Response to interpellation 2025/26:29 on the functionality of the emergency number during the shutdown of 2G networks
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerns the functionality of the emergency number during the shutdown of the 2G network. KD argues that the phase-out is a decision from the telecommunications operators, not the government 1, and that the operators have a statutory responsibility to ensure emergency communication 2 1. KD believes that one can feel secure with the work being performed 1, that the telecommunications operators are well-prepared 3, and that PTS is doing a good job 4. KD argues that it is easier to perform consequence analyses afterwards 3. S argues that the government has not conducted a proper consequence analysis before the shutdown 5, that there is widespread concern 6 5, and that the government shows indifference toward the risks 6 5.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Civilministern Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! Adrian Magnusson has asked me whether I and the government have ensured that the decommissioning of the 2G network, starting on December 1 this year, will not entail any risks for private individuals, businesses, and public activities, and, above all, whether the emergency number 112 will function as it does today.
The mobile operators already issued information in 2020 that 2G and 3G technologies will be phased out, and they have communicated timelines for the technology shift early on. The phase-out of the 2G networks begins, according to the operators' plans, in December 2025. Previous governments also received questions regarding this technology shift and whether it is ensured that the phase-out does not entail risks for society-critical activities. What has changed during this parliamentary term is that one of the operators has notified that they are waiting until the end of 2027 to shut down its 2G network.
Services in mobile networks have become increasingly important for society, and it is therefore central that the decommissioning of the older mobile networks occurs responsibly and with special consideration for the users' safety and the society's preparedness.
Different groups in society are affected in different ways, partly depending on different geographical conditions and what technical equipment is used. It is important that users receive the correct information and support well in advance before the older networks are decommissioned.
Operators are legally obliged to cooperate in relaying emergency communications via the emergency number 112. They are also obliged to relay the information required for SOS Alarm to be able to locate the person in distress. Even if the user's regular operator lacks coverage or has suffered an outage, calls to 112 can be connected via another operator's network. This is called emergency roaming.
The Government has acted to ensure that the technological shift takes place responsibly and to increase the preparedness for the sectors that are particularly affected. The Government has tasked PTS with monitoring how the decommissioning of the 2G networks proceeds. According to the assignment, PTS shall monitor and report on which replacement solutions are offered in cases where electronic communication services have been dependent on the 2G networks.
The Government has furthermore given PTS a special assignment to report on experiences from and consequences of the decommissioning of the 2G networks. In the execution of the assignment, PTS shall obtain information from other authorities and organizations and report on what consequences have arisen, both in Sweden and in other comparable countries. PTS shall submit a written final report to the Government Offices by May 15 next year at the latest.
Earlier this year, the Government invited organizations that in different ways gather actors affected by the technological shift to the Ministry of Finance for an updated account of which measures need to be taken to manage the phase-out. Representatives from, among others, SOS Alarm and the Armed Forces participated in the meeting. The accounts I received show that many actors have taken their responsibility and are prepared to handle the technological shift. I want to conclude this somewhat long contribution by saying that the Government continues to follow the developments.
Adrian Magnusson (S)
Mr. Speaker! Thanks to Minister Slottner for the answer!
It is not the first time that the Minister and I have met in this chamber to discuss issues regarding the shutdown of the 2G and 3G networks. But depending on how the shutdown proceeds from now on, this may be the last time. We will simply have to see.
I share the Minister's view that the shutdown has been planned for a long time and that there have been information efforts regarding the shutdown. We therefore do not need, as in many other issues in this chamber lately, to waste time discussing what is true. Despite this, it has emerged during the process that the information has not reached a good number of people within several different sectors. I hope that the Minister is aware of this.
Mr. Speaker! I have met representatives from several different industries and sectors who have expressed concern regarding the shutdown. For example, agriculture can be mentioned. Several farmers have expressed great concern about what will happen to their agricultural machinery during the shutdown of the grids.
There has also been a great concern about what will happen with the E-call system that exists in several cars around the country. Will it continue to function even after the networks are shut down? It has been highly unclear so far, and we have not even discussed the issues with foreign cars.
Questions have also been asked about how the emergency number 112 will function during the shutdown of the 2G network. European Emergency Number Association, which I will hereafter refer to as EENA, has warned that an all-too-early shutdown of the networks risks the security of the emergency number. The answer provided by the Minister means that we can only hope that the shutdown does not entail risks for the emergency number's functionality. Based on the answer provided in the chamber, the only interpretation that can be made is that the government has had no contact with EENA.
Mr. Speaker! Somewhere here we come to the core of the problem. There are many questions hanging in the air regarding the decommissioning of the networks, and the answers are few. In other countries around Europe, thorough impact assessments and investigations have been conducted regarding the risks and dangers of decommissioning. In France, for example, a comprehensive impact assessment has been carried out. But we do not need to go so far away; we can simply look slightly westward, towards Norway. There, at the initiative of the Storting, an impact assessment was conducted on what a decommissioning of the 2G network could mean in terms of risks. Following that, an orderly decommissioning has taken place in stages.
I must, in this debate, but also after the previous debate that the Minister and I had on a similar subject, express my surprise that the government so stubbornly chooses to reject the ideas of investigating the risks before a shutdown is carried out. Instead, one chooses to give a mandate where the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority shall follow the shutdown while it is ongoing. As far as I have been able to discern, no gradual shutdown occurs, but everything is shut down at once by all operators except one, which, after the previous debate that the Minister and I had, actually postponed the shutdown of the network for a few years.
This means in practice that the shutdown is carried out first and any consequences are considered later, when the shutdown itself has already taken place.
Mr. Speaker! This is, in my opinion, a rather strange way to handle such a question. The usual way is surely to investigate the consequences of something before doing it and not afterwards?
This indifference towards the risks, whether it concerns lawnmowers, security alarms, agricultural machinery or the emergency number, actually surprises me. We have a government that often has a high tail-end in security issues and a high tone in preparedness issues, but in the end, one can wonder if it is just talk and hot air.
This will be a shrug of the shoulders, despite the concern from various organizations involved in the issue. Even the Director General of the Post and Telecom Authority has written a text about how the municipalities must act, probably because there is widespread concern. But that concern does not seem to exist at the Civil Minister's office in any case – nice for him and his office!
Civilministern Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! Shutting down the 2G and 3G networks is not a decision that the government makes, but it is a decision that the telecommunications operators have made. It will now take place at the end of this year. It is a responsibility for the telecommunications operators to ensure that different services that they are required by law to perform can also be maintained. This applies, for example, to calls to the emergency number 112. It is a statutory responsibility, and we have an authority that is the supervisory authority for this.
The Government has now also tasked PTS to follow the issue. Now Adrian Magnusson thinks it is too late and that it should have been done earlier. But now we are where we are, Mr. Speaker, and I want to say that it is an interim report that we will receive in May 2026 and not a final report. I was alerted that I said it incorrectly in the interpellation answer.
One of the telecommunications operators, the largest one, has announced that they will wait until 2027 with the shutdown. This means that this will still happen gradually, and in this case, one can for a period of time use Telia's mobile network as a replacement. I do not take a position on Telia's decision to wait until 2027 – I really want to say that – but it creates conditions for a more gradual decommissioning when they can relieve each other's networks.
We have previously always been in agreement on technology neutrality. Now, Adrian Magnusson has not expressed this in this debate, but in previous debates it has been expressed that the Social Democrats in some way have wanted the government to stop the decommissioning and so on. But those debates have been with Isak From, and he is not present here. I will therefore refrain from further comments on just this.
But the Social Democrats and the government parties have agreed that technology neutrality shall apply, and I think that principle is important. It is fundamentally good that we fill our networks and spectrum with 5G; that is what will make Sweden competitive! That is what the inhabitants all around the country want. I believe that it is 0.02 percent of all data that today goes via 2G networks. It is therefore a vanishingly small part. But if the decommissioning does not occur in a controlled manner, that too can have consequences – absolutely.
After having met with the mobile operators and after having been informed for almost six years about the decommissioning, and when PTS is now very well prepared and is going to analyze this and has also begun the work, I still feel secure. Can I promise that there won't be any problems? No, it is clear that I cannot. But I still think that this approach and the work that has been done, is being done, and will be done provides very good conditions for this technological shift to succeed.
Adrian Magnusson (S)
Mr. Speaker! The core of the debate, once again, is that no proper impact assessment has been made of what this will entail before the shutdown is carried out. What the government says is: We will follow the work, and should any consequences arise, we will become aware of them in hindsight.
One could have done as in the vast majority of European countries and said beforehand: We will conduct a consequence analysis. We will try to look at what could go wrong and where the major risks lie.
We know, for example, that many safety alarms are dependent on 2G and 3G networks. One may have views that the municipalities and regions across the country have not updated their safety alarms earlier. That is entirely possible. One could absolutely have that discussion and say: We think you should have done this. But one must nevertheless be aware that not all municipalities may have done so. In that case, one cannot simply say that this is the telecommunications operators' responsibility. We have older people who are used to their safety alarms working, and when they then fall in their homes, the safety alarm suddenly does not work.
It is something hollow, I must say, to say that this is the operators' responsibility. As an elected person, an elected official and a minister, one still has a responsibility for the well-being of people in this country, and this blackout can have quite large consequences. Now we do not know that, as said, because no proper analysis of the consequences in this country has been made. That has been done, for example, in Norway.
One could also have looked at Norway and said that what Norway is doing right now seems quite good. The Norwegian impact assessment did indeed conclude that they did not see any major risks with the shutdown in Norway. But as said: We do not know how it looks in Sweden, because this impact assessment has not been carried out.
That there is a concern even quite high up in the agency hierarchy and the state administration, I think is noticeable when one reads the various articles and submissions on the subject. On October 23, for example, the Director General of the Post and Telecom Authority wrote a text in Dagens Samhälle which begins as follows: "I urge all public actors to review whether their own operations are affected by the decommissioning of the 2G and 3G networks."
It is worth noting that a director-general of an agency writes an article to the country's municipalities, regions, and other public actors where he says: You must review this. I am completely convinced that the director-general of the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority did not do this because he thought it was fun, but because he saw that this could go very wrong.
In the same article, he expressed himself as follows: ”It is up to everyone who is responsible for socially important systems to ensure that life-saving equipment still functions after the turn of the year 2025/2026.”
Again: There is a widespread concern that this could go quite badly.
It has been a while since the Minister and I had this debate. I know that the Minister and Isak From have also had such debates. After that type of discussion, one could have said: We might have to, if not pull the emergency brake, at least sit down and give a mandate to look at what the consequences could be if we carry out this shutdown.
I think it is quite good that Telia has chosen to wait. Since we do not have this impact assessment, it is good that Telia keeps its networks running longer so that we at least have something to fall back on if things were to go really badly.
There is also, unfortunately, some rather frightening statistics showing that quite a few municipalities have not analyzed their operations. In a survey conducted in March, it emerged that 20 percent of the municipalities had not analyzed their operations. It is clear that one can think that it should have been done. But now it has not been done, and then perhaps one still has to say that we must take a careful look at the potential consequences.
Civilministern Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! It is clear that it is always easier to conduct a consequence analysis after one has implemented something than before. One can conduct risk analyses beforehand, but consequence analyses are always easier to perform when one sees the effects of different measures.
Now, Adrian Magnusson is very certain that no consequence analysis or risk analysis exists. I am quite sure that the telecommunications operators have worked very diligently on this. I also thought that emerged during the round-table discussions. They are very well prepared, and they also do not want there to be chaos or for people to live insecurely because the 2G network is being switched off. They have been incredibly careful with their information.
Then I want to remind that the previous government, even if it may feel like a long time ago now, sat almost until 2023. The then Minister for Digitalization could have, at that time, given a mandate to PTS to conduct the risk analyses. When we took over, it was quite close in time until this shutdown was to occur. If the Social Democrats were serious about actually wanting to conduct an analysis of this, that mandate would actually have been given during the previous parliamentary term so that PTS could have performed a thorough piece of work.
Then I did not say that the operators are responsible for replacing alarms or so. It is the operations that do that. I must also say that it is very alarming if there are municipalities that have been so tone-deaf since 2020 that they have not understood that a technology shift is now taking place. I think that is very serious in that case.
When I was a municipal politician in Stockholm, we spent a lot of money on such exchanges to prepare ourselves for a technological shift. I mean that every municipality must have the capacity to absorb that information and change that infrastructure. Otherwise, one must review one's organization, seriously speaking.
I want to emphasize once again that I believe the decisions we have made, the legislation that exists and the mandates that PTS has received lay a very good foundation for this technological shift to occur as smoothly as possible. There will certainly be one thing or another bump in the road, one example or another of some household appliance that does not work, but on the whole, we have laid a good foundation for it to occur smoothly.
Adrian Magnusson (S)
Mr. Speaker! It is still somewhat telling when the Minister says, if not exactly: I still believe that the operators have conducted a consequence analysis. I have that picture.
Again: This is an opinion, an estimate and an assessment that a consequence analysis has been carried out.
In Norway, the equivalent of the Post and Telecom Authority conducted the impact analysis. One could have taken a holistic approach to this issue instead of hoping that Telia, Telenor, or whoever it is, is sitting and doing its impact analysis in its own room. One could have said: We are doing a risk and impact analysis – if one wants to call it that instead; we can do that for the sake of the matter – from a state level where we take control of the whole society and all the risks that exist and do not leave it to the market.
It has certainly been known for a long time in certain circles that there are risks with this, but the issue has become increasingly relevant. Despite it becoming increasingly relevant and being increasingly prominent in the debate in these circles, the government has chosen not to conduct any risk and consequence analysis beforehand. One chooses to test-drive it a little bit and see where it lands, and then the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority will have to keep an eye on it. It is an approach, but I believe it is a risky approach. I hope that it will go well.
Then one can only note that sales of this type of system, E-call systems and others, are still ongoing, with this technology which will be obsolete within not a very distant future. That is also a problem. Who is responsible for that, I do not know. But it is also a problem in this matter that the government disclaims responsibility and that perhaps no one else takes responsibility in certain parts. Those who then have to face the consequences risk being people who drive and crash or elderly people in the country's municipalities.
We must continue to follow the issue and see where it leads.
Civilministern Erik Slottner (KD)
Mr. Speaker! We continue to follow the issue.
I realized that Adrian Magnusson would hook on that part about belief. It was a bit vague, but I don't know if the operators call it exactly consequence analyses. It is a bit like calling a spade a spade, and I don't know if it is exactly a consequence analysis they have done. But I know that they are very prepared and stand ready for this technological shift. It has emerged very clearly at the meetings we have had with the operators.
Since the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority is the regulatory authority. Sure, one can complain and say that we hope that PTS will solve this, but they are the state's regulatory authority in this area. It is obvious that we make use of them, and they do it very well.
PTS is an authority with a very good reputation. It is also going to merge with Digg in 2027, which I believe will create an even more robust authority.
If the Social Democrats really had wanted to conduct a risk assessment some time before the technological shift, the previous government should have made such a decision so that it could be done thoroughly. But they chose not to do so, so the sinner has woken up a bit late, I think.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.