(cont. from § 11) National security strategy (cont. UU6)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I would like to begin by expressing my regrets regarding the loss of Yasmine Eriksson and the Sweden Democrats. I was myself on the journey where Lars Wistedt passed away, and I will say a few words about Lars in my upcoming speech.

National Security Strategy

I have two reflections that I would like to have answers to from the Sweden Democrats. In the report, the Sweden Democrats object, which we also heard in Yasmine Eriksson's speech, to the idea that climate change should be an existential threat to humanity. One even objects to the government writing "in the longer term" - that is, not just against it being a direct threat here and now, which we can actually see it is anyway just by looking at, for example, the events in Spain where flood waves have washed over cities.

I am wondering what it is that the Sweden Democrats do not see in the long term. The fact is that if we do nothing about the climate change that is happening here and now, it will be an existential threat to humanity. Our harvests will be destroyed, the availability of food will disappear, and animals and nature will die. It will lead to an existential threat to humanity.

We have just had the COP summit in Azerbaijan and now see that we are not on track to reach the 1.5-degree goal but rather the 2-degree goal. This will make the conditions for human life much more difficult. But if climate change instead leads to four, five, or six degrees of warming, we are talking about an existential threat to humanity. I believe it is important that we are able to say that.

I am very proud that seven parties in the Swedish Riksdag manage to state that climate change is an existential threat. But I must say that I am a little surprised that one party does not even manage to speak of it as an existential threat in the long term.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Yasmine Eriksson (SD)

Madam Speaker! We are debating the report on the national security strategy now, and it is to extend to the year 2030. It is only six years ahead. The Sweden Democrats do not consider that the climate constitutes an existential threat to humanity in Sweden in the coming years. On the other hand, we do not deny that climate change constitutes a threat. But we do not consider that it should be written down here. It is not an existential threat to humanity in Sweden during this short period.

We do not want climate change to take focus away from other more acute threats regarding the security situation in Sweden. We have ongoing large-scale organized crime and antagonistic actors in our vicinity who are real war threats against Sweden. We must arm ourselves for that.

The floods in Spain were absolutely catastrophic, but this is about the Swedish national security strategy. It is important not to undermine other parts of the strategy. The government lists the measures they want to see and also the goals that can be measured. In that respect, they do not make it equal to the others, and therefore it should not be written up to such high priority or be considered an existential threat.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam President! I want to raise another issue that also concerns the national security strategy. "On a global level, the development is characterized by authoritarian states attempting to reformulate international norms and undermine or reshape the rules-based world order, based on the UN Charter," it says in it.

We have just received a notification from the International Criminal Court based on the Rome Statute, which is part of the international legal order. In it, it was clear that they want to arrest and prosecute Israel's Prime Minister for crimes against humanity. They want to uphold international law and international world order. But for some reason, the Sweden Democrats are taking a different stance. They are doing it together with authoritarian states around the world that make the same types of statements – for example, Orbán in Hungary. They say that in this case, international law should not be upheld. The Sweden Democrats believe that a different legal order should apply. Netanyahu should be able to carry out his genocide and go free.

Madam President! These two types of positions from the Sverigedemokraterna show why we need a national security strategy that establishes that Sweden should be a country that stands up for international law and international legal order. Sweden must stand up for the fact that climate change is an existential threat, because it threatens Sweden's security and population. If we get the same floods in Sweden as in Spain and if we get a legal order where those who commit serious crimes against international law get away with it, we need national security and that we focus on it in a national security strategy.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Yasmine Eriksson (SD)

Madam Speaker! The Sweden Democrats stand up for a rules-based world order as stated in the national security strategy. We stand behind the majority of the strategy, except for the part about the existential threat to the climate.

I believe that Vänsterpartiet and Sverigedemokraterna agree on standing up for the rules-based world order. I therefore do not really see that problem.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Madam President! Sweden finds itself in a time of growing challenges. The security policy landscape is characterized by uncertainty, and the threats we face are becoming increasingly complex.

It is in this context that we are to see the national security strategy - not as a solution in itself, but as a compass that shall provide long-term guidance for the government's work in safeguarding our national security.

The strategy is intended to constitute a basis for the government's governance of agencies and for priorities that affect our society. It highlights how we shall meet the most acute and long-term threats, from military aggressions and cyberattacks to climate crises and hybrid warfare. In short: It is a plan to protect the Sweden that we all love.

Madam President! Security is nothing that we can take for granted. It requires continuous planning, follow-up, and a clear long-term vision. That is why this strategy is so important. It gives us a map to navigate in a world where the threat landscape changes rapidly. It is about equipping us not only for today's crises but also for tomorrow's uncertainties.

Madam Speaker! We know that national security does not begin and end with the government. It begins in the local, in the municipalities, in the civil society organizations and in the families. We Christian Democrats see it clearly: A strong civil society is the foundation for a strong national defense. It is particularly important that support for local community efforts is prioritized, so that we stand ready in crises whether it concerns natural disasters, energy shortages or information warfare.

Madam Speaker! Security is fundamentally about safety for every individual citizen, for our social structures, and for our values. We must stand up for democratic principles and be an example internationally. Sweden's credibility is built on the fact that we not only have a strong defense capability but also a moral leadership.

The national security strategy shows the need for cooperation with the EU, with the UN, and with our Nordic neighbors. Global security is intertwined, and our contribution must be active and clear.

Madam President! The national security strategy is an important tool for Sweden's security. It provides long-term direction for the government's work and signals that we see the challenges we face and that we are ready to act. But the strategy must also be translated into practical measures, budget priorities, and coordination at all levels.

In matters concerning national security, there are occasions when the security interest must weigh heavier than everything else. It is not about prioritizing away important societal goals, such as for example the expansion of renewable energy, but about us having to recognize that without security, nothing else can flourish.

When the Armed Forces make clear assessments regarding risks to our defense capability, we as decision-makers have an obligation to listen. It is better to act cautiously than to hope that the risks do not become reality. Taking chances is not an option when it comes to our country's security.

Security is not something we can handle alone; it is something we build together. It begins with us seeing the whole, focusing on the future, and putting the safety of our citizens first.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Madam President! I would like to begin by moving for the approval of our reservation 8.

The national security strategy is an important document, especially in times like these. We have a major war in the middle of Europe, where the people of Ukraine are fighting not only for their own country's independence, democracy and sovereignty, but actually for all of democratic Europe.

Russia has violated the European security order by attacking one of its neighboring countries with the aim of totally erasing Ukraine as a state. If that attack is not pushed back, Russia will proceed. More countries are in line for Putin's aggression. That is how despots behave. They continue to move forward until they are stopped.

That is why it is so important that the democratic world continues to stand up for Ukraine for as long as it is needed. At the same time, there is now great uncertainty about which path the USA will choose, both in terms of Ukraine and in terms of Nato. Here, Europe must receive a message from the new American administration.

It is a very uncertain situation in Europe, which, as mentioned, makes a strategy of this kind very important. In that case, it is also important to seek broad consensus. That is what we Social Democrats have done, both regarding the strategy that we developed in a government position in 2017 and for this strategy.

We Social Democrats therefore wrote an article in the spring where we urged the government to invite a broad range of parties to talks regarding the new strategy. The government did not even bother to respond, let alone invite anyone to talks. I truly regret that. We needed a broad consensus and new measures to secure Sweden in the new insecure world we now live in. But the government has not been in the least interested in listening, let alone in negotiating.

That is why we now stand here with a national security strategy that not even a third of the Riksdag stands behind. I count no fewer than eleven reservations from all parties except M, KD, and L. Also, the Sweden Democrats have a reservation.

It didn't have to be like this. We surely could have found broad solutions if the government had invited us to talks. But the government did not want that. That also makes the strategy thin. There are no news at all, and it completely lacks the broad grip on national security that we would have needed. When we find ourselves in a situation like this, it is about ensuring that all of Sweden functions well in peacetime because we know that the situation is very difficult with high alert or, in the worst case, war.

I will give some examples. We have today a healthcare system that does not even manage its mission in peacetime. How will it then manage its mission in wartime? And it will not get better in the coming years. On the contrary, healthcare is now being cut in many regions, as a result of the government not prioritizing the state grants for welfare in its budgets.

Värmland, Örebro, Blekinge, Sörmland and Östergötland are just a few examples of regions that are now cutting back heavily in healthcare. In my home region of Skåne, where the Moderaterna, Kristdemokraterna, Liberalerna and Sverigedemokraterna rule, the largest cuts in healthcare ever are now being carried out. 2.8 billion they are to cut in the Skåne healthcare. That corresponds to 1,000 positions that are to be removed, despite that the Prime Minister promised in the spring that no one would be laid off in healthcare. That promise did not hold long, either.

It is the same thing with medicines: When the Reinfeldt government privatized the pharmacies, one forgot that the state pharmacy had a responsibility for preparedness, that is, a responsibility to ensure that there are enough medicines if war were to break out. One might think that medicines specifically – penicillin, insulin, anesthetics and everything else – are quite important to have at hand if there were to be high alert or, in the worst case, war, but that question remains unresolved. It was forgotten when privatization occurred, and it has still not been solved.

It is clear that a national security strategy should have contained concrete measures to strengthen Swedish healthcare and to find a solution to the pharmaceutical issue.

Another example is the infrastructure. Just take the railway! It is such that the trains in Ukraine run more on time than the trains in Sweden, Madam Speaker, and in Ukraine there is war. Is that not a terrible grade? It is the consequence of no one taking a holistic responsibility anymore. Once upon a time we had SJ and Banverket, and then the trains ran on time. Now we have 58 – I am not lying, it is 58 – train operators crowding onto Europe's most worn-out tracks. The tracks are worn out because all railway maintenance has been privatized and cut down. It is not strange that it does not work.

Nor the government has any plan for this. They do not want to take back the maintenance into state hands so that we can get it in order, and they do not want to allocate enough resources to refurbish the railway network. The situation is bad enough in peacetime, but in the event of high alert or war, the Swedish privatized and worn-out railway system would be a catastrophe. How are we going to be able to move both civilian and military personnel quickly across the country if needed?

Speaking of infrastructure, the government has not even been able to provide an update on an upgrade of the Malmbanan (Ore Line), which has an extremely important role from a preparedness perspective. LKAB cannot deliver ore, which costs 100 million kronor per day, and they also cannot fulfill their task regarding the new rare earth metals they are about to begin mining. So, it doesn't even work in peacetime. How then can it work in war? Ore is a commodity we may come to need in such a situation. Even here, the government must change its policy.

The third example is the electricity supply. Here, the government has put all its eggs in one basket: It is nuclear power that is supposed to solve all problems. But no one knows when the nuclear power plants are to begin construction. No one knows when they will be completed. No one knows where they are to be built. No one knows what they will cost. Nor does anyone know who is to pay.

At the same time, we know that nuclear power is not a good energy source from a preparedness perspective. All parties in the Defence Preparedness Committee said a few years ago that all nuclear power must be shut down immediately if Sweden were to suffer a military attack. In that case, we lose a third of our electricity supply. That assessment was, therefore, backed by all parties in the Riksdag.

It is very easy to understand why. If a wind turbine is bombed, the only thing that happens is that the turbine falls into the sea or onto the ground. But if a nuclear power plant is bombed, not only is a large part of our power supply knocked out, but we also risk a nuclear accident with radioactive fallout over large areas of land. It is a very great vulnerability.

Nor even here does the government have any plan - on the contrary. Here, they have just said no to new electricity production in the form of offshore wind power on the east coast, equivalent to a doubling of Sweden's current production. That it should be for defense reasons has been denied by the government's own research institute, FOI. They have denied it. They say that there are technical solutions for this - solutions that are applied by Poland, Great Britain, and Denmark.

In addition to this, the government does not want to pay for the connection to Krieger's offshore wind farm on the south coast, which means that investment will not take place either. It would have been wind power equivalent to the electricity needs of almost all households in Skåne.

The government is therefore putting all its eggs in one basket, which is extremely bad from a preparedness point of view.

Madam President! Healthcare, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure and electricity supply - these are just a few examples of issues that this strategy should have addressed and signaled solutions for. I can only once again regret that not even a third of the members of the Riksdag stand fully behind this strategy. It is not the show of strength we needed in times like these. On the contrary, it is a sign of weakness.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Joar Forssell (L)

Madam Speaker! Members! We are already in a war - a cold war. A second cold war is currently underway, being fought between democracies on one side and autocracies on the other.

One could venture to compare our enemies with parts of a body. It would be a bit difficult, Madam Speaker, because one does not want to compare Russia with a heart or China with a liver, as those are things we need. But they certainly produce a lot of bile, those countries that cooperate against us – China, Russia and Iran.

Perhaps the best thing would be to compare them with Frankenstein's monster. Every part of that entity which is fighting a cold war against our democracy - and which consists of countries like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea - is rotten and spreads disease, but they are joined together. They are one and the same. One cannot be against Vladimir Putin without being against Xi Jinping, and it is not possible to be against the dictatorship in Iran without also being against the dictatorship in North Korea or some combination of these. It is the same Frankenstein's monster that is fighting a cold war against us in the democratic world whether we want it or not and whether we want to realize it or not.

They do not have a common ideology, Madam President; there are communists, fascists and Islamists among them. But they have in common that they hate the rules-based world order and want us to have a world where the strongest decides. They want a world where we do not make decisions based on the democratic, liberal principles we have used for a number of years and use today. They want instead a world where exactly Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and their peers get to decide.

Madam President! It is for that reason, that is to say because we face this collective threat, that we need to have a strategic and united response. It is therefore why we need to meet the threat with integrity and with just the type of strategy that the government has developed. Sweden is, in fact, worth defending, Madam President.

Sweden is worth defending when China and Russia cut cables on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. Sweden is worth defending when Iran harbors murderers in Sweden. Sweden is worth defending when China carries out hacker attacks against Swedish and European politicians or makes "investments" with actually the sole purpose of exercising political control over Sweden and others. Then Sweden is worth defending.

Madam President! When Russia maps out and prepares for war - war against us in this room, against us in Sweden who vote and against us who want to live in a democracy - Sweden is worth defending.

Well, Madam President, it is not enough to build higher firewalls against hacker attacks, acquire slightly better air defense, or make statements about how important a rules-based world order is. It is not enough, and sometimes we must also have a strategic, unified approach for how we can defend ourselves.

Madam Speaker! I believe we need to talk about how we can strike back. It does not mean that we are to attack another country in a way that means the Cold War becomes hot, but it means that we must establish a situation where other countries know that if they harm us, there will be costs.

For example, we need to hack back when we are hacked. We need to ensure that assets that, for example, Russia has bought up through straw men in Sweden are expropriated, just as our neighboring countries do. We need to ban certain trade that poses a threat to our security.

Madam Speaker! One point in this is that Ukraine must receive exactly all the resources, exactly all the means and exactly all the weapons that they need to push back Russia. Ukraine must win the war, and Russia must lose the war. Again: This is not about a certain plot of land, a certain city or a centimeter of ground that one can get back or negotiate over, but this is about ideas.

It is about the fact that the countries that today constitute the axis of evil want to reject the liberal, democratic ideas that we in this chamber believe in. Then Russia must lose, so that their revanchism, not just soldiers, shall be pushed back, so that their ideas of a Great Russia, not just soldiers, shall be pushed back, and so that their authoritarian system, not just soldiers, shall be pushed back.

Therefore, it is important that we in Sweden, when we speak with our friends in the world, continue to emphasize that all the restrictions that have been placed on how Ukraine may use weapons must be lifted and removed.

Madam Speaker! Russia, China and Iran must be pressured back economically, culturally and militarily. At all levels, they constitute a threat to our way of life and our way of building our society. Now there may be someone, perhaps in the so-called peace movement, who would say that this is escalation, but then I, if they are listening to this, would like to take the opportunity to say that it is precisely the opposite.

What escalates is when we do not strike back and when we do not act in a deterrent way. That is when it escalates. Just as Chamberlain's actions caused it to escalate into a second world war, we contributed to the escalation that today has led to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine when we did not act sufficiently powerfully when Russia attacked Georgia or when Russia attacked Crimea.

We did not act sufficiently powerfully then, Madam President, and that is why Russia continued. It is when we do not draw hard lines in the sand and hold these that it escalates. It is when we do not give Ukraine the weapons that are needed and when we do not have clear, hard answers to security policy challenges that it escalates.

The same naturally applies to China. It is when China commits thefts against our companies and we do not act back to stop this properly, or when China carries out hacker attacks against politicians in Sweden, Europe, and the democratic world and we do not act back, that it escalates.

We need, in addition to the security we think about here at home in our country, also to be prepared to contribute to security in other countries, for example through deterrence, so that China does not in the future do as Russia did against Ukraine and, in China's case, attack Taiwan.

We find ourselves in a cold war. This cold war takes on warm expressions in different parts of the world, but what is common is that if politicians in the democratic world behave as Chamberlain did towards Hitler, the axis powers of our time and our time's "Vladolf Putler" and others will escalate.

It is only when we stand up for our democracy and our defense, firmly and upright, that we can de-escalate.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! Today's debate takes place in the shadow of the fact that Member of Parliament Lars Wistedt passed away suddenly during the night between Sunday and Monday.

Lars was a very appreciated person, by both the majority and the opposition. I personally had the privilege of traveling with Lars during his last business trip, and the jokes, the laughter, and the joy will always remain with me. Lars! Your democratic duty is now over. You have contributed to making Sweden safer through both your professional and your political career. Thank you for your efforts, Lars!

Madam Speaker! Today's debate and decision mean that it is the first time the Riksdag is addressing a national security strategy, but it is not the first national security strategy that has been developed by a government.

I am pleased that the government's representatives have listened to the arguments from us in the opposition and chosen to make the strategy a referral. I assume that we have now set a new standard for national security strategies so that it is the Riksdag, as the people's primary representative according to the constitution, that makes the overall decisions on national security.

In the document, the government establishes Sweden's national security interests. Vänsterpartiet largely agrees with the description, but we believe, as does the Defence Preparation Board, that Sweden's vital national security interests should be established by the Swedish Riksdag. That is why Vänsterpartiet in reservation 1 points out that the Riksdag should be the body that decides on the goals for national security. Therefore, Madam Speaker, I move for the approval of reservation 1.

Vänsterpartiet shares the view that the security policy situation is more serious than it has been in a very long time. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, natural disasters such as fires, droughts and floods occurring in the wake of the climate crisis, various forms of cyberattacks, division between different groups in society, crime, influence attempts and fake news must be met by a robust and strong society.

It is good that the strategy has a broad perspective on security and that climate change and the division in society are included, but the words become empty when the strategy is compared with the policy that the government has pursued over the last two years.

The government's policy is going in the opposite direction compared to what the strategy describes. We are not reaching our environmental and climate goals, we see increased vulnerability among people, and we see increased polarization in the public debate.

The foundation for a safe, secure and robust society is always a population that has a secure home and a job with a wage that it is possible to live on, that children receive the help they need in school and that no one is subjected to racism or discrimination.

Yesterday, the proposal for a reporting law arrived to create further division in our society. Now the proposal was watered down, and the Sweden Democrats were clearly disappointed when they suffered their greatest loss during this parliamentary term. But the legislation still sets a dangerous new standard for our society where the breeding ground for hate and racism can be fertilized.

Vänsterpartiet sees a need to strengthen both the military and the civil defense. We also see a need to prevent criminal activity both within and outside the country's borders.

It is important to take threats and risks seriously, without succumbing to alarmism and war headlines that risk creating a situation that can be exploited by both antagonists and political forces who want to sow division between people. How we politicians describe the situation is therefore of the utmost importance. It sets the tone for how the society we live in is perceived by the citizens.

Madam President! Sweden's role in the world has changed. The Moderate-led government has yielded to Turkey's pressure and is placing a Swedish NATO membership before the principles of democracy and the rule of law.

One reduces the aid and puts the Swedish business community's interests first in development policy. At the same time, one takes off the leadership jersey when it comes to being a feminist role model in foreign policy, actually without providing any real arguments.

When wealthy countries like Sweden sideline the climate, it matters for how other countries act. It is clear that the government has no ambitions for Sweden to still take responsibility for global developments.

I believe that Sweden should be a country that actively works for peace and disarmament in the world. It is about taking initiatives and participating in a long-term effort for a more peaceful world. Signing the UN nuclear weapons convention should be a matter of course. But instead, Sweden has been brought under NATO's nuclear umbrella where nuclear weapons risk being used in our name.

The attacks against Swedish civil society, against the role of study associations and folk education, are an ideologically motivated attack against exactly that which makes democracy vibrant. It is easy to tear down the popular movements that have been built up over generations. In the same way, the rug is pulled out from under civil society organizations when information support to Swedish aid organizations is scrapped.

They even take on the state administration with general savings, completely without considering the individual agencies' needs and conditions. It risks undermining trust in public institutions. It goes directly against what is considered important in the national security strategy.

Madam Speaker! Our support for the Ukrainian people is more important than ever now that the war after the election of Trump enters an escalating phase with, among other things, North Koreans fighting for Russia. Unlike Trump, our support needs to be long-term and predictable. We need to support Ukraine so that they have the best possible conditions to negotiate for peace.

Vänsterpartiet has voted for Ukraine's EU application. We want the EU to support the reconstruction of a free Ukraine. Such support should prioritize Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, not the opportunity for foreign companies to make money through privatizations.

As part of this support, the EU should appoint a special representative for Ukraine, in order to achieve a ceasefire, democracy, and lasting peace. A special EU representative for Ukraine could play an active role in consolidating the efforts of the EU, Sweden, and other countries for peace, stability, and the rule of law.

It is central that the reconstruction of Ukraine takes place in accordance with Agenda 2030, which is the UN's global goals, in a socially and economically sustainable way and with good conditions. Corruption must be combated, and it must go hand in hand with reforms for increased democracy. The support must originate from the Ukrainian population, not from corporate profit interests. This involves, for example, new housing with low rents, a strengthened civil society, and strengthened trade union rights.

It is also important that UN resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is allowed to be guiding. The resolution is about, for example, women's rights and participation in peace processes.

It is pleasing that the Ukrainian parliament approved the Rome Statute on August 21 of this year. This means that the country is now joining the International Criminal Court, ICC, and that any war crimes committed by all parties can be investigated in accordance with international law. There is already today an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin. One day justice will reach even Putin. He shall be prosecuted and convicted for the crimes against humanity he has committed.

Over the last ten years, the number of countries and companies working with autonomous weapons systems has increased sharply. The development towards smaller and cheaper systems with increasingly advanced artificial intelligence makes it possible for more countries and more non-state actors to acquire autonomous weapons systems. There are areas where artificial intelligence can be used for good purposes, for example mine clearance or cybersecurity. But in a free, democratic and rule-of-law world, we can never accept delegating ethical decisions to algorithms.

Today, clear regulatory frameworks for autonomous weapons systems are missing. We believe that fully autonomous weapons systems should be prohibited under international law and that Sweden should work towards a binding international convention against fully autonomous weapons systems. Furthermore, we believe that Sweden should never participate in or promote the development of, or participate in any other activities concerning, fully autonomous weapons systems.

Madam Speaker! In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about international law. Last week, we received the news that the International Criminal Court wants to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu for crimes against humanity.

It is incredibly important that Sweden as a country, if we care about both our own security and global security, works to ensure that international law and the rule of law are upheld. It is important to now clearly break with the far-right Israeli government and to be clear that Netanyahu shall be arrested if he comes to Sweden.

It is a dangerous development we have seen over the past year. Double standards have been created in the Western world when it comes to international law and the rule of law. It may be that one says they do not want to create them, but the effect, what the rest of the world sees, is in practice double standards. We must counteract this. Therefore, it is important to stand firm that international law shall apply in Sweden, and therefore war criminals such as Vladimir Putin or for that matter Benjamin Netanyahu shall be arrested if they come here.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! I also took part in the journey with the NATO delegation. Similar to my colleague Håkan Svenneling, who touched upon Lars Wistedt's incredibly tragic passing, I want to confirm the image of a person who showed commitment and joy. Lars Wistedt was a significant part of the delegation. It is incredibly sad. We all felt and feel sympathy for the relatives and those close to him. I can inform that the entire NATO assembly honored Lars Wistedt's memory before we concluded our work.

Madam Speaker! We shall now consider the communication regarding the national security strategy that the government has laid before the Riksdag. It is commendable that the government allows the Riksdag to consider the communication. Previous governments have not done so. But previous governments have, on the other hand, invited [us] to talks before they themselves have made their decision.

Madam Speaker! We may be able to look forward to a good combination of both models in upcoming proceedings. It would be valuable to get both a more anchored national security strategy and a debate here in the Riksdag about the result. When I listen to this debate, I cannot help but think that we probably should have gathered together. There are very many different things being raised. I believe one would benefit from having an in-depth discussion in a preparation of the national security strategy. But that is not where we are now.

Madam Speaker! This is not the last debate we will hold. We see that as somewhat of a challenge in this situation. This debate is about the national security strategy, but in a few weeks we will be talking about security strategy and security policy direction in connection with the total defense bill, before we make decisions on that bill.

If one reads that bill at the same time as the communication on the national security strategy, one sees that the texts are formulated with the help of two different pens or keyboards – someone may also have resorted to using AI. It also speaks to the fact that we would need to have a better order when it comes to these issues, in order to create clarity. There is really room for improvement. We want to see that opportunity being taken.

To begin with, we want to see an annual report with a follow-up on the goals, which are not so incredibly clear. They are quite general. But if one is to follow up with annual reports, as is stated in this strategy, it is important that these do not remain in the Government Offices but also become subjects for the Riksdag to be able to scrutinize, especially initially in order to get a development of the strategy.

We also want to see that the Nordic perspective is included in that work. We would like to see a Nordic unified, common security strategy. In the Nordic region, we work together a lot. What one does affects the other. There is a lot of exciting material to read. I think the Finnish security strategy has much to teach us, but there are others as well.

The security strategy thus describes the current security situation, priorities and principles for the continued work, as well as goals for the government's work within three focus areas. When it comes to a secure Sweden and the current security situation, it was previously said to be a cold war, but others now speak of it being a hot war we find ourselves in, due to Russia's attack on Ukraine.

We have from our side warned that we now risk a new Munich and that this is not history but current here and now, if we do not manage to stand clearly and step up our support for Ukraine. We hope that the Prime Minister, when he now meets his colleagues from the Nordics, the Baltics and Poland at Harpsund, tries to take the initiative to go further in this area. In the state of uncertainty that prevails, it is important that we take the lead to build a secure path forward and thereby influence others. It is one of the parts that is most current right now and which will affect Sweden during the period until 2030.

When it comes to a safe, open and cohesive Sweden, one can say that it is about more than crime and terrorism. Even though we understand that the government has a Tidö program, I think it would be good for the government not to get stuck in maintaining that perspective but instead to look beyond it and see that there is also other things to do if one wants to reach a safe, open and cohesive Sweden.

Speaking of trust and confidence in administration, it is not only criminals who risk eroding this. Trust among people in general is one of our most important resources, according to many researchers.

When it comes to resilience and competitiveness, climate adaptation is included, but only in the form of disaster reduction. It is a disaster reduction in a situation where there is, to say the least, an imminent risk that we will not meet the two-degree goal by 2030. 2.5 degrees warmer and upwards would mean something completely different than what we can see now.

The government has a target for 2030. However, there is another target that one obviously does not engage with as much, but which affects how much disaster work one must perform, namely the climate goals for 2030. Work on them is conspicuously absent, but preventing a disaster is better than managing a disaster once it has occurred.

It has emerged from the previous debate that some perceive the climate threat as something existential and very challenging to even name. That is the case, and what we do not do now will hit tomorrow and the next strategy hard. Therefore, it is important that we act here and now, even when it comes to climate issues.

I thought, as a friendly addition to the Sweden Democrats, to say that one of the areas we have often touched upon when we have talked about total defense and the defense's development - or decommissioning, as it was for a while - is that we were naive. We were naive, but were you not naive too, Sweden Democrats, when it comes to the climate!

In the same way that we now need to significantly strengthen our military efforts - we account for 3 percent when it comes to appropriations to the Armed Forces - we must also see that we need to act when it comes to the climate.

In my speech, I would also have touched upon the supply preparedness and the whole-country perspective. Food supply must also be included. If we are to have trust and manage to ensure that all of Sweden can live even in a crisis and a war, we must be better when it comes to the self-sufficiency rate, so that we can manage our carrots. Carrots are good in many contexts, but they are not enough for our self-sufficiency.

I therefore wish to move for approval of reservation 10 under point 5.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jacob Risberg (MP)

Madam Speaker! In the national security strategy, it is established that there is no more important task for the state than to safeguard Sweden's freedom, peace, and security. The ultimate responsibility for this task lies, of course, with the Riksdag and the government.

In the national security strategy, which we are debating here today, the government's overall view on this task is described. The strategy constitutes the framework for the government's work with national security. I must begin by saying that we in Miljöpartiet can agree with much of the view on the threat to national security and a good deal of the measures, the work, and the preventive efforts that are proposed against these threats.

There is a broad parliamentary consensus on Ukraine and the support required to help Ukraine reach an end to the war. There is also a consensus regarding issues such as hybrid threats and threats from authoritarian states.

Madam Speaker! In the national security strategy, the government states that climate change in the long term poses an existential threat to humanity and that society today is not adapted to higher temperatures. It further states that climate change deepens existing conflicts globally, partly because they affect the availability of resources such as fresh water, food, and usable land, and that climate change entails an increased risk of migrant flows.

The Government also concludes that the global green transition entails new growth and cooperation opportunities, that a transition to fossil-free status in Sweden and globally - also to reduce dependence on exporters of fossil fuels - is in Sweden's interest, and that the costs for damages and losses are expected to increase without adaptation of society to the changed climate.

Production conditions within green industries and other parts of the business sector change if the availability of water is threatened. Climate policy is to the highest degree security policy, both nationally and internationally.

Madam Speaker! The document thus shows the government's awareness of the security policy importance of climate change. That the government recognizes climate change as an existential threat to humanity creates expectations that this will have a far-reaching role in the strategy, but unfortunately, the government primarily settles for confirming the security policy importance of climate change without further developing how the security threat can be averted or mitigated.

Specific climate policy measures do not appear in the strategy, except in focus area 3, which concerns a resilient and competitive Sweden. Under the point concerning society-critical activities, the government states that it intends to adopt a climate adaptation perspective in the work on crisis preparedness. The government thus reduces the security policy climate policy to only include limited climate adaptation within Sweden's borders.

Madam Speaker! The Government also mentions the EU, the UN, and Swedish aid as important for handling the climate issue but proposes nothing specific beyond that for Swedish foreign policy within the climate area. In addition to climate adaptation, the Government wants to counteract climate change, but political proposals for measures are conspicuously absent throughout the rest of the national strategy. The strategy also states that Swedish international climate policy will be developed, but even here, proposals for measures are missing.

In the point I just mentioned, it is described that a transition to fossil-free status in Sweden and globally, also in order to reduce the dependence on exporters of fossil fuels, lies in Sweden's interest.

Madam Speaker! I believe that the national security strategy needs proposals for measures to reduce fossil fuel dependency in order to lead to action. That it is in Sweden's interest to transition to fossil-free and reduce the dependence on exporters of fossil fuels are examples of how fine words can become empty in the lack of just proposals for proactive measures to counteract climate change.

The descriptions of the climate in the strategy must also be seen in the light of the government's current policy. They want to give the impression of investing in climate and environmental policy, but in practice, it concerns accounting maneuvers to reduce emissions rather than actual climate measures. The Tidö parties' climate policy is under all criticism. Sweden looks set to miss at least three out of four climate goals by 2030. They also have no plan for a just transition with solutions to the existential crisis we face and which is mentioned in the strategy. Instead, the government continues to subsidize fossil fuels with yet another tax cut on gasoline and diesel, abolishes the aviation tax, lets the railway decay, and reduces Klimatklivet by 1.5 billion for 2025 compared to this year.

Madam Speaker! Miljöpartiet considers that countering global warming and taking necessary measures for climate adaptation in Sweden and the world should have a fundamental place in the government's security strategy. A strategy that establishes that climate change is an existential threat to humanity should reasonably contain a clear vision and needs to be followed up with concrete measures for how this threat can be averted and mitigated through reduced emissions and climate adaptation.

Madam Speaker! I naturally stand behind all the reservations from Miljöpartiet but only move for reservation 9.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Let me first convey the government's condolences on the occasion of Lars Wistedt's sudden passing. I also want to thank Håkan Svenneling for so well capturing Lars's fine work in both the chamber and the committee. It has been a privilege to work with Lars, who was a very cooperation-oriented politician and Member of Parliament.

Madam Speaker! We live in serious times. Ukraine is fighting for its survival, and more countries, such as Moldova, are being put under strong pressure from Russia. Furthermore, we and our allies are exposed to constant attempts of influence from Russia which, among other things, aim at us ceasing to support Ukraine.

In this serious security situation, it is impossible to be too clear. The defense of Sweden's national security is the government's single most important task. This completely central position permeates the national security strategy, which is a summary of how the government views this task. It constitutes the framework for the government's work with national security until 2030. It is also the government's hope that it will provide guidance to all those in Sweden who are deeply involved in strengthening our preparedness. I am thinking of authorities, municipalities and regions, but also of actors outside the public sphere who are part of our strong civil society. Swedish society is, as is known, so much larger than just the state and its institutions.

In times of crisis, nothing is more important than crystal-clear priorities. The national security strategy takes its starting point in a clear definition of Sweden's vital national security interests – the interests for which we are prepared to make the greatest sacrifices. It is about safeguarding our security, our democratic governance, our freedom, our independence, our sovereignty, and our freedom of action. It is about safeguarding our population's life and health, defending Sweden and our allies against armed attack, and maintaining our territorial integrity. It is also about maintaining supply readiness and the functionality of society. Finally, it is about maintaining what makes Sweden Sweden, namely fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human freedoms and rights.

Madam Speaker! There is no doubt that Russia is the most serious threat to Sweden's national security and that we must prepare for it to continue to be so for the foreseeable future. An armed attack against Sweden or our allies cannot be ruled out. But the threats to Sweden's national security are many and complex and are interconnected in ways that are often difficult to oversee.

The national security strategy highlights system-threatening organized crime and the importance of protecting society's central institutions. It also highlights that internal and external threats are more interconnected than ever before. Other serious threats include, among others, climate change and pandemics, which are usually called non-actor-driven threats and require different types of measures.

The national security strategy is also permeated by two insights that have not previously been emphasized in the same way in connection with national security.

Firstly, innovation power and the ability to be at the forefront in a number of technological areas where development is proceeding at a rapid pace is completely central from a security policy perspective. Here, there are reasons to be inspired by our Ukrainian friends, who have shown that precisely innovation power and the ability to quickly translate technological development into military capability is of decisive importance when facing a quantitatively superior adversary such as Russia.

Secondly, competitiveness is important, and it is closely linked to the capacity for innovation. Extensive resources are required to manage the large-scale investments that the security situation demands, and these resources can only be produced by a competitive Swedish business sector.

Madam Speaker! A strategy that does not say what is to be done and what is most important is not worth much. But just as important is to say something about how it is to be done, not least when we find ourselves in a situation that radically differs from what we have been accustomed to for decades.

The Prime Minister stated at the launch of the national security strategy this summer that it is no longer resources that are primarily the scarce commodity, but time. Not least, it is about the fact that the buildup of the total defense must be accelerated in light of the serious security situation.

This requires us to act differently than before. Therefore, the government specifies a number of guiding principles for the work on national security. The principle of promptness and pragmatism is, among other things, about removing the unreasonable obstacles that cause it to take too long before we see the results of investments in defense. It is about shortening processes and removing unnecessary rules. It is also based on the insight that time is a cost in a serious security policy global situation if it threatens military capability building. The principle of decisiveness and the ability to make decisions under uncertainty is precisely about making quick decisions when required, even if all facts are not known. Passivity is particularly dangerous in times of crisis.

If there is anything Ukraine's struggle has shown, it is that a society's resilience and its ability to adapt are vital to withstand the efforts that a war entails. Ukraine also shows us the importance of involving the entire society. Coordination needs to be strengthened. Siloed decision-making benefits no one when it comes to Sweden's security.

Madam Speaker! In conclusion: In the strategy, the government notes that one of Sweden's strengths is that over the years we have shown that we as a country can unite to take necessary measures when the situation so requires. I personally had the privilege of experiencing this on March 16, 2022, when eight parties, under the leadership of the previous government, stood behind that Sweden should allocate 2 percent of GDP to defense. It is a strength for Sweden when we can do so. I have also taken part in the broad consensus that has characterized much of the Defense Preparation's work.

I know that we have different views on certain issues in the strategy that is the subject of today's debate. I respect that, for that is how it should be in a democracy. But it is an immense strength for Sweden that there is such a broad consensus on both the threats that ultimately target our right to choose for ourselves how we want to live and what we must do to counter these threats. In a restless time and in an uncertain world, it is a strength that we as a people can unite and do what is best for our country.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Madam Speaker! I agree that it is a strength when there is consensus, not least across block boundaries, in these matters. But in this case, that is not the situation.

I stated in my post that it is less than a third of the members of the Riksdag who fully stand behind this strategy. The government has not even negotiated with the Sweden Democrats, and even the Sweden Democrats have a reservation. This situation arose because the government did not invite [them] to negotiations and talks about the strategy.

In 2017, when we were in government, we invited the opposition to talks. At that time, you did not want to come, Pål Jonson. Now we had to invite ourselves, via an article in Dagens Nyheter. When we did that, we didn't even get a response. Then the result becomes exactly like this. Is it 103 out of 349 members who stand behind the strategy? That is thin. It is narrow.

If there had been discussions about this, we would of course have raised the questions that I raised in my motion. We would have pushed for investments in healthcare, railways, pharmaceuticals and electricity production, because the strategy is about more than just defense. Security is more than just defense. It is about making the entire society function.

The Minister for Defence is not the Minister for Social Affairs. He is also not the Minister for Infrastructure. But I still want to ask a question to the Minister for Defence.

The Minister for Defence must surely wonder, when he hears how healthcare is being cut back all over the country: How are we going to manage this in war? When he hears that our trains have worse punctuality than the trains in Ukraine and that LKAB cannot even get the ore out via the Malmbanan, he must surely ask himself: How on earth are we going to manage this in war?

My question is: Does the Minister for Defence not become concerned when large parts of public Sweden function so poorly in peacetime, and does he not then wonder how it will go in wartime?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! First, I must direct this back towards Morgan Johansson. We are standing here today because this government chose to submit a letter to the Riksdag regarding this. Consequently, we also have the opportunity to hold this debate in the Riksdag. This was not chosen by the government that Morgan Johansson sat in.

Since then, I have double-checked with the national security advisor, and the members of the Defence Committee were invited to talks on the national security strategy in May this year. It is natural that it is the members of the Defence Committee who are invited to discussions on the national security strategy, as the lion's share of the threat assessment contained in the national security strategy comes from the report Allvarstid, including the concept of "vital national security interests". The Defence Committee's work has therefore also been central to the guidance of the national security strategy.

In the end, it is the government's national security strategy. I also want to report on the work that the government is doing with it. I respect that there are different opinions, especially in broader security issues, such as when it concerns infrastructure, healthcare, and climate. In those cases, I think it is natural that it comes to expression in a debate like this. But central issues, such as this one regarding the vital national security interests, come from the Defence Consultative Council and have been developed in broad political consensus there.

Again: We chose to make a statement on the national security strategy, and the government that Morgan Johansson sat in chose not to do so. We also invited to talks in May this year regarding the national security strategy.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Madam Speaker! This is pure nonsense. I sit in the Defence Committee. I sat in that Defence Committee that went through point by point in the reports that we wrote. We have not negotiated the national security strategy in the Defence Committee. No party in the Defence Committee has seen the national security strategy before it landed on the Riksdag's table.

That is why we wrote the article. We said: We want to be involved in negotiating the national security strategy, so that we can include our points in it. It is about, for example, investments in healthcare, the railway, and everything else that must function in peacetime in order to also function in wartime.

It is pure nonsense to claim that this has been negotiated in any way or that an invitation has been extended. It has not happened. I sit, as I have said, in the Defence Preparation Board. There, we have dealt with the Defence Preparation Board's reports but nothing else.

When we wrote the article, the government could at least have made an effort to respond to the invitation itself. They could have invited us to negotiations where we could have gone through the texts in the national security strategy. In such a negotiation, we would have submitted our proposals.

I do not recognize this image at all.

Furthermore, the previous government invited [us] to negotiations in 2017. Then, you did not want to come. I believe it was Pål Jonson who was responsible for that at the time. So then you didn't even want to come, Pål Jonson. Now it was we who invited [you] to negotiations, and then we didn't even get any answer.

No, we have not seen this strategy at all before it landed on the Riksdag's table. That is how it is.

Since it is good that we now have a writing, so that we can talk about this. It is the time that I think we should have when it concerns such questions. It is excellent. But this also shows the problem here. Now Pål Jonson does not even have a third of the Riksdag behind him in the matter of the national security strategy. He has, therefore, not even negotiated in the Sverigedemokraterna in it. It is a weakness. It is not a strength in this situation.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I never said that we have negotiated the national security strategy, Morgan Johansson. I must correct Morgan Johansson regarding the fact that the government should not have been invited to information about the national security strategy. It was, in fact, done in May. I have now had that verified. I also know it by having spoken with the former chairman of the Defence Preparation Board.

So it was not a negotiation but an information session about the national security strategy. As I understand it, that is how the meeting took place. I have also checked how it was in 2017. I know that the previous government was then finished with its national security strategy and that they wanted to invite us, who were then in opposition, but we thought it was better to receive a memorandum and to have that debate completely openly in the Riksdag.

The government naturally takes note of this debate. I think it is good that we are discussing many issues today that are linked to climate and security, for we have not done so to a sufficient extent. I therefore think that this debate is important.

But ultimately, this is the government's national security strategy, and we have not proposed anything other than that this is the government's primary responsibility. It is then also natural that it is the government that designs the national security strategy, naturally in dialogue with the Riksdag. We take note of the debate we have. Much of the preliminary work was actually done in the report that the Defence Committee released in June 2023 and which is called Allvarstid. Many of the formulations recur from Allvarstid and the Defence Committee. I still think it is a reasonable approach to an anchoring.

Återigen: I respect that we can express ourselves differently and also that we have different opinions when it comes to infrastructure, social issues, and climate issues.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! Energy is security. This is shown, not least by the war in Ukraine, where Russia precisely attacks Ukraine's energy supply. Last week, Odessa was dark for two days. They had succeeded in knocking out the entire energy supply to such an important and large city.

It is by attacking the energy supply that Russia tries to break the Ukrainian resilience. It is also something that is pointed out in the national security strategy.

Earlier this month, we received notice from the government that they are stopping offshore wind power. It is a total of 13 parks, including parks connected to Gotland. Regarding Gotland, we know that they are of very great security policy importance. Since there is not enough energy production on Gotland, one is also very dependent on cables from the mainland, and in the current situation, it is, in any case according to me, far too few cables. This government has instead staked all its cards on nuclear power.

Ukraine shows how wrong it can be to invest in nuclear power. In Ukraine, Russia has used former nuclear power plants, such as in Chernobyl, but also current nuclear power plants, such as Europe's largest in Zaporizhzhia, to be able to attack Ukrainian targets. Ukraine then cannot respond to artillery fire because there is a risk of hitting the nuclear power plant or damaging it in some way. It shows that energy is not just security in war but also a weapon in war.

I wonder what the Minister for Defence thinks about the fact that we, rather than moving in the right direction regarding energy and security in line with the goals of the national security strategy and strengthening the Swedish energy system by making it more multifaceted and more regionalized, are moving in the wrong direction by hanging ourselves on long cables. It will make it easy to knock out Swedish energy production.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I believe that a national security strategy is precisely designed to provide guidance also for tough and difficult decisions.

If the Armed Forces says that it would involve unacceptable security risks to expand offshore wind power in the Baltic Sea because it would, for example, affect radar surveillance capability when it comes to identifying incoming ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, and if the Defence Radio Establishment says that it could powerfully weaken our signal intelligence capability and lead to unacceptable risks, then we must also take that into account in the difficult assessments and trade-offs that we simply must make.

Apart from this, the offshore wind power may affect our ability to identify threat risks in the underwater environment and also affect the Armed Forces' opportunity for exercise.

We are open to offshore wind power but not in the Baltic Sea area. This is because Kaliningrad is one of the world's most militarized areas. We also strive to achieve better processes. Not least, the Armed Forces are doing so, and therefore we have also commissioned an investigation, which will be presented in December, on how we can achieve predictable processes.

We have opened up for offshore wind power, for example on the west coast and north of Åland. But it is much more difficult to have offshore wind power in the Baltic Sea area. It would, again, lead to what the Armed Forces say are unacceptable risks to Sweden's security, and if Sweden's security is the most important criterion – which the national security strategy says – we must take note of what the Armed Forces say.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I fundamentally think it is good that we have a Defense Minister who listens to the Armed Forces and the Defence Signals Agency and considers Sweden's security. It is obvious that we have a difficult goal conflict, but it is also very clear that the government has not managed to do its homework. They are laying a dead hand over new, important energy production that both southern Sweden and especially Gotland need, while simultaneously putting all their cards on a high-risk energy system in the form of nuclear power.

We also know that countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Poland are all capable of building offshore wind power and still wanting to defend their country. Several of them are located around the Baltic Sea and in our immediate vicinity. To then remove such large parts as this involves risks becoming dangerous for Sweden from another aspect.

We are now seeing very important initiatives regarding civil defense. I am very pleased that this government has continued what I perceive as the previous government's initiatives regarding the development of civil defense. That we received a minister specifically for it is a positive part of this. I am, however, somewhat concerned about the development that we only focus on war as the dimensioning threat when we know that the most likely threat is the climate. This is shown, not least by the forest fires in Sweden and the flood waves in Spain.

I wonder if we are ready for the climate catastrophes that are coming. Has the government made sufficient investments? Are we sufficiently ready and equipped for it, especially when the government cooperates with a party that obviously cannot even manage to say that the threat is existential? I would very much like to see Sverigedemokraterna travel to Valencia and tell the Spanish people that there is no real existential threat.

We know clearly that climate change is already here. All statistics point in the wrong direction. The climate threat will hit Sweden hard and clearly. It could very well be war in Sweden, but it is very likely that there will also be a climate catastrophe.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I have heard the argument that it works in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Poland, Estonia, and Finland many times. I want to urge Håkan Svenneling to look at a map. Where is the offshore wind power being built? Does it face Kaliningrad? Does it face Russia or not? Look at Finland – they are building offshore wind power, but they are not building in the Gulf of Finland, because there it matters how radar pulses travel and what opportunities one has for signal intelligence.

All this, Håkan Svenneling, is determined by the military-geographical situation and in which direction one establishes the offshore wind power. We have clearly indicated that given the position that Kaliningrad has, it is difficult to have a coexistence in the Baltic Sea area. It works better on the west coast, and it works better north of the Åland Strait. It is also important to carry this perspective in light of the fact that we have a special responsibility within Nato for the Baltic Sea area, where we have unique military capabilities. Therefore, we take note when the Armed Forces say that offshore wind power in the Baltic Sea area would lead to unacceptable risks.

When it comes to the threat, the government says that the climate in the long run is an existential threat. The primary threat, however, is posed by Russia. It is also the dimensioning threat for the Armed Forces and for the defense's design, which has to do with the fact that Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it has a low threshold for the use of military force. They take large political and military risks, and they demonstrate a terrifying brutality in Ukraine.

Therefore, we must also dimension our defense policy against the primary threat to our security, and that is Russia. We also speak quite extensively about the policy of limitation that we want to design against Russia.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! Russia is a clear threat. Russia is currently waging a hot war, a brutal war, on our continent. We find ourselves in a situation where many are now wondering what will happen, if we are once again close to a Munich moment.

Therefore, it is crucial that Sweden, together with the Nordic-Baltic countries and Poland, tries to do everything to fill the gaps of uncertainty that we now see and bring in others who are waiting, observing, and wondering what will happen on the other side of the New Year.

It is now that we really must show that we mean business when we say that we stand behind Ukraine and that Ukraine must win. Now we have the opportunity to be clear and act more powerfully, otherwise the risk is great that there will be more uncertainty and war on our continent.

In this situation, I would therefore like the Minister for Defence to be clear. If it is a decisive time now, what do we do? What extra measures is the government taking to try to build an alliance that is prepared to go further than what we have seen so far – not wait any longer, not wait any longer but act here and now?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! I thank Kerstin Lundgren and the Center Party for their deep commitment to Ukraine! It is indispensable and good. I am proud to come from a country where I receive more criticism for doing too little for Ukraine than for doing too much. It is a strength for Sweden that there is such a broad consensus regarding these issues.

A few things: Unlike many other countries, we have continuously increased our military support to Ukraine from 2022, 2023, and 2024. Kerstin Lundgren knows that we have a financial framework for 2024, 2025, and 2026 totaling 75 billion. We express it in such a way that this is a floor, not a ceiling, and that we are willing to do more.

I want to put the matter into a bit of perspective, linked to the economic framework. Germany has a framework of 4 billion euro, the United Kingdom has a framework of 2 ½ billion pounds, while the French framework is at 3 billion euro.

Sweden ranks very high in relation to the vast majority of other countries. According to the Kiel Institute, Sweden ranks sixth in the world. But we are willing to do more than we have done previously. Some expressions of that are, naturally, that the Prime Minister has gathered the Nordic-Baltic circle at Harpsund today together with Poland, which thinks similarly to us on these issues. I had the Ukrainian Defense Minister visiting on Thursday and Friday last week.

We are clearly signaling that we are open to doing more than we have done so far. We are also opening up for the production of, for example, long-range patrol robots and also robots that Ukraine will produce in Ukraine. Production shall be scaled up there.

We do not impose any international law restrictions on the platforms and systems that we donate to Ukraine. We have not donated long-range missile systems now because we do not possess such systems yet, but we support the Ukrainian production.

Several measures have been taken recently. I also had a meeting with the NB8 constituency last week to discuss how we can step up the support to Ukraine.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! There is talk of frameworks and measures that we have taken. Here and now, decisive battles are being fought. It is a decisive time in Ukraine. The coming months this winter will have an immensely great significance for the outcome.

It is important that we stop doing too little and too late. It has always been someone else. Someone-else-ism also applies here. We do not send Jas, even though we can – because we are waiting for someone else. This must come to an end if we are serious about Ukraine having to win. Otherwise, we will be standing here with a completely new security situation for the remainder of this period for the security strategy.

Madam Speaker! I also heard the Minister refer to the Prime Minister regarding defense and the security strategy, namely that resources are not the problem but time. I heard the Minister say that passivity is not a line of action. But, Madam Speaker, imagine if the government were to gain this insight when it comes to the climate. Here, the question of time truly applies. If we do not manage to reach the climate goals by 2030, we know that it will go very fast - 2.5 degrees and beyond. Some researchers recently said that they do not even dare to think about the consequences.

Passivity is really not the way in this case. Here, the government needs to review its agenda and not listen to those who do not see the climate threat as existential.

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Försvarsministern Pål Jonson (M)

Madam Speaker! Frameworks matter. Money matters. This applies especially in a situation where Ukraine has powerfully built up its own capacity for defense industrial production in line with what Russia has done in proportion to its own size. That we can invest capital in the Ukrainian defense industrial capacity is crucial. Sweden has a significantly larger framework than the vast majority of other countries, but we can and are willing to do more than we have done so far.

The most important goal with the Swedish support is that it should make a difference on the ground. Right now, there is financial capital so that we can strengthen Ukraine's own national defense industrial production. We also ensure that for all the platforms and systems that we send there, there is logistics as well as access to and maintenance of spare parts. They shall make a difference on the ground.

There is a great depth of intention connected to the Swedish support that I am proud of. It is not the government that should be credited for it, but the Armed Forces and the Defence Materiel Administration are incredibly dedicated in the work of supporting Ukraine.

Unfortunately, it is not quite correct as Kerstin Lundgren says that we could send Jas if we wanted to. It doesn't work that way, Kerstin Lundgren. It is about export licenses and decisions that must be made with other countries within the framework of the Air Force Coalition.

It is clear that we can send Gripen planes to Ukraine, but if they do not have weapons, the planes will not be of any particularly great use. Unfortunately. Here we need to cooperate with other countries. We have been urged to wait with the Gripen and instead contribute with our airborne sensor ASC 890. It can command the F-16.

We in no way rule out the possibility of sending the Gripen later. For the final support package, we have allocated 2.1 billion so that it will be possible to do this further ahead.

(Applause)

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(A decision was to be taken on 28 November.)

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