Response to interpellation 2025/26:238 on Sweden as a space nation within military satellite capability
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
1 M considers that space is a strategic domain where Sweden needs to strengthen its military space capability 1. 1 M argues that the government has taken measures by allocating funds to the Armed Forces to improve space situational awareness, develop own satellites, and enable launches from Esrange 1. 2 M argues that great progress has been made through a total defense decision where space is a supporting part 2. 3 M wants to improve commercialization and civil-military cooperation 3. 3 M emphasizes the importance of own autonomy for intelligence services, target selection, and integrated air and missile defense 3. 4 M argues that Sweden is well-equipped as the Air Force is responsible for the space domain and that they have a space chief and a space department 4. 4 M emphasizes that Sweden is working to support Ukraine in telewarfare capability and that they recently decided to purchase up to ten military satellites 4. 4 M considers that the Armed Forces is best suited to make priorities within the framework that politics sets 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Markus Selin has asked me what concrete measures I intend to take so that Sweden shall maintain and further develop its capabilities in military satellite communications. He has also asked me how I ensure that the Armed Forces' needs for space-based services are translated into Swedish space policy and investments.
Space is a strategic domain. Military space capability constitutes an important part for Sweden as a space nation. One of the pillars in the defense and security strategy for space is a portfolio of space capabilities and space services in support of total defense.
The Government has allocated 1 billion to the Armed Forces between 2024 and 2032 to improve the military space situation picture, develop own satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance, and enable the launch of military satellites from Esrange.
During the autumn of 2025, the government decided to invest an additional over 1.3 billion on the procurement of satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance. This so-called "off-the-shelf" purchase aims to more quickly strengthen the capability for intelligence gathering and long-range engagement.
In the government's defense industry strategy, the government announced the establishment of the total defense space program. This is the government's initiative to realize the space portfolio and ensure a unified space capability for the total defense. The space program thus constitutes a concrete tool to ensure that the Armed Forces' needs for space-based services are translated into Swedish space policy and investments.
Sweden shall work to achieve interoperability together with allies regarding secure satellite communications that provide coverage over the Arctic to support command.
The Government is taking several measures to diversify access to satellite capacity for state, commercial and military satellite communications.
Markus Selin (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you to the Minister for Defence for the answer!
I want to begin by emphasizing that this interpellation concerns an area that is extremely urgent at this very moment as we stand here and debate, and which is becoming more decisive for Sweden's defense capability day by day. I believe I know that the Minister for Defence and I are, in broad strokes, largely in agreement on the importance of this for Sweden as a space nation.
Madam Speaker! I also want to say that the Minister for Defence's answer is ambitious. I will turn and twist it a bit to show what I believe we need to do more of together.
I agree with the direction, but the answer is vaguer when it comes to the implementation. The Minister for Defence's answer describes will, money, and programs. I would like to emphasize that there is a lack of more concreteness regarding readiness, timeline, concrete operational initiatives, dependencies, and priorities – especially regarding military satellite communication, which was the very core of one of my two questions to the Minister for Defence.
The Armed Forces must be able to rely on Swedish satellite capacity and space-based services, not just in theory and in strategies but in practice. Yes, Sweden has good conditions through Esrange. Yes, Sweden has a strong space industry. Yes, Sweden is an engineering nation. Yes, Sweden has a geographically favorable location in northern Europe. But it is also clear that developments in our surrounding world are occurring very rapidly.
I can mention in retrospect that during the Social Democratic governments in the years 2014–2022, several important steps were taken to strengthen Sweden as a space nation. The space strategy was updated, and Esrange was developed into a strategic national resource. Sweden took more space in ESA, and Sweden took more space in the EU's space collaborations.
The total defense began to be rebuilt during these years, and defense appropriations began to increase significantly. Thus, space and intelligence capabilities were also identified as future-critical. The defense industry's role in these discussions cannot be overemphasized. The strategic partnerships were strengthened, and the space industry is an important part of this ecosystem.
Against this background, I would like to ask a few more questions to the Minister for Defence.
The Minister of Defence explains important investments in surveillance and intelligence, but my interpellation concerns, as stated, military satellite communication for command, communication, and endurance. Can the Minister of Defence state which own Swedish military communication capability is actually being built?
The Minister of Defence speaks of readiness together with allies. But readiness is not tested in cooperation, it is tested in crisis. A relevant question then becomes: Who decides on availability, priority, and continuity if several countries in defense cooperation simultaneously need the same satellite resources?
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! I will give Markus Selin at least partially right – I also thought that good things happened in the space area during the last parliamentary term, but it was not in the military area. That is what I actually missed.
Let us go back and look at the total defense decision that was taken in December 2020. I believe Markus Selin was in the Defense Committee then. I myself was chairman of the committee. In that decision, I believe space is mentioned with five lines, at least when it comes to Swedish capability.
In the defense decision we took in December 2024, space is a central and fundamental part, so I dare to assert that much more has occurred during this parliamentary term in the defense area specifically. It is naturally not only the government's merit, but it has to do with the global developments that space has become much more important. But the fact that we have gotten a strategy in place with defense and security policy aspects of space, I think is important. It was something that the ministry pushed through to achieve exactly what Markus Selin is requesting, and that is prioritization and allocation of resources.
We have two aspects of this. The first is the base plate space, which I partially spoke about in the answer. It is a little over 1 billion for that. The second is the apartment purchases at 1.3 billion. We now get exactly what Markus Selin requests: own autonomy through a dozen own satellites. It is actually a breakthrough for us when it comes to satellites.
We are also starting to catch up with what other countries have developed. Do we have our own capability in this? That is a relevant question. There are companies that partially deliver services for this. Ovzon is a company that can offer this.
There is also extensive international cooperation when it comes to space. Sweden is part of what is called Northlink, which is about the NATO allies being able to strengthen their connectivity, not least when it comes to the Arctic areas. Satellites are very important there. We are also part of what is called APSS, which is also a NATO cooperation within the space domain.
I think that very much has happened in relation to how it has been in the space area during previous parliamentary terms, partly because we have prioritized this.
Space is, as Markus Selin knows, an important area for three overarching reasons. It is about positioning, which is important for the military area. It is about reconnaissance – earth observation for civil defense and reconnaissance for military, as it is expressed. And it is naturally about communication.
What has been a very large catalyst for the Swedish space industry is the cooperation we have with Ukraine – I will return to that. There, we have learned an enormous amount. It is the first time we are experiencing a completely transparent battlefield. We all know where the military resources and capabilities are, and we know that primarily through space-based systems which are then fused with sensors and drones. This also creates entirely new needs for us linked to long-range capability and targeting.
So, very many advances have occurred. In June last year, I myself signed a letter of intent with my Ukrainian colleague on how Sweden and Ukraine can further develop space cooperation. I can return to that, but that is where we have worked in practice. A number of companies from Sweden have been suppliers and provided very important services.
Markus Selin (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister for Defence, for the answer!
I would like to go down to the level of detail and concretize this. I understand that not everything can be said publicly when one starts hitting bottom on the issues, but I believe that the defense minister and I can take a few more steps. I would like to thank again for the answers the defense minister has given so far.
I want, as I did in my first speech, to emphasize that strategies, programs, and collaborations are good and needed. I would, however, like to hear more about concrete priorities, about what the need is and what the requirements specification looks like, as well as measurable commitments and actual execution power when it comes to our common space capability.
We are currently seeing that comparable countries clearly prioritize their own space capabilities – not as an alternative to cooperation, but they invest in both their own capabilities and in important collaborations.
With the risk of being a bit repetitive, I can also mention something that lies a few steps ahead. For us Social Democrats, this is about developing national capability and competence and about modernizing procurement processes. We shall ensure that the state is an active and long-term procurer in the space area. Against that background, I also argue that space issues must now be elevated from being a complementary area, among other things within the total defense bill, so that this becomes measurable and has a real operational effect. As the Defense Minister knows, it is not until we link the strategies with resources, timelines, expressed needs, distribution of responsibility, and materiel decisions that it finally actually becomes a concrete defense capability.
My question remains, Madam Speaker: How do the government and the Minister for Defence ensure that military satellite capability and, in particular, secure satellite communication for command and connectivity do not become a side issue in defense planning, but rather a prioritized area in upcoming decisions, in equipment planning, and in research and innovation initiatives? I know that this has been close to the Minister for Defence's interest since before.
Madam Speaker! I intended to touch upon the capability gaps, something that is linked to my previous questions. How does the Minister of Defence view the next five years? What steps and measures will we take? How do the government and the Minister of Defence intend to close the capability gaps that the Minister of Defence sees in our space capability? Last but not least: Does the Armed Forces have the readiness and endurance required when this is actually to be implemented and when it truly matters?
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Markus Selin, for all the questions! I will do what I can to get through them – there was quite a lot of them.
Let me practice a bit of self-criticism. What I think we need to get better at is the commercialization when it comes to space. There we see that other countries that could be comparable are ahead of us. I am thinking of the Netherlands, Norway and Finland. Is there anything we know about the space sector or Space X or whatever we like, it is that commercialization of space is interesting.
We are good at space research, and we have long-standing traditions with Esrange and so on. But it is about capturing the commercialization and achieving a civil-military cooperation. I think we could achieve even more when it comes to this. I think that is important.
What is important about the space domain? It is the services that one needs from the space domain. I think three things are very important. It is naturally a sovereign capability linked to intelligence services, i.e., reconnaissance satellites to be able to monitor various troop movements in our near area. We get that now. It is no secret that we monitor Russia, especially in our own near area. We will also partly get this with the new military satellites we will gain control over.
The second thing we need is satellite capabilities when it comes to what is called targeting in English and målval in Swedish. In order for us to develop the long-range capability, we must also be able to identify where the opponents have their military resources. This is partly about the work we do when we build up a much stronger air defense. We also need to work with wide-area air defense. The Government presented in Sälen an investment of 15 billion to protect Sweden, not only when it comes to the military installations but also the civilian ones. It is a way to be able to handle incoming missiles.
Sometimes it is better to shoot the archer than to knock down the arrows. Therefore, it is important that Sweden also develops a long-range military capability, and we have taken measures and steps in this that we look forward to further developing.
The third [area] within the space domain that I want to prioritize is Sweden's integration into what is called IAMD, i.e., integrated air and missile defense. This is also something that the Armed Forces are requesting. It is about linking together the long-range capability, it is about linking together sensors, and it is about linking together space capability in order to be able to adapt this to the modern battlefield. A number of measures are being implemented to achieve this.
I think it is important to highlight the things that have occurred during a relatively short time thanks to hard-working individuals in the Armed Forces. I want to say for the record that we launched our first military satellite in August 2024 through what is called GNA 3. We also have a cooperation with Denmark called Bifrost. When we begin to work more integrated and concretely with being able to launch our own satellites, we get what Markus Selin requests, which is greater strategic independence and that we develop our own capability.
Markus Selin is an engineer, so he knows this better than I do, but what is also linked to the space domain is that the transmission capacity and the militarization have caused the cost curves to be broken. That is why there is a veritable explosion of satellites. Sweden will, of course, also be successful in using satellites. We will go from around 7,000 satellites today to upwards of 40,000 or 50,000 satellites in a few decades.
Markus Selin (S)
Madam Speaker! I can say once again that I am reasonably satisfied with the Minister for Defence's answer. It is to my satisfaction that we have a consensus on these important and long-term issues, which extend several parliamentary terms into the future.
I think the Minister for Defence should be thanked for having answered many of my questions here in the rostrum today. With the risk that I am asking too many questions, I actually have to exert myself to find one or perhaps two questions that the Minister for Defence did not quite have time to pick up.
A question was asked regarding the capability gaps. What do the actual needs look like here and now, for example, in the Armed Forces? Are there metrics for measures and steps there that we can compare all the way up to the strategy? The Minister for Defence is welcome to comment.
Another question is admittedly rather tedious, but it is topical: What do we do? What does Sweden do when it has to prioritize between different allies and between different defense collaborations? We have a limited bandwidth when it comes to capacity to space. How should this be prioritized with our allies in different defense collaborations? That question is, as said, topical.
I choose to conclude here, Madam Speaker, and look forward to the Minister for Defence's two concluding answers.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Ultimately, it is the Armed Forces that are best positioned to make that prioritization. Politics sets the framework and ensures that there is a balance between goals and means, and then the Armed Forces will, of course, factor in the prioritization in the resource allocation.
We are well-equipped to do this. As Markus Selin knows, the Air Force is responsible for the space domain, and we now have a daily space situational awareness. We have a space chief and a space department, which I have visited, at the Air Staff linked to the Air Force. This means that we are gradually working our way into the space domain, practically and operationally, in order to move forward in these issues.
Connecting to what we learn regarding our needs, I can say without going into details that, just as in the space domain, there are capability goals. We are an ally, which will characterize some of the needs we have on that point. As an ally, we receive military capability objectives within different domains. These are, however, for obvious reasons, surrounded by secrecy.
Let me conclude by saying that something we do and that we learn a great deal about from telewar is that Sweden and Germany, within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, are leading the work to support Ukraine in telewar capability. There is, of course, an obvious connection between space and telewar, as it is about connectivity.
The Ukrainians have been quite dependent on certain American suppliers, and they want to diversify. When it comes to the telewar dimension, it is obviously good to have different types of connectivity, and we are working on that – while we also have a space strategy for defense aspects. We also have a space program, and a few weeks ago we made a decision to, within the framework of low-earth orbit purchases, buy up to ten military satellites.
Thank you for the debate, Markus Selin!
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.