Response to interpellation 2025/26:52 on activity clubs

Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! Mattias Vepsä has asked me what I and the government concretely plan to do to combat Nazi activist clubs.

Let me first, as an important starting point, state that the government and all relevant authorities are conducting a very systematic work against violent extremism based on the national strategy against terrorism and violent extremism which was decided in the summer of some years ago (skr. 2023/24:56). Viewed over a longer period, the threat has primarily come from right-wing extremism, autonomous left-wing, and violent Islamism.

The Swedish Security Service, the Swedish Police Authority, and Center against violent extremism at the Crime Prevention Council monitor all relevant violent and extremist environments, including the activist clubs, and these authorities make ongoing assessments of what threat they pose.

The Swedish Security Service has a good overview of the activities of the activist clubs in Sweden. The clubs constitute a platform for the radicalization of, primarily, young men towards violent right-wing extremism. At the current time, they are not assessed to constitute an attack threat. However, some individuals with connections to the activist clubs have recently been convicted of serious violent crimes.

The Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen) works to prevent young individuals from being recruited and radicalized in the violence-oriented environments of clubs. The preventive work consists, among other things, of cooperation with, for example, the police, schools, and social services. The Swedish Security Service works together with other authorities to increase knowledge about active clubs and other violence-oriented environments.

According to the National Defence Intelligence Centre, the primary threat of terrorist attacks against Sweden during this year will likely come from lone actors acting out of a violent Islamist or right-wing extremist motive. The recruitment of children and young people into criminal gangs is also continuing to be worrying, especially as there are overlaps between these gangs and the violent extremist environments. Having the breadth and long-term perspective to handle these threats is important, while simultaneously taking into account that the threats can change rapidly.

As appears from the government's national strategy against violent extremism and terrorism, society needs to mobilize to strengthen resilience among children and young people. The relevant authorities have since the strategy was adopted strengthened and developed their cooperation. Information and knowledge about violent extremism as well as support in the preventive work are available to professionals within, among others, school, leisure activities and social services. The Center against violent extremism also fulfills a central function by providing tailored support to local actors and contributing to a higher quality in the preventive measures.

In the seven police regions, there are Redex centers, which are a form of cooperation between the police and the Security Service that the authorities have jointly developed for the purpose of early detection and reduction of threats from various violent extremist environments. Within the framework of Redex, the authorities develop working methods, develop measures, share operational information, and participate operationally in operations as specialist support to local police areas.

In the national intelligence picture, which the Swedish Security Service compiles and shares with relevant authorities, information about violent extremist environments in various locations is summarized. In this way, municipalities can gain access to local situational pictures and support in developing interventions, for example together with the police and the Center against violent extremism.

The government has also tasked the authorities included in the Cooperation Council against Terrorism with a mandate to develop and intensify the work against terrorism and violent extremism in order to strengthen Sweden's security. This is a council where, I believe, eleven or twelve authorities are included, which is led by the Swedish Security Service. Based on the mandate we have given, the authorities shall intensify their cooperation, and it is Säpo that shall coordinate the long-term development of this work. The mandate to the Cooperation Council has contributed to the fact that there are now better conditions for national, regional, and local authorities to conduct a structured, persistent, and long-term work.

The government is now carrying out a follow-up of the strategy in various ways. We last had a larger meeting with representatives from the authorities in the Cooperation Council and for a number of affected municipalities. In the near future, we will have a corresponding meeting with actors from civil society, the research community, and so on. When we have completed this follow-up, I intend to return with a consolidated report to the Riksdag on how this work has developed and how we envision it can develop as we look forward.

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Mattias Vepsä (S)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Minister of Justice, for the answer! The question I asked was about what more concrete measures need to be taken.

We see that the activity within, above all, the far-right is increasing in 2024. This occurs after many years of a downward trend when it comes to specifically activity linked to far-right environments. Since then, it has shifted a bit in how it looks.

What this debate is about is how these activity clubs have grown quite strong. Unfortunately, it is reported a bit too often how young people have been drawn into this form of activity. It is therefore about right-wing extremists who train in martial arts to increase their violence capital. But there is also an ideologically motivated idea here, which is that they want to overthrow society – abolish democracy and implement their Nazi ideas.

Expo has looked at this and argues that there is probably a large dark figure in what we know about the activity clubs. Very many of the far-right organizations, NMR and other terror-like groupings, like to show off their activity, on social media but also out on streets and squares. Expo has done a fantastic job with mapping. I know that Säpo has a handle on it, just as the Minister for Justice says in his answer. But it is warned that there is a large dark figure because, within this form of activity, one wants to go under the radar. It is about wanting to rent premises – sports halls, gyms or other. If one is too open with their activity, it is clear that it becomes difficult to rent those premises and do what one wants to do.

ETC reported in connection with the judgment that the Minister refers to. It was two people who were convicted of violent acts. There were also hate crime motives linked to this, but as I understood it, it was the violent crimes they were convicted for. According to an article in ETC, there is a core group of approximately 43 individuals, from Trelleborg in the south to Sollefteå in the north, who have a high level of violence and know-how; they know what they are doing. This is, therefore, a widespread operation.

Here in Stockholm, we have had a debate, I believe in the spring, about the activities out in Aspudden, where an activity club and organized Nazi members took over a sports stand and forced the football club to play in a secret location.

All of this is also linked to a global movement. This is not something that just pops up in Sweden, but it exists at a European level and internationally. The activity clubs are therefore something larger than a group of individuals gathering to practice martial arts.

When we meet with the Security Service and review the reports that are publicly available and the situational pictures that are published, I get the impression that they look at the individual level and say that the activist clubs as groupings do not have such a strong capacity for violence – as groupings, they do not have the position that they can threaten. But we see that more and more individuals from precisely these groupings actually commit acts of violence and shake our societies, build fear and make people uneasy.

I also think that this during the summer has been very much noticed, closely linked to the highest central state leadership – that the activist clubs can also infiltrate government circles. I wonder with that said if it is time for further concrete approaches when it comes to this threat.

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Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! I want to point out that I accounted very concretely for which measures are being taken in this area. This is also being done with a great degree of openness in relation to the potential seriousness of the threat.

The Swedish Security Service has stated that while these are indeed a relatively new type of far-right group in Sweden, they see that the method of luring young people into a broad and seemingly innocent martial arts context poses a great risk that these clubs will grow into a threat to our security. The Swedish Security Service points out that violence is also a driving force in the recruitment. They point to risks that the radicalization process can occur faster in such a context.

They also emphasize that it is not about any individual individuals in any individual suburbs of municipalities around Sweden, but that it undoubtedly concerns part of a global and European development. This is a growing phenomenon, not least in countries in Europe, with a focus on younger actors.

The Swedish Security Service has also reported that they see signs that people from these clubs want to try to influence public officials.

They are open about their assessment that there are active clubs or structures that have access to weapons and explosives and that they are actively working to scale up their combat capability. Martial arts training is part of that.

The reason I am enumerating this is that I want to say that the authorities responsible for monitoring this type of threat – primarily the Swedish Security Service but also others within the framework of Redex and in cooperation with the police – do not do it half-heartedly. They do it thoroughly and realize the context in which these types of groupings operate, and they take measures that reflect the seriousness of the threat.

This with the dark figures is an important insight. One must constantly ensure that one digs deep to reduce the dark figures as much as possible. I perceive that the Security Service to a very high degree does so. One does not underestimate the negative force, the threat potential, in these structures.

From the government's side, it is largely about proceeding from the strategy that we have established regarding combating, preventing, and deterring violent extremism and terrorism. It is a powerful structure where we bring together different actors in society who can truly work against this problem and also take concrete measures immediately where the problems exist.

This is a task that we take very seriously. It is a work that we follow very closely and at this moment are evaluating. We will return to the Riksdag regarding this during the spring, in a consolidated form.

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Mattias Vepsä (S)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Minister, for the answer! We have had a series of debates regarding right-wing extremism during the past years of this parliamentary term. It is always equally interesting and exciting to have that debate. I believe that we fundamentally share the view that we need to do more to combat the anti-democratic forces.

I hear the minister describe how the activity clubs build up their operations and their violence capital, and the minister touches upon the question of whether these could become groups that arm themselves. Then we are dangerously close to this perhaps being met by the terrorist legislation in a clearer way. But there is also older legislation here in Sweden, from the 30s. There is a law about something called secret corps activity. The shooting clubs of that time and similar were considered a threat when it came to building up parallel police groups or military competence that was not under the state. It was a time that was very sharply defined by the strong ideological contradictions. Above all, it was about how Nazism broke out in country after country.

We live in a time that is restless. Today we see far-right forces taking part in the parliamentary work in country after country and also pushing forward their positions and even leading countries. We also know that they have close links to the extra-parliamentary movements. It is clear that they fundamentally share the same current of ideas: Some have chosen the parliamentary path while others remain in the street fight.

In our committee motion, we have allocated more resources to CVE to strengthen knowledge about these environments. I know that the government has its strategy at the base. Very much emphasis is placed on cooperation here, and I agree that we should have more cooperation. It is important that we spread knowledge throughout society.

But in the work of providing more money to the authorities to expand knowledge and perhaps go deeper, we need to look at what this phenomenon is that has grown strong in Sweden over the past year. We need to review whether it is time to update legislation. I have read the law on secret corporate activity, and we are constantly having a discussion about anti-terrorism legislation and so on. But has the minister and the government considered the legislative path here, i.e., in the continued work when the overall assessment of the strategy is to be made? It is a question that I would like to get an answer to.

This with the forms of cooperation is crucial. I get the impression that there is sometimes a gap, and it is somewhat similar to the secrecy issues that we have discussed in other areas, i.e., between the police, social services, and the school. There is competence and knowledge in different parts of our society, but it is not always that the knowledge is in the right place. Then the municipality, or perhaps a private actor that rents out a premises, can end up in a situation where one does not know enough.

The question is also whether the Minister and the government see that it might be time to have a more proactive work and if there is any room for that. It can be within the framework of the legislation, but it can also be about the fact that we also here need to move forward in approximately the same way as when it concerns the confidentiality part. Has the government reflected on those questions?

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Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! First, I want to repeat how incredibly important it is that we maintain a breadth in our understanding of the threat landscape. It is, of course, about keeping track of each and every one of these threats. That a threat has been mitigated during a certain period does not mean that it cannot grow in size and significance in the future.

That is why I mean that it is crucial to have full focus on the far-right, the violence-seeking Islamism and the autonomous left, and we shall do it in parallel.

An additional reason for this is that we have seen that these threats can to a large extent interact with or reinforce each other. They can even sometimes be mobilized by social problems. There is no doubt that the conflicts in the Middle East and, for example, the hatred towards Israel is something that unites the extreme left, violent Islamism, and right-wing extremism. Activity in certain groups can also motivate and trigger activity in other groups. In order to follow each threat individually and to see how they interact, reinforce, and relate to one another, it is very important to have the entire problem picture clear. This is therefore not about downplaying any of the threats but rather about highlighting each threat from all relevant perspectives.

Collaboration is a buzzword that can mean everything and nothing. But one thing that emerged, at least initially, in the evaluation we are now conducting of the new strategy, is that the relevant actors in the field fundamentally seem to think that this gives strength to a very practical and operational collaboration, even if it admittedly has development potential.

A structure that is very effective is precisely Redex, where the Security Service and the police work operationally and in a close proximity to the individual when it comes to the various threats. It is also important with that structure's ability to share information, for example with municipalities, so that they can also have a situation picture as precise as possible and be able to implement their preventive measures. Not least, it concerns measures that are directed towards children and young people.

I do not want to anticipate what we will return to the Riksdag with. But when we conducted the evaluation together with a number of municipalities, there were some who expressed that they thought the exchange worked exemplarily, while others perceived that there was potential for development.

I believe it is important that it does not just become cooperation on an overall strategic level, but that it becomes a cooperation that means very concrete sharing of information, so that all actors who can influence this, not least preventively, can do so based on as correct a perception of reality as possible.

Finally: This regarding illegal association activity is legislation that has its historical background. It is perhaps also designed to meet how the threats were perceived to look back then. Preliminary investigations regarding this have occurred even during more recent years, but just this legislation is probably somewhat blunt. I do not exclude at all a review of that type of legislation, even though I believe that just as prevention we need to continue to develop other legislation, for example when it concerns secret coercive measures and other intrusive legislation to reach the structures. But I do not exclude, therefore, that we can also review other legislation to reach the structures in a more effective way.

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Mattias Vepsä (S)

Mr. Speaker! I thank you for the exchange here. It was content-rich.

I absolutely believe that we can join forces to do the legislative work together. We are ready. We truly see this threat as something it is important that we do something about.

I am also thinking about the fact that we are facing an election year. We went through an election year in 2024 as well, and the picture that I became aware of and saw myself then is worrying. During the spring, we saw how the far-right forces focused their attention on, among other things, Social Democratic May Day celebrations but also on various associations. It was Miljöpartiet and Vänsterpartiet out in Gubbängen whose premises were stormed.

We also see in troll factories and elsewhere how hate and threats online interact in some form. Just as the Minister for Justice says, these are not isolated activities, but they interact. We need to be ready for that, not least during the upcoming election year. I know that the government in other parts has taken initiatives together with the police to ensure that we enter an election year with security.

But it has also been the case that these activist clubs have acted a bit like the civil guard. There was a highlighted text in Aftonbladet recently about an influencer who was attacked because he had ended up in a reputation carousel on TikTok. When one reads that, one also becomes worried that these forces are so active and willing to actually take the law into their own hands. They are on social media, they are out in society, and they are prepared to use violence to influence and intimidate.

I would like to thank you for this debate. I hope that we can return to this and that we receive further concrete proposals on the floor of the Riksdag.

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Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)

Mr. Speaker! Let me conclude by agreeing on the importance of us taking hold of these issues at the beginning of an election year.

Next week, if I am not mistaken about the calendar, I will meet with the parliamentary parties' party secretaries together with the Security Service and the Police Authority to discuss how we, with joint efforts, can achieve a safe, secure, open, bold, and accessible election year, both for the elected officials who will be involved and for candidates in the election campaign, but also for the citizens, whose access to politicians is a completely central part of an election campaign in a free and open society. Then, surely, the questions we are talking about now will become topical.

I am convinced that other issues will also be raised, for example, experiences of meetings that have been disrupted by other groups, including part of the Gaza protests. I believe that also personal experiences in relation to other groups, which we have not mentioned here today, will be included in the material that the parties take with them into that discussion.

From the side of the Security Service and the Police Authority, there is a high state of readiness to meet the parties in this. The police have, for example, already designated the election as a special event in order to already at this stage be able to take measures in a powerful way to build up a safe, secure and open election campaign during the next year.

With that, I say thank you for today. I wish the members a pleasant weekend.

The interpellations debate was hereby concluded.

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