conscripts for basic training in 2027/28. This means that the goal that the volume of basic training should amount to at least 10,000 conscripts by 2030 at the latest, as stated in the government's policy decision for the military defense, may be reached significantly earlier than planned.
In addition to this, the Armed Forces have stated in its budget basis for 2026 that the agency is reviewing the possibility of training up to 14,000 conscripts annually. The agency has also reported that the capacity for basic training of conscripts is increased during the period 2025–2035 and that measures are being taken to streamline the training.
Peter Hultqvist (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister for Defence, for the answer!
In our view, more needs to be done than what we have agreed upon so far. I understand the Minister for Defence saying that the implementation of the 2024 defense decision continues to constitute the basis for the Armed Forces' capability development. It is natural based on the decisions that have been made, but now a new defense commission is to start shortly.
At the same time, we have a change in the security situation not only in our part of Europe but also more generally around the world. The recent incidents around Greenland highlight this with all desired clarity. Intelligence services have reported that we should also not rule out a direct conflict with Russia within, say, five years – different timeframes are specified.
This means that the demands on us increase. Therefore, one should look at how to find more opportunities to train conscripts faster. Our requirement is 12,000 by 2030. I believe that it is possible to achieve this. It is about taking the task seriously and trying to release more officers, lure back former officers, use reserve officers to a greater extent, and use temporarily employed soldiers and K-soldiers for troop training.
It is also about the fact that we must quickly ensure the restoration of some infrastructure such as barracks and mess halls, perhaps achieve an increased utilization of training grounds and provide materiel and equipment for the soldiers.
If one has a clear political will and is very distinct regarding the requirements, such things can be implemented. I have, of course, checked this possibility with people I have a relationship with within the Försvarsmakten. I make the assessment that this is possible if the will exists.
With the dimensioning we are to have by 2030, 10,000 conscripts per year will create an organization that is sufficient for an initial defense of Sweden and for holding key areas in Sweden. It will be difficult to replace losses, and it will be difficult to hold the entire country. That size of the conscription training entails a limited endurance.
If we go up to 12,000–15,000 per year, we get better endurance. We get a reserve of 120,000–150,000. We can defend several areas simultaneously. We can hold out longer, and we can rotate units. I believe that one must have this as a primary goal after 10,000.
We have said from our side that 20,000 conscripts per year is the goal. That provides a much larger war organization. It makes it difficult and expensive to attack and occupy Sweden. It gives us a territorial defense of the entire country, a deeper endurance, and a great replacement capacity. That level of an organization would also have a deterrent effect before war.
One must therefore see the number of conscripts in relation to the defense of Sweden and what kind of signal it gives from a security policy perspective. 10,000 by 2030, which we have agreed upon so far, is too few; we must see how we can reach significantly larger volumes. A first step could be to move forward such things that we have previously said we will manage.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Regarding the serious security policy developments in the world, I believe there is broad consensus in the chamber regarding the main features and also regarding the consequences it entails for the Armed Forces. There are broad agreements linked to the defense decision we took on 17 December 2024, which all eight parties stood behind, but we also have the agreement reached on 19 June linked to our defense investment goals – that we shall reach 3.5 percent for military defense and 1.5 percent for defense security-related investments.
When it comes to the personnel procurement system, we have a good system in an international comparison. There are many countries looking at the Swedish model. I have received many visits during the past year. There are also several countries that are reactivating or resuming conscription. I am thinking of Germany and possibly France and the Netherlands. The strength is our mixed system with both standing soldiers and conscripts, who also form the backbone of the procurement with both specialist officers, sailors and group commanders. This is a very important foundation for us to move forward.
When it comes to the volumes, the basis must be the war organization's needs and fulfilling them. Now the Armed Forces says that they have a need which implies that they are working to design the war organization with 10,000 conscripts by 2030 and then 12,000 during 2030–2032. At the same time, the government has also directed the Armed Forces. One should look at up to 14,000. That is one part.
The second thing I want to say is that the Swedish Armed Forces' personnel supply is also going well. We are currently over in all personnel categories in the Swedish Armed Forces' war organization. When it comes to conscripts, PPV has a mission for next year to recruit almost 9,500 during this year. I rule out in no way that we can reach 12,000 by 2030, given the large expansion.
It is also, as Peter Hultqvist is pointing out, about the efficiency, which I also touched upon in my initial response. Work is now being done for the efficiency of education, which the government has directed. Not least, this is about the experiences from the war in Ukraine, which have shown that it is sometimes possible to make the education more efficient in a shorter time, if it is structured in the right way. We have skilled instructors who have been and trained the Ukrainians. It can be made more compressed. We are also looking at different alternatives with simulators and so on. I perceive that there is a will within the Armed Forces to increase the volumes and also to increase efficiency.
Peter Hultqvist is also involved in the dimension regarding the ability to have officers with troop leadership and the old basic requirement that they must be able to teach many. Even there, the Armed Forces are working intensively to increase their capability.
Peter Hultqvist (S)
Madam Speaker! It is clear that one can say it is the war organization's needs that govern. That is what happens when you lay it out according to the planning that has been agreed upon and when the Armed Forces describe how they view the whole thing. But one can also say that we need to expand the war organization depending on the fact that the situation looks the way it does.
I see it as positive that the Minister for Defence says that they are looking at training 14,000 conscripts per year. It is still an indication that it would not be impossible to reach the figure of 12,000 already in 2030.
We have been in agreement in the negotiations we have had. But we can also consider how we will reach an agreement in the next negotiation. Now it will be a defense preparation, and we will then raise the question of trying to move this forward with the proportion of those subject to conscription and also bring up the discussion on how far we should go in the long run.
As I have said, 12,000–15,000 conscripts per year provide significantly better endurance. It provides a different geographical coverage. It provides the possibility to defend more areas, and it provides the possibility to rotate units. If we eventually reach 20,000, we have a completely different defense force. Then it also becomes a deterrent before war breaks out. Then it becomes, so to speak, truly expensive to try to attack Sweden in one way or another.
From time to time it has been said that land warfare, army units and such are a historical parenthesis and that it is now other types of high-tech systems that matter. I can only state that it has been proven once again in Ukraine that it is on the ground that the decisive battle will ultimately take place.
Our thought remains: It is reasonable to try to move forward the goal of reaching the figure 12,000. I share the view that we fundamentally have a good personnel supply system. This was something we addressed when we came to power in 2014. At that time, we had an organization based on professional soldiers, but now we have both conscripts and professional soldiers. I believe it is a good balance.
The previous organization, that is, the one that existed before the conscription was activated, we would have had problems with today, especially when it comes to achieving the numbers required. At that time we also noticed that it was not possible to recruit officers in a way that was reasonable. We would have had a difficult situation today if we had continued with that system.
We therefore have the same view regarding the mixed system, and I am glad that people from other countries are coming to look at this. We shall have a common ambition to safeguard the consensus on these issues. I also think that the eight-party agreement is important to maintain. It has been good to be able to talk about it in international contexts, among other things.
But if we are to be able to reach an agreement in the new defense preparation, one must feel that one gets a proper say in the matter. As a consequence of this, that we want to speed up the increase in the number of conscripts and have a goal of two new brigades after 2030, one must also discuss the longer-term goals and how many conscripts we are to have.
We must, therefore, increase the stride further in these issues. We have done a lot, but significantly more needs to be done. The opposition is, just as I said in Sälen, not a rounding figure but a reality in a settlement.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! If what lies behind us is to be any guidance for the future, I still think that we on both sides have shown a give and take in order to move forward. It was also against this background that the government instructed the Armed Forces to begin looking at 14,000 conscripts. The Defence Preparation Board stated, in fact, that this was important. It was also a way for us to comply with that and create conditions for a broad political consensus when it comes to the continued design of the personnel supply system and also the Armed Forces in a broader perspective.
I said in my speech at Folk och Försvar in Sälen that the war units need to become both stronger and more numerous, that is to say that they must be both personnel and materially fulfilled and self-sufficient. It is truly important.
We will also need more war units than those covered by the defense decision we took on 17 December 2024. That is why we have given a mandate to the Defense Committee to also weigh in the military capability objectives that we receive together with other allies. We will need to design our defense force with the starting point that we are Nato allies. That will be governing.
The war organization needs to become larger, and it needs to become stronger. The war organization is decided by the Riksdag, and it is therefore also completely natural that the Defense Preparation Board is used for this instead of having pure defense negotiations.
Let me say a few words about this regarding the size of the war organization. I said 130,000 plus reserves. What it means in substance is that we have given a mission to the Armed Forces to look at the possibility of producing replacement units. If a company is knocked out, there must be a plan for an additional company that can replace it. It is a lesson from the war in Ukraine that the ground forces in some cases have had casualties of up to 130,000, or up to one third. Therefore, the Armed Forces also need to work on creating replacement units. At the first contact, it can sometimes result in very large casualties.
This is a mission that the Armed Forces will return to in the middle of November. I hope that it can be part of the Defense Committee's work to also follow that dimension, precisely so that we can achieve greater endurance when it comes to the land combat arena.
There are, of course, also many perceptions and lessons in the context of the war in Ukraine. This one with volume and scale is definitely one of them. Another is the large component of unmanned systems and the importance of being able to protect oneself against unmanned systems. Right now, it is not a war of maneuver in Ukraine, because one cannot mobilize mass in that way.
We have taken measures to strengthen our capability when it comes to countermeasures against electronic warfare. We have also invested in various unmanned systems given that the Russian military capability has developed very rapidly in that regard.
This last one was more of a here-and-now perspective. We also use the apartment purchases to carry this out.
Peter Hultqvist (S)
Madam Speaker! Of course we must have self-sufficient units. We must have more war units. That is the very basic view from our side. That is also why we point out that we must have more brigades than what has now been decided.
We must also have territorial defense units that can, among other things, defend the transports that are to go through Sweden from, for example, Norway or the west coast. These can be transports that go via the sea and then through Sweden. It is a deficiency that we have not achieved this until now. It has been raised in the defense preparations previously, but it has not received the effects it should receive until now. It is also an issue we should look at.
In addition to the units we are now developing and organizing, we should to an increased extent look at support units, i.e., units that in various ways support those who have the direct front-line task. It is one thing to report that one has this type of unit in a formal sense, but it is another thing to order and build them up. Here, I believe, there is a major task within the framework of conscription.
What is required of us from the NATO side will, in my opinion, require more conscripts. It will require larger army units. For NATO integration, an increased intake on the conscription side is completely crucial and important to reach the various objectives in the NATO cooperation that are reported.
I think it is positive that the Minister says that the figure of 14,000 is being looked at. I see it as an opening for continued discussions in the Defence Preparation Board. Then we will have to see what it results in. But I have been clear about our position regarding 12,000 by 2030. We stand behind the agreements that exist, but in a new negotiation, new positions and viewpoints can also be put forward.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! What is crucial regarding the question of more brigades is, above all, the cost. There is an enormous difference between a mechanized brigade and an infantry brigade. One has to pay somewhere between three and four times as much, so it probably needs to be specified whether it is a mechanized brigade or an infantry brigade. It also takes a considerable amount of time to build this up. It has certain consequences for our opportunities to reach NATO's military capability goals. I just want to say that in general terms.
The second dimension is about achieving increased availability of personnel. Direct training of conscripts is a very good instrument for this. We also now have good results for those who complete the basic training. Furthermore, over 80 percent of them recommend that other young people perform their military service and perceive it as good and developing. They are, therefore, good ambassadors. If one expands the military service significantly, it is clear that more will not be motivated to perform it, and then one can risk not achieving as good results. It is the size of the combat units that should be decisive.
Furthermore, we look at how we can get the war organization to grow. I am on the same line as Hultqvist – it needs to grow. In Roland Ekenberg's investigation, one looks at increased personnel availability. There is a rule that I think there may be reasons to review. As Ekenberg emphasizes: If one has not completed any refresher training within ten years, one is by definition automatically removed from the war organization as it is now. I don't think we can really afford that. We review Roland's proposal in a positive spirit.
Another thing that also increases the availability of personnel and which I really want to highlight as a good and meritorious piece of work is the Home Guard's direct training to Home Guard soldier, which was carried out in Härnösand. It gave very fine results. 152 people signed up, and almost all passed the training. It is a fast and efficient training organization that is strongly inspired by the fine work the Home Guard did to train Ukrainian soldiers within the framework of Interflex.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.