Response to interpellations 2022/23:238 and 286 on the supervision of the Swedish Police Authority
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
1 M argues that there is already internal and external oversight of the police 1. M wants to await the Committee on the Constitution's handling of proposals for a broad review before the government takes a position on further measures 1. M believes that structural problems can be handled through regulatory letters and mandate formulations 2 and emphasizes that review and oversight must be independent to have legitimacy 2 3. S argues that the authorities' powers require effective and continuous oversight. S argues that an independent oversight body could focus on democratic anchoring and trust and that there is a need for increased oversight as reports to the Parliamentary Ombudsman have increased dramatically 4. 5 SD argues that the oversight is not working and that the police are in free fall 5 6. SD wants an independent control function with access to the police's systems 5. SD believes that the police are performing worse despite increased resources and that the National Police Commissioner should be replaced 7. SD argues that the internal audit is not independent 6 and proposes an accident investigation board or a temporary solution 6 7.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)
Madam Speaker! Per-Arne Håkansson has asked me if I intend to take the initiative for an independent oversight body for the Swedish Police Authority, the Swedish Prosecution Authority, and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service in order to strengthen public trust and confidence.
Furthermore, Katja Nyberg has asked me what I think about the establishment of an independent control function or an alternative special supervisory authority and, if I do not consider that to be the right way to go, what proposals I have to address the Police Authority's structural obstacles.
Today, there is a lack of an authority that has a specific ordinary supervisory responsibility over the police. Instead, the supervision is exercised by ordinary supervisory bodies but also by extraordinary supervisory bodies such as the Riksdag's ombudsmen, namely the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice.
In the budget bill for 2017, funds were allocated to strengthen both internal and external oversight. At the Swedish Police Authority, the Swedish Security Service, and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, oversight bodies were established directly under the agency management, and the Chancellor of Justice was provided with funds to be able to increase its personnel resources in order to expand its extraordinary oversight over, among others, the police and the Prison and Probation Service.
Against that background, it can be stated that there is already today an internal and external oversight of, among other things, the Swedish Police Authority's activities.
During the spring of 2022, the parliamentarily appointed 2020 JO investigation submitted its report on the review of the JO office to the Committee on the Constitution. In the report, it is proposed, among other things, that a new investigation be appointed with a mandate to conduct a broad review of the public supervision, including the issues raised by the interpellants today.
My starting point is obvious: If we are to restore safety in Sweden, it is important to have a well-functioning supervision of the Police Authority's and other law enforcement agencies' activities. This is something that the government prioritizes very highly. Since the Committee on the Constitution has handed over the JO investigation's report to the Riksdag, the proposals are now being prepared in the Committee on the Constitution. I want to await the committee's handling of the issue before the government takes a position on what further measures in the area need to be taken.
Per-Arne Håkansson (S)
Madam Speaker! I would like to thank Minister of Justice Gunnar Strömmer for the answer to my interpellation. If I interpret the formulations correctly, there is an opening and perhaps even an interest from the government's side to take initiative in the direction of the interpellation.
The background to the interpellation I have submitted is the attention surrounding the police leadership's crisis situation in early March, and the focus that has since been directed towards the country's police leadership, which has brought the question to a head. But it is fundamentally about a long-term question regarding trust and confidence in democracy and the social system.
The Swedish Police Authority and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service face major challenges. These agencies' far-reaching powers to intervene in individuals' lives presuppose effective and continuous supervision of the operations, both internally and externally.
Between 2017 and 2022, the appropriation to the Swedish Police Authority was increased by 50 percent, and in addition to increased resources, increased powers were also granted, such as new wiretapping rules and other things. Now, the Tidö Agreement speaks of visitation zones and paradigm shifts in a number of areas, and these need to be followed up so that the societal functions will hold in the long run. Ethical aspects, rules of fairness, and issues of trust need to be highlighted. They are an important part of the overall picture, as I see it, from the public's point of view.
The questions regarding an independent oversight authority for the police and the Prison and Probation Service have been noted by the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, JO, and are being addressed specifically in the parliamentary committee on a review of the JO office, which I have also joined myself.
When it comes to how the public administration should be exercised, two doctrines have been set against each other in the research that has been conducted in the field. One has had the administration's independence and self-control as a starting point and is perhaps the direction right now, while the other has seen an external audit performed by an independent supervisory body as the norm for the public administration.
In the answer, the Minister for Justice refers to the fact that the previous government allocated funds to strengthen both internal and external oversight in the form of extra resources to the police, the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen), and the Prison and Probation Service (Kriminalvården), as well as to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (JO). He now wishes to await the Committee on the Constitution's (KU) handling of the issue that I have raised here.
Based on an overall assessment, I would nevertheless like to ask the Minister for Justice how he assesses the need for an independent oversight body for the police, the prosecution authority, and the correctional services, based on the issues that have been raised in the work so far.
Katja Nyberg (SD)
Madam Speaker! Thank you for the answer, Minister of Justice!
I am sorry to say it, but the Swedish police are today, unfortunately, an authority in free fall. A well-functioning police force is a prerequisite for a secure rule of law. The Swedish police today face great challenges in fulfilling their mission and need increased resources, both financially and in terms of prosecution. But ultimately, it is a leadership issue. We have a police leadership that does not want to become better, and it will therefore never become better if we politicians do not do what is required.
Despite the fact that the appropriations have doubled since 2015 to approximately 40 billion per year and the investigation activity has increased with almost 30 percent more employees, the total number of reported cases to the Prosecution Authority has fallen. If the Sweden Democrats and the government are to continue to throw money at the police in competition with so much else as defense, healthcare, pensioners and so on, we must demand more bang for the buck, so to speak.
The investigation that the Minister for Justice mentions in his answer, which has a mandate to conduct a broad review of public supervision, is welcome. But there is also a report that was submitted in 2015 and is still being processed in the Government Offices. We also do not know at this stage what the response from the Committee on the Constitution will be.
What everyone knows, however, is that the crisis within the police continues every minute, hour, and day. Given the crisis prevailing within the Swedish Police Authority, the answer cannot simply be that we must wait for the investigation because it will take far too long, probably several years.
The National Audit Office has in a recent report audited the Police Authority's handling of large-scale crime and the large number of special operations initiated regarding serious crime. The report points to an authority that is not succeeding in its mission. Furthermore, the Police Authority is not open to adopting the National Audit Office's criticism, which, according to the National Audit Office, is very unusual. The National Police Chief's response to the criticism directed in the report was: I do not agree.
For me, the police commissioner's answer makes it very clear where the problem lies: in the highest police leadership. In order for us to have a chance to get the Police Authority, the volume of crimes, and the serious crime in order, something needs to happen already now. We do not have time to wait for an investigation.
There is today an internal and external oversight of the police, but as the Minister for Justice says, there is a lack of an authority that has a specific ordinary oversight responsibility over the Swedish Police Authority. The oversight is carried out by ordinary oversight bodies and also by extraordinary oversight bodies, but based on the results that the Swedish Police Authority displays, these control functions do not work. Furthermore, it takes a very long time. The controls occur in retrospect, and by then it is many times too late.
An independent control function is about obtaining alternative information to that which the police themselves present regarding their activities and various prevailing conditions. Current information should instead be provided in connection with the police presenting their information, sometimes even beforehand, and not as it is now, in retrospect.
Today, the Swedish National Audit Office and the results dialogue rely on the answers and information provided by the Swedish Police Authority. An independent control function should have access to the police's systems and be able to extract information itself, rather than being dependent on the police's good will to report correct information. As it is now, it is more of a fictitious control, because one is dependent on the National Police Commissioner. The person one is tasked to control is, therefore, one's own boss.
And given that the control functions are not working and there is no time to wait for an investigation, I wonder how the Minister for Justice will ensure that the correct information is further disseminated from the Swedish Police Authority.
Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)
Madam Speaker! I shall try to address both interpellants in one context. They are largely overlapping issues, but still not completely.
I believe that these questions must be sorted out somewhat. Much of the problem description that Katja Nyberg gives—I also understood from Per-Arne Håkansson that his interpellation in any case partially emanated from the recent reporting regarding various problems within the police—I agree with, even though I turn against the description of a police force in free fall. I believe that one would have difficulty getting support for that if one went around to the police stations in Sweden. We have a police force that works extremely hard and which succeeds very well in its mission every day out in the field, and I think that we must take that as a starting point.
With that said, there are structural problems in the Swedish police. They are well-illuminated, I think, in the external reviews that have been presented here during the spring. We have the all-too-low crime clearance rate, and there are question marks regarding whether the police growth occurs out in the capillaries, so to speak - in breadth, in the field, in investigative work or in outer service - or if it occurs more at the top or the waist of the pyramid.
A review has been conducted on the use of special events. I know that there are different ways to look at it. But it is clear that questions arise and things are brought to a head when one redeploys staff to certain places only to have corresponding problems a week or a few weeks later at the place from which resources were taken.
There are a lot of different issues here that are extraordinarily relevant. I completely agree that we cannot wait for a larger investigation of how the supervision should be organized at the agency level. I want to be extremely clear that all the problems that one can see on good grounds when it comes to the Swedish police, in light of everything that is being done and that is also good, must be addressed, but above all in other ways.
I think it should happen through our regulatory letters, how we formulate our assignments to the police and how we as the government and the Riksdag in different ways follow up on the use of resources. I agree with that starting point one hundred percent. If we now mobilize more economic resources and provide more efficient tools to the Swedish police, the citizens' justified expectations for results will of course increase, and the policy's responsibility to ensure that there is a return on the resources and tools provided will also increase.
All of that and the entire problem picture must be handled in other ways than through new inquiries. I agree with that one hundred percent.
The bigger question, whether the Swedish police and correctional services should be scrutinized by a special agency, which would then be established for that purpose, must, on the other hand, be investigated in a special manner. It is fundamentally about restructuring the agency framework for supervision.
My firm opinion is that with a high tempo and great operational power, we will be able to tackle a good deal – I would like to say all – structural problems that are raised on good grounds regarding the Swedish police without having to wait for any investigations. On the other hand, the question of supervision must, for reasons I consider easily understood, be handled in such a way that, in that case, solutions can be found that can be lasting over a long period. Both things can be done, but not within the framework of one and the same process.
Per-Arne Håkansson (S)
Mr. Speaker and the Minister for Justice! In the debate, a police leadership in free fall was mentioned. I distance myself from that formulation and do not stand behind it. My opinion of the Swedish police is that they do a strong and good job and carry out operations based on the resources and opportunities that exist.
In my interpellation, I wanted to raise the issue of oversight and democratic anchoring, which is important for there to be trust and confidence in the Swedish police in the long term. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen's annual reports have highlighted problems within both the police and the correctional services. Many people deprived of liberty are kept for a long time in remand prison before they are moved to a facility. This is due, as I have understood it, to a lack of resources.
The leadership crisis that prevailed within the police during the winter, I can imagine, led to a considerable amount of resources being diverted to handling those types of issues instead of on what should be the main focus: combating crime and gang crime. In that case, it could have been an advantage to have an independent oversight body that can focus on those issues and ensure that, in the long term, it is conducted in a way with democratic anchoring.
I asked a question to the Minister for Justice in my previous statement regarding his view on the need for that type of body. Does the Minister for Justice consider that such a need exists?
Katja Nyberg (SD)
Mr. Speaker! I want to be clear that individual police officers and managers do a very good job within the Police Authority. But we see example after example of it not working. Still, we allow it to continue and just stand by and watch. It is obvious that the oversight of the Police Authority is not working today.
There has previously been an independent investigative function based on evidence-based policing. It was a very qualified group that was appointed in 2009, I believe. But unfortunately, this function only functioned for six months. This was because the police leadership wanted to put a muzzle on them. The only thing they could do was to resign, which they did in 2010. We already had, then, a police leadership that could not tolerate being scrutinized. And it just continues. Somewhere, it must be stopped.
There is an example in recent times. The Commissioner of the Swedish Police speaks about how police officers should say it as it is and that there should be a high ceiling. But when employees do that, it is not appreciated, and the message is adapted and becomes watered down. An example of this in recent times is the conflict at the Police Authority's internal audit. The reviewers are internal auditors and informed the Commissioner of the Swedish Police about irregularities in connection with the audit of the Police Authority's management of the National Forensic Centre.
The three internal auditors did not want to sign their own report because it had been adjusted at the request of one of them who participated in the audit. This resulted in the responsible auditor being reassigned due to so-called disloyalty towards the immediate supervisor, as it was expressed.
In § 14 of the Police Ordinance, it states that "an employee at the Police Authority or the Security Service shall notify their superior of such conditions in police work that the superior should be aware of". But the responsible auditor who tried to comply with that duty to notify was reassigned due to disloyalty towards his boss. He is still reassigned. It would not have happened if we had had an internal audit that was a truly independent function.
If we are not going to replace the top police leadership and are going to wait for an investigation to possibly get an independent control function in place, I wonder how we are going to address the problems. The only remaining alternative I see is a commission of inquiry. We need a more offensive crisis management of society's most important authority. If we cannot quickly establish a control function because we must wait for an investigation, the alternative is a commission of inquiry to identify problem areas, structural obstacles, and needs for change. I do not believe that just regulatory letters, supervision, talks with the police leadership, and so on will be enough.
How are we going to do it for real, to put a stop to the madness within the Police Authority?
Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)
Mr. Speaker! I shall try to categorize this into two issues. One is the more overarching one regarding the oversight of the police and the Prison and Probation Service. The other is somewhat more operational and hands-on, how one can address structural deficiencies in the Swedish police without having to wait for investigations that take several years.
I will take the first question first. I am open to seeing what the Committee on the Constitution will come to. We will not have to wait particularly long for that. I believe, however, that we can expect it this summer. I hope that it will give us good guidance on how we should proceed with the larger issues regarding the oversight of authorities, including the Swedish Police Authority and the Prison and Probation Service.
I am well aware that in various instances during recent years, in qualified contexts and with broad parliamentary support in the anchoring, proposals have been put forward for a specific supervisory authority for the police and the correctional services. Criticism has also been voiced against it for various reasons. Now we shall see how the KU in all its wisdom possibly judges the way forward. I look forward to taking part in that.
Regarding the other parts, including the independent oversight body within the agency that Katja Nyberg requests, I do not consider that it has anything to do with that type of agency when it comes to external oversight. That is something that falls within the framework of how the Swedish police should be organized internally and how we steer through regulatory letters, resource allocation, and other means. In that case, we have completely different opportunities to act promptly.
I will not go into more detail regarding the testimonies that Katja Nyberg highlights and which I cannot really evaluate, at least not on the fly here in the Riksdag's rostrum.
But one can at least say something on a general level. We know that there are structural deficiencies in the Swedish police. Several of them have been highlighted during this spring. This concerns both crime clearance and growth. Is it not happening out in the field, in the investigative work and in the outer service as politics expects it to happen? How does one use the opportunity to redistribute resources within the agency from one region to another?
All these questions are on the table, and those questions will be addressed and handled strategically and promptly during the year we are now in. There will not be a need to wait for any long benches in government inquiries.
Without going into more detail on the points that Katja Nyberg highlights, I also want to say something else. To the extent that internal audit bodies exist, the entire legitimacy of the internal audit naturally lies in it being able to take place in an independent manner without undue influence from the parts of the operation that are to be audited. This applies to the Police Authority. It applies to all agencies. And in a well-functioning society, it applies to that part for all other activities altogether.
It is excellent that you highlight these issues, which concern both the long-term and the more structural. It is about how we are to audit authorities in Sweden and about the more operational and immediate. How can we, while being fully aware that extraordinary work is being performed in the Swedish police, simultaneously address the obvious structural problems that exist? The need to do this grows with every new tax krona and every new effective tool that we add to the Swedish police.
Per-Arne Håkansson (S)
Mr. Speaker! From the reasoning that has been presented here by the Minister for Justice, I perceive that there is an interest in moving forward in the issues regarding the supervision of and control over the Swedish Police Authority, the Prison and Probation Service, and the Prosecution Authority. It also concerns the observations that, not least the Parliamentary Ombudsman makes in his annual report.
It feels honorable that the Minister for Justice wants to wait for the KU's handling, but I have understood from the Minister for Justice that he still sees a need for increased supervision.
During the last ten-year or twenty-year period, the reports to the Parliamentary Ombudsman have increased dramatically. Individual people perceive that they are getting caught in the system. This increases the workload at JO but perhaps above all means that individual citizens' cases may not always be handled in a good way based on the needs that exist. So there is reason to continue working on these issues. I look forward to the Minister for Justice taking initiative in the area moving forward.
Katja Nyberg (SD)
Mr. Speaker! I want to return to the fact that the police are performing increasingly poorly despite significantly increased resources, new powers, and a major reorganization. I doubt anyone has missed that, but few ask what the police are doing with the existing resources, what requirements are being set, and what results are to be achieved.
If the National Police Commissioner had been a CEO in the business world, he would never have been granted renewed confidence. If you receive a multi-billion investment and it results in decreased productivity, you are not allowed to stay. With the new police organization, which was established in 2015, it is Anders Thornberg who has full responsibility for the entire Police Authority. The citizens deserve a National Police Commissioner who makes the decisions that are required and who delivers results.
And finally, it is about the right leadership, but I know that the government is not on board yet when it comes to replacing the police commissioner. Unfortunately, there are very many capable managers and employees within the Police Authority who today do not dare to make visible the challenges that exist due to the risk of being reassigned, as in the example from the internal audit, with the justification that they are disloyal.
I have mentioned the alternatives. One can have a commission of inquiry. One can replace the police leadership. Or one can reintroduce what existed in 2010, a form of independent investigative function. But then the problem is that it lies under the Swedish Police Authority. It becomes like a form of stopgap. We must get a temporary solution so that we can put a stop to this madness within the Swedish Police Authority. It is about all information and what exists becoming transparent, and then we must be able to control it. This is therefore not to be appointed by the police and controlled by the police. Then I wonder: Can we make some form of temporary solution, stopgap, instead of just awaiting the longer investigation and what KU will say?
Justitieministern Gunnar Strömmer (M)
Mr. Speaker! Thank you very much for an extraordinarily important debate regarding issues that are pressing in themselves! Citizens have legitimate expectations that increased resources and sharper tools for the police and, for that part, other parts of law enforcement shall partly lead to better results, and partly be followed up in such a way that we can ensure that we get value for every tax krona invested.
I welcome both interpellants' perspectives regarding the need for effective supervision. I think it is an extremely urgent matter that every measure and step we take moving forward in this part is about embracing scrutiny, embracing audit, and embracing supervision. It is clear that if the relevance of that scrutiny and supervision is to be high, and if the scrutiny and supervision is to have legitimacy and credibility, it is based on it being independent in relation to that which is to be scrutinized. This applies regardless of whether the scrutiny body exists outside the Polismyndigheten, if we are now speaking about the Polismyndigheten, or if it is complemented by a scrutiny body on the inside.
I think the single most important thing to take away from this debate is this: Whatever we do now shall be in the direction of increased revision, increased supervision, increased scrutiny, increased transparency, and increased independence. It will benefit the Swedish police. It will benefit other law enforcement agencies. It will improve results, and it will strengthen the citizens' trust both in the police activities and in politics' ability to ensure value for every invested tax krona.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.