Total defense

Björn Söder (SD)

Madam Speaker! Today we are debating the Committee on Defence's report on total defence.

It is a question that ultimately concerns the state's most fundamental responsibility, namely to protect the nation and ensure that Sweden can function even in war and severe crises. This is no longer a theoretical discussion. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brutally reminded Europe that war between states is still a reality. At the same time, we see increasing great power rivalry, geopolitical uncertainty, and a world that is becoming increasingly unstable.

In such a situation, every nation must ask itself a simple question: Are we ready?

Madam Speaker! For large parts of the time after the end of the Cold War, the answer to that question has unfortunately been no. For many years, large parts of the Swedish defense were dismantled. Readiness stocks were phased out. Civil defense disappeared in practice. Defense spending fell, and the military defense was reduced to a level where endurance in certain respects was counted in days.

It was a policy built on the hope that history had ended and that peace and stability in Europe were something permanent. It turned out to be a very dangerous illusion.

The Sweden Democrats have for a long time warned about the consequences of this development. Already in the late 90s, when I wrote the section on defense policy in our youth organization's first principle program, I warned that the development in Russia could quickly come to change.

I wrote then: ”To then decide on a disarmament of the Swedish defense, with regard to what happened after the defense decision of 1925, is insane. A disarmed defense takes years to build up again – that time is not available in the face of a threat of war in modern times.”

We have repeatedly highlighted the need for higher defense appropriations. We have warned against Russia's aggressive development. We have emphasized the importance of rebuilding the civil defense.

When one reads today the debates from the defense decisions of 2015 and 2020, it is clear that many of the issues that are now considered self-evident were then met with skepticism or lack of interest. It is therefore important to state: The realignment of Swedish defense policy that is now taking place should have been started much earlier.

Madam Speaker! It should also be said that much is happening now. The rebuilding of the total defense has gained momentum, and the defense appropriations are increasing significantly. It is necessary and welcome.

Total defense is about the entire society's ability to meet war and crises. It is about the Armed Forces but also about energy supply, transport, healthcare, food supply and the protection of critical infrastructure. It is about endurance. Ultimately, it is about a society's resilience.

When it comes to civil defense, many important initiatives are being taken today across the country. Authorities, municipalities, regions, and the business sector are working to strengthen preparedness. But at the same time, the picture is clear: the work is still in an early stage and often fragmented.

A central challenge is that there is a lack of sufficiently clear national target goals. What should the civil defense be dimensioned for? How long should society be able to function during war? When should different capabilities be built up?

Without clear goals, we risk getting 290 different solutions across the country with varying capabilities and different levels of preparedness. It is not a sustainable total defense. The State must take a clearer strategic responsibility and ensure that the entire society works towards the same goal.

Madam Speaker! We must also speak about the resilience in society.

For decades, Sweden was built around maximum efficiency. Stocks were abolished, redundancy was removed, and many systems became completely dependent on stable global supply chains. It worked as long as the world was stable. But in an increasingly uncertain world, something else was needed: robustness, redundancy, and preparedness. This applies to everything from energy supply and transport to food production and digital infrastructure.

It is also important that the cooperation between the state and the business sector functions. A large part of the society-critical infrastructure is currently in private hands. Therefore, close cooperation between the state and the business sector is crucial for the function of the total defense.

Madam Speaker! The Sweden Democrats also want to specifically highlight the importance of Sweden's defense industrial competence. For us, this is about more than industrial policy. It is about national sovereignty.

Sweden is one of the few countries in the world that can still develop advanced weapons systems, including combat aircraft. That competence is strategically important and something we must safeguard. A country that can develop and produce advanced defense systems stands stronger and has greater freedom of action in an uncertain world.

Madam Speaker! Another crucial issue is personnel and competence within civil defense.

Municipalities and regions play a central role in total defense, but many today lack sufficient resources and sufficient competence to fully meet the requirements being set. This is an issue that must be taken most seriously. If we do not succeed in strengthening the competence supply, we risk standing here in five or ten years and still discussing the same problems.

Madam Speaker! Total defense is ultimately based on a simple insight: A country that wants to be free must also be prepared to defend its freedom. This applies militarily, it applies civilly, and it applies to the whole of society. Sweden's security can never be taken for granted. It must be built up, step by step, with long-term perspective, determination, and political courage.

The government, but also the Riksdag, needs to find more common denominators for the reconstruction of the total defense to gain momentum – especially when it comes to the very restrictive environmental legislation, which is in obvious conflict with the reconstruction of the defense. This also applies to planning and building acts that are costly and require long investigation times.

The Sweden Democrats will continue to be a driving force for a stronger Swedish total defense. A country that cannot defend itself risks, in the long run, also losing the right to decide over its own future.

Madam Speaker! With this, I move for the approval of the committee's proposal in the report and the rejection of all reservations.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! First, I want to state that I stand behind all S reservations. I choose, however, to move for approval of reservations 5, 17 and 43.

We are now living in a time of great uncertainty. We have war in Ukraine. We have war in the Middle East. We have different types of activities that are constantly ongoing and which threaten Swedish security and Swedish sovereignty. It is in that light that this debate is being conducted.

We also have ongoing work in the Defence Preparation.

I want to highlight some important things that need to be done. We need to strengthen our military presence on Gotland. In addition to the regiment that we have previously established, we also need to establish an amphibious battalion. We also need to establish brigade air defense on Gotland.

Gotland is a strategic target. Gotland can also be an island where a foreign power can exert blackmail. From a Russian point of view, Gotland is a very important island in terms of the possibility of dominating the Baltic Sea and hindering NATO's various types of operations and transports. If someone has gained a foothold on Gotland, it also implies a great risk for the Swedish mainland, the Finnish mainland, and the Baltics. It is therefore very important to have a stronger defense presence there.

The air defense in Sweden must also be strengthened. Today, we do not have enough air defense for the base protection and the civil defense that is necessary. Admittedly, air defense initiatives have been presented from the government's side, but in the long run, they do not cover what is required. They meet a small part of the need. This is also an important point we should consider for the future.

Territorial defense units are necessary but are not included in the decisions that have been made here in the Riksdag. If we are to be able to manage to protect our territory and protect transports through Sweden, especially from a host nation support perspective and for NATO's planning to be able to function, territorial units are required that can protect military transports with materiel and with combat personnel.

We must also review how we manage to protect ship transports across the Baltic Sea against Finland and ship transports from the Swedish mainland to the Baltics.

These are points that are necessary for the logistics to be able to function, which is necessary in a crisis or war situation. A requirement from our side is therefore to establish territorial defense units to manage the protection of supply lines and logistics.

We already need to state that we want to continue with two new army brigades, after we have built up the four that are planned in the defense decision that has already been taken. They are to be delivered by 2030, but four army brigades are not enough to manage the protection of Sweden and what is necessary in relation to help and support in other NATO territory.

We have a commitment in Latvia today, and we have a headquarters position in northern Finland in Forward Land Forces. This also means that in our planning we will allocate large resources to manage the defense in northern Finland. It requires a larger army, but it also requires that we increase the number of conscripts. There is currently a decision for 10,000 by 2030. It will not be enough to meet the needs we will have. Our long-term goal must be 20,000 in order to be able to maintain a reasonable rotation in the units we send to other parts of our near area, manage to replace our own losses, and manage the defense of the Swedish mainland. The targets that we have built up until now are not sufficient and must be increased, and the possibility of moving forward an increased conscription must be reviewed.

We must have a stronger resilience and a stronger total defense in Sweden. What we have done since the 2015 defense decision, where we moved from a defense based on international operations to beginning to build a national defense, has involved many positive shifts in positions and changes in the Swedish Armed Forces, but it is not enough. The resilience must become greater. Then we must look at the whole when it comes to our future resources for the navy and for the combat aviation.

We should already now initiate a process to order an additional Swedish submarine. The Baltic Sea is an important area where Sweden and the NATO side must build up a naval force so that we achieve a dominant position.

The submarine capability is in a real sense a deterrent for a potential enemy, and it is a strategic advantage that we shall utilize. Poland has stated that it is interested in entering into a cooperation with Sweden regarding the ordering of submarines. This could initiate that we can build up a common practice, a common submarine fleet, and it would be a great advantage when we look at the whole regarding the actions in the Baltic Sea.

Submarines are important. We must remember that the submarine weapon is considered by the Riksdag to be a Swedish security interest. It also applies to us to guard our knowledge in the area, our development opportunities in the area, and our production capacity in the area. We must be clear to ourselves that the submarines that Sweden produces are the world's best submarines for operating under operational conditions in brackish waters and in archipelago areas in the Baltic Sea. We therefore have a resource that is at the forefront which we must be careful with and guard.

We must also ensure that we have Swedish sovereignty over the next generation of combat aircraft. It is very important. For a very long period, we have built combat aircraft in a collaboration between Saab and the state, and now we stand in a situation where it is being investigated which alternative we should choose for the future regarding the next generation of combat aircraft after the Gripen E system. Naturally, we can buy from or cooperate with another country, but what I want to establish today, and which should also be established in a parliamentary decision, is that we shall have Swedish sovereignty over the next generation of combat aircraft. In our view, this means that Sweden must also be involved in developing, designing, and producing the next generation of combat aircraft. It is very important.

We want to have a review of the procurement of defense materiel so that we open up for direct procurement from Swedish industry to a greater extent. We must use the resources that were once built up to provide the Swedish Armed Forces with defense materiel. We must find systems to link the Swedish state and the defense industry in the area to an increased extent.

It also requires a national defense industry that can work with these issues. How do we supply the Swedish Armed Forces with materiel? How do we manage our efforts to help Ukraine?

We want to resume the activity that was unfortunately discontinued some time ago, that is to say, to establish a Swedish authority for defense exports. Defense export is an important activity, where we build collaborations with other countries. It requires proper and large resources for this purpose. It is a firm experience I have from my years as Minister of Defence.

Following the logic of the reasoning I presented earlier regarding the connection to the Swedish defense industry, I want to open up for a state partial ownership in various defense industry companies. It is not about takeover or majority ownership, but it is primarily about our specific security interests, submarines and combat aircraft, and connecting direct influence and ownership in Saab from the state's side.

There is much I could go through today, and time is running out. The challenges of managing the Russian threat in Sweden mean that we must make proper decisions. There is Russian ownership and interests in the business sector, in plots of land, in real estate, and in companies that make themselves felt in Swedish society in various ways. The task I have is that Russian ownership interests in Sweden encompass a total of 12.8 billion kronor. There are large partial holdings by many people with a Russian background, and there is a network that has an interest in having support points in the form of real estate and infrastructure. We must have legislation that essentially means that we can phase out this. Much of this is positioning from Russian intelligence services and, in practice, infiltration into Swedish society.

In Finland, the legislation has been significantly strengthened to tackle the problem. Sweden is not at the same stage as Finland in this area, and it is important to rectify this. It is also included in our proposal that such work shall be carried out.

I move for approval of reservations 5, 17 and 43, and otherwise I stand behind all S-reservations.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! Even though I do not stand behind the reservations – I naturally stand behind the committee's majority – there are many good motions from the parties that contain good proposals. That must be kept in mind. It does not mean that the proposals should be implemented just now. Many things are already underway, but it is important to emphasize that there is a broad consensus on total defense.

Madam Speaker! Sometimes when we stand here in the rostrum we speak to ourselves, but that is not why we are here. We are here for the sake of the citizens, and we must not forget that. I therefore intended to make a short attempt to contribute to the public education regarding the total defense.

I want to remind everyone what total defense is. I will read from my notes, and I have obtained my information from the Swedish Civil Defence Authority.

Total defense is Sweden's collective defense. It consists of the military defense and the civil defense. Together they form the total defense. It is all activity in the entire society that shall prepare Sweden for war. To defend Sweden and our common values, security, freedom, and independence is a responsibility for the entire society and requires, ultimately, a personal effort from all of us. The foundation for total defense is all of us who live here and our resilience to meet an armed attack. The better prepared you yourself are, the more strength the society can devote to helping those who truly need help. In Sweden, all Swedish citizens and all those who are permanently resident in Sweden are covered by total defense duty from the year they turn 16 until the year they turn 70.

Madam Speaker! It is often repeated that Sweden finds itself in perhaps the most serious security policy situation in modern times. Russia's aggression in Ukraine continues, with a terrible suffering for the Ukrainian people. Furthermore, hybrid threats are growing, great power rivalry is constantly reminded, there is war in Iran and so on. This means that Sweden's collective defense capability must be strengthened. It must be done purposefully and quickly and be long-term and sustained.

The report we are considering today covers a great deal that the Riksdag has already made decisions on regarding a robust total defense. The Government is now also carrying out, with the Riksdag's support, the largest reinforcement of Swedish defense capability since the Cold War. It is therefore, just as I said initially, reasonable that we reject a number of motion proposals. Either the work is already underway, or it risks splitting the whole. The guiding words are: Total defense – the whole before individual solutions.

I also want to remind about what I said in the introduction: It does not mean that things are bad, but the work may already be underway, or it risks splitting the whole.

The total defense shall be cohesive, coordinated, and governed by the direction that the Riksdag established here in the chamber in December 2024 regarding the bill Total Defense 2025–2030. We shall not compromise on the principle of a total defense that is well-balanced between civil and military defense, where authorities, the business sector, and civil society work towards the same goal and where resources are invested where they also yield the greatest effect.

Speed in capacity-enhancing measures is also important. It means that we should do certain things first, because that provides the fastest effect.

When it comes to operational capability, which is being addressed here, the focus must lie on war units that function. The capability in war units is the most important.

The war organization shall be manned and equipped. The units shall be trained, self-sufficient, and ready for deployment. The Defense Forces' growth shall occur at a high pace with deliveries of materiel, personnel, and infrastructure.

It does, however, take time in all three areas. Much has been done to speed up the whole process, but more must be done.

The Armed Forces and the government are already working according to a clear, ambitious and sustainable plan to build operational effectiveness, all in accordance with what the Riksdag decided barely one and a half years ago.

Madam Speaker! The support for Ukraine must be persistent, long-term and strategic. Sweden's support for Ukraine is not only morally right. It is also strategically necessary. Europe's security policy future depends largely on how the war in Ukraine ends.

The Ukrainian arms, which we in the committee majority refer to in the report, create the predictability and long-term perspective that Ukraine needs. Sweden is one of the absolute leading countries when it comes to military support, and our contribution makes a difference on the battlefield and for Ukraine's civilian population. We support Ukraine not only militarily but also economically, humanitarily and diplomatically. And the support shall continue as long as it is needed.

The psychological defense is also addressed in the report. Sweden is, after all, subjected on a daily basis to information influence from Russia, China, Iran and other actors. The purpose is to try to divide our society and undermine trust in our authorities, our institutions and ultimately our will to defend.

Therefore, it is clearly crucial that the Psychological Defence Authority continues its work, that the investments in resilience and democratic protection continue, and that the role of civil society is protected. But this must happen without building any parallel structures, which would occur alongside already ongoing work.

Madam Speaker! Sweden is now building up its defense industrial capacity at a historic pace. It is about powerful increases in material appropriations, long-term procurement authorizations, and investments in innovation, production, and research. We shall further strengthen the Swedish defense industry, but this is best done through structured, long-term strategies, not through point interventions in the form of any individual announcements.

Madam Speaker! Finally: Sweden must be both defended and functional. This means that military activities must be given necessary space. Important societal resources, such as energy and infrastructure, must be able to coexist with the total defense and be co-planned. Permit processes shall be accelerated and simplified, which the government is already working on. But I still want to emphasize that more must be done.

Madam Speaker! Sweden's total defense must be strengthened. Sweden is best defended together with our allies. Ukraine shall receive continued and long-term support, for our and Europe's security. And the Swedish people shall be able to trust that the state is building a robust total defense that functions in peace, in crisis, and in war.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! What I reacted to in Jörgen Berglund's speech was this point about there being many good proposals in various motions but that they disturb the overall picture or that work is already underway in some way.

I raised a number of examples from our motions. We have, for example, proposed an amphibious battalion on Gotland. As far as I know, no work is currently being done on this. It does not disturb any overall picture. On the contrary, it reinforces it. There is an obvious problem that we must have a stronger defense on Gotland.

I also pointed out that we should have two army brigades after 2030. I swear, no such work is being carried out. It does not disturb any overall picture either. It is, in fact, a necessary measure in order to be able to build up a stronger army and a stronger defense capability. And it is something that we should point out already now, so that the Armed Forces have the opportunity to start thinking about it in their way of acting moving forward.

I also proposed the establishment of territorial defense units. It is highly necessary. It does not disturb any integrity at all, and I do not perceive any activity taking place there.

I pointed out a long row of gaps. I could go through it with a number of additional examples. I mean that these are extremely relevant proposals. I hope that they are implemented eventually. But it is nothing that can be dismissed as work in progress or as something that disrupts the whole. On the contrary, they strengthen the whole and are necessary.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! I thank Peter Hultqvist.

When the Riksdag in December 2024, just over a year and a half ago, decided on the current war organization, there was broad support for it in Sweden's Riksdag. I am glad about that. And I perceive that it still holds.

We are still not finished with the war organization that we decided on at that time. We know, just as I pointed out in my speech, that there is much to do. When the defense is to grow, it is not just about deciding something on paper. It is about people – conscripts and officers – about infrastructure and about materiel that one can train with. We do not have that, and that is what we are working on now.

Let us first build up and implement what is stated in the defense decision we have. What happens in the future is difficult to predict. But I cannot see that since we passed that defense decision, with such a broad consensus, it has changed so much that one now wants and is going to add further things. Besides money, personnel and materiel are also major limitations. It also takes time to produce.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Peter Hultqvist (S)

Madam Speaker! I am well aware of the problems that can arise regarding both personnel and conscripts. But problems are there to be solved.

The political ambition must be to take the stride in a necessary way, so that it becomes clear to the organization what we are heading towards. And that defense decision that we agreed on last time, which I think is good, is not the final point in any way. It is not like the formula for solving this. It is a step along the way.

We must make new and more defense decisions. Given how the world around us is developing, we may also need to speed up certain things. That is why I mentioned the three different proposals in the previous speech.

Work is also underway in the Defence Preparation Board, and I hope that I will be able to gain traction for this there. But these things are so self-evident that I do not believe a parliamentary decision on the matter would disturb any blueprints in a deeper sense.

At the same time, I believe that most who are involved in these types of processes can see both issues. It is partly about the practical problems with equipment and personnel that we must solve and which are solvable, and partly about the need for increased capability and the need to provide these types of signals early, so that the preparation times become manageable.

If someone were to stand up in the Riksdag or the Defence Committee and say that we should not increase the size of the army, I think that would be a very strange position. In that case, I believe one finds oneself in a world that does not exist.

This cannot be difficult, and it cannot be done in very many different ways. Therefore, we are persistent.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! We need a larger army, and that is what we are working on in accordance with the parliamentary decision that has been made. This is naturally ongoing. But to add further things that are to be implemented now, when one has not finished what we have already decided on, I do not understand the logic in. There is no personnel, there are no officers, there is no infrastructure, and there is no materiel to train with.

It is good to have ambitions, but in the Social Democrats' budget for expenditure area 6, there is no deviation in money from the government's proposal. There are no funds set aside to implement an amphibious battalion, two army brigades, and a territorial unit. That would be a shot in the air, I think. Speaking of the territorial unit, the government made a decision in January regarding, among other things, air defense as a step along the way. Even the previous Defense Commission concluded that a territorial unit was needed. There, I and Peter Hultqvist probably have the same opinion.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I am making a small guest appearance in the Committee on Defence today. I sit in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which can be said to be the Committee on Defence's sister committee when it comes to issues regarding our total defence. I will primarily address two issues in my speech: offshore wind power and the DCA agreement with the USA.

Madam Speaker! Today we have a situation where the Armed Forces can stop plans for the construction of offshore and land-based wind power simply by assessing that it risks encroaching on military training areas. Already early in the process, the Armed Forces submit preliminary opinions on new projects through so-called obstacle referrals. Early notifications are absolutely crucial for a wind power operator to dare to take the next step and invest in expensive and extensive permit applications.

This is one of the very first pieces of the puzzle in producing the renewable energy that our industry is crying out for. Last Friday, I visited industry in Värmland, which wanted to see nothing else. But we clearly see that wind power is being planned which then does not come to fruition. I am thinking in particular of the wind farm that was to be built by Blekinge Offshore in Hanöbukten. At the EU Committee meeting this morning, I heard the Prime Minister say that he wants to increase our energy production in the wake of the war in the Middle East.

We in Vänsterpartiet believe that it is fully possible to expand offshore wind power where the conditions are best and simultaneously provide the Armed Forces with reasonable conditions for its training activities. When deadlocks arise because an authority can in practice block important expansion of renewable energy, the government must take responsibility. A solution is needed that is forward-looking, wise, and long-term. Therefore, we believe that the government should task the Armed Forces with producing a basis for how the training activities can be organized without hindering the expansion of offshore wind power.

Madam Speaker! Almost two years ago, we had a large and long debate here in the Riksdag about the DCA agreement. The debate was so long that I ruined the Left Party's summer party. Other parties' evening plans were also ruined. But the DCA agreement is and was so important to debate.

Today, the arguments used then are just as important – or perhaps even slightly more important. Since Donald Trump became the President of the USA, the seriousness of the effects of the DCA agreement has begun to sink in and become a reality for many. Yesterday, a report was released from the V-Dem Institute. It shows that the USA is sinking like a stone in the index for countries' democratic status.

After New Year's, a new DCA debate has broken out where it has been said that it would be wise for Sweden to break the DCA agreement with the USA. It is perhaps not so strange, given the number of times Donald Trump has violated international law. First, he kidnapped Venezuela's president. Then he directed military threats towards Greenland and Denmark. After that, he attacked Iran in violation of international law – that Iran responded to the attacks by attacking its neighboring countries also clearly violates international law. Sweden should therefore not have a DCA agreement with Donald Trump and the USA, I think.

Our arguments against the DCA agreement are many. Firstly, our opposition is principled. We do not want an agreement with the USA in the defense area where the Americans are given such far-reaching rights and opportunities on Swedish soil.

Secondly, the DCA agreement contains extensive tax exemptions for both American soldiers and their relatives, as well as for all employees in companies that have connections to the American military. We in Vänsterpartiet do not like this. People should pay taxes.

Thirdly, it is a question of jurisdiction – which country's legislation should be applied if crimes are committed? Here it is extra important that Swedish crime victims always have the opportunity to participate in and follow the trials, which becomes more difficult if it is American legislation that applies and the trial takes place in an American military court. I believe that many can, without much problem, imagine what situations could arise. What speaks for Trump following some kind of good rule of law? I want to remind how it went in the case with Asap Rocky a number of years ago. Trump sent his chief negotiator for kidnappings and did everything possible to pressure Sweden.

For the fourth, we do not want to see the USA gaining access to Swedish garrisons and training areas. The DCA agreement gives the USA a great opportunity not only to stay on but also to decide over locations inside Swedish garrisons, regiments, and flotillas. So we cannot have that. The Swedish military's garrisons shall be decided over by the Swedish Armed Forces and they must be able to control and cordon them off when needed.

For the fifth, the DCA agreement gives Sweden little opportunity to know what it is that the Americans are taking with them and storing in Sweden. It should always be Sweden that ultimately closes the door to a warehouse and holds the key. Nor has the inspection of American vehicles and ships been assessed as possible without American approval. In our reservation, we therefore propose a notification that the Swedish state, through an authority, shall be given the opportunity to inspect what is in warehouses held by other countries' militaries on Swedish soil.

For the sixth, it is about nuclear weapons. We in Vänsterpartiet hear both the government and parties outside the government say that nuclear weapons are not relevant. But then we should also enact a law against nuclear weapons as soon as possible. We have seen the nuclear weapons debate completely explode in recent weeks. It is something that will likely become a hot topic when the Riksdag is to debate, among other things, nuclear weapons again on April 23rd this spring. But it is clear that we need legislation against nuclear weapons on Swedish territory, because now parties are starting to slip and could imagine that nuclear weapons are used both in our name and on our territory.

The DCA agreement is about 30 pages long and has been negotiated for a very long time. Time has been spent writing in rules about vehicle inspections, driver's licenses, and even stamps, as well as addressing a whole mass of tax issues, but if something as important as the question of having nuclear weapons on Swedish soil has nothing written. When it comes to how serious crimes should be handled, the agreement has vague wording that allows room for different interpretations. I think it is like picking nits and swallowing camels.

Furthermore, Swedish bases risk being used to threaten our neighboring countries, as in the case of Denmark and Greenland. Trump has been very clear in various conflicts – he thinks that the USA should have the right to everything. Most recently, Spain was subjected to pressure when the country asserted that the USA may not use the American bases in Spain to attack Iran in the Middle East.

Madam Speaker! I also want to focus a bit on other things in this debate. Sweden is in the midst of a very large build-up of the total defense. We agree on this here in the Riksdag. We agree on the expenditures, but we do not agree on the financing. It is obvious that Sweden needs a readiness tax where the wealthy pay the most for our total defense.

The buildup of the Swedish total defense and specifically the military defense takes up a great deal of time and resources. The number of conscripts shall increase, more officers shall be trained, more soldiers and civilians shall be employed, more vehicles and various systems shall be purchased. Garages and halls for storage need to be built. Furthermore, entirely new regiments shall be established, for example here in my county, Värmland, where A 9 in Kristinehamn is now being re-established.

In addition to this, we are therefore to provide space for American soldiers. It may seem like a minor issue in this context, but it is also important to consider how everyday life functions at our garrisons. If even American soldiers and their activities and supplies are to be accommodated, someone will need to make decisions and prioritize. Should there be beds for more conscripts or beds for American soldiers? Should there be storage for Swedish weapons or for American weapons?

The second question that I want to raise in this debate and which is often not mentioned is also the conflicts surrounding land use. We are proud of the Swedish right of public access. But with this agreement, we know that we will need to practice more, also within the Swedish total defense. Then there are very large risks that there will be more cordons and areas used for military areas if USA is also to be involved in deciding which areas one should practice on.

That we do not block off more than we need is important for the popular anchoring of our own defense force. It also becomes more difficult for neighbors, entrepreneurs, tourists, housing construction, and municipal services if our garrisons and training grounds become massive areas that cannot be put to use. We are talking about 17 bases, from east to west, from north to south. This has a major impact for many in the vicinity of these places.

I certainly have no Americans arrived in Sweden under the DCA agreement. This is not primarily due to Sweden but rather to the fact that the Americans are still largely reconsidering where they should focus their resources internationally. On the other hand, Swedish authorities, such as the Armed Forces, have negotiated with the USA on how the implementation of the DCA agreement shall proceed in practice. Much happens in secret under confidentiality, but there is great concern regarding what consequences the agreement will have in practice in the future.

With this, Madam Speaker, I would like to move for approval of reservation 32 regarding the DCA agreement.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! Thank you, Håkan Svenneling, for an interesting contribution!

I was struck first and foremost by the reservation Vänsterpartiet has regarding the wind power. I read aloud from the position that Vänsterpartiet proposes: ”Vänsterpartiet menar att det måste vara fullt möjligt att både bygga ut den havsbaserade vindkraften, där förutsättningarna är som bäst, och att ge Försvarsmakten rimliga förutsättningar för övningsverksamhet.”

It is not so difficult, one might think. But now we do not have the Armed Forces just so that it can practice. We have an armed force that we must be able to deploy if the worst happens – if deterrence fails, if we have to go to high alert and ultimately end up in war against an adversary. This is the big problem with establishing offshore wind power everywhere.

I think it is perfectly reasonable that the Armed Forces, which can still be considered our expert authority in the area, can make the assessment of whether it is appropriate or not. Vänsterpartiet seems to have only understood half of the challenge. The training activities are probably not the big problem, but the question is: What do we do if the worst happens? Does Vänsterpartiet mean that the wind turbines should stand there? It feels like you have missed something, but Håkan Svenneling is welcome to enlighten me.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! The right-wing government we have now is very clearly for nuclear power and very clearly against wind power. If one is to start from Jörgen Berglund's reality and use some kind of military-strategic argument regarding this, the analysis should lead to that one should also be against nuclear power, given how Russia uses Zaporizhzhia's nuclear power plant in the war in Ukraine. It is Europe's largest nuclear power plant, and it has been used as a base for attacks to influence the Ukrainian warfare.

When it comes to wind power, we must, of course, take the interests of the Armed Forces into account. But the decision the government made when making the trade-off between different interests meant that they laid a dead hand over the Baltic Sea. They laid a dead hand over price area 3 and 4, which are the areas where prices are highest, where we need to increase our energy production to lower prices and strengthen Swedish industry. We must take that into account. We will not have any industry to build competitiveness on, so that we can procure defense materiel, if we do not invest in this.

Obviously, it is happening in other countries. If you fly over Denmark and the Netherlands, you see large areas with offshore wind farms. The United Kingdom has a major investment in offshore wind power. But in Sweden, we have chosen to say no.

There is a difference: Between us and Russia lies the Baltic Sea. That is quite clear, and that needs to be taken into account. But one should also not exaggerate the risks with offshore wind power. I believe it would be wise if one could identify areas where the Armed Forces can coexist with our important need for energy and increased power production. Then we shall build that power production where it blows the most, and that is out at sea. It has little impact. No people live there. There are fish and birds.

We must make trade-offs so that we can both have a defense and produce energy.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jörgen Berglund (M)

Madam Speaker! Thank you for a certain clarification from Håkan Svenneling! We are not to have an energy debate now, but I can still state that we stand behind all types of power. That we safeguard nuclear power and want to expand it is true. That is something we are very proud of. We believe that it is the long-term solution. One cannot escape the fact that even though the wind turbines stand out in the Baltic Sea, there are days when it does not blow.

My core criticism was that the Armed Forces make the assessment that it is not appropriate to have wind power in these locations from a defense interest. I am pleased that Håkan Svenneling raised the expansion in other countries. There is a big difference compared to Denmark's and the United Kingdom's expansion of offshore wind farms. They have a completely different geographical location. The Swedish sensor chain is built in a different way than theirs. Therefore, it is not appropriate.

It should then be said that if there are places where it is possible to build offshore wind power on a commercial basis without it conflicting with a defense interest, it is clear that we should do so. No one has claimed otherwise.

Madam Speaker! Håkan Svenneling dwelt a lot on the DCA agreement. It is perhaps not so surprising. It has surely not escaped anyone that Vänsterpartiet is a strong opponent to it. He also took up this issue with nuclear weapons – how will it go? Vänsterpartiet is fundamentally opposed to NATO, even though both Håkan and I belong to NATO's parliamentary assembly and have even taken on roles as vice-chairpersons in various committees. It is with a bit of trepidation and delight that one has a Vänsterpartist in that role, but I still appreciate that Håkan Svenneling does this. The EU-skepticism is there as well, even if it is no longer EU-opposition, as I have understood it.

It was quite harsh criticism that came from Håkan Svenneling here. Then the curious question arises: How will it go with Vänsterpartiet in government? What line will then apply? One must, after all, be collectively responsible as a government in Sweden. You are against the DCA agreement, but the Socialdemokraterna were very positive about it, which I am very happy about.

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Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! Perhaps it is fortunate that I am responsible for civil preparedness and resilience in NATO's parliamentary assembly. Perhaps that might calm Jörgen Berglund somewhat.

What I miss when the government steps forward and says that they want new nuclear power is precisely the safety perspective. They highlight it in so many other aspects. I wonder where one is to get uranium from. They now want to start mining it in Sweden, with great risks, even though there is very little uranium in Sweden. But that makes us dependent on other countries for an important source of energy.

Furthermore, we have seen in the war in Ukraine how nuclear power plants are used as part of military tactics. This government must also take this seriously.

We have been clear about the DCA agreement. The Riksdag has also been clear that it decided on the DCA agreement and entered into it. I was slightly surprised, but even the Danish Folketing said yes to the DCA agreement, while Denmark was under some threat from the USA regarding Greenland.

I think it is the wrong path to take, and I will raise those arguments again. When we form a government, which I am quite convinced will happen after September 13, the DCA agreement will of course be there. The implementation of it will be there. But I will constantly argue that it is wise not to let American soldiers gain access to Sweden's territory.

Jörgen Berglund's party and its ministers and spokespersons were very clear about the consent clause that exists in the beginning of the DCA agreement. I think its importance is overestimated, but it still builds on the fact that the Swedish government can always say yes or no to the American one, so to speak, in terms of what one does here in Sweden.

I think a wise course of action, now that Donald Trump is president, is that we signal that no is the main entrance here. We are not interested in the military cooperation with the USA as long as Donald Trump is president and violates international law. I think that we should be able to agree on that collectively, and I hope for Jörgen Berglund and the Defence Committee in that part.

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Yusuf Aydin (KD)

Madam Speaker! I am also here temporarily. I am substituting for my colleague Mikael Oscarsson, who is prevented from attending. I would initially like to move for approval of the committee's proposal in the report and for the rejection of all reservations.

We live in a continued unpredictable and uncertain global situation. Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine recently entered its fifth year, and still, no clear peace resolution is in sight. Russia spares no means in its warfare, and it constantly and deliberately targets the Ukrainian civilian population as well as other targets that are not considered to be of military value. The past winter has been particularly harsh, as the Ukrainian energy supply has been the explicit target of Russian missile and drone attacks. Russia is not only trying to wait out the suffering of the Ukrainian people but also to freeze out the Ukrainians into submission.

How this war ends will shape Europe's security for generations. Therefore, the support for Ukraine is both an act of moral solidarity and an investment in our security. Sweden stands on Ukraine's side – politically, militarily and economically – for as long as is required. These are not just words. Sweden has shown, and will continue to show, this also in action.

Mr. Speaker! Along NATO's eastern flank, including towards Finland, Russia is now building up the infrastructure necessary to quickly be able to scale up its capabilities. According to Must, there is no doubt that Russia will move a significant number of soldiers from the front in Ukraine to NATO's eastern flank in the event of a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine. The assessment is that Russia could be ready to wage a local war already a couple of years after a potential ceasefire.

According to Säpo's annual situation report, which was published today, it is also warned that the threats from Russia may increase.

It is these unwanted and worrying scenarios that we are obligated to prepare our country for. It is exactly what this government, with broad support, is doing. And it is being done with determination.

Mr. Speaker! I am proud to represent a party and a government coalition that has clearly moved from words to action regarding safeguarding Swedish security. We have been involved in bringing Sweden into Nato. We have, with broad support, adopted a new defense decision that significantly raises the ambition and capability. But the pace of the defense's growth needs to increase. We have therefore intensified the buildup further by adopting Nato's goal of spending 5 percent on our total defense, of which 3 ½ is on the military.

Total defense consists of two pillars – the military and the civil. They are dependent on and a prerequisite for one another. Therefore, the buildup occurs simultaneously, and large investments are made in both of these parts. For the military defense, over 170 billion kronor will be added up to 2030, among other things for material investments and the procurement and modernization of combat vehicles, ships, and aircraft. In light of the experiences from the war in Ukraine, special investments are also being made in additional air defense, in more ammunition, and in filling the supply stocks. And the size of the war organization shall during the same period increase from approximately 88,000 to 115,000.

To strengthen civil defense, over 37 billion kronor will be invested by 2030. Money is allocated to ensure access to medicines, medical supplies, and food in a crisis or war situation. Investments are made to protect electricity supply, drinking water, and important communication networks. Efforts are also made to provide support to municipalities and regions so that they can maintain school, healthcare, and elderly care during high alert. Emergency stocks of grain in the form of revolving stocks in the four northernmost counties have been re-established, and funds have been allocated to begin the establishment of emergency stocks of grain in the rest of the country. The Government has reintroduced and expanded the general civil obligation as well as the obligation to complete refresher training.

This is, overall, an unparalleled buildup since the Second World War. A dangerous world requires a strong Sweden, and strength is exactly what the buildup provides. This requires large investments, but this is absolutely crucial. That is why we are even initially borrowing money to reach our goals by 2030. No one in our world, whether allies or antagonists, can any longer doubt the Swedish determination and our capability and ambition.

Sweden's peace, freedom and independence depend on the measures we take now and on the decisions we make now and on the decisions that are made in the coming years. Through a strong national defense, combined with strong cooperation with our allies within Nato, we can jointly deter Russia's imperialist ambitions. A strong total defense is the ultimate guarantee for a Sweden in peace. Nothing is ultimately more important than this.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Mikael Larsson (C)

Mr. Speaker! In difficult times, unity and action are required, and that we all work towards the same goal and with the idea that everyone is needed. It is in the strong local communities that we build resilience, a will to defend, and a sense that we shall and want to protect our democracy and human rights and that one shall be allowed to love and live with whomever one wants.

When we now debate the total defense, I will go into a number of different things that strengthen Sweden's total defense. It is about both what is being done and what the Center Party considers important in this.

Mr. Speaker! Right now, Sweden's total defense is being strengthened. It is being expanded throughout the country. New regiments are being planned and built. Shelters and rotation warehouses for grain are being planned. Training is being held in many places around the country. At home at the kitchen tables and in the lunchrooms, there is perhaps talk about what will happen and whether one is prepared if something happens.

In my speech, I will address the big picture, which we influence here in the chamber, but also that which truly happens at the kitchen tables and in the dining rooms.

Mr. Speaker! I want to begin with the military defense and mention some points that are important for strengthening the total defense and making Sweden an even safer place.

The first thing I want to highlight is Sweden's entry into the Nato alliance and the cooperation that we now have. Sweden has made a fantastically fine and good journey into the alliance, and that work shall continue and be strengthened every day and every year ahead. Together in the alliance, we are safer.

At home, it is important both that the decided basic organization is built out and completed and that it is constantly developed. The Center Party sees all branches of defense as equally important, and they must hang together.

The combat readiness shall increase in our various combat units, which we decided on in the total defense decision. Perhaps the most important question is that the personnel supply in the military defense must be linked with the procurement of materiel and also the expansion of the infrastructure. Personnel, materiel, and infrastructure must be linked in all decisions that are taken. The important thing, both to strengthen Sweden's total defense and to be able to cooperate in the Nato alliance, is to expand and make the wise and good decisions that allow Sweden to contribute to strengthening the host nation support in Sweden and to our neighboring countries.

Mr. Speaker! Connected to the total defense, I must also mention that which concerns the digital world. Right now, during this debate, Sweden may be subjected to large or small cyberattacks. It could be things that we will never discover, but also such things as we will discover. The Center Party has proposed that a cyber home guard should be established and built up to place an even greater focus on cybersecurity and to be able to stop cyberattacks from antagonists.

Mr. Speaker! The business sector is an immensely important part of strengthening the total defense. The entire business sector in Sweden must be involved in building a stronger total defense all over the country. I will go into a part that I think is very important to highlight when we talk about the total defense, and that is the connection to the food supply in the event of crisis and war.

Sweden is dependent on imports of input goods, for example feed, seed, seeds, pesticides and spare parts, and now that the war is raging in the Middle East, where for example trade fertilizer is manufactured, we become even more vulnerable. The Defence Preparedness Authority proposed revolving stocks for grain, and it is very good that this has now started in the four northern counties. I and the Center Party will follow the issue to see how it can be taken further and perhaps also can be developed to cover the whole country.

In the budget proposal for 2026, there are also funds set aside specifically to build up stocks of supplies. It is extremely important that the buildup of stocks for supplies gets underway. Now is the time to really show action – things do not need to be investigated any further when it comes to stockholding.

Mr. Speaker! The war in Ukraine continues with daily horrors. It affects Ukraine deeply, but it also affects the rest of Europe. Sweden and Europe must continue to support Ukraine with materiel, spare parts, research, and innovation and truly stand on Ukraine's side moving forward. The civilian population has been hit incredibly hard during the years of war. This also applies to the past winter. It is incredibly important that both Sweden and the rest of Europe continue to support Ukraine and the needs of the civilian population.

Mr. Speaker! In this debate on total defense, I also want to highlight the voluntary defense organizations and the Home Guard. These organizations contribute in an important way to public anchoring, will to defend, and collective total defense capability through their presence throughout the country. In order to be able to plan and staff for the requirements of war, however, the voluntary defense organizations need to have current knowledge and be continuously included in planning and exercises throughout society.

The Home Guard has a high state of readiness and very good local knowledge throughout the entire country and thus creates the conditions for war units to mobilize to protect and guard important areas and facilities. Furthermore, the Home Guard also has an important role in host nation support. In order to be able to perform its role, more modern and heavier equipment needs to be procured for the Home Guard so that they can be constantly developed.

Centerpartiet has long pushed for that we want to see stronger voluntarism both in peacetime crises and in a modern civil defense. It is important that the municipalities and regions also think of voluntarism in a scenario of high alert and that they develop the activities there together. The voluntary defense organizations' activities cover many different important areas and can have an important role, not least linked to civil protection.

Civil society actors can also have an active role in both the operational crisis management and the preventive work that needs to take place. Knowledge of home preparedness and how to manage on one's own needs to improve on a broad front across the entire society. Volunteers need to be included in training and planning but also in exercises in an even more systematic way. Additionally, agreements and arrangements need to be written and updated regularly.

Mr. Speaker! In all debates concerning the total defense, I usually mention two important things that we sometimes forget but which are an important part of strengthening Sweden's total defense and therefore must never be forgotten. It is public education, and it is community halls with village halls, Folkets hus, and the temperance movement's Våra Gårdar. These can together truly strengthen the construction of the total defense and get the entire Swedish people to understand the seriousness and that it is together that we build a stronger total defense.

With this, Mr. Speaker, I would like to conclude by moving to approve the Center Party's reservation 15.

(Applause)

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Gulan Avci (L)

Mr. Speaker! We live in a Europe where war is no longer a historical parenthesis but an ongoing reality. Russia's brutal attack on Ukraine is not just an attack on a single country but an attack on the entire European security order. Putin shows with all clarity that he is prepared to use military violence, threats, and blackmail to move borders and undermine democracies.

This, Mr. Speaker, is the reality that we must contend with. At the same time, we see how unpredictably Donald Trump behaves. Many of us have concluded that Europe must take a much greater responsibility for our security, deepen the cooperation between Europe's countries and create a strong independence for ourselves, and against that background, it is absolutely crucial that Sweden continues to build a strong total defense, both within the military and within the civil sphere.

Just over a year ago, the Riksdag made a historic defense decision that marked a clear shift in course from disarmament to rearmament, from naivety to realism. That decision stands, and there is a broad political consensus on the direction forward among the Riksdag's eight parties. It is a strength in the very uncertain times we live in.

But a decision on paper is obviously not enough. Now it is about implementing the decision, increasing the pace, and ensuring that both the military and the civil defense actually deliver the capability that the situation requires of us.

The military defense must grow rapidly in volume and capability. Units must be filled, materiel must be in place, and we must be able to act together with our allies within Nato.

Civil defense is at least equally crucial. A society that does not function in a crisis will also not function in war. This means, among other things, that energy supply, transport, healthcare, and food supply must hold even under very severe pressures in society.

Mr. Speaker! In Ukraine, we see how society continues to function every day despite massive Russian attacks. The trains run, the power grid is being repaired, healthcare holds together, and the children go to school. Neither research nor the defense industry takes a break. It is impressive to see what endurance the Ukrainian people have had for over four years. It has strengthened the will to defend and the resilience in the entire society. But this would not have been possible without the support of the rest of the world. Therefore, Sweden's support to the Ukrainian people will remain as long as our support is needed.

Mr. Speaker! We know that the nature of war is changing rapidly. There is a tendency to prepare for the latest war rather than the one to come. It is a mistake we cannot afford to make. Therefore, innovation and technology are crucial for managing future conflicts, from drones and AI to space-based systems and advanced intelligence capabilities. Therefore, we welcome the liberals' [view] that research and development is a major part of the rearmament that now needs to take place.

This week, the announcement came that Sweden is taking an important step forward in the space domain. Through agreements between FMV and SSC, the possibility is now being created to launch satellites from Esrange starting from 2028. This strengthens our own capability but also our role as a partner to other countries and allies. It is precisely the type of investment that shows that we take the defense of the future most seriously.

Mr. Speaker! Part of this, which is sometimes underestimated in the debate, is the significance of the Swedish defense industry. Sweden has something that many other countries lack: an innovative, technologically advanced, and agile private defense industry. It is a strategic asset not only for our own security but also for Europe's security. We see how Swedish systems are in demand internationally. The interest in the Jas Gripen from both Ukraine and Canada is a clear example of this. It says something about the quality but also about the fact that Sweden plays a role for the broader Western defense capability.

For us Liberals, it is obvious to safeguard the defense industry and provide them with the right conditions to contribute to the rapid upgrading of the military defense through the delivery of materiel. The defense companies contribute to security, innovations, and the ability to quickly adapt to a changing threat landscape. But, Mr. Speaker, total defense is fundamentally about more than structures and resources. It is about a society that holds together when it really matters, about trust between people, about responsibility, and about the will to defend what is ours. That is also why it is so important that we continue to stand united in the large sense.

We can and shall have different political views, but in matters concerning Sweden's security, we must be able to maintain a continued common line. The threat to Europe and Sweden is real and requires that we take full responsibility and understand the new world order we live in. With this, Mr. Speaker, I move for approval of the proposal in the report and rejection of all reservations.

(Applause)

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Ulf Holm (MP)

Mr. Speaker! In a debate on the Swedish total defense, it is impossible not to begin with a few words about the serious security policy situation in which Sweden finds itself. In our absolute vicinity, a terrible war is ongoing, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, for over four years now. It is not just about Ukraine's right to self-determination and freedom. It is at least as much about our and Europe's freedom.

Russia poses a real threat to Sweden and other countries in Europe. We need to strengthen our total defense both to be able to continue supporting Ukraine and to protect ourselves against Russia. We must stand united on a multi-year, systematic plan for the economic, civil, and military support to Ukraine.

Mr. Speaker! Now we also have another war to contend with. USA and Israel have started a war against Iran. This war, too, is contrary to international law. Miljöpartiet demands that the hostilities in the region cease immediately and that the diplomatic negotiations be resumed. According to media reports yesterday, a top British diplomat who had participated in the negotiations stated that an agreement was near, but that USA and Israel nevertheless started the war.

Mr. Speaker! In this context, one must ask what the United States' unreliable president Trump means for the world and for Sweden. So far, it has mostly been misery and an escalated security policy concern, to say the least, which obviously also affects Sweden. Trump's attack on Greenland and the decision to withdraw all support for Ukraine are events that affect us in Sweden very much.

One can also ask whether the majority in this chamber, who thought we should join the DCA agreement, now think it was a good idea. The agreement means that American forces can be on Swedish soil. Who knows what Trump will come up with? He is not the man who usually looks at agreements and what they entail, but it is rather about what he decides to do on a whim. I think it would be reasonable if Sweden had some kind of control over the American military personnel who come to Sweden, what they have in their luggage and what they have in their supplies. It is not an unreasonable task for Swedish authorities.

It is also unfortunate that Sweden did not demand an agreement in connection with the NATO membership that ensures that nuclear weapons may not be present on Swedish territory in either peacetime or wartime. Nuclear weapons are a weapon of mass destruction. The world does not need more nuclear weapons, but fewer. Miljöpartiet believes that legislation should be introduced that prohibits the import of nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory.

Mr. Speaker! It has become increasingly apparent over the past year that the struggle over natural resources is becoming ever more decisive for the security policy situation. Oil is still a driving force in war and unrest.

A transition away from fossil oil would increase Sweden's resilience here and now and increase security for future generations. Despite this insight, the government unfortunately does the opposite, pushed by the Sverigedemokraterna. They have increased the need for fossil fuels during this mandate period while simultaneously making it more difficult to electrify, for example, the Swedish vehicle fleet, which means that many people and also the Swedish economy are seriously affected by the developments in the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker! The EU must stop feeding Putin's war chest. It is completely unreasonable to support the Ukrainians with one hand while the other hand, in many EU countries, pays the Russian state for fossil fuels. The EU has introduced many sanction packages against Russia, which is good, but gaps still exist. The Green Party therefore wants to see a total ban on the Russian shadow fleet. The gaps must be closed. We want to see a fast track for powerful measures, and we are pleased that Swedish authorities have now begun to act more resolutely.

Mr. Speaker! The climate issue, the struggle for natural resources, and the climate transition will affect Sweden more and more. The climate is the defining issue of our time. We will be hit by more extreme heatwaves, torrential rain, droughts, fires, floods, increased risk of avalanches and erosion, ruined harvests, and contaminated drinking water. These are some of the consequences that many Swedes will unfortunately experience. I believe, therefore, that Sweden must ensure a preparedness that can meet the consequences of climate change. A broad view of security takes into account military threats as well as other threats, for example, climate change, pandemics, and natural disasters.

By strengthening our preparedness and creating a robust society, conditions are created to handle both contemporary and future challenges. Against this background, I believe it is necessary to climate-adapt the entire society, including the total defense, to meet the effects of climate change.

Miljöpartiet proposes that the work with climate adaptation should also be linked to and become a part of the civil defense. Therefore, Miljöpartiet believes that the Armed Forces should be given a mandate to return with a plan for how the development of the defense can be carried out without negative impact on climate and environment. A mandate should also be given to the agency to plan so that the Armed Forces' vehicles can also function as part of the future energy system based on electricity and renewable fuels.

Miljöpartiet also believes that the government should be given a mandate to investigate the possibilities for increased supply of goods through domestic production.

Mr. Speaker! On the same theme, Miljöpartiet considers that the Armed Forces must cooperate with actors in the energy sector to find suitable locations and technical solutions for the expansion of primarily offshore wind power, and to ensure that this does not interfere with the defense's various interests.

We propose a special mission for the Armed Forces so that they act to enable and facilitate the expansion of specifically offshore wind power. Sweden must meet an increased need for self-sufficiency as part of the civil defense, and in that regard, the defense cannot constitute an obstacle to the expansion of offshore wind power. That the government rejected 13 offshore wind farms in Skåne and Blekinge counteracts the need for more electricity in southern Sweden and our goal to become more self-sufficient.

Mr. Speaker! Miljöpartiet attaches great importance to the starting point indicated by the Defence Committee that the total defense should have such strength, composition, leadership, readiness, and endurance that it can act as a deterrent and thus be preventive and peace-preserving. Miljöpartiet therefore wants the total defense to grow in a balanced way between action and support in both the military and the civil defense.

We believe in this context that Sweden's cooperation with the Nordic and Baltic neighboring countries must be further developed within the framework of civil defense, crisis preparedness, and military cooperation.

Mr. Speaker! I naturally stand behind all the reservations from Miljöpartiet but move for approval only of reservation 2 under point 1 on total defense and reservation 38 under point 16 on wind power.

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 12.)

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