Response to interpellation 2025/26:241 on the Nordkalotten
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
1 M argues that the security policy situation in the Nordic region is analyzed continuously and that Sweden now belongs to the same operational area as Denmark and Finland 1. 1 M argues that the government has tasked the Armed Forces with establishing NATO's forward presence in Finland, where Sweden is a framework nation 1. 2 M argues that Russia has high ambitions to increase its forces and that Sweden is building up a stronger subarctic capability 2. 3 S argues that the Nordic region has received a more central role in NATO's planning with a focus on deterrence 3. 4 S argues that China is increasing its influence in the Arctic 4. 4 S argues that upper Norrland has great strategic importance 4. 5 M argues that Sweden and Finland are integrated into NATO's joint defense planning 5. 5 M argues that Sweden should be a staging area to strengthen NATO's deterrence 5. 5 M emphasizes the importance of infrastructure for military mobility 5. 5 M sees the Swedish contribution to FLF Finland as a complement to other allies' forces 5. 6 M considers that Sweden takes a great responsibility in the surrounding area and that strong war units are the most important contribution to NATO's deterrence 6. 7 S argues that it is important to strengthen the military presence in the northernmost parts of the country 7. 7 S argues that it is important to start building up military infrastructure now because it takes time 7. 7 S argues that it is time to start acting on capabilities that require a more permanent presence 7.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Erik Ezelius has asked me whether the government has made any analysis of which military capabilities need to be created or strengthened in the northern parts of the country due to the security policy situation in the Nordic region and, if so, what measures I and the government are prepared to take to increase Sweden's and NATO's readiness and ability to operate in the mentioned geographical region.
The security policy situation in our immediate vicinity, including the Nordic region, is analyzed continuously both nationally and in Nato. Finland's and Sweden's Nato membership has changed the security policy situation in the Nordic region and means that we have a new context when it comes to both operations planning and capability planning, and that we need to have an alliance perspective in these matters.
The Government has worked to ensure that Sweden, together with the other Nordic countries, belongs to the same operational area of responsibility. On 5 December 2025, the affiliation for Sweden, Denmark, and Finland was moved to the alliance's operational headquarters in Norfolk, USA. The move means that all Nordic countries can now be led from one and the same operational headquarters, which further strengthens the alliance's ability to act in a coordinated manner in the Baltic Sea region, the North Atlantic, and the Arctic.
NATO carries out operational planning within the entire Euro-Atlantic area, including the Nordic region. Sweden is involved in this planning, primarily at the military level. In order to be able to act in a coordinated manner within the framework of the alliance's operational plans in the northwestern operational area, necessary command resources are required. Therefore, the government has tasked the Armed Forces with preparing and establishing parts of NATO's command structure as well as offering Sweden as a location for these.
The Alliance's concept for deterrence and defense is based on maintaining a credible deterrence and defense capability. In the 2026 regulatory letter, the Government has tasked the Armed Forces, together with Finland, to establish NATO's forward presence in Finland, FLF Finland, based on Sweden's responsibility as a framework nation. The establishment of FLF Finland is now ongoing, and FLF is an important part of NATO's collective deterrence and defense and contributes to strengthening the Alliance's capability on NATO's northern flank. It is also an important part of Sweden's and Finland's integration into NATO.
Erik Ezelius (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you for the answer, Minister!
Yes, the security policy situation in northern Europe has fundamentally changed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As a direct consequence, Finland and Sweden have joined Nato, Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024, which has significantly changed the strategic balance in the region. Nato territory now borders directly against Russia in the north – previously it was only through Norway's short border – and the alliance's collective defense according to Article 5 applies fully even in this area. Consequently, the Nordic region has received a more central role in Nato's joint planning with a clear focus on deterrence against Russian aggression.
I see a group of young people sitting in the gallery. When I told my wife yesterday that we were going to debate the Nordic Cap, she said: It is the first time I have heard the term Nordic Cap. What does it mean? I can answer briefly in the same way here: The Nordic Cap is a geographical term referring to the northernmost parts of the Nordic region. The area includes northern Sweden, northern Norway, and northern Finland. Sometimes northwestern Russia, what is called the Kola Peninsula, is included. The term is often used in security policy and military planning and regional cooperation.
At the same time, the Arctic has gained increased strategic importance. Climate change and reduced ice cover make the area more accessible for both civilian transport and military activity. Furthermore, the region is important for surveillance, shipping, space, and signal intelligence, which makes bases, air defense, and communication lines in the north key resources for both Nato and Russia. This has led to increased military presence and more exercises from both sides.
Parallel to this, political polarization has increased. Institutions such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council have previously functioned as stabilizing forums, but after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, cooperation with Russia has largely ceased. This reduces the possibilities for dialogue and increases the risk of misunderstandings and escalation.
Finland, as a new NATO member, has significantly strengthened its defense and its role within the alliance. The country has focused on Arctic warfare through, among other things, hunter brigades, advanced border surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, and rapid integration into NATO's planning structure. Large-scale military exercises in Lapland together with allies aim to improve interoperability and the ability to operate in subarctic environments. After 2022, Finland completely terminated defense and research cooperation with Russia and simultaneously built up border fences along the eastern border.
Norway has also increased its military engagement in the north. The country has begun to ease previous self-imposed restrictions on Nato exercises near the Russian border, which enables more frequent and extensive training with allied forces. Infrastructure in Finnmark is being progressively expanded to be able to receive larger units and carry out more regular exercises, including preparations to reinforce the Finnmark Brigade. At the same time, training and logistics facilities in northern Norway, such as Camp Viking, serve as hubs for Arctic military cooperation.
Russia has simultaneously maintained and modernized its military presence in the Arctic. The Northern Fleet as well as air and ground forces on the Kola Peninsula have continued to be a high priority, with investments in submarines, air defense, and hypersonic weapons systems to secure the northern flank and the country's nuclear deterrence. Despite the military efforts in Ukraine, significant parts of Russia's naval and airborne capacity are still stationed in the Arctic. Furthermore, Russian intelligence and hybrid activity in Nordic waters is reported, for example through research vessels and observations near borders, which is seen as a broader pattern of gray zone operations.
At the regional level, several Nato countries have intensified their presence through joint exercises and expanded basing in the Arctic. Taken together, the Nordic region is characterized today by increased military activity, stronger alliance cooperation, and a clearer confrontational relationship between Nato and Russia.
My question to the Minister for Defence is whether he shares the picture that I have now painted.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! The short answer to that question is that in all essential respects, I share Erik Ezelius's view.
Let me just broaden the picture a little bit in connection with the threat analysis that forms the basis for the quite extensive measures that we are now taking at the national level to upgrade the defense, but which we also take as an ally.
The reason for that naturally has to do with the pattern we see in Russia. A full-scale invasion and occupation of Ukraine has been launched, and Russia has repeatedly shown itself willing to take very large political and military risks. One may not have been dazzled on the battlefield in that one has not succeeded in taking more than barely 1 percent of Ukraine's territory during the past year, but one is willing to take very large casualties.
Right now, Russia is tied up in and around Ukraine with somewhere between 750,000 and 800,000 soldiers. But they continue to invest in their infrastructure, not least in the Leningrad Military District. They have stated ambitions to go from the level of brigade size to division size in the places where they are currently active. It is therefore a tripling of the forces for which they have a stated ambition. Where they currently have army corps – I am thinking of the 44th Army Corps in Karelia – they want to move up to armies. They thus have high, stated ambitions.
We have also had to conclude that Russia's production capacity of defense materiel has increased significantly since the full-scale war broke out. If they can maintain that production pace but do not exhaust personnel and materiel in Ukraine, this will have certain military consequences for us.
It is therefore urgent for us to build up a stronger capacity for deterrence and defense against Russia, even after a peace agreement or a ceasefire that we all want the Ukrainians to receive. But it must be a long-term sustainable peace agreement for Ukraine's part.
Alongside that, we have also seen that Russia is now restoring a considerable number of the military installations in the Arctic that it had during the Cold War. This is a reality, which is why Nato is now focusing on increased presence also in the Arctic region.
What leads and dimensions this is NATO's three new defense plans. As I said in my answer, we are included in one of them together with the other Nordic countries, USA, Canada and the United Kingdom. Those defense plans must be resourced so that they have a good capacity for deterrence and defense. It is in that picture that Sweden enters. Then we have different military capability goals, where much of the weight lies in northern Sweden.
The defense decision we made on December 17, 2024, leads to the fact that we are now beginning to acquire a stronger subarctic capability. The cornerstone in this is, naturally, in the land combat area our two mechanized brigades, the 4th Brigade and the 19th Brigade, which have a unique ability to be able to operate in these cold and demanding environments. I usually say that it is one thing to be able to survive in these environments and another thing to be able to conduct high-intensity warfare. Our soldiers can do that better than the vast majority.
Of course, that comes to it – which I will return to – that a point in much of the cooperation is that Sweden is the framework nation for what is called FLF Finland, that is to say, NATO's activities for deterrence and defense in Finland. It is a task within NATO that Sweden leads, in close cooperation with Finland. Alongside that, all Nordic countries are included in FLF Finland – which is good for Nordic defense cooperation – and also resource-rich countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. I will return in the next speech to how this dimensionizes and shapes our subarctic capability.
Erik Ezelius (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister, for the answer!
We return to the Arctic. Analyzing the superpowers China and the USA provides another grid to overlay on the analysis to further complicate the issues. China positions itself as a near-Arctic country, with increased interest in the region's opportunities, despite the country not bordering the Arctic. This is done through diplomacy, research, infrastructure projects, and economic cooperation that often occurs in partnership with Arctic states such as Russia.
China has invested in research, for example Arctic research stations, and participated in regional forums to strengthen its influence. The country has also built icebreakers and shown military ambitions through presence and conducted goodwill visits with naval units in waters in the north.
China and Russia have developed cooperation for the joint development of the northern sea route and for infrastructure projects. They have also carried out joint operations in the region.
The USA has in recent years increased its strategic focus on the Arctic and the High North as a result of Russia's and China's growing presence. The region is central for surveillance, deterrence, and early warning, but broader American security policy priorities are currently creating great uncertainty among European allies regarding the USA's long-term commitment.
Overall, the developments in the Arctic and the North Atlantic reflect a deteriorating security situation characterized by increased military activity and geopolitical competition.
What does all this mean for Swedish affairs, and what measures are being taken? Well, if we go back to the defense preparation and to the subsequent defense decision 2020, we see that the government noted a long-term need for increased military capability and presence in upper Norrland, especially regarding units with subarctic competence. Against this background, the Armed Forces were tasked with analyzing how the capability in northern Lappland could best be strengthened ahead of the defense decision 2025, taking into account operational, economic, and security policy aspects as well as the trilateral cooperation between Sweden, Finland, and Norway.
Upper Norrland has great strategic importance through important natural resources and space activities, as well as as part of NATO's northern flank. NATO membership has further increased the requirements for military presence, subarctic combat capability, and host nation support for allied units. At the same time, the availability of units with such capability within NATO is limited, which implies a special responsibility for Sweden, Finland, and Norway. Just as the Minister for Defence pointed out, it is one thing to have combat value to be able to perform tasks in those types of conditions and another thing to just survive.
The Armed Forces presented its mission in December 2022 and proposed measures to strengthen the continuous presence in upper Norrland through, among other things, expanded conscript training in Boden, Luleå and Arvidsjaur, increased winter exercise activities, some training in Kalixfors, as well as the establishment of a logistics base in the Kiruna area.
In later documents, the Armed Forces have again emphasized the need for increased presence and suggested that the area along E10 be used for Home Guard activities and limited conscript training focused on logistics and host nation support. The Defence Preparedness Board also emphasizes the importance of training air defense and engineering units in the region, as well as that the possibility of giving I 21 an expanded responsibility for subarctic logistics units should be considered.
At the same time, the Defence Preparation Board notes that the strong industrial development in Norrbotten, in combination with housing shortages and geographical location, can complicate the Armed Forces' recruitment of both military and civil personnel.
Does the Minister for Defence consider that this rapid development of events warrants that, within the framework of new defense talks or the defense preparedness that will be activated again in the near future, an analysis be conducted on which military capabilities need to be created or strengthened in the northern parts of Sweden?
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! We are doing this progressively. As Nato allies, Sweden and Finland are now integrated into Nato's joint defense planning, and the move from JFC Brunssum to Norfolk also means that we will now fully enter the tactical plans. This creates conditions to deepen Nordic military cooperation within the framework of Nato – alongside the binding defense obligations between our countries, of course. The work is therefore moving quickly.
Much of this is driven by the requirement that Erik Ezelius pointed out, namely the host nation support requirement. It is extensive and dimensioning, not least for Sweden which is to be a mobilization area in large parts to be able to strengthen NATO's capacity for deterrence and defense, primarily in Finland but also in the Baltic countries, where we, for example, have a mechanized battalion in place in Latvia.
There will be a need for infrastructure investments, and in the broad agreement we made on June 19 last year that we shall go up to 5 percent of GDP, 50 billion has been allocated for security of supply measures and military mobility.
Military mobility is central. The obstacles that can arise for military mobility can be administrative, legal, or physical. It can therefore be bureaucracy or a lack of legal support that hinders the movement of military resources, but it can also be about the need to be able to invest in actual infrastructure. We have identified four different routes through Sweden that are central. One is up in the north connected to Kiruna, Bodö, and then further into Finland. Strengthening the infrastructure is important for the development of our military capability up in the Nordic region.
Let me return to another part, namely the work with FLF Finland, which will be responsible for NATO's deterrence and defense measures in Finland. It is based largely on the work that Sweden and Finland developed before we became allies, through what was called the FISE cooperation. Then, we will naturally have staff officers both in Sodankylä and in Rovaniemi. We have said that before. We have a commander for the mechanized battalion that will constitute the very backbone of the more immediately operational available contributions for FLF Finland.
We have also said that there are eight other FLFs, namely NATO's forward presence, among the alliance's easternmost allies. What distinguishes this FLF is that it will not be permanently based in Finland, given the geographical conditions, which are quite unique – I believe there are 20 rivers, three roads, and an enormous amount of forest in the area. It is difficult to station a combat group or mechanized battalion permanently there. It will therefore rotate in and out and also cooperate very closely with Finland.
The main part of Finland's armed forces is located in the southern part, but precisely in Sodankylä, they have a hunter brigade. They also have an additional brigade in Rovaniemi. The Swedish contribution will be a complement together with our other allies.
Erik Ezelius was also involved in space capability. It is vital both for the Arctic and for being able to see what is happening in the Arctic and for subarctic conditions. This is an investment we have also made. We presented, for example, an initiative which means that we will now purchase ten military satellites. Everything shall be ready by 2028 so that we can obtain a better situational awareness. We must remember that this concerns large geographical areas, and we need to have good intelligence capabilities, not least to monitor the movements of Russian combat forces.
Erik Ezelius (S)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Minister for Defence, for the answer, and for a good debate! It is important also to inform those who are listening, watching on the web, or sitting here in the gallery to take part in how the conditions look. It is important to understand that our part of the globe will have an immensely central and strategic role moving forward.
It is also extremely important to remember that Sweden is a very large and elongated country. It is about 160 miles from south to north – or as people usually say: The distance from Skåne to northern Lapland is approximately the same as from Skåne to northern Italy.
All of this is important to remember, because if one conclusion is that we, due to the changed security policy situation, will need to strengthen our military presence in the northernmost parts of our own country – both within the framework of Article 3, to ensure our own defense, and to strengthen the collective defense of the Nordic region – we should start now, preferably yesterday but definitely not tomorrow. Building up military infrastructure around training and in the form of shooting ranges, barracks, and so on, simply takes time.
I am not saying this because it is easy, but because it is difficult. And the Armed Forces will probably not jump for joy; they are already under heavy pressure to man our new units, man NATO staffs, and so on. As a former professional officer myself, I know that secondments are not something one rejoices over. But if the conclusion is, or becomes, that one will need to create capabilities that require a more permanent presence, it is time to start acting. Time, in fact, is a luxury we no longer have.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Erik Ezelius, for the debate!
I have had a lot of contact with I 19 and many of those who work with what is called FLF Finland. It is a large and demanding responsibility, but I also perceive a great enthusiasm for the mission. Sweden takes a large responsibility in the surrounding area, and we chose to do so as recently allied. When SACEUR was at the People and Defense National Conference in Sälen, he called us a model ally. Praise be given where it is due, however, and it is not I and Erik Ezelius who are to be praised, but the Defense Forces' hard-working personnel. They are today at an advanced position in Latvia, where they work with their mechanized battalion, and we have our Gripen planes down in Poland.
Not least, it is about the great responsibility we therefore have within FLF Finland. We are the ninth ally to shoulder such a responsibility in an alliance with 32 countries. The other countries that have FLF responsibility are larger, but we think it is important that we shape and take responsibility for security in our immediate vicinity. This is a form of forward defense with a fan of activities in northern Europe, so it fits well with how we want to develop our defense.
The work has, naturally, begun much earlier. I do not need to tell Erik Ezelius this, but much of the foundation was laid with the 2020 defense decision and the mechanized brigades. What we did with the 2024 defense decision was to ensure the further development of the brigade concept and ensure that the brigades have ammunition, spare parts, and supplies. It is such things that create strong combat units, and strong combat units are ultimately our most important contribution to NATO's capacity for deterrence and defense.
Thank you very much for the debate!
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.