Response to interpellation 2025/26:245 on GPS interference
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
M considers GPS interference in the Baltic Sea to be hybrid threats that require increased resilience through alternative navigation systems and cooperation with authorities 1. M emphasizes that the government has taken measures through countermeasure policy and support for sanctions against Russian telewar battalions 2 3. M advocates for the term hybrid threats rather than a terror classification 3 4. M argues that these are hybrid operations 4 and that sanctions that bite are important 4. S considers the interference to be systematically state-driven terrorism and state terrorism 5. S argues that the government should classify the activity as an act of terrorism 6 7. S argues that both a terror classification and existing hybrid sanction regimes can be used simultaneously 7. S demands that the issue of terror classification be pushed forward in the Nordic-Baltic circle 7.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! Peter Hultqvist has asked me what measures I intend to take in view of the increasing number of GPS interference incidents in the Baltic Sea.
The Chairman raises a problem that is important for us to counter. Radio frequency interference affecting satellite navigation systems, GNSS, in the Baltic Sea region has increased since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The interference is part of a context of increased uncertainty and increased unpredictability in Sweden's immediate vicinity.
Since the end of 2023, they occur more frequently, cover increasingly larger areas, and are becoming more intense. At the same time, pure jamming signals have in part been replaced by so-called spoofing – deliberate falsification of transmission information to mislead the receiver.
The disturbances we are now seeing can have far-reaching consequences and increase the risk of accidents. It is therefore of importance that there is good resilience against such disturbances, which the government's defense and security strategy for space paves the way for. The relevant authorities have an established and recurring cooperation regarding the disturbances, and for 2026, the government has tasked the sector-responsible authorities with strengthening resilience against hybrid threats.
Access to alternative solutions can increase resilience. Aviation can, for example, navigate safely through types of systems other than GPS. Furthermore, aircraft in Swedish airspace can receive radar guidance from air traffic control. Sweden also has plenty of ground-based traditional approach aids, which provides robustness. Ships shall be able to navigate safely even without support from GNSS systems. Redundancy exists through both terrestrial and astronomical navigation tools as well as radar systems and echo sounders.
Sweden is also active within the EU and international organizations. For example, Sweden has been involved in pushing forward in the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, on the issue of resilience against GNSS interference. Sweden welcomes the resolution in the ICAO General Assembly condemning Russia for recurring GNSS interference which undermines aviation safety and security in international civil aviation. Also, the ITU, the International Telecommunication Union, is investigating interference that violates the radio regulations and has urged Russia to immediately cease the interference.
We are prepared for the fact that the global situation in our immediate vicinity will mean that this type of threat, disruption, and pressure will continue.
Peter Hultqvist (S)
Madam Speaker! We can observe that the GPS interference in the Baltic Sea area is increasing. They come primarily from transmitters in the Kaliningrad area and the Saint Petersburg area and interfere with aviation, maritime transport, and emergency services in a very serious way. This leads to incorrect positioning. Hundreds of thousands of flights have been affected, and ferries and ships have been forced to use alternative methods for navigation. This is to be regarded as a hybrid war. The interference occurs daily and can, among other things, be used to conceal military transports from the Russian side.
I am well aware that the government has tried to protest against this in various international organizations, but the question is whether it is enough. This is something that is systematically recurring and must be regarded as state-driven. The effect is a destabilization of aviation and maritime security. It is about instilling fear and uncertainty and in that way influencing national decision-making. Because there is a systematic nature to it, there must be a strategy behind it. It cannot be characterized as individual incidents.
Therefore, the question of how we should view this type of activity must be raised. By working towards destabilization, instilling fear, and influencing national decision-making, which in practice becomes the effect of the entire operation, one conducts a form of systematic and strategically designed terrorism. In this case, it becomes a form of state terrorism.
One can consider how to act in such a case. It is actually possible for the government to raise the issue in the EU that the GPS interference is an act of terror. The government can also declare that the interference is to be regarded as a hostile act directed against the state's security.
Then we naturally have courts that can handle such matters. It is Säpo that investigates crimes against national security, and there are also international criminal courts. But it is very important which direction we choose here and how we designate this activity.
Someone said in another context today that this is the new normal. I do not like the term "the new normal." It is abnormal with these types of interference levels. We must not establish it as some new factor that we simply have to contend with, because it is based on a malicious antagonistic handling with the aim of sabotaging people who are flying, are on the sea, or are engaged in some other socially useful activity. This is part of a strategic Russian pattern.
My question to the minister is simple: Is it not time to speak plainly and designate this as the act of terrorism it is? In practice, it is state terrorism that we are dealing with.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! I shall in a moment give an answer regarding the measures that have been taken in a concrete sense, not only in words but also in action, to rectify the problem.
We see this as hybrid operations. They should be seen in a larger pattern of what is now happening in the Baltic Sea. It is a number of things happening in the Baltic Sea simultaneously. For the first, naturally, recurring cable breakages are occurring. Critical infrastructure on the seabed is obviously affected by measures being taken. We must keep track of that. For the second, GNSS interference is occurring, but also pure spoofing, that is to say that one projects an image of a ship somewhere other than where it actually is. For the third, the dynamics in the Baltic Sea are affected by the work with the Russian shadow fleet. For the fourth, we see that the Russian Baltic Fleet has acted more offensively towards us and our allies during the past year.
It is, therefore, a recurring pattern. We are crystal clear when it comes to the fact that we condemn and are critical of Russia's actions at this time.
One can discuss whether it should be a terror classification or not, but we must address this. We have what is called a policy of countermeasures against Russia, where we are to limit and weaken Russia, as a consequence of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
It is often argued that there are three overarching reasons why Russia does this. In some cases, it may well be about protective measures. One is naturally concerned about the successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian military installations but also on civil infrastructure. It can therefore be a protective measure that is being taken. And one can practice. But we also know that this is done deliberately, targeted at us and our allies. I think it is important to take that picture with you.
On December 15 last year, the European Council decided to list Russia's 142nd military intelligence battalion in Kaliningrad within the framework of the so-called hybrid sanctions regime. By using the sanctions instrument – I believe that is what Peter Hultqvist is also actually after – we can obtain extensive entry bans into the EU for individuals. We can freeze the assets of persons and entities and obtain a ban on funds or economic resources available to those included in this battalion.
This was a Lithuanian initiative that Sweden gave strong support for. It is precisely in line with the policy of counteraction, where we try to limit and weaken Russian actions. It is a concrete action and a concrete measure that allows us to combat the type of hybrid operations that Russia directs towards Sweden and other allies.
Peter Hultqvist (S)
Madam Speaker! I think that the Nordic governments and the Baltic governments could agree to mark that they see this as a pure act of terror – it should not be difficult. It is just based on the sanction regarding the telecommunications link, which the Russians have in Kaliningrad.
One must in some way raise the guard and raise the level of what this actually is. This question pops up at regular intervals. There are some newspaper articles. There is some reporting. Then a long time passes, and nothing is said. But this just continues and goes on.
In some way, one must mark it so that it appears very clearly to the public in the European system, the EU system, and also in relation to Russia that we see this as something serious. Therefore, one should also classify the level of how it is viewed, that is, use terrorist acts as the basic platform when describing this. It is, therefore, state terrorism with systematicity and aggressiveness that aims to weaken us in different ways.
I believe that one could reach an agreement on this between the Nordic and the Baltic countries. I even believe that in the Baltics, it could be welcomed with satisfaction if we were to take such an initiative.
I share the image of the breadth of hybrid operations, and it is one of the so-called hybrid operations that we are talking about.
This has led to an increasing tendency to look at having other types of navigation skills. It is about returning, to a significant extent, to navigating without GPS systems or other electronic systems. There is also more extensive practice in this, and attempts are being made to revive old skills in order to ensure that one can act without electronic equipment.
The Coast Guard has, among other things, reported that they have re-acquired nautical charts. I believe it will take a fairly substantial amount of time before one can implement and revive this type of knowledge. This must, therefore, be a very prioritized issue moving forward if we are to be able to approach this properly.
This will not subside, and I do not know if the protective measures we have taken have actually bitten much so far. When it comes to this type of jamming and this type of consequential interference, one constantly finds new variants of how it is to be done. It is clearly documented that there are bases on the Russian side, in both Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg, with special antenna facilities and special equipment that even originate from the old Soviet Union and were built up at that time and have well been modernized in the time we are living in now.
My request remains: Could the government not consider raising the level here and clearly clarifying that this is an act of terrorism? Can an initiative such as that be attempted together with the Baltics and the other Nordic countries, so that it is clarified that we view this very seriously? It is about driving this issue with that entire breadth within the framework of the European Union.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! I have, of course, done so. I have raised this issue in the Nordic circle, within the framework of Nordefco. I have also raised it in what is called the NB8 format. As Peter Hultqvist knows, the five Nordic countries and the three Baltic countries meet from time to time to discuss the way forward.
Sweden is among those experiencing greater problems than others in this context, but it is also well-known along the Finnish border and up in Kirkenes in Norway that this is a growing problem.
With that said, we have now taken measures, but we have used the term hybrid threat rather than terror classification. It was a Lithuanian initiative, and I think it is good that this was done against the 142nd telewar battalion in Kaliningrad. What we are requesting are muscles, and that is obtained through the sanctions instrument. It can probably be similar if it is linked to terror as it is when it concerns hybrid operations. But then you get the freezing of the economic assets. You get the entry bans. You get a number of restrictions for everyone who is part of the battalion.
We do not rule out at all the possibility that this type of activity may need to be directed towards more actors, because this is a growing problem. We noticed this, above all, at some point in the beginning of 2023, when this began to grow in strength and scope, not least in our own immediate vicinity.
It is also about increasing our own resilience. Peter Hultqvist touched upon a good deal of the measures and actions we are taking to strengthen our resilience against this. It is about investments in ground-based systems so that one is not dependent on the GPS system. It also concerns other extensive systems, such as the Galileo system, which can also provide us with resilience, so that one is not only dependent on the GPS system. It is about, as Peter Hultqvist also touched upon, that one must be able to manage ordinary manual navigation.
The only thing that is positive in this is that we have not had any major incidents so far. But with that said, we are deeply critical of the deeply reckless Russian actions. We have raised it on a number of occasions. We have worked together with Lithuania in the EU. We have raised it in the Nordic circle. We have raised it in the NB8 circle. We have also raised it in the International Telecommunication Union and in the ICAO. The government is active in this issue and sees this as a growing problem.
Peter Hultqvist (S)
Madam Speaker! I think one can do both in this case. I have nothing negative to say about these hybrid sanction regimes. You may well elaborate on that further in different contexts. But such work would be strengthened by making a terror designation. At the same time, a terror designation would become a clear signal towards Moscow, and it would be perceived as us focusing on the problem and showing that this is unacceptable. If one has this as a platform, it is no problem to then drive forward different sanction regimes in different areas concerning exactly this.
I think, just as we seem to agree, that this is a deeply serious activity. One does not do such things without a clear reason. The reason is to disturb and destroy and to in different ways create the uncertainty that has developed in the Baltic Sea area. This will only continue. Therefore, we must raise how we view the activity a bit.
State terrorism is actually a phenomenon that occurs on and off in history and involves a state deliberately terrorizing citizens in other countries or other nations for a certain purpose. This type of terror also aims to make us adapt in different ways to what some call a kind of new normal. We absolutely must not go down that path.
I think it is good that efforts are being made in different ways to handle this, even though there is still a great deal left to do. My demand for the future, however, is that the issue of terror classification must be pushed forward, be raised again in the Nordic-Baltic circle, and demonstrate the seriousness of this. The statistics show very broadly how much the Russian side is involved in this.
Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)
Madam Speaker! I do not master the purely legal discussion linked to whether it is state terrorism or hybrid operations myself. I think it sounds more like hybrid operations, but let us in that case save it for another discussion.
What is important and what has been achieved now is that the sanctions can bite. That is what will have an impact. There will be consequences for all individuals who are connected to the operations, and then it hurts. Here, Sweden is very active and driving within the framework of our counteraction policy against Russia as a consequence of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
We have a close cooperation between the authorities to handle hybrid threats but also to be able to handle GNSS interference and also spoofing. This includes the Coast Guard, the police, the Security Service, the Armed Forces and obviously the Navy. We are also investing significant resources in increasing our resilience so that we can become a hard target. This reduces the incentives or the carrot for Russia to conduct this type of activity. We have repeatedly raised this in a number of international forums, and as I said in my previous contribution, the government is working intensively on the issue.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.