The National Audit Office's report on the reduction obligation for gasoline and diesel
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerns the Swedish National Audit Office's report on the reduction obligation. SD argues that the previous law was unrealistic and led to high diesel prices 1, and that the reduction has decreased society's costs 2 3. S accuses SD of removing the reduction obligation without a consequence analysis 4 and proposes "Sverigebränslet" to secure domestic production 5. MP criticizes that emissions are increasing 6 7 8. M argues that the reduction is legitimate as a high reduction obligation affects the countryside 9 and emphasizes electrification 9 10. C claims that the reduction obligation is cost-effective 11 12 and that the government's policy is backward. KD argues that the previous law was unfeasible. L emphasizes that nuclear power is crucial for the transition 13 14.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Speakers (48)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Rickard Nordin (C)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Rickard Nordin (C)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
- Rickard Nordin (C)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Rickard Nordin (C)
- Martin Kinnunen (SD)
- Rickard Nordin (C)
- Kajsa Fredholm (V)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Kjell-Arne Ottosson (KD)
- Elin Nilsson (L)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Elin Nilsson (L)
- Elin Söderberg (MP)
- Elin Nilsson (L)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Elin Nilsson (L)
- Björn Petersson (S)
- Elin Nilsson (L)
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Mr. Speaker! We are to debate the reduction obligation here in the chamber again, just as we did late last year. I intended to start by looking a bit at the consequences, as there were quite a few speeches here in the chamber regarding this.
The consequences for the diesel price in connection with the reduction of the reduction obligation amounted to more than 4 kronor per liter. For HVO100, which was not actually directly affected by the reduction obligation, the reduction amounted to more than 6 kronor.
Mr. Speaker! The National Audit Office states in the communication we have to deal with here today that the reduction obligation act was not feasible. The reduction obligation act has its background in the environmental goal preparation that was commissioned during the first half of 2010 and which consisted of seven of the Riksdag's today's eight parties. The Sweden Democrats were therefore not included, and we were also not invited to the preparation after entering the Riksdag.
We know today what happened next. The Environmental Goals Commission decided on a very ambitious emission target for transport that was largely to be achieved with biofuels. Referral bodies warned of enormous price increases, but it was chosen not to listen, and instead, it was hoped for something else.
The question was investigated further. In the 2018 budget bill, the proposal for a reduction obligation law was included. However, no consequence analysis worth the name was ever carried out by the Social Democratic government, and when we questioned how expensive it would become to transport oneself in our country, they turned a deaf ear. What the National Audit Office now states is exactly the same as what we Sverigedemokrater stated before the law was enacted.
It can also be mentioned that the social democratic MP government was so clever that they simultaneously lowered the tax on diesel during the implementation so that the citizens would not notice what the government had just set in motion. It was naturally hoped that production would increase in Sweden, that imports would decrease, and that we would get a lower price.
But, Mr. Speaker, the imports did not decrease particularly much because the involvement constantly increased. The price of biofuels did not go down, but what we saw was a Sweden with the world's highest diesel prices, this in a large and sparsely populated country that is dependent on reasonable prices for the transport of both goods and people.
Mr. Speaker! The reduction obligation law can serve as an example in history books of bad and ill-considered politics, where one chooses to listen to pious hopes and ignores looking at the consequences. The reduction obligation law was never sustainable. People were never consulted. People were never told what consequences the policy would lead to, and it could be seen early on that there was no tolerance.
Mr. Speaker! We are now hearing critical voices from the left-wing parties regarding the fact that the Tidö parties lack a plan for how we are to meet Sweden's commitments within ESR. For people outside of this committee, we can summarize ESR as an EU regulation that imposes requirements on each country regarding the reduction of emissions within the transport sector, agriculture, and heating. One also has the opportunity for some flexibility through the purchase of emission credits abroad and so on.
Mr. Speaker! I may find it a bit provoking when, for example, from a Social Democratic standpoint, there is a demand for immediate policy to reach the ESR commitment, because what the Social Democratic government did when Sweden negotiated ESR was to build the entire Swedish position on the old reduction obligation legislation, a piece of legislation that the Swedish National Audit Office has thus stated was not feasible.
With this as a basis, it was therefore concluded that the Swedish ESR obligation was not a problem - look, we have this reduction obligation law which will ensure that Sweden meets this without any problems!
Mr. Speaker! The situation we have today is that there is hardly any party in Sweden's Riksdag that thinks the old reduction obligation law was good. There is hardly any party in the Riksdag anymore that wants the old reduction obligation law. The entire Swedish negotiation regarding the ESR commitment was therefore based on legislation that we all now know has no support in Sweden's Riksdag.
This is what has created problems for Sweden to reach the ESR commitment. Had the government at the time understood that this was a bad and unrealistic law that one could not build the Swedish position on, Sweden would have had the opportunity to obtain exemptions. The Swedish commitment could have been adjusted, just as other countries have done. One example is Malta, which has exemptions due to a very large banking sector. In the same way, Sweden could have worked for exemptions because we took very many measures in the heating sector early on, in the 70s, 80s, and 90s.
It is therefore not the Sweden Democrats' fault that it will be challenging to reach the ESR commitment, and it is not the Sweden Democrats' fault that one cannot answer today what will come in its place when the reduction obligation law disappears from and onwards 2027.
Björn Petersson (S)
Mr. Speaker! I may be new to the Committee on Environment and Agriculture, but I am nevertheless astonished by Member Martin Kinnunen when he raises the discussion on impact assessment and the lack thereof.
In the audit report from the Swedish National Audit Office that we are to debate today, it is stated that adequate consequence analyses were missing. The astonishment comes when the member tries to blame the removal of the reduction obligation on the previous government, when the government that Kinnunen and his party sat in did not at all perform any consequence analysis. There is simply no consequence analysis!
And for his part, Member Kinnunen is performing a part of a consequence analysis here when he tries to give the impression that the Sweden Democrats would not bear responsibility if Sweden fails to live up to the objectives in ESR. In reality, it is the Sweden Democrats who have pushed for and implemented the removal of the reduction obligation – the reduction obligation that the report we are to debate today very correctly establishes is an important part of meeting the objective.
I wonder how Martin Kinnunen and the Sverigedemokraterna intend to resolve the commitments we have now when they choose to remove the reduction obligation.
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Mr. Speaker! Welcome to the Committee on Environment and Agriculture and our debates, Björn Petersson! We look forward to more occasions.
The Sweden Democrats naturally take responsibility. We have delivered a climate action plan that is very clear in this area. There, we also clarify that we will have this reduction obligation law until 2026. Then an investigation will be conducted which will be presented before the current reduction obligation law expires. After that, the question will be taken further.
Mr. Speaker! We know the consequences of the old reduction obligation law today. It was very costly for Swedish society. We saw significant price reductions when we adjusted the reduction obligation law. Most striking is the price adjustment that arose for HVO100, i.e., the fuel that contains only HVO. It is evident today that it was a few companies on the Swedish market that earned outrageous amounts of money on this because it is marginal pricing on all products. It is the last liter of HVO that matters.
I note a detail here. I have debated these issues with the Social Democrats during a couple of parliamentary terms. During the last parliamentary term, I debated the reduction obligation law with the Social Democrats. The same person whom I debated the reduction obligation law with then is today the CEO of one of the companies on the market, which had hoped to earn incredibly large sums of money by selling expensive HVO on the Swedish market.
Is it common in the Social Democratic Party to try to combine business interests with politics and then go to the large companies afterwards?
Björn Petersson (S)
Mr. Speaker! Member Kinnunen refers in his answer to the fact that the climate action plan is to be investigated after the 2026 election. As I understand it, the climate action plan contains proposals for a domestic emissions trading system and ideas for an increased reduction obligation. It is a thought based on the idea that we should reduce emissions by increasing the costs of fuel so that demand decreases, that is, to restrain the sale of fuel on a cost basis.
Then I must ask a question to Member Kinnunen, namely whether the Sweden Democrats stand behind the ideas in the climate action plan presented by the Minister.
In other respects, I question how the Sweden Democrats reason regarding the price of fuel in the long term. It is my firm opinion that oil is a finite product and that the price will continue to increase. The member refers to the previous debate when Kinnunen claimed that the price would decrease by 5.50. It did not do that; instead, it decreased by approximately 4 kronor. Now, a quarter of the way into the year, a quarter of that decrease is gone. Whether any of that price reduction remains after the end of the year remains to be seen, but in the long term, that is not the case. What are we who live in the countryside supposed to run our tractors on when the price of oil skyrockets and there is no new production of biofuels?
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Mr. Speaker! I thank Björn Petersson for the questions.
I can state that when I drove past the pump today, petrol and diesel cost the same amount. This is unique for those who have fueled only in Sweden since the reduction obligation was introduced. But in all other countries, the price for diesel is generally cheaper, and we are heading towards that even in Sweden. This is positive because it shows that we have obtained a lower diesel price than we would have had otherwise. We can also state that the diesel price today is approximately 10 kronor lower than what it was at its highest during the Socialdemokraternas time in power.
Mr. Speaker! 4 kronor, 6 kronor, 1 krona - that is approximately how much we received a reduction in the different fuel types at the turn of the year. It is of great significance for Swedish society and for the possibility of jobs and growth when we are in a difficult cost situation for the regions and for the municipalities. For the regions, it means several hundreds of millions in reduced costs. At that point, I have not even included the municipalities, but it could very well be about billions. For Swedish society as a whole, it is about reduced costs of tens of billions during 2024 alone.
This is, of course, an important part of the policy that the Sverigedemokraterna stand for, that is to reduce the cost burden for municipalities, regions and companies. We Sverigedemokrater do not intend to reintroduce any kind of steering mechanism that allows Preem, St1 or Finnish Neste to earn a fortune on old Social Democratic policy. It will not happen. I definitely do not believe that Sverigedemokraterna politicians will get nice jobs within the biofuels industry going forward.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Mr. Speaker! It is pleasant to be here to debate the reduction obligation again!
I reacted when Kinnunen stated that no one was for the reduction obligation. There, I want to remind of the history. It was seven parties that together decided on the reduction obligation. With the underlying data, with their strengths and weaknesses, as they stood at the time, seven parties in the Swedish Riksdag agreed to introduce the reduction obligation and ensure that we powerfully reduce greenhouse gas emissions. With that policy, we were together on our way to reaching our Riksdag-established goal of at least 70 percent less emissions from the transport sector by 2030, our interim goal for national emissions within the ESR sector by 2030, and our binding commitment to the EU.
When we voted on the Tidö parties' proposal to significantly increase emissions by reducing the reduction obligation, the result on the voting board was 147 to 148. It would have been enough for one member from either the Liberals, the Sweden Democrats, the Moderates, or the Christian Democrats to have voted with a climate conscience, and then we would not have had the sharp emission increases we see now.
When the reform was implemented, Kinnunen spoke about crises for households. The Climate Policy Council says that the use of the reduction obligation as a regulator of fuel prices has been directly unsuitable. Why did the Tidö parties not instead work with distribution policy to support households when energy prices skyrocketed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Mr. Speaker! I thank Elin Söderberg for the questions.
It is correct that in my speech I claimed that almost no one is for the old law, but it is however an environmental party that seems to be for the old law. That is how I perceive it. There is also a left-wing party that before the election was not for the old law, but now it is a bit unclear. It was clear when Dadgostar went around with a helmet on his head and spoke with journalists. Then one was critical, and it sounded different – but that does not concern Elin Söderberg's party.
Mr. Speaker! I want to clarify an important detail, namely that emissions in the world have not increased because we have changed the reduction obligation law. There is nothing to indicate that the production of biofuels has decreased. What has happened is that the area of use for biofuels has changed. On one hand, it has shifted the consumption of fuel from road traffic to other parts of transport, and on the other hand, HVO has been moved to other countries' markets.
This means that we will not see any net change. On the other hand, it is correct that the calculations change, but for the global climate work, no deterioration has occurred at all. There is no research in the world that has shown that the change at the turn of the year of the Swedish reduction obligation law has led to increased emissions of greenhouse gases.
Due to the EU's and Sweden's accounting decisions on how emissions are accounted for, there is a direct change, but it is not a change regarding the emissions of greenhouse gases in the world. What affects it in that case, given that one believes that the emission effect of all biofuels is as large as the authorities have concluded in their calculations, is that the emission reduction occurs because one produces the fuels and then uses them somewhere. But where they are used is of no importance.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Mr. Speaker! I am thinking about the word responsibility and I truly wonder how the Sweden Democrats view the word responsibility.
We face extremely serious climate-related risks that affect the Swedish population both directly and indirectly. That is why we have climate goals, and that is why we are expected to be able to deliver a climate policy that protects the population from these serious risks.
But with Martin Kinnunen's statements here that emissions in the world may not have increased, that they occur somewhere else, one can just lean back. It is very simple. One does not need to take any responsibility at all, neither for Sweden's transition nor for the world's transition, because if we do nothing here, someone else will reduce the emissions. Then the transition will occur somewhere else.
It is an incredibly strange way to behave towards what is one of the absolute worst societal crises we face. It is established. We see the consequences directly when it comes to drought affecting food production and leading to increased food prices. We see flooded basements in Sweden. We see roads collapsing due to worsened extreme weather.
We see that the number of days per year increases when it will be so hot in regions that it poses a life-threatening danger for people. This will naturally lead to indirect effects in the form of climate refugees and civil unrest that produce security policy effects.
This is a breadth of consequences that we in politics must take responsibility for handling. But the Sweden Democrats obviously do not want to take any responsibility at all.
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Mr. Speaker! It went far in Elin Söderberg's reply - we even got into the migration issues.
Then I want to emphasize that the latest statistics and all indicators in the migration area look good. The number of asylum seekers is going down. The number of residence permits is going down. The number of family migrants is going down. And we have only just begun to scratch the surface. Large parts of the Tidö Agreement remain, so I am convinced that we will be able to reduce migration even further.
It will not affect the least of how the reduction obligation law is designed. There is no direct connection here, I want to assert. The reduction obligation law and migration flows are different issues.
Mr. Speaker! I noted that the change to the reduction obligation act will not affect emissions in the world. This is because there is a great shortage of biofuels in Europe and in the world as a whole. We have a shortage of biofuels for ships. We have a shortage of biofuels for aviation.
We also have a reduction obligation for aviation in Sweden which also should be changed. But the companies solve this by paying the obligation fee, because there is not enough to refuel. It is therefore a reduction obligation law that works poorly. Here, one can work with redirecting HVO so that we have HVO for aviation, because aviation is much more difficult to transition and electrify than road traffic is.
Road traffic will likely become very electrified quite soon. But it probably will not happen as early as 2030, but it will likely accelerate during the 30s. That is what we will see.
Mr. Speaker! I want to emphasize that the changes to the reduction obligation act will not have any negative effects on the migration flows to Sweden.
Björn Petersson (S)
Mr. Speaker! We already see tangible effects of climate change around the world. The tundra is thawing. Glaciers are melting. The oceans are becoming warmer. The changes in the climate with increased extreme weather, rising sea levels, and droughts threaten the societies of future generations and, with it, Swedish prosperity.
We need to take responsibility for the situation and do everything we can to halt the development and mitigate the consequences. This cannot be left for each individual to handle on their own. We must solve it together.
That is why we in the UN and the EU have set common goals for, among other things, reduced emissions of greenhouse gases.
That is why we in the Swedish Riksdag have decided on binding targets for the reduction of our carbon emissions in the transport sector. To achieve this, a transition to renewable fuels is required. The reduction obligation, to mix fossil fuels with biofuels, is part of that transition.
Today we are debating the Swedish National Audit Office's report on the reduction obligation for petrol and diesel.
We Social Democrats welcome that the Swedish National Audit Office has reviewed the design of the reduction obligation. The Swedish National Audit Office's work is crucial in ensuring an effective and responsible climate policy.
At the same time, it becomes somewhat tragicomic. The National Audit Office's review was conducted before the Sverigedemokraterna puppet government mutilated the reduction obligation and lowered the level from 30.5 percent to 6 percent.
Mr. Speaker! We are deeply concerned about the government's and the Sweden Democrats' decision to so radically reduce the levels in the reduction obligation. It is obvious to everyone that by burning 4 million liters more diesel per day, we increase emissions. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to reach the goal of reduced emissions by 2030.
We risk having to pay large environmental fines to the EU if we miss the target, somewhere between 15 and 50 billion kronor - money we could have used for other things.
It is alarming with increased emissions and the risk of fines, but it is far from the only thing that worries us.
For us Social Democrats, the green transition is about more than reduced emissions and more than mitigated climate change. For us Social Democrats, the green transition is about securing investments in our country and securing the fair jobs of the future and, with that, our future generations' welfare.
To succeed, we need to lead the transition. The government's reduction of the reduction obligation puts us at the back of the pack. The business community and investors are dismayed. Industry investments in new technology and in domestic production of biofuels are now threatened by the government's actions.
We are also concerned about which alternatives to the reduction obligation the SD government will push through and what compensatory measures it will propose.
The Swedish National Audit Office points out in its review the option of moving part of the responsibility for emission reductions from the transport sector and shifting it onto agriculture and forestry.
To demand that agriculture reduce its emissions and reforest agricultural land and to reduce logging in the forest to increase carbon storage, is that what the SD government will propose?
Are we going to spend billions to buy emission allowances in the EU? Is that what the SD government will propose?
From the Minister and today from Member Kinnunen, we hear that the climate action plan is to solve reduced emissions with a national emissions trading system. Is that what the SD government will propose – to reduce emissions through price increases to reduce demand and raise the price of gasoline and diesel so that people cannot afford to refuel?
We are concerned about the SD government's lack of a consequence analysis in the reduction of the reduction obligation and concerned about the lack of real political alternatives.
Mr. Speaker! In its review, the Swedish National Audit Office concludes that the reduction obligation can partially contribute to climate policy goals in an effective way. Especially in the goal for domestic transport by 2030, it is considered to contribute at a reasonable cost compared to the alternatives. But the review has also shown that the previous design of the reduction obligation, with an annual increase for diesel up to 66 percent by 2045, is not feasible.
Mr. Speaker! We Social Democrats see the seriousness and are prepared to take responsibility. I move for approval of reservation 1.
Sweden needs a new way forward. The government's own expert agencies, Energimyndigheten and Naturvårdsverket, are clear that we will not meet the goals without the reduction obligation. At the same time, we need to find a feasible and sustainable way forward.
We call our proposal Sverigebränslet. We propose instead a sustainable blend of biofuels that is fixed over time and increases predictably and stably. Starting from 2024, the level of the base blend shall be 19.3 percent for diesel and 7.8 percent for gasoline. This is a way forward that gives Sweden the opportunity to reach the 2030 goal and gives the industry and the fuel industry the stability and the planning conditions required to dare to invest in Sweden.
We also believe that a number of other measures are needed to create a more stable situation regarding fuel prices. The existing system for the reduction obligation is not sufficiently flexible.
We therefore believe that it is the right way forward that a part of the Sweden fuel is a so-called supplementary blend. When the price on the world market goes up, the blend can be reduced, and when the production of biofuels in Sweden has started on a larger scale and the price becomes lower, the supplementary blend can increase. We want to see a reduced reduction obligation fee, and we want to switch to the European diesel standard MK3.
We also believe that Sweden must work hard at the EU level to enable a differentiation of the tax on sustainable biofuels and fossil fuels. It is a fundamentally important issue that climate-smart fuels should not be taxed in the same way as fossil fuels.
Overall, with our proposal, we can also save billions of tax kronor that would otherwise go towards purchasing emission rights or paying fines to the EU. We Social Democrats believe there are much better things to use those billions for, for example, to solve the healthcare crisis.
Madam Speaker! In summary, climate change is here and now and requires action. The more increased emissions today, the tougher, more expensive and more intrusive measures will be required in the future. We should not push more of this onto our children but instead take responsibility here and now and do everything we can.
In this speech, Malin Larsson, Sofia Skönnbrink and Anna-Caren Sätherberg (all S) concurred.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! I thank Björn Petersson for a good speech. It was very interesting to listen to.
In the presentation of the Socialdemokraternas proposal, a number of percentages for biofuel blending from 2024 onwards were mentioned that are lower than the previous curve for the reduction obligation.
I wonder if the Social Democrats can highlight some of the additional measures that they want to add to ensure that we simultaneously reach the ESR commitments and the national climate goals by 2030.
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I thank Member Elin Söderberg for the question.
It is true that in the Social Democratic proposal for a solution, Sverigebränslet, we propose a lower blend of biofuels than in the previous system. That was before the Sweden Democrats' puppet government so draconianly reduced the blend level in the reduction obligation from 30.5 percent to a measly 6 percent.
In our proposal, we suggest 19.3 percent, a lower level which we assess should not have the same radical effect on pricing. Our manufacturing industry shall be given sufficient conditions to build up a domestic production, which we believe is needed for the future.
Elin Söderberg asks me very pertinently about our other proposals to meet our commitments in ESR. In that case, I must refer to my party colleagues. Since it is my second week in the Committee on Environment and Agriculture and I have only just managed to read up on this matter, I will have to forward the question.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Björn! It is good that one can play the "new-at-the-job" card sometimes.
I want to particularly highlight that what we from the Green Party see is that the conditions for reaching our climate commitments by 2030 are diminishing. In order to reach both national goals and our binding EU commitment, the transition within the transport sector is absolutely central. There are then three areas that we need to work on. The first is a transport-efficient society, that we ensure that the total energy use for our mobility, both passenger transport and freight transport, in the country can be reduced. The second is that we shall work with electrification or replacement of vehicles. For example, we want to reintroduce the electric car bonus and have a special rural bonus when it comes to the electric car bonus. The third area concerns replacing the fuels in the existing vehicle fleet, where the reduction obligation has been completely central.
Powerful reforms are needed in all these three areas. If less is done in the third area, regarding the replacement of the fuel in the existing vehicle fleet, very powerful measures will be needed for a transport-efficient society or to replace the vehicle fleet much faster than what is happening on the market today. There are technical limitations within areas one and two. Therefore, from the Miljöpartiets side, we have advocated for a higher inclusion of biofuels. Otherwise, it is difficult to make the calculation work.
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I thank the member for a good account of the three areas that need to be worked on. I recognize them from our documents.
I share the member's view on the challenge we have ahead of us. I also share the member's view that more will need to be done in the other areas since, according to the calculations, we do less in our proposal in this area. The reason is, as the Swedish National Audit Office's report shows and as we are debating today, that the level we previously had in our calculations is not feasible. Therefore, we need to find a solution that will be feasible. We must be able to secure the build-up of domestic production and keep a reasonable cost for fuels for the people, so that we get a popular acceptance for the transition that we must make and so that we get fuels that my niblings can drive grandpa's tractor on when that day comes when the oil is no longer sufficient.
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Madam Speaker! Shortly before the turn of the year, the Social Democratic Party held an exercise and then went out into the media and spoke about having been wrong about very many things. They had been wrong about migration policy and about feminism. They had also been very wrong about climate policy. They had a policy that had served carrots to the rich, I believe a Social Democratic representative expressed it.
Madam Speaker! What strikes me a bit now, as we have this debate on the old Social Democratic reduction obligation act, is that humility and self-criticism are conspicuously absent in the member's speech, for it was a Social Democratic piece of legislation that was completely condemned by the Swedish National Audit Office.
I wonder a bit about the self-criticism regarding the very poor Social Democratic climate policy that was conducted during the Social Democratic government. It is admittedly a bit unclear whether it was the Green Party's fault or if it was also the Social Democrats' fault. When it comes to the Social Democratic party, it is usually someone else's fault. The member may simultaneously clarify this.
Do you still hold the views that the old climate policy had flaws, that it handed out carrots to the rich and that it hit vulnerable households in the countryside, or have you turned the page now and think that you did everything right during your time in power?
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! Member Kinnunen makes it sound as if the Social Democrats, in the development of a new direction for policy and reassessments, would have completely turned around. That is not true. The basic principles remain. It is to be a Social Democrat.
The Speaker talks about carrots for the rich with a representative of the Social Democratic Workers' Party, who has equality as one of their fundamental parameters. For us, distribution policy constitutes the foundation; it is in our DNA. This becomes difficult to counter in any other way than that it is ridiculous to me.
Kinnunen continues to accuse the Social Democrats of always blaming someone else – this after Kinnunen in his speech has done nothing but blame others. He says that if the government now fails to reach the ESR targets because the Sweden Democrats wanted to lower the reduction obligation, this is the fault of the previous Social Democratic government.
I do not agree with Kinnunen's description of my party as a party that does not take responsibility when we have been wrong. I want to remind that in my speech I stated that the Swedish National Audit Office has established that the template and the plan that existed do not hold, and that we have reassessed our policy and have a new idea, which we see will hold.
I also want to remind that when the decision was made, it was believed that it would hold, but it did not. Now we have reassessed, and now we are doing it again.
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Madam Speaker! From the Sweden Democrats' side, we naturally welcome the alleged Social Democratic shift in climate policy.
When it comes to carrots for the rich, I can share the member's view that it did not sound good from a Social Democratic perspective, but it was nevertheless this that a party colleague of the member said on Sveriges Radio.
Madam Speaker! I thought we would try to get some more clarity on the Social Democrats' new policy regarding biofuels and the reduction obligation. They have presented some kind of napkin sketch that they call Sverigebränsle. It might be some kind of subsidy that is to be introduced. They say they are to have a certain level, but it shall be fluid. They should, therefore, be able to sit there and reprogram the blending.
I don't really know how this is going to work, because the prices on the world market for all commodities – whether it is ethanol, HVO, oil, diesel or gasoline – vary extremely strongly. So I wonder how it is going to work when one tries to fine-tune the blending. When the price is low, you are supposed to turn it up, and a week later you are supposed to lower it, when the companies, according to information, may need perhaps half a year to trade up their biofuels. I wonder how this fine-tuning is going to work, when the companies need such a long time to prepare for the blending level.
How is one supposed to know how much higher the price the Social Democrats want? The proposal you have submitted implies a shock increase of the reduction obligation which will significantly raise the price at the pump, which will lead to costs for municipalities, private households, regions and companies of several billions every year. Can the member here and now state how much more expensive it will become if the Social Democrats get to decide?
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I have not sat in the Committee on Environment and Agriculture for very long, but I have been a Social Democrat for a long time. Climate policy has always had the same direction for me and it still does. Social policy proposals change bit by bit; they are adjusted and argued over. We still stand up for the reduction obligation. We have a different variant now than before in order for it to be possible to implement. This is Social Democracy for me: that it must be possible to implement the policy. I can consider it to be a fundamental principle.
Climate policy in other respects is, for me as a Social Democrat, about us securing the world for our future generations - securing prosperity for those who come after us.
Kinnunen asked me about costs. He mentions municipalities and so on. It is quite true that the fuel becomes a bit more expensive when we dilute it. But to look at the cost at a single point of expenditure, for private individuals, municipalities or regions, becomes foolish. It is about the total cost.
The Sweden Democrats have succeeded in lowering costs here and now, in 2024. Fuel prices will continue to rise. If we do not succeed in building a domestic production, we will not have the cheap fuel of the future. Then we will be forced to buy the extremely expensive fuel from others who produce. It will become incredibly expensive for those who come after.
Furthermore, they will have to pay off the penalties or fines that we have to pay – or whatever other solutions one is now going to come up with to try to reach our climate policy goals. They will have to pay, just not at the pump. They will not see the meter ticking when they are standing and refueling, which is frustrating. I know; I live in the countryside. I refuel my old diesel estate far too many times a week, so I know how frustrating it is. But the alternative cost becomes too high.
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! Some Social Democrats seem to have missed that we have a Moderate-led government. Ulf is Prime Minister; he is a Moderate. Romina, who is a Liberal, is our Climate Minister. To claim otherwise is disrespectful, both towards the voters, who have given us this mandate, and towards democracy. I know that the Social Democrats both know and could do better.
Madam Speaker! Lowering the reduction obligation is legitimate for several reasons.
Firstly: Expensive gasoline and diesel affect those living in rural areas the most. It creates an unfair distribution of the burden when the countryside is forced to bear the costs of the transition. This leads to a lack of acceptance for the climate policy.
Secondly: The National Audit Office's report is very clear. The design of the reduction obligation was based on deficient data and consequence analyses. It was not feasible, and there were great risks in relying to such a high extent on a steering instrument to achieve the climate goals.
Thirdly: Of those who voted in the election in Sweden 2022, 95 percent voted for parties that promised to somehow lower fuel prices. This is, therefore, fundamentally a question of democracy, a question of justice, and a question of reasonableness.
An entirely too heavy burden has been placed on those who are dependent on the car in their daily lives. In many parts of the country, the car is the only possible means of transport to get to work, drop the children off at football practice, or visit parents at the elderly care home. It is neither right nor fair that those who are dependent on the car should have to carry the heaviest load through high taxes on fuels.
We must reduce emissions as soon as possible, and we must do it in a way that is long-term sustainable. We know that global warming is caused by humans. Few question nowadays whether we should reduce emissions – the question is rather how.
To reach net zero, both growth and high climate ambitions are required. We need a competitive business sector that moves us forward in the green transition, and we need everyone to be part of that journey. This presupposes legitimacy for the climate policy.
We cannot back into the future. Introducing prohibitions and compulsions that override both the people's will and economic responsibility would strike down our business sector and make us all poorer. It would stop development and throw us back to a time that I do not believe very many want to return to. It actually was not better before.
Madam Speaker! Reducing emissions to zero is actually quite simple. One simply has to prohibit all emissions within Sweden's borders by law. It is something we could do during the next vote.
But to introduce a so-called climate dictatorship, as some activists advocate, is not the way to go. It is not what the voters want, and I refuse to compromise with democracy to appease the people who are sitting here outside and blocking the entrance to the heart of democracy. There are many ways to engage for the climate, but blocking the entrance to protected objects is unacceptable.
This government received a mandate in the 2022 election. It was a mandate for change, and lowering the reduction obligation was highly prioritized. There must be an acceptance in the climate policy. The people who are affected, that is, the entire population of Sweden, must feel that they are part of the transition, that they trust it and that it is reasonable. We can observe that the high levels of the reduction obligation did not win any resounding acceptance. Given the significant criticism that has come, not least from the Swedish National Audit Office, it is then entirely natural to make a course correction. Policy must sometimes dare to question old truths.
That biofuels are not used in our passenger cars is not crucial for the global climate. They will be of great use in heavy machinery, in aviation, in ships, and in the sectors that are much more difficult to electrify. For passenger cars, it is of the utmost importance that we now focus on electrification. This means having a stable and well-functioning energy system that meets the growing needs and expanding the charging infrastructure, which is something the government is investing heavily in.
We want to follow a more long-term sustainable path, a path that implies that the transition is a competitive advantage and that makes other countries actually want to follow suit. The climate issue is global, and therefore the solutions must also be. We shall both reduce Sweden's greenhouse gas emissions and encourage other countries to raise their climate ambitions. The only way to do that is to demonstrate the prosperity that can be built through climate-smart, long-term sustainable measures.
Sweden shall be a green leading country. Unfortunately, no other country in the world will want to follow the Swedish example if the only thing we have to show is high prices, an unstable energy system, and the lowest growth in the EU. Sweden shall be a leading country by getting other countries to follow suit. If we do not succeed in that, we are poor role models.
Madam Speaker! Many factors play into the price of gasoline and diesel. We live in a restless world, but that Sweden alone moved forward with the highest requirements in the EU was not taking people's situation seriously. Many households and companies are still under pressure, not least by the inflation which we now see is beginning to fall, but it is disrespectful and irresponsible to force the part of the population that is dependent on the car to bear that bill.
At the turn of the year, we saw a clear reduction in the price at the pump. It matters who is in power in Sweden.
Rickard Nordin (C)
Madam Speaker! The National Audit Office has thus investigated the reduction obligation and has some justified criticism, for example regarding consequence analyses. What is clear, however, is that it is very cost-effective. It states this in the same report.
It is interesting to look at different scenarios for the way forward. Helena Storckenfeldt and I are probably in agreement - I believe - that we will reach the climate goals by 2030. To be kind, we can base this on the EU's climate goals, which are somewhat lower than the Swedish ones. Konjunkturinstitutet has, in its environmental report, analyzed different scenarios to see what the price at the pump needs to be in 2030 for us to reach the goals based on different political conditions.
One of the scenarios is a low reduction obligation, that is, the one we have now with this government, and a strong electrification. In that case, one must also remember that this electrification is based on a reintroduced electric car bonus and a doubled taxation on internal combustion engines. It is therefore a more powerful policy than the one the government is pursuing, primarily the investment in charging stations. With that policy and in that scenario, the price of gasoline and diesel in 2030 lands at 40-45 kronor. That is what is required to reach the climate goals.
Another scenario is roughly like the Center Party's policy: lowered tax on renewable fuels and an adjusted but reintroduced reduction obligation that is feasible to implement, which our Energy Agency and our Swedish Environmental Protection Agency have also shown. In that case, the price lands at 20-25 kronor per liter.
How, Helena Storckenfeldt, are you going to be able to manage to keep the price of petrol and diesel low with the policy you are pursuing if you are simultaneously going to reach the climate goals? There is no scenario that manages to make that calculation work.
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! The Swedish National Audit Office was very clear in its review of the reduction obligation. There were several different parts that it is important that we take into account. I wish we had done that at a much earlier stage. I know that the historical description is, just as Elin Söderberg pointed out earlier, that we were seven parties who stood behind the reduction obligation that was proposed then. What I think is positive is when politicians dare to rethink.
I am absolutely interested in the proposals that Centerpartiet has put forward and look forward to looking closer at them. We have now reduced the reduction obligation to 6 percent until 2026, and then we have said that an investigation shall be conducted to see how it should look going forward. I rule nothing out.
What we must ensure is that we have legitimacy for the climate policy, that we do not pit one group against another and that not one group has to bear the entire burden. An example was raised regarding distributive policy measures, and I think it is absolutely interesting to look at that. What we know, however, is that we cannot put all our eggs in the same basket called the reduction obligation, for that is when we have seen these shock prices.
We know that it is not a sustainable way forward. We know that that level would not even have been possible to fulfill. Then it is clear that we must take a step back and make a new attempt, and that is what we are doing right now by lowering the obligation to the EU's minimum level of 6 percent. I think that is good. I do, however, look forward to seeing what further measures we can introduce to ensure that we reach the climate goals in a sustainable and long-term way so that everyone is on board at the same time.
Rickard Nordin (C)
Madam Speaker! The problem is that this government is doing everything backwards. First, you abolish things, and then you say that other things might come later. It is nice that you want to listen to things that the Centerpartiet says now, but we have been saying this for a long time.
It is perfectly possible to lower the price at the pump and not increase emissions, but rather continue to lower them. The National Institute of Economic Research says exactly the same thing. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency has shown the same thing. The Swedish Energy Agency has pointed out the tens of thousands of jobs that could have been created. Nevertheless, the government has chosen to do this.
If there is another solution that reduces the price at the pump and simultaneously reduces emissions, my question to the Moderaterna is: Why did you not choose that path?
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! It was very clear, and I raised it in my speech, what the Swedish National Audit Office had criticism against: that the reduction obligation was based on deficient data and deficient impact assessments and that it was not feasible. Just such a thing makes it clear to me that one must back down properly and take a new approach. It is not possible to just let something like that continue. Bad policy must be removed – that is how it is! So the policy must work. We cannot allow bad policy to remain fixed just because it is not Rickard Nordin who is Prime Minister. Bad policy must be reworked. One must dare to rethink. Old truths are not allowed to live on for the sake of the matter.
That is why we have lowered the reduction obligation to the EU's minimum level, which is 6 percent, and stated that an investigation shall be conducted to see what is actually feasible. Your reduction obligation was not that.
Those who decide are the people, the voters. It is they who have given us the trust to be in this chamber, to express our opinions, to press the button and vote. The vast majority of them, 95 percent, have voted for a party that went to the election on a platform of lowering fuel prices in one way or another. That we have done, and we stand by it upright.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! I reflected on many things in Helena Storckenfeldt's speech and have many points to take up. We shall see if it becomes a clear thread.
To begin with, I reflected on the fact that Helena Storckenfeldt mentioned that one should not invest too much in a single measure, with reference to the reduction obligation. My question then is what the Moderaterna have introduced instead. We do not see that proposals for several measures to replace the reduction obligation have been submitted. Instead, they have lowered the reduction obligation, significantly increase emissions, and place all the responsibility on the incoming government through the announced investigation in the climate action plan.
Another thing I reacted to was that the emissions shall be reduced in a way that is long-term sustainable. To reduce emissions in a way that is long-term sustainable is, for me, to ensure that we reduce emissions sufficiently quickly to avoid the absolute worst consequences of climate change.
What do the Moderates assess as a long-term sustainable way? Is it a pace that leads to two degrees of global warming, a pace that leads to three degrees of global warming, or a pace that leads to four degrees of global warming?
Helena Storckenfeldt also mentioned that we agree that we are to make climate transitions and that it is not a debate about if. My firm opinion is that today we do not have a debate about how we transition. That is because there are extremely large differences between the Tidö parties' climate policy and the Miljöpartiet's climate policy. If the Tidö parties or the Moderaterna could present an alternative policy to reduce emissions by as much, we would have a debate about how. But today we have a debate about if.
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! Biofuels will be used regardless. My colleague Martin Kinnunen gave a clear example that it is in the production itself that we see the emission reductions. It is not about whether it is used exactly in my car at home in Halland, but about that biofuels are used.
We know that there is a gold market at the EU level and in Sweden to get more different sectors to use biofuels. We have not made it illegal to produce biofuels. I therefore do not understand that discussion.
We have put forward powerful proposals for the expansion of charging infrastructure, and we have opened up for new nuclear power in Sweden. It is the basis of the climate policy. In order for us to manage the climate transition, energy is required. If we do not have any energy, we will never succeed. It is a fact that electrification is required for us to manage the climate transition.
The reason why we in Sweden have succeeded in reducing emissions since the 70s is our fossil-free energy mix based on hydropower in the north and nuclear power in the south. When one of them was removed, which the Green Party participated in doing prematurely—which, by the way, was incredibly irresponsible—we saw clear consequences. We saw increases in emissions.
It is clear that it is good that it is not the Green Party's policy that governs any longer. That is because it is not long-term sustainable. It succeeds in reducing emissions in the short term. But it increases inflation, it borrows us up to our teeth, and it wants us to retreat into the future. It wants people to stop traveling, to stop producing, and to stop buying. It is not the way forward.
We believe in a future that is actually possible, a future that is green and a future where Sweden is a pioneer in the climate transition. That requires moderate politics.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! I must begin by refuting the entire tirade that Helena Storckenfeldt concluded her speech with. I ask everyone to look at what climate policy Miljöpartiet de facto pursues and form an opinion based on that.
We see that a climate transition is needed that leads to prosperity throughout the country. When Miljöpartiet sat in the government, the Swedish economy increased – it was very strong – while at the same time we powerfully reduced emissions, in the short term and in the long term. When Miljöpartiet sat in the government, Sweden was also a strong example. Other countries looked at Sweden and thought: How can we do as Sweden does when it comes to the climate transition?
But now the government has significantly increased emissions, so that Sweden becomes a brake even in the EU. There is fossil lobbying referring to Sweden's shift due to the Tidö parties. We are not at all the example we could be.
Helena Storckenfeldt says one thing, where I truly share the opinion, namely that Sweden should undergo a transition that leads to strong prosperity and that we should be an example so that others want to follow in the path we choose, but in action, the government acts in a way that makes it so that Sweden is no longer an example.
When it comes to the fact that biofuels can be useful in other places, it is an incredibly strange approach. In the Committee on Environment and Agriculture, we deal with many other policy areas, for example, food production. A huge amount is being done in politics to promote domestic food production. Imagine if someone were to say: We have not banned Swedish food production. Therefore, we do not need to do anything, or we can make it difficult for it. It is an incredibly strange approach that the Moderaterna have only towards the reduction obligation. I view that very seriously.
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! I want to say, in short, that it is not true that Sweden would not be a strong voice internationally. We still have some of the lowest emissions per capita in the world and continue to be a strong voice internationally when it comes to climate work.
What matters most is what effects we see. Which ones actually dare to follow our example? And what examples do we actually have to offer other countries?
It is the development in the world at large that we are talking about. We want it to occur in a socially sustainable way. We want developing countries to almost be able to skip the step that we in Sweden were forced to take, which meant that we released the majority of our emissions. We want other countries to be able to skip that step.
Then it is required that we have a competitive business sector. Then it is required that we have a holistic view of how the transition in Sweden is carried out. Then it is required that we have a good economy. It is interesting that Miljöpartiet speaks passionately about climate responsibility and responsibility in general when it comes to the climate. But they do not take responsibility when it comes to the budget. They present a budget with a deficit. In an already tough economic situation, they ensure that we have it even harder in Sweden.
Economic responsibility is linked to the climate transition, whether the Green Party wants it or not. We stand strong on that. It is decided that we must focus on bringing down inflation. If we do not do that, we will all become poorer, and then we will have no money to spend on the climate transition tomorrow.
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! Member Storckenfeldt expressed concern over how I expressed myself regarding who governs the government. I must disappoint the member, but that is how it is reasoned in the construction sites across Sweden. Even though my comrades and I are not well-educated, we can count. The member's party, the Moderaterna, together with the Liberalerna and Kristdemokraterna, are fewer in number than we Socialdemokrater are.
The Speaker spoke about gaining the voters' trust. The parties have absolutely gained the trust. We must also have respect for that.
For my comrades in the building trades, it is clear who is running the government. The closest thing to an apology the member will receive from me is that I am pleased that my statement causes offense.
The member spoke about a competitive business sector. We need that. And we need to lead the transition - I have heard the member say - in order to move forward and achieve a competitive business sector.
I am worried about these issues. We need to build domestic production. Here in my county, Kalmar län, Södra Skogsägarna are in the process of investing in a large refinery. They are extremely worried about the government's actions, and it scares me. It scares me that they are targeting me. I am the union candidate on our list. Business representatives and investors are calling me. It makes me worried.
I wonder what answer the member has for the entrepreneurs on how we are to solve this.
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! I really have no idea how to respond to the fact that the member is pleased that his statement causes offense. Is that what one says in the chamber of the Riksdag? Is that what one says in the heart of democracy? Does one express oneself in that way? Is one happy about it? I find that strange and somewhat remarkable, if I am to be completely honest.
I also speak regularly with entrepreneurs, Björn Petersson. I am out on study visits both in my home county of Halland and in the rest of Sweden, and I hear that we are investing in exactly the right things. That we are focusing on expanding the charging infrastructure so that the electric car becomes a real alternative and that we lowered the petrol and diesel prices by lowering both the taxes and the reduction obligation is positive for local entrepreneurs who have had it very tough for a long time.
I am also out and talking with entrepreneurs. I am moderate. I talk with many entrepreneurs. If Björn Petersson thinks otherwise, I just want to point out to him that it is not true.
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! Business representatives at home told me before the reduction of the reduction obligation, and continue to tell me, that if it is reduced to below 15 percent they cannot bear the investments in new production. That is what they tell me. It would be unfortunate if they were telling the Moderate representatives something else. I do not think they are doing that.
The Energy Agency has been tasked with increasing the production of domestic fuel. What is the Moderates' solution to achieving that, if we now lose domestic production of biofuels and it does not happen?
Helena Storckenfeldt (M)
Madam Speaker! One of the absolutely most important parts of climate work in general is the forest. The forest is an incredible resource where we can create long-lived products and push out fossil alternatives on the market in Europe. The forest plays an incredibly important role here as well. We will need all good forces to manage the climate transition.
The Moderates want to see an increased domestic production of biofuels. As we have mentioned, there is a gold mine for biofuels all around Europe. It will be needed for aviation and shipping, i.e., in sectors that are not as easily electrified as passenger cars.
Under the S and MP government, Sweden had the lowest growth in the EU. The energy supply was devastated, and emissions increased because of that. We were not on track to reach the climate goals. For the first time ever, we have a government that has presented a climate policy action plan that reaches net-zero emissions by 2045. It is historic, and I would like to tip off Björn Petersson to go home and read that plan.
Rickard Nordin (C)
Madam Speaker! On Monday, when I was having breakfast with my eleven-year-old son Alvar, he asked what I was going to do during the week. I told him about the Mistra Conference on circular economy and explained that it is about reusing things in the same way that he reuses old cardboard boxes to make his small inventions.
I also told him that I was going to debate the reduction obligation, the law that ensured that fossil fuels in regular gasoline and diesel were slowly but surely replaced with renewables. I told him that the government has now scrapped large parts of it. Alvar became quiet for a short moment. He reflected. His eyes became a bit glassy. Then he said: "The Earth is our home, and we are destroying it. People can't just believe that fossil fuels are better than green ones." I think that summarizes this entire debate. When it is so simple that an eleven-year-old can understand it, then I really wonder what on earth this government and its handlers in SD are doing. Even Vänsterpartiet has signed off on this populist sludge.
You say that other countries are worse. If others destroy our home, are we also supposed to do so? You say that renewable fuels cannot solve everything. Who said that they should solve everything? You say that the fuel can be used somewhere else. At the same time, investments of 20 billion have been stopped in Sweden. You say that it was not feasible. Why then not adopt all those proposals that show how it can become feasible? They come from, for example, the Swedish Energy Agency, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institute of Economic Research, and for all intents and purposes also the Center Party.
Martin Kinnunen, Helena Storckenfeldt, Kjell-Arne Ottosson, Kajsa Fredholm and Elin Nilsson - you have all gotten what you wanted. Fossil fuels are increasing now. What is your answer to Alvar? How do you defend that we are destroying our home? How do you defend using fossil fuels over green ones?
The National Audit Office's report that we are now debating has often been used by the government as an excuse to slash the share of renewable fuels in favor of fossil fuels. We are talking about 4 million liters of diesel per day in increased use. It overturns the long-term perspective for the transition that has existed. 20 billion in investments will now not come. The long-term perspective that the business community always demands is swept away.
The climate action plan, which was postponed time and again until it was no longer possible, is merely a castle in the air. Measures are to be investigated to, at best, be in place after the next election. It is not certain that any of the politicians who are in power today will be in power then.
The government's talking points often concern the idea that renewable fuels would be inefficient as a policy instrument. In that case, they have not read the Riksrevisionen's report. Already in the summary, it is stated that it is an effective policy instrument – significantly more effective than electrification and especially in the short term. The only thing mentioned that could be more effective is to stop logging in the forest.
Konjunkturinstitutet has advocated for an increased carbon tax. It is the same tax that the government has instead lowered.
The government, and also Helena Storckenfeldt in this debate, speaks about not putting all eggs in one basket. That has not been done. It is a pure lie. Instead, the government has crushed all the eggs. The environmental car bonus was abolished. The travel deduction with a focus on rural areas and public transport was scrapped. The requirements for climate-smart procurement were eliminated. The reduction obligation was slaughtered. What they have replaced it with is a scrapping premium that extremely few will use because very few go from a scrap car to a completely new electric car. Furthermore, charging stations become difficult to use when you have shock-increased the electricity tax and abolished the environmental car bonus, so that the private sale of electric cars has also come to a complete standstill.
The renewable fuels are, according to the National Audit Office, therefore the most effective we have, if we are not to take drastic measures. We can read what the government's responsible State Secretary wrote in 2022: "The reduction obligation is our tool to reach the climate goals in the transport sector. The alternative is prohibition and rationing or abandoning the climate goals. I hear no one arguing for that, only against the reduction obligation."
This was written in February 2022 by Daniel Westlén, who is Climate Minister Romina Pourmokhtari's State Secretary. Now the government has scrapped large parts of the reduction obligation without introducing anything else in its place.
Unlike fossil fuels, where we have 100 percent import - and where we know that world production occurs in countries like Russia, whose war economy we really do not want to finance, or Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others, where there are very large problems with human rights - we in Sweden have the opportunity to produce the renewable fuels. Both the Bioeconomy Inquiry and the Swedish Energy Agency have shown an enormous potential: several billion liters from sustainable raw materials, tens of thousands of jobs, multi-billion investments and rural initiatives.
Not so long ago, before the ugly face of populism showed itself in the Moderaterna, it sounded different. Back then, it sounded like this: "Good that the requirements for the inclusion of biofuels in our cars are increasing. Important for the transition and something M has demanded for a long time. But unclear why it has taken the government over a year to reach the same levels that the authority proposed and that one is therefore postponing the increase by half a year." It also sounded like this: "Today, Sweden imports 85% of our biofuels. Now we need to get a domestic production of sustainable biofuels started."
This was written by Jessica Rosencrantz in September 2020. Now it sounds completely different, and we have still not seen any initiatives for domestic production of biofuels - even though the government's own investigator John Hassler has proposed exactly this.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, prices rose. A rather natural response to such a Russian action would be to try to reduce the dependence on the goods that Russia exports, such as oil and gas.
That SD, with its history of Russian infiltration in the Riksdag building, has difficulty choosing between Putin and Biden and chooses to serve Russia's interests, is hardly surprising, and the Left Party has a communist heritage that seems to be relevant here as well. But that my bourgeois colleagues in M, L and KD join that crowd surprises me even more - especially given the current security situation. Why does one choose to finance the Russian war economy?
The Moderates say that 95 percent of the voters voted to lower fuel prices, which is correct. But what they forget to mention is that an overwhelming majority - seven out of eight of the parties that the voters voted for - also stood up for the climate goals. The Moderates also promised to do that, and now we have a situation where we will not reach the Swedish climate goals.
A good way to tackle the increasing prices we saw would have been to – as the Centerpartiet proposes in reservation 2, which I move to approve – lower the tax on the renewable parts, which is exactly what the National Institute of Economic Research has highlighted as one of the absolutely most cost-effective ways if one wants to keep prices low. Then one could have saved for the transition and kept the prices down.
This could preferably be done in combination with the initiatives on renewable fuels in Sweden that Jessica Rosencrantz highlights. It is also pleasant that the Social Democrats join Centerpartiet's policy and what we call Tanka svenskt!, which is similar to what the Social Democrats accounted for.
Unfortunately, this has not been done from the government's side. Instead, they are lowering the tax on fossil fuels, spread out across the entire country so that those who really need the reduction - those who live in the countryside and are dependent on cars - get a few kronor and öre, while the majority of the money ends up in the metropolitan areas. That is because that is where the most cars are driven, which simply is because the most people live there. In the metropolitan areas, however, there are very good conditions for using public transport.
We see the same thing now with the reduction obligation. The difference is that this will strike straight at the heart of the countryside - straight at the green industries. Sweden has tough climate goals, established here in the Riksdag with the support of seven out of eight parties, that we shall reduce emissions in the transport sector. This also applies at the EU level; we have EU goals for reduced emissions in the sectors that do not trade emission allowances, that is to say transport, agriculture and work machinery.
If we do not now make the reduction in the transport sector, there will be a problem, because even though the government refers to the fact that electrification will solve everything, it is not enough to reach the goals. There is not one scenario in the world where we manage it. Not even if all new cars sold from tomorrow onwards were electric cars - and we know that the share has fallen - would it be enough to reach the climate goals.
What remains is therefore reduced logging in the forest and reduced production in the food sector. There are no shortcuts. Buying emission rights and emission space from other countries is probably expensive, if it is even possible at all.
When the government says that we are to solve this through investments in charging stations, one forgets to mention that it has been condemned as being extremely inefficient in relation to much else - especially if no new electric cars are sold. The talk about scrapping premiums is even worse, not to mention that the investment in wetlands has stalled because it is difficult to find suitable projects. All these things are good, but they are not enough to reach the climate goals.
To summarize: The only thing the government does effectively is to increase emissions. One takes out a promissory note that future governments and future taxpayers—especially those who will exist in just a few years—will have to pay, and with interest.
The Climate Act is clear: the Government shall conduct climate policy work aimed at reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. This and many other decisions from the Government go in the completely opposite direction. They are flagrant violations of the law.
The Center Party conducts a policy that makes a difference, which is anchored in research and which lowers both emissions and costs for citizens while simultaneously strengthening our security situation and creating jobs. Such a policy should be pursued by every party that calls itself conservative. The Center Party holds the line - both against Russian fuels and against climate delayers in the Riksdag and government.
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Madam Speaker! I thank Rickard Nordin for an engaged speech. Eleven-year-olds with glossy eyes and the reduction obligation act was something new, but it was of course interesting to take part in.
The Center Party has been proactive regarding the reduction obligation law. They have stood behind it. Now they want to see something else – even the Center Party has landed on the fact that that legislation, which they thought was good, is not good, Madam Speaker. The Social Democrats have produced some kind of napkin sketch where parts are to be combined; from the Social Democrats' side, it is about a number of subsidy checks, and from the Center Party's side, they speak of tax cuts.
Rickard Nordin wants to use tax cuts. Normally, one lowers taxes for the citizens so that it becomes cheaper for them, but here it is about trading off against more expensive raw materials. We are, therefore, lowering the tax, and then we give the money to the large companies Preem, ST1 and Neste instead. That is what it is about. How will this affect the state's finances? That is my first question.
Madam Speaker! When it is spoken of Sweden's fuel, it is important to remind oneself that we are not in the Soviet Union and that trade with fuel is free. This is also stated by the Bioeconomy Inquiry: We cannot know at all where the fuel will end up once we have manufactured it. Therefore, it is difficult to push down just the fuel costs by increasing production, because the fuel will go to whoever pays the most.
Rickard Nordin (C)
Madam Speaker! I can only state that the Center Party's proposal is backed by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise as one of the absolutely most effective proposals if we are to have both low prices on fuels and meet the climate goals. I understand that Martin Kinnunen does not care about the climate goals, and then one can do a bit as one likes. But if one is to achieve both things, the Center Party's policy is the absolutely most effective, according to the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.
I am a bit curious if Martin Kinnunen can provide any suggestion for another policy that reaches the climate goals and keeps fuel prices low and is simultaneously more efficient. I have, in fact, not seen any such policy at all.
Yes, the Centre Party would like to review how the reduction obligation is designed, as there are challenges. Legislation, proposals, and instruments that one likes should be nurtured, and to nurture means to take responsibility and adjust when one sees that conditions change. That is what we are prepared to do. We are, however, not prepared to slaughter Swedish climate goals or prepared to sacrifice the agriculture and forestry sector, which will have to take the hit.
We are also not prepared to sacrifice the Swedish taxpayers, who may have to pay billion-euro fines to the EU when we fail to meet the climate goals. That is not taking responsibility for either the state's finances or the taxpayers' money – and above all, it is not taking responsibility for the climate.
Martin Kinnunen (SD)
Madam Speaker! There are many balls in the air at the same time when discussing these questions. We have the Swedish goal for 2030 for the transport sector. We have ESR commitments and so on. Then we have the discussion about where any potential fines would fall if one fails to achieve them. What will happen in 2032 when one tries to complete the accounting? We do not know that.
What we know today is that about twenty countries in the EU appear to have difficulty achieving their ESR commitments. Sweden is one of these countries. We can willingly admit that. We can also admit that an investigation will be conducted regarding what shall replace the reduction obligation after 2026. That is what we know.
Madam Speaker! What we also know is that if we implement something resembling the old reduction obligation law, and combine it with various forms of industry support and tax cuts, we will also see costs in the budget.
I heard a statement that it would cost 15 billion if Sweden failed to meet the ESR criteria. We can state that if 15 billion were to be imposed in 2032, it is a very limited annual cost compared to the socio-economic costs resulting from the reduction obligation.
I think that in that case one should be more concerned about the socio-economic costs of the reduction obligation than any potential fines. At the same time, we in Sverigedemokraterna are, just like the government, completely focused on trying to follow the legal acts and find ways forward. But we do not have exact instruments today.
The problem is that Sweden put all its eggs in one basket. Everything was staked on a reduction obligation law that is now totally condemned by six to seven of the Riksdag's different parties.
Rickard Nordin (C)
Madam Speaker! I can state that there is no answer to Alvar on the question: Why should we continue to destroy our home? There is no answer as to what other, more effective measures the Sweden Democrats have to both reduce emissions and keep fuel prices low.
There is no answer as to how we should stop importing Russian fuels to Sweden. There is no answer as to how we should increase the production of Swedish fuels. It is important from a security policy perspective and for the total defense needs, regardless of where they ultimately end up.
There are simply no answers from either Markus Kinnunen or the government. That is what is so symptomatic of the debate. You are destroying. You are destroying Swedish climate policy. You are destroying Swedish competitiveness. You are destroying Sweden's reputation in the world. You are putting us in a situation that is much, much worse than it was just a few years ago.
Kajsa Fredholm (V)
Madam Speaker! Vänsterpartiet will refrain from voting on points 1-3 in the report, as we are presenting our policy in a separate statement. But we move for approval to place the communication in the records.
Vänsterpartiet agrees in substantial parts with the conclusions that the National Audit Office draws in its report. That being said, I intend to speak a little about the current political situation we have in climate policy. A fair amount has happened since the report was published, after all.
Madam Speaker! In an ongoing climate crisis, the government and the Sweden Democrats choose to lower the reduction obligation to a level that entails large emissions. They do this without providing alternative proposals on how emissions should be reduced in the near term.
The government's climate policy is neither good for the climate nor good for ordinary people. A political course change is required that kick-starts the climate transition and builds a more just Sweden.
Madam Speaker! Of all Swedes, 95 percent are aware of climate change, and four out of five Swedes want to see a policy that solves them. Despite this, the government and the Sverigedemokraterna have, since they took power, consistently pursued a policy that increases emissions, among other things in the form of the reduction of the reduction obligation that was made in the autumn.
It is not just bad climate policy. It is completely contrary to the will and needs of the Swedish people. The climate action plan that the government has just presented unfortunately shows that this irresponsible policy is not an accident. What the government says there is that they plan to continue to fail, and in practice, they have given up hope that Sweden will meet the national climate goals by 2030.
What is called an action plan consists rather of a number of imprecise assessments and vague expressions of a direction of intent. The most concrete thing proposed is that analyses shall be carried out and investigations commissioned. Actual proposals for Sweden to reach the nationally decided climate goals by 2030 are lacking. Sweden will have a very difficult time living up to our climate commitments within the EU.
The criticism from the climate movement has also, unsurprisingly, been massive. But this is not just very bad climate policy. It is also socio-economically irresponsible. For every year that we delay, the costs of dealing with the problems increase. That the government chooses to postpone measures means that necessary measures become harder to implement and that the costs for the citizens risk becoming very large.
This applies particularly to the transport sector where measures are required immediately. A lack of concrete measures in the near term risks resulting in having to implement drastic measures further ahead which can lead to extremely high fuel prices.
Since Sweden is failing so significantly in climate measures at home, we risk having to pay several billions because we cannot live up to the EU's climate commitments by 2030. Such a policy stands in direct contrast to the very foundation for a climate transition with popular anchoring and for a just transition.
Madam Speaker! There is, however, another way to go, a way that it is possible to implement already today. Sweden has every opportunity to kick-start the climate transition and do so in a way that can also build a more just Sweden.
It is a Sweden that creates jobs and wealth, and ensures that ordinary people get better off while the costs of the transition are borne by those who bear the responsibility. With a more equal distribution of resources, reduced resource use can be combined with a high material standard for all, both in Sweden and globally.
The transition to a sustainable society must have the greatest consequences for those who have the greatest climate impact and use the most resources. In order for Sweden to reach the goals tied to the national climate policy framework as well as our climate commitments within the EU, a strong political course change is required and a package of measures must be initiated already during the current mandate period.
Madam Speaker! To make the just climate transition a reality, we in Vänsterpartiet propose, among other things, that we should introduce a common Sweden ticket of 450 kronor per month for all regional public transport in all of Sweden.
We also want to introduce an annual state subsidy of 5 billion kronor for expanded public transport and investment support for new vehicles.
We propose that we should introduce targeted support for electric cars and a reformed climate bonus so that it can be utilized to a greater extent by those with lower incomes.
We propose an increase in the pace of electrification of road transport. To enable further reduced emissions from the transport sector, an intensification from the state regarding the expansion of charging infrastructure and infrastructure for hydrogen is needed.
Within Klimatklivet, support is provided for public charging infrastructure and charging of heavy vehicles. In addition to electrification, Klimatklivet also provides support for the transition of the transport sector with new fuels such as green hydrogen, e-fuels, and sustainable fuels.
In addition to reducing emissions, this strengthens our national asset and self-sufficiency in fuels. We believe that the appropriation for Klimatklivet should be increased to 7 billion kronor per year and extended to 2033.
Not least, we need to introduce a new mode-of-transport neutral travel deduction that benefits public transport and rural areas.
Many, many more proposals can be read in our special statement.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! I would like to begin by moving to approve reservation 4.
The National Audit Office established that the reduction obligation has the potential to contribute, above all to the goal for domestic transport by 2030, at a reasonable cost compared to other ways to reach that goal. The alternative is fossil fuels from rogue states. Increasing fossil dependency means that we are actually supporting Putin's war chest in the current situation.
The Climate Policy Council has established the following: That using the level of the reduction obligation as a regulator of fuel prices has been directly unsuitable and difficult for the fuel companies to manage. There may be reasons to adapt the reduction obligation to changed global conditions, but such an adaptation should, in that case, be based on systematic evaluations at, for example, the Swedish Energy Agency's control stations.
Now the Tidö parties have significantly lowered the reduction obligation without us having had an overview of the consequences that follow.
The National Audit Office presents views that we in Miljöpartiet largely share. The reduction obligation is only one of several tools to reach the climate goals within the transport sector. The reduction obligation is the only thing that can significantly reduce emissions from the existing vehicle fleet in the short term, which is absolutely crucial to reach the goal of reducing emissions from the transport sector by at least 70 percent by 2030, as has been established by us here in the Riksdag.
The National Audit Office indicates that there is some room to improve the cost-effectiveness in the design of the reduction obligation. Naturvårdsverket and Trafikanalys have proposed to the government, prior to the climate action plan, an investigation to study a more cost-effective design with a common reduction obligation for gasoline and diesel. We in Miljöpartiet stand behind this. However, the government has not taken this further.
If new, effective measures are put in place that take us towards both the 2030 goal and the long-term goal of 2045, we in Miljöpartiet are open to changing the reduction obligation – but only after new measures are in place. It is the sum of the climate policy that is decisive and not every individual reform. The business community, organizations, and private individuals must be able to feel long-term trust in the climate policy.
Instead of phasing out climate policy tools without replacement measures, the government could develop climate policy based on the proposals coming from the authorities. It is also absolutely necessary to consider the binding targets in the ESR sector and how the introduction of EU ETS 2 will affect the design of national climate policy. As the EU steps forward, there are great opportunities to, by the power of the EU, continue to develop our climate policy here in Sweden without dismantling the tools that already exist. To phase out the reduction obligation completely without new compensatory climate policy tools is and was an irresponsible policy.
How is the government going to handle the increased cumulative emissions that are now occurring? To brake the transition, significantly increase emissions and wait and see will entail extra costs for the transition and make the curve for the reduction of emissions significantly steeper already in a few years. This will occur at the same time as the government has removed the long-term rules of the game and created a great uncertainty for the future for several sectors within the business community. Due to the government's irresponsible stance towards the climate transition, the business community lands in a jerkiness and an uncertainty.
In the current situation, there are no other measures in place that replace the reduction obligation, and with the government's policy, emissions within the transport sector are projected to increase by up to 50 percent in just one year compared to the previous legislation. Furthermore, emissions will increase even more in the longer term towards 2030. These are enormous volumes for which the government is responsible. According to the government's own calculation of emissions from domestic transport and work machinery, carbon dioxide emissions will be approximately 5.2 million tons higher in 2024 and 6.7 million tons higher in 2026 than what would have been the case with the previous legislation.
The government is making Sweden more dependent on fossil fuels when we need to do exactly the opposite. Sweden needs reduced fossil involvement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reduce our vulnerability to volatile oil prices as well as for geopolitical pressures. More Swedish renewable fuel gives reduced emissions, better conditions for Swedish companies and an increased crisis preparedness. The latter is important not least in an uncertain time where a large dependence on non-democracies can quickly turn out to be a great vulnerability.
An increased proportion of fossil fuels in the gasoline and diesel pumped in the country, which follows from the lowered reduction obligation, leads to an increased vulnerability to price shocks for households and companies. The price development for oil is highly uncertain, especially against the background of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. We are particularly price-sensitive as a country regarding the availability of winter diesel, which has decreased in production.
Furthermore, lower prices on fuels mean that the incentives to choose electric vehicles and other low-emission means of transport are weakened in relation to using vehicles powered by fossil energy. The government's proposal to reduce the reduction obligation thus counteracts the government's own ambition to increase the electrification of the transport sector.
In addition to the fact that a lowered reduction obligation leads to increased greenhouse gas emissions, that climate goals are not met, reduced crisis preparedness, increased dependence on non-democracies, increased vulnerability to price shocks from volatile oil prices, uncertainty for Swedish companies in the industry, unclear access to winter diesel, and worsened incentives for electrification, the lowering of the reduction obligation risks entailing very high costs for the state and thus also for Swedish taxpayers.
The EU's recovery fund requires an active climate transition from the member states. The reduction of the reduction obligation could mean that Sweden loses large parts of 38 billion SEK from the EU's recovery fund. The government has also indicated in the autumn budget amendment that it uses emission allowances from the emissions trading system to compensate for the fact that it is not expected to reach the ESR target. They want to take from the industry's emission space to compensate for their own failure within the transport sector's transition. This could lead to lost revenue for the state of up to 6 billion SEK by 2030.
Furthermore, the government will need to take additional measures to compensate for the fact that the ESR target for 2030 will not be met due to the reduction of the reduction obligation, which could mean high costs for the state as a result of attempting to purchase emission space from other EU countries or, alternatively, very high fines from the EU.
The consequences of the decision to significantly reduce the reduction obligation are enormous. They extend across several areas. Here we are discussing the National Audit Office's report, and the National Audit Office has come up with proposals on how we could develop the reduction obligation. The authorities have taken the proposals further, but instead, the government, without any plan whatsoever to handle the consequences of a reduced reduction obligation, has implemented the reduction.
Kjell-Arne Ottosson (KD)
Madam Speaker! I begin by moving for the adoption of the proposal in the committee report and the rejection of all reservations.
Madam Speaker! "The review shows, however, that the current design of the reduction obligation is not feasible."
"The government's calculations were non-transparent and gave an incomplete picture of how the reduction obligation could affect fuel prices."
"In October a year ago, a liter of diesel cost 28 kronor and 52 öre."
Madam Speaker! It was exactly as I began the debate on November 29 last year, which then concerned precisely the decision on the reduction obligation. Just as I thought, I have noted that today's debate has rather been about the reduction obligation than what we are actually supposed to debate, namely the National Audit Office's report.
The idea of a reduction obligation in itself is good, but putting too many eggs in the same basket when it turns out that the bottom of the basket does not hold is not a good idea. Even if the idea is good, it does not help; instead, it must be correct. The National Audit Office's report is clear: It was not correct. Decisions were made on incorrect and unclear grounds. The National Audit Office highlights in its report that it was largely deficient consequence analyses that formed the basis for the then-government's proposition. But one was apparently intent on pushing this through as the great solution at any cost, whatever the cost might be—and it certainly cost.
On page 58 of the report, we can read the following: "Overall, the reduction levels proposed in control station 2019 were not adapted to what was possible at the time; the implementation of the proposed reduction levels was based on the assumption that the conditions would change in a favorable way."
To plan to gradually fill the basket with more eggs without having checked the strength of the basket appears clearly naive. The National Audit Office agrees with my analysis of the eggs in the basket, even if they phrase it somewhat differently. It is written that there were "large risks in relying to such a high extent on the obligation to reduce to achieve Sweden's climate policy goals".
Furthermore, we can read in the review: "In order for the reduction obligation to be effective, it should contribute to achieving the climate goals at reasonable costs and with reasonable consequences for society."
I believe everyone in the chamber knows that if one wants to take the people along, it is absolutely crucial that they are not punished when they follow the path that the government and the Riksdag point out in these issues. We often speak of the transition being sustainable in three aspects, namely ecologically, economically, and socially. That was not the case with the reduction obligation. In the scenario regarding domestic transport emissions from which the reduction level was calculated, it was assumed that no additional policy measures would be introduced for increased electrification, more energy-efficient vehicles, or increased transport efficiency that could be more cost-effective measures. It was assumed that the electrification of the vehicle fleet would develop slowly. Thus, decisions were made on truly loose foundations.
In chapter 5 of the revision report, with the heading "The decision basis for the reduction obligation", the subheadings in that chapter are shockingly readable:
The prerequisites and consequences of the reduction obligation are uncertain, which places high demands on the basis for decision-making.
Ambitious reduction levels were decided despite deficient underlying data
The introduction of the reduction obligation did not include reduction levels and consequence analyses up to 2030
Despite significant deficiencies in the Swedish Energy Agency's underlying data in control station 2019, the government chose to proceed with ambitious reduction levels.
The Energy Agency's basis for control station 2022 shows that the decided reduction levels cannot be implemented.
Decided legislation is not feasible with regard to fuel quality requirements.
I could continue here, Madam Speaker, but I believe the point has nevertheless been made.
The current government clearly saw the problems because there were several problems. Therefore, changes have been initiated, and it is a journey that has just begun. The Swedish National Audit Office also says that the reduction obligation can partially contribute to climate policy goals in an effective way if it is designed in the right way. With good help from the tool that the National Audit Office's report is, that journey has now begun for a changed and sustainable reduction obligation that is based on biology, which is based on facts, and which is based on substantial consequence analyses and not on ideology and ideological desires far from reality.
Elin Nilsson (L)
Madam Speaker! Now we stand here again debating the report on the reduction obligation.
Sweden must reach the climate goals. Emissions must be eliminated, and climate change must be stopped. We shall reach net zero by 2045. This is based on the fact that the availability of fossil-free energy is expanded; it is the foundation of the climate transition itself. We need both solar, wind, and nuclear power on a large scale, and we need electrification.
The historical experience of managing environmental problems shows that the transition only succeeds if it is made in an economy that is growing. It is free people in prosperous economies who solve environmental problems, and growth is fundamentally about smart solutions. Precisely this is also the core of the climate work. The transition requires reliable access to fossil-free energy. That is where the great weakness in Swedish climate policy has previously been. Now we have changed course. In this, nuclear power is absolutely crucial. Therefore, one cannot leave nuclear power out of the debate we are having today.
Another important factor in this context is that the climate policy we are implementing has broad support among the general public, even among people with small economic margins. It is actually each and every one of us here and across the country who share responsibility for this. For the transition to take place, the prerequisites must be in place. A transition that must involve the entire society and that is to continue for decades must have broad support.
The measures and instruments must be perceived as sensible and well-balanced by the vast majority. The changes must occur in a controlled manner. They must not turn everyday life upside down for people or drive fundamentally healthy companies toward ruin.
Madam Speaker! We have a reality outside this chamber to deal with. At the same time as we meet the climate crisis with powerful means, we have a difficult, though improving, economic situation to take into account, a situation that makes it difficult for many to make ends meet.
Some of this is, of course, rooted in high fuel prices. People have had difficulty putting food on the table, and they have not been able to afford to drive their children to school and extracurricular activities.
That is the reality we chose to handle. It generated increased emissions, unfortunately, but the effort was made so that household finances would not be ruined and so that people would be able to make their reality work. And it is not at the expense of people who need to make their reality work that one can pursue a truly long-term climate policy that is sustainable.
Here, Madam Speaker, I had first intended to conclude my speech, but I had other thoughts.
To begin with, I would like to take the opportunity to welcome Björn Petersson to the debate. I would also like to take the opportunity to reflect on something regarding the debate climate here in the chamber. I had first intended to say something mitigating about the fact that it is not so incredibly easy to be new at the job and that I of course understand that the member very well knows that Sweden is governed by a government where the Moderaterna, Liberalerna, and Kristdemokraterna are included and that it in certain issues cooperates with the Sverigedemokraterna.
Mr. Speaker, well, I see. The member is therefore pleased that his - forgive me - rather clumsy rhetorical device causes offense. It is actually completely unworthy of political discourse. In my world, it is not okay to call Sweden's government "SD's puppet government."
This cements the image of the Social Democrats as a power party that puts power above all else. I know it stings, but it is actually no law of nature that the Social Democrats rule Sweden.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! Elin Nilsson began her speech by saying that Sweden shall reach the climate goals.
I want Sweden to reach the climate goals, and we in Miljöpartiet are working on presenting a climate policy to reach the climate goals in Sweden. We have presented an entire alternative climate action plan as a follow-up motion to the government's.
But when the Liberals stand and say that we are to reach the climate goals, I hear it as some kind of wishful thinking, because in practice, it is what the government is doing to increase greenhouse gas emissions so that Sweden is no longer expected to reach the climate goals.
It doesn't matter how many times one stands and says that we will reach them, we will reach them, we will reach the climate goals if the government does not deliver reforms that ensure Sweden reaches the climate goals.
One of the biggest things this government has done that makes Sweden no longer reach the climate goals is that it has significantly lowered the reduction obligation.
Here, some relevant criticism of the underlying data highlighted by the National Audit Office regarding the introduction of the reduction obligation is addressed. However, no clear impact assessment is presented regarding the effects of what is to be done, or of the fact that one is now shock-increasing emissions so that we no longer reach the goals and create uncertainty for the business sector when the reduction obligation is significantly lowered.
The question is why Elin Nilsson is standing here and saying that we will reach the climate goals when she is presenting a policy that ensures we do not reach them.
Elin Nilsson (L)
Madam Speaker! Thank you, Member Söderberg, for the question!
Yes, I stand here in the speaker's chair and say that we shall reach the climate goals so that we shall reach the climate goals. We shall reach net-zero 2045. That is what we are working for.
We are taking action to increase fossil-free energy production in Sweden. It is an incredibly important part of this. It is a path that Miljöpartiet does not share the view on, but which we see as completely necessary to manage the transition to a fossil-free society. We take responsibility for Sweden.
Elin Söderberg (MP)
Madam Speaker! I would then like to ask Elin Nilsson to account for the climate benefit of new nuclear power in Sweden, from which year the emissions would in that case be expected to decrease and by how much.
Miljöpartiet has a policy for a powerful expansion of electricity production in Sweden. We have put forward a production goal for 2030, and we see that, in addition to that, energy efficiencies are needed so that we can make electricity available quickly for the industry's transition.
New nuclear power delivers none of this but is about electricity at some point far in the future. The government highlights it as its primary climate argument. Elin Nilsson highlights it specifically despite the fact that it has nothing to do with the transport sector's transition and is completely irrelevant when it comes to the goals for 2030, that is, what we have discussed today linked to the reduction obligation.
Elin Nilsson (L)
Madam Speaker! Yes, one can stand here and say that nuclear power has no climate benefit, but it does.
When nuclear power is in place, it will deliver fossil-free energy that is completely crucial for the transition we are now in. One cannot ignore that. It will take some time to get it in place, but it is absolutely necessary.
It is, however, only one part. I share the view that we need a broad spectrum of fossil-free types of energy. We need more wind power and more solar energy, and we need hydropower – and nuclear power. Without nuclear power, we will not manage the green transition.
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I must begin by thanking Member Elin Nilsson for the welcome to the committee and the debate.
We have today debated, or we are debating, the Swedish National Audit Office's review of the reduction obligation and its effectiveness. In the report, it is established that the reduction obligation can be an effective part of the solution and that it is a cost-effective part in comparison with other alternatives when it comes to the transport sector.
The Chairman mentioned several times in his speech and in the debate the 2045 goal. Before the mutilation of the reduction obligation, Sweden was one of five countries on track to meet the goal by 2030.
What is the position of the Liberals regarding the 2030 goal? How does one view solving the climate goal 2030?
Elin Nilsson (L)
Madam Speaker! The goals for 2030 are fixed. We are working to achieve them. But we also look ahead and see that we need to have solutions in place where we reach net zero in 2045.
One cannot pick one out - the 2030 goals are necessary to reach the 2045 goal with net zero. One cannot separate them. But they are fixed.
Björn Petersson (S)
Madam Speaker! I am wondering regarding the climate action plan. It is to be a supporting part of how the goal is to be achieved. It includes parts that should raise the cost for fuel at the pump, diesel and petrol.
I wonder if the Liberals and the liberal minister have reached an agreement with the Sweden Democrats on implementing this policy? As things stand now, the policy is to be implemented after the next election, or after the election following that. The climate action plan has not been broadly agreed upon. Our party has certainly not been involved in developing the proposals and has had no insight. The question, therefore, is whether the Liberals have gotten the Sweden Democrats on board with this policy – or how does one intend to implement it?
Elin Nilsson (L)
Madam Speaker! The short answer to the member's question is that the climate action plan has been negotiated between the Tidö parties. It is a joint agreement between the four parties. It will be honored, and we will implement what is stated in the climate action plan.
The deliberation was hereby concluded.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.