Strategic export control 2022 - military equipment and dual-use products

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! This debate concerns the government's communication regarding Swedish exports of war materiel and dual-use products 2022. When one reads the communication, one recognizes much. It sounds roughly as it usually does when we receive these communications.

Sweden's exports of defense materiel amounted to a value of 15.2 billion kronor in 2022. 83 percent of that defense materiel went to established partner countries that we have worked with for many years. For example, Brazil made the largest deal when they bought Jas 39 Gripen for almost 3 billion. Then came the USA, who for 2.6 billion bought primarily ground combat systems and naval artillery. Then came Germany, who for 1.3 billion bought, among other things, missile systems. It is, as said, roughly how it usually looks in the records.

The Swedish regulatory framework for arms exports is one of the world's strictest. It became even stricter in 2019 when we, among other things, introduced a specific democracy criterion into the framework. It shall carry great weight when the responsible authority handles and processes the applications to export materiel.

I was the responsible minister for developing the new legislation in 2018/2019. I am pleased that we, in a spirit of good cooperation and across the block divide, succeeded in achieving legislation with broad support in the Riksdag. Six of the eight parties in the Riksdag stood behind the new law.

To that comes the fact that we have parliamentary oversight in these matters, which is also unique from an international perspective. Sensitive matters are examined in the parliamentarially composed Export Control Council, EKR, where all parties are represented. These are often incredibly difficult trade-offs. It is about foreign policy, about security policy, about defense policy, and about industrial policy. It is of great importance that deals of this kind are examined by the parties at an early stage. And that happens in the Export Control Council.

There are those who say that this export is not particularly important, that we could have done without it. They say that it only concerns 15 billion. The total export in Sweden amounts to over 3,000 billion in total. Then there are those who argue that the money from this export is not so important and that we could have been without that export.

I mean that it is not so. Sweden would not have any own defense industry without our export of defense materiel. That which we purchase for the Swedish defense simply does not support an own defense industry.

A domestic defense industry has at all times been an enormously important part of our defense and, in the long run, our national independence. It becomes even more important in a situation where the security policy situation has deteriorated as dramatically as it has over the past year. In that case, it becomes even more important that Sweden, like so few other countries and as almost no other countries of our size, has a domestic defense industry.

Sweden is, for example, the only country in the Nordic region that has its own strong defense industry. It is an asset in this situation, but also when we are hopefully on our way to taking the step into Nato. Even in that context, the Swedish defense industry becomes an asset when we take on the task of, together with others, defending our part of the world. Then the 15 billion of war materiel exports are crucial. Without exports, we have no defense industry. It is that simple.

But it must be understood that it must be done in a responsible manner. That is exactly how the legislation is structured. War materiel may only be exported if there are security or defense policy reasons for it and if it does not conflict with Sweden's international obligations or Sweden's foreign policy otherwise. And sensitive deals are therefore examined by the parties in EKR. In some cases, matters can also be raised to the government. It is clear that it is a strength for Sweden that there is a broad political consensus on the legislation in the area.

Mr. Speaker! I said initially that the communication looks roughly as they usually do. It is the 39th communication in order. But there is one thing that makes 2022 unique. It is not about what we have sold but about what we have donated. In 2022, it was the year when, for the first time since 1939, we donated larger quantities of defense materiel to another country so that this country could defend itself against another country's aggressiveness.

In 1939, we did it on account of the Soviet Union's attack on Finland. Stalin had joined with Hitler's Germany to divide up Eastern Europe between them. Nazi Germany attacked Poland in September 1939, and the communist Soviet Union attacked Finland in November of the same year. It would then become the Winter War.

In solidarity with Finland, Sweden sent a large amount of weapons. It was anti-aircraft guns, it was anti-tank pieces, it was mortars, it was machine guns, it was grenades and it was rifles and much more - for example 50 million rifle cartridges. It was a very extensive support to Finland at that time.

In 2022 we did this again, but this time to Ukraine after Russia's attack on the 24th of February last year. I was Minister for Justice at that time and was responsible for arms exports. I remember those days last year very well. Russia's attack on Ukraine put Europe in the most difficult security policy situation since the Second World War.

During those days, we discussed a lot in the Social Democratic government how we should position ourselves and how we should act. We very quickly arrived at the conclusion that there was only one conclusion to draw in that situation. It was that the democratic world must unite to support Ukraine by all means and push back the Russian aggressor. So that is what happened.

On February 24, Russia attacked Ukraine. Just four days later, on February 28, the Swedish government decided to send defense materiel to Ukraine. We were one of the first countries to do so. It was helmets, it was protective equipment, it was field zones, and it was 5,000 rounds of armor-piercing ammunition.

It was a unique decision, as said the first since 1939, where Sweden donated weapons and other defense materiel to another country so that it could defend itself. Sweden was thus one of the first countries to do so.

These early weapon deliveries proved to be enormously important for Ukraine. I could see that with my own eyes when we visited Ukraine a few weeks ago with a delegation from the Foreign Affairs Committee. We visited, among other places, the areas north of Kyiv that Russia occupied and held for a period of one month last year – Bucha, Borodychanka, and Irpin.

Putin's intention was to be able to quickly take Kyiv with an attack from the north in March 2022. And they were very close to succeeding. At their closest, the Russian forces were only one kilometer from Kyiv's city center before they were forced back.

If Ukraine had not received the extensive arms deliveries it did receive from many countries, including Sweden, it very well could have been the case that the war would have ended very early during last year - and then with a Russian victory. Then democracy would have been crushed and the political leadership in Ukraine would have been killed, and Ukraine as a state would have ceased to exist and instead been incorporated into Russia.

Now it did not turn out that way. Thanks to the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people but also thanks to the defense materiel that Sweden and other countries quickly provided, the outcome became another. I must say that I am enormously proud that we were able to make those decisions as quickly as we did.

Ukrainian representatives are deeply grateful for this, which became very clear when we were there. They were deeply grateful for what Sweden had done – but also a little surprised that it was precisely Sweden that was so quick to decide on military support. They are, of course, familiar with our history of non-alignment and reluctance to involve ourselves in conflicts on the continent. This time, however, we were very quick to make these decisions, and they were historical decisions that the social democratic government, as it has said, made on 28 February 2022.

Since then, Sweden has decided on an additional number of support packages with a total value of over 10 billion kronor. It has concerned weapons, ammunition, air defense systems, armored vehicles and economic contributions. It has helped Ukraine to push back the Russian attack.

In the areas that have been liberated - such as Butja, which we visited - all the horrific war crimes that Russian forces have committed are being revealed. In Butja, over 400 civilian victims were found, men, women, and children, of whom over 100 had been buried in a meter-deep mass grave behind a church. They lay side by side in plastic bags. Other victims were found shot in the street, seemingly completely randomly and indiscriminately.

That is how it looks also in the rest of the occupied areas: thousands of killed civilians, sexual abuse of women and children, torture and thousands of Ukrainian children who have been kidnapped to Russia. We will likely see more of this for every kilometer that Ukraine can hopefully retake with the offensive they are now preparing. If Russia could do this in Bucha, which they held for only one month, what have they not managed to do in the areas they have now held for perhaps over a year? We will probably see more examples of that type of abuse.

That Russia's cruelty knows no bounds, we saw another example the other day when they obviously blew up the dam in Kachovka, which has led to an enormous natural disaster. Tens of thousands of people have been affected by floods and lost their homes. Drinking water supply, food, and fields have been destroyed. Entire ecosystems have been wiped out. To Russia's war crimes, ecocide is now also added, that is to say, an intentional and large-scale environmental destruction.

It is naturally Russia that is behind it. They had occupied the power plant, and the reason is clearly to hinder Ukraine's offensive. Russia can of course deny it as much as they want, but it is naturally they who have done this. They destroy everything else in their path, so it is most likely that they do not hesitate to also destroy this dam, without the slightest thought for people and the environment.

This crime must be condemned with force. It shows that Russia does not care one bit about the country it occupies and the people who live there. It also brings to the fore the question of making ecocide, i.e., large-scale environmental destruction, a separate international crime in the Rome Statute. It is an issue we Social Democrats are pushing for.

It is now clearer than ever that Ukraine must win this war and that Sweden will continue to support Ukraine until the day the war is won - until the day the last square meter of Ukraine's land is liberated and the last Russian soldier has left the territory.

With that, I move for approval of the committee's proposal, Mr. Speaker.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Morgan Johansson for the speech.

Morgan Johansson sat in the government that helped develop the regulatory framework for the export of war materiel that entered into force in 2018. I thought I would take the opportunity to ask if Morgan Johansson is satisfied with the result. The purpose was to tighten the export control of war materiel to non-democratic states, and that was certainly laudable. But I think the regulatory framework has so far been somewhat toothless: Among the buyers of Swedish weapons, there are still a number of dictatorships, warring states, and countries that commit gross and extensive violations of human rights.

There are loopholes in the law that enable this, for example this matter with follow-up deliveries. Is it not time that we try to close these loopholes so that the regulatory framework truly lives up to its purpose?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I am very proud of the agreement we managed to reach in 2018, which six of the eight parties stand behind. It was prepared by a special investigation, the so-called KEX investigation. It ensured that one of the world's strictest regulatory frameworks became even stricter, among other things through the introduction of a new democracy criterion. It has also meant that we have been able to follow up to a greater extent where the materiel we export ends up.

As I said in my speech, we exported 15 billion last year. Of what we exported, 83 percent went to our 39 partner countries, which we have worked with for a long time – that is Brazil, USA, Germany and other EU countries. Then, of course, we have a number of countries that we do not export to: we have no exports to China, and we naturally have no exports to Russia. We do not export to Iran or North Korea.

Then there are some countries to which we make follow-up deliveries based on old deals that we have made. But when it comes to the countries in the Middle East, there were no new decisions last year, but only follow-up deliveries - and then in the category of other war materiel, i.e., not war materiel for combat. I think it is good that it looks that way. One can also note in the letter that a number of rejections have been made by ISP. This concerns, for example, deals where there has been a desire to export to Bahrain and Qatar, as well as to Israel and Tunisia. Such rejections have been communicated in different ways.

I would therefore like to say that the legislation we have right now is well-balanced, and it is, as has been said, one of the world's strictest regulatory frameworks. It is also one of the most open and transparent systems that exists.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! I thank you for the answer, but I do not feel completely satisfied with this. The fact is that exports are increasing to non-democratic states, and I think it is quite shameful that a country like Sweden – which nevertheless stands up for international law, human rights and so on – continues to export weapons. Even if it concerns follow-on deliveries, we still continue to export weapons to countries that are to the highest degree authoritarian and undemocratic.

It concerns, for example, countries participating in the war in Yemen, which the UN describes as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Since the bombing of Yemen started, Sweden has exported war materiel to six of the states participating in this coalition. Among the recipients of the exports in 2022 are several of the warring parties, namely the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Only during 2022 does this concern the export of war materiel to a value of 7.5 million.

We could stop this and ensure that we plug the holes so that these follow-up deliveries, which are a result of the export still continuing, are no longer permitted. I think it is quite shameful that we export weapons to these undemocratic, warring countries.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Last year, there was nothing for the Middle Eastern countries other than follow-up deliveries and then in the category other war materiel, that is to say, not war materiel for combat.

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve mentioned the United Arab Emirates. That deal was not about war materiel for combat such as cannons, bullets and gunpowder, but about a radar system, that is, other war materiel. It is an agreement that we will, of course, fulfill.

It becomes very difficult for a country to be able to have any arms exports at all if old deals are not to apply. In the legislation, there is a presumption of approval for follow-on deliveries, and that is why we must do this. Otherwise, no countries would want to trade with us if they knew that the delivery of spare parts for the systems they purchase could be cut off at any time. One must have such a balance.

I believe that the Left Party's criticism is largely about not wanting any export of weapons and war materiel at all. As I pointed out in my speech, the export is necessary, regardless of what one thinks of it, in order for us to be able to have our own defense industry at all. The day we phase out the export, the defense industry will disappear, and that would mean a setback in a substantial part of Swedish security policy and, in the long run, our independence.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Yasmine Eriksson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I would first like to move for approval of reservation 2 from the Sweden Democrats.

Sweden's defense industry is in high gear, and our war materiel is in higher demand than it has been in a long time. This is very positive in the current security policy situation, and it is a concrete contribution to our deterrent activities against the aggressive dictatorships, most clearly represented by Russia's aggressive war in Ukraine.

Sweden has an important role as the armory of democracies, which we should be very proud of. What has constituted an obstacle to Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been the Ukrainian defenders who are armed with weapons from the Western world, where Sweden plays a major role.

Russia's war in Ukraine is becoming increasingly brutal. Just this week, we have been able to see how a large dam has been blown up in Ukraine, which has led to extensive destruction. Massacres carried out by Russia have been discovered in areas that Ukraine has liberated, and it is reasonable to assume that Russia has committed more and even more extensive atrocities in the areas that have been occupied for a long time. Ukraine therefore needs to liberate the occupied areas as quickly as possible, and for this, weapons from the West are needed. This is perhaps the clearest example that shows the need for an increased export of war materiel from Sweden.

The policy in this area has, unfortunately, for decades been aimed at restricting and complicating the export and manufacture of war materiel. This has hindered and continues to hinder Sweden's opportunities to manufacture war materiel both for our own defense and for export.

The latest investigation conducted on the issue was titled "Strengthened export control of war materiel" and aimed to limit exports based on various parameters. It was a naive starting point already at the beginning of the investigation in 2015 and is a line that is unsustainable in today's world with aggressive dictatorships.

It is high time that we get a new direction for the policy in place, and the need for this has been highlighted from several sides. In the bill on Swedish NATO membership that the government has placed on the Riksdag's table, several referral bodies pointed this out, including the Inspectorate for Strategic Products and the Institute for Foreign Policy. Today's export control regulations are not adapted for either a NATO membership or for the new security policy world that requires both we in Sweden and other countries to have war materiel so that we can defend ourselves against aggressive dictatorships.

Mr. Speaker! A new investigation needs to be carried out as quickly as possible on how the regulatory framework can be adapted to the new situation that Sweden finds itself in. Every day that passes without such an investigation being initiated means that Sweden and our partner countries risk ending up in a situation where we will not have sufficient access to weapons.

We mean that it is irresponsible not to immediately commence such an investigation. An investigation is needed quickly on how the regulations can be adapted so that Sweden can play an important role as a producer of the weapons that we and allied countries need to defend ourselves against aggressions like the one currently unfolding in Ukraine.

In order to avoid a country being subjected to such a brutal invasion as the one we see in Ukraine, one needs to have a basis of working preventatively through its defense. In this way, one can achieve a deterrent effect. For this, weapons are naturally needed, which are difficult to procure in retrospect. Therefore, it is extremely important that the Swedish defense industry is given the conditions to already now be able to supply us and our allies with the weapons needed to deter an adversary.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden also needs to prepare for a threat that will exist for a long time. Therefore, we need to practice against different scenarios. One of the worst scenarios, which unfortunately is relevant, is if we are exposed to weapons of mass destruction in different ways and how we should then act. Russia is currently threatening to deploy nuclear weapons, and the country has, with the help of chemical weapons, attacked opponents in different states. In the future, Sweden could also be exposed to different forms of weapons of mass destruction.

In order to be able to handle these situations as well as possible, those of our authorities who are affected need to practice together, something that has previously been done through so-called non-proliferation exercises. These exercises have unfortunately not been carried out to the same extent in recent years. It is time to scale up the exercises so that Sweden can handle operations involving weapons of mass destruction against the country.

Mr. Speaker! Sufficient and correct competence in the area of export control is also needed to be able to handle the situation that has arisen as a result of Sweden being a major exporter of both war materiel and products with dual-use. Unfortunately, that is not the case today and has not been for a number of years. The military competence at the agency ISP, which controls these products, has in fact decreased in relation to the total number of employees. In the current situation, it is smaller than ever as the number of employees has increased.

The need for military competence to be able to assess the defense policy reasons for different exports has not decreased but has instead increased radically in relation to the ongoing rearmament. Already in 2017, the Swedish National Audit Office pointed out the need for specialist competence at ISP, but unfortunately, this has not been addressed. Instead, we have a situation where legal assessments take precedence over defense policy ones. This leads to, and has for many years led to, negative consequences for Swedish war materiel exports and for our defense.

Mr. Speaker! From this year's communication on strategic export control and dual-use products, there are also several positive areas that are worth noting. This includes, among other things, that Sweden has for the first time approved the export of war materiel to the Middle East's only democracy, Israel. It is groundbreaking for Swedish export control, and increased exchange with Israel in the area of war materiel would be very welcome for several reasons. On the one hand, it concerns a well-developed democracy, and on the other hand, it is a country that has a high-tech defense industry that Sweden can benefit greatly from having a close cooperation with.

I also note that the work with post-controls is progressing, which is an important part of having control over the war materiel that is exported and ensuring that it does not end up in the wrong hands. It is now important that the first on-site controls can be carried out as quickly as possible.

Mr. Speaker! In conclusion, I would like to point out that one can observe in the communication that things are moving in the right direction, but that it is happening too slowly. When I speak, I am primarily referring to the need for a new investigation, which I mentioned. Progress has also been made by the current government, which abolished the requirement that the ISP should devote large resources to assessing other states' domestic policy priorities and that feminist foreign policy should be taken into account even within this area. On the contrary, a journey has now begun that could mean that Sweden stands in solidarity and exports weapons to our allies. Not least, we can facilitate our Nato accession by adapting the regulatory framework.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! The Sweden Democrats stand outside the agreement we made regarding the export of war materiel in 2018. When one listens to Yasmine Eriksson's contribution, one understands that she is simply turning against that legislation.

What did we do then in 2018? What were the major changes that occurred then? Well, one thing was that we introduced a specific democracy criterion. In the assessments of these deals, special weight, even central weight, shall be attached to the democracy criterion regarding which countries we export to. I think it is an important part to be able to maintain the legitimacy of the entire system. We turn primarily to other democracies that want to defend their freedom and their independence, which is marked via the democracy criterion. It is not unconditional, however, but must be weighed against the defense and security policy considerations that may need to be taken into account in an individual deal. Every deal is assessed individually.

The second thing we did was that we strengthened the follow-up of where each weapon and other war materiel ends up. ISP received a special assignment regarding this and is also building up a special competence.

I wonder what the Sweden Democrats think about this. Why is one turning against this legislation? Is it the democracy criterion that the Sweden Democrats are against? Is it the follow-up that the Sweden Democrats are against? Which dictatorships do the Sweden Democrats want to export more weapons to? I understood from Yasmine Eriksson's speech that this was the big problem with the new legislation. Which dictatorships, Mr. Speaker, does Yasmine Eriksson want Sweden to export more weapons to?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Yasmine Eriksson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Morgan Johansson for his account of the law. The Sweden Democrats want to investigate it, as stated. This is largely due to the fact that we are in a new security policy situation which makes it relevant. The law needs to be updated and supplemented in view of the current situation. This applies particularly if we soon join Nato. In that way, it will be in line with how we can work with arms exports going forward.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Yasmine Eriksson condemned the legislation we have today and thought it was too strict. Then I pointed out what we did in 2018. We introduced a democracy criterion and increased the possibilities to follow up where the material goes. Do the Sweden Democrats want to open this up again and liberalize the legislation? I understood from Yasmine Eriksson that she went against that legislation. My question was which dictatorships she wants us to deliver weapons to. Current legislation prevents us from doing so.

The legislation we have today did not, however, prevent us from making the unique decisions we made last year to strengthen Ukraine and, for the first time since 1939, to assist another country with defense materiel so that it can defend itself. We have now done this to a value of over 10 billion kronor.

I naturally think that the legislation we have should primarily remain in place. I absolutely do not want to lift the entire issue of this question. Then there may certainly be one detail or another that needs to be looked at in connection with the NATO membership. What I wonder about is that Yasmine Eriksson goes against this legislation and condemns it. What I understood is that she is against the feminist foreign policy, against weighing in how human rights are observed in the countries we export to, and against the democracy criterion.

My question remains: Which dictatorships and which countries that violate human rights do the Sweden Democrats want to export more weapons to?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Yasmine Eriksson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! Morgan Johansson has repeatedly made insinuations in his replies that we would want to export to dictatorships. But in my main speech, I was quite clear that large parts of the arms exports are about Sweden and our allies being able to defend themselves against this type of dictatorship. It is therefore completely opposite to what he is trying to pin on me.

There are certainly parts of the current legislation that constitute obstacles, and that is something to oppose. When it comes to Ukraine, that is exactly the case. We had to take it through the Riksdag and make exceptions in order to be able to make these exports. It would have been a better situation if such a practice had already existed. The practice today is that we do not export to countries that are in an armed conflict, which Ukraine was and is. But we export to Ukraine. Sverigedemokraterna want there to be such a practice that applies from the very beginning, so that it does not need to take unnecessarily long.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magdalena Thuresson (M)

Mr. Speaker! The report we are now debating concerns the government's annual report on the export of war materiel and dual-use products. The report accounts for the Swedish export control policy regarding war materiel and dual-use products during the year 2022. From this year's report to the Riksdag, it can be stated that the export control of war materiel and other products requiring permits functions well.

Normally, this is a routine matter, an annual control instance, a point on the agenda to be ticked off. But during the past year, the world changed. Russia's illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which we here in the chamber have condemned in great unanimity, came to change our view not only on Swedish neutrality but also on what role arms deliveries have in maintaining peace in Europe.

For many, the war probably contributed to the insight into what important role the defense industry and the export of defense materiel have for our own security. As a small country, Sweden must have a defense industry with access to more markets than just the Swedish one for our model to function and for us to have access to the equipment required for our own security.

Mr. Speaker! I also want to mention in this context that the production of war materiel is an important part of Swedish industry. It employs many people, and our great technological expertise in the area makes Sweden an attractive partner for cooperation. A vital war materiel industry is a strategic resource for our country.

It is also important to remember that what was previously trade in goods today instead is more about technologically advanced development projects where it is common for several countries to participate in the cooperation. A weapons system like Archer may indeed have "Made in Sweden" stamped on it, but it could never have been developed if it were not for the good opportunities to cooperate with other countries.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden's policy to preserve and develop the defense industry and to let this occur in cooperation with other countries pays off.

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, Sweden has supported Ukraine with several weapon deliveries. Today, Archer is used by the Ukrainian army. Swedish weapons defend Ukraine. Swedish weapons defend freedom. It is something we should be proud of.

Mr. Speaker! The war in Ukraine and Russia's attempts to change the European security order, as well as a future membership in Nato, will likely affect and have in some ways already affected the policy for war materiel.

Firstly, it concerns the practice Sweden previously had of not sending weapons to war zones. In Ukraine's case, it was obvious that this informal rule could not apply. In its future policy for the export of war materiel, Sweden needs to clarify that countries that, like Ukraine, defend themselves in accordance with international law shall be able to do so with weapons exported from Sweden.

Secondly, Sweden intends to become a member of the defense alliance Nato. Whether Sweden will need to make any major changes to the current regulatory framework and practice is unclear since our most important partner countries are already Nato countries. But as the government notes in the Nato bill that the Riksdag adopted this spring, membership may lead to changes. When a country is part of an alliance, all member countries are expected to take collective responsibility for all member countries' security. Today, the regulatory framework states that the export of military materiel should be good for Sweden specifically, but in the future, we should have as a starting point to also consider what is good for the alliance and its members.

Mr. Speaker! The defense industry is a central part of our security and defense policy. It is in Sweden's security policy interest to safeguard a long-term and continuous cooperation in matters of materiel with a number of traditional partner countries, which is based on both the export and import of war materiel.

The government's annual report to the Riksdag fulfills an important function regarding transparency in matters concerning export control and the export of war materiel and dual-use products.

I vote in favor of the committee's proposal.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! I would like to begin by moving for approval of reservation 3.

The new regulatory framework for the export of war materiel entered into force in 2018. The purpose was to tighten the export control of war materiel to non-democratic states, but the regulatory framework has until now been somewhat toothless. Among the buyers of Swedish weapons are still a number of dictatorships, warring states, and countries that commit gross and extensive violations of human rights.

Vänsterpartiet wants Sweden to be a country that consistently stands up for democracy and popular rule, a country that actively works for peace and disarmament and a country that condemns all crimes against human rights regardless of where, by whom or with what motives they are committed. Sweden has all the prerequisites to be such a voice, but that requires that we stop arming authoritarian regimes.

The communication we are now considering is the fourth statistical compilation that accounts for a full year with the new regulations from 2018 and contains the amended guidelines.

It is positive that we get a better picture of the receiving state's democratic status in this year's communication. It increases transparency and openness regarding arms exports. However, the fact that Swedish exports are increasing to non-democratic states clearly shows that the regulatory framework does not function when it comes to putting a stop to exports to dictatorships and other countries with extensive democratic deficiencies.

The existing regulatory framework has, above all, two major loopholes or gaps.

The first thing is that the regulatory framework only applies to permits for new deals entered into after April 15, 2018. All deals considered to have a connection to deals granted before the democracy condition came into force can be classified as so-called follow-on deliveries and thus escape the new permit review. Follow-on deliveries can involve spare parts, ammunition, or entirely new systems of the same type as those previously delivered. Follow-on deliveries have no time limit, meaning we can continue to deliver weapons to various dictatorships for a very long time. For example, follow-on deliveries are ongoing for systems that, according to ISP, were originally delivered from Sweden 30-40 years ago.

Legislation that does not include follow-on deliveries becomes ineffective if the purpose is to stop exporting weapons to warring and non-democratic states.

For example, the permits for subsequent deliveries to Israel that ISP granted during 2022 can be mentioned here. Israel's violations against human rights, international law, and the Palestinian people are not only continuing but are also becoming increasingly grave. The blockade of Gaza continues, as does the construction of the wall that has long been condemned by the UN. The number of illegal settlements on occupied land is growing unchecked, and the displacement of Palestinians from eastern Jerusalem is increasing.

In the government's communication, four granted export licenses for the sale of war materiel to Israel in 2022 are noted. ISP writes that the licenses concern follow-up deliveries of materiel which, when the first deal was made, were not classified as war materiel.

Israel's violations of human rights should be grounds for not granting either new permits or follow-up deliveries to Israel.

The war in Yemen is still ongoing and is described by the UN as the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Over 24 million people, 80 percent of the population, need humanitarian support. Of these, over 12 million are children.

Sweden has since the bombings of Yemen started exported war materiel to six of the states participating in the coalition. Among the recipients of the exports in 2022 are several of the warring parties including: United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Only during 2022 does this concern exports of war materiel to a value of 7.5 million kronor. Since the war started, Sweden has exported war materiel to a value of 13.8 billion kronor.

All of the countries participating in the war in Yemen and which receive Swedish weapons are authoritarian states that violate human rights. They thus fulfill all the main criteria for not being granted export of Swedish war materiel. Despite all regulations and writings, in addition to the law on war materiel, the arms exports to these countries continue. That Sweden continues to supply non-democratic and warring states with war materiel is serious, shameful, and highly irresponsible.

The second loophole or gap in the regulatory framework is that it does not entail a stop of exports to non-democratic states. Deficiencies in the democratic status shall only affect the assessment and constitute so-called obstacles for export. If there are significant national defense or security policy interests, export can still be granted. The position of not supporting and legitimizing undemocratic and oppressive regimes can thus be set aside if other interests are considered to carry more weight.

Turkey is a country that has repeatedly violated both human rights and international law. Following a decision in October 2019, all arms exports to the country were halted due to a military offensive against Syria. No exports were carried out during 2020 or 2021.

In the debate, it often sounds as if there is no possibility to influence the arms deals, but the truth is that ISP has several different possibilities to stop the arms deals or refer the review to the government. It is therefore the political will that decides.

In this way, it has now been decided to once again grant arms exports to Turkey - not because of democratic progress, increased respect for international law, or that the country has stopped behaving militarily aggressively towards other countries, but because of Sweden's application for membership in Nato.

Sweden should not export war materiel to Turkey. Turkey's military actions in Syria are ongoing, and the humanitarian catastrophe is total. Sweden should therefore work for a joint EU arms embargo against Turkey. In a time when respect for international law is violated by Russia in an unacceptable and dangerous way, Sweden needs to stand uncompromisingly up for international law. To accept that other countries violate it just because they are NATO countries is to undermine that respect.

It is beyond all criticism that the regulatory framework, which took seven years to develop and which the then-government expressed would make one of the world's strictest regulatory frameworks even stricter, has not contributed to a reduction in Swedish arms exports to warring and non-democratic countries, which was the purpose, but rather has done the opposite.

The Government should be tasked to carry out a thorough evaluation of the amended regulatory framework as soon as possible. The Government shall take responsibility for ensuring that the amended regulatory framework also has an effect in assessments of the export of war materiel. ISP should refer the consideration by the Government of all export licenses, including future follow-up deliveries, to non-democratic and warring countries or countries with serious and extensive violations of human rights for assessment according to the amended regulatory framework.

Finally, I want to be very clear that Vänsterpartiet naturally stands up for Ukraine's right to defend itself and fully supports the Swedish military support to Ukraine.

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Joar Forssell (L)

Mr. Speaker! I have a question concerning Israel. Member Johnsson Fornarve seems truly passionate about Israel not being allowed to have any weapons; at least that is the impression I get from the speech.

At the same time, the Left Party wants, as far as I know, that we reach a solution in the form of a two-state solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine. It is clear that this raises the question: How will it be possible if Israel does not get access to weapons?

Israel is, as is well known, the Middle East's only democracy. It is also a country that is existentially threatened by a number of dictatorships, terror sects, and others around in its vicinity. Therefore, I think, Mr. Speaker, that it is obvious that one must be able to defend itself. A country must be able to defend itself in order to be able to exist. If the country Israel does not exist, one cannot have a two-state solution if it is Israel and Palestine that is meant – but perhaps it is Palestine and Jordan or something else that the Left Party means.

If we do not export weapons to Israel and do not let Israel defend itself against terror sects, dictatorships, and others who want to completely wipe the country off the map, we cannot simultaneously advocate for a two-state solution.

Mr. Speaker! My question to the Left Party member Johnsson Fornarve is therefore: How is Israel to be able to defend itself so that we can achieve a two-state solution if we do not allow arms exports?

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Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Joar Forssell, for the question! I no longer see Israel as a democracy with the new regime and with the enormous crimes that are being committed against international law and the principles of the rule of law.

Israel does not either recognize a two-state solution itself but considers that Palestine should not exist. An annexation of Palestine is taking place. The illegal settlements are increasing avalanche-like in number. A displacement of Palestinians from eastern Jerusalem is occurring, and the violations of human rights are enormous. That Sweden should not export weapons to a country that so flagrantly violates human rights and that does not uphold international law, I think is quite obvious.

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Joar Forssell (L)

Mr. Speaker! I do not know where to begin. The Left Party has a dark history when it comes to Israel. One can easily Google one's way to images where high-ranking Left Party representatives, for example, stand and wave maps where Israel is erased. I therefore understand why Member Johnsson Fornarve hesitates to defend Israel.

But let us have some sense in the debate! It is obvious that Israel is a democracy. It is a democracy with flaws - like many democracies - and we shall criticize Israel. I was myself down in Tel Aviv at the end of April and participated in demonstrations against the judicial reforms that have been underway for some time. I therefore completely agree with this; one should criticize the flaws that exist.

But Israel is the Middle East's only democracy. Israel is a beacon of freedom, human rights and democracy in its part of the world and, in fact, for the whole world.

Mr. Speaker! If one is serious about advocating a two-state solution, one must stand guard over the fact that there are two states. I agree that we should criticize those who do not think this. The Liberals agree with the Left Party on that. But, Mr. Speaker, if Israel does not have weapons and can defend itself, there will not be two states left. Then Israel will not remain. Neighbor after neighbor, terror sect after terror sect and dictatorship after dictatorship want to destroy Israel, and then one must allow arms exports to the Middle East's only democracy.

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Lotta Johnsson Fornarve (V)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you, Joar Forssell, for further questions! Yes, it is difficult to know where to begin. Joar Forssell says that he stands up for a two-state solution, and Vänsterpartiet obviously does as well. We stand up for international law, and that is what is important here. We stand up for Palestine's right to exist, but the Israeli government no longer does.

Is Joar Forssell prepared to criticize the Israeli government for no longer standing up for a two-state solution? I think that is very important, because it is so fundamental.

Is Joar Forssell prepared to distance himself from the occupation, from the illegal settlements, and from the brutality that we see growing increasingly since the new right-wing regime came to power? Is he prepared to distance himself from the blockade of Gaza and from the displacement of Palestinians? All of this constitutes violations of international law committed by Israel. To export weapons to a state that so flagrantly violates international law and human rights, I see as completely unreasonable.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! This is the 38th communication on this subject being handled by the Chamber - the communication that accounts for export control and Swedish war materiel export. Anyone interested in history can go back to the first and compare to see the development of the information value that has occurred in the communications submitted to the Riksdag.

We were among those who started this – to submit an account of the export of war materiel to the chamber and to the Riksdag. I think we have reason to be happy about this beginning.

Mr. Speaker! When I listen to the debate, I feel however that we are partly mixing apples and pears. War materiel may not be manufactured here in the country without a permit. We may also not, without a permit, export war materiel to other countries. The war materiel legislation is very clear in that part. Many of the discussions that have been held here earlier, Mr. Speaker, have not concerned the legislation. You can go in and look at paragraph by paragraph, and you can see that they are not found in any of the legislative paragraphs. On the other hand, there are regulations, and these regulations are disposed of by the government and can, of course, always be adjusted and changed. It is important that one has a grip on this.

The government or the authority appointed by the government may issue regulations on the export of firearms, designated ammunition, and so on. A permit can also be issued and shall be handled in a special manner when it concerns, for example, our future partner countries in Nato. Exceptions for export may be granted, for example. There are a number of such matters that I believe the debate would benefit from being clarified.

When we talk about the export of war materiel today, it is also important to be clear that it also includes the export of telecommunications, for example. We have quite a lot that concerns other things, for example dairy products. This is needed in order to be able to have ongoing dairy operations in different countries.

When reading the statistics, one should know that not everything is war materiel. It is war materiel, it is other war materiel, and it is products with dual uses. Everything, however, is included in the overall picture of the export of war materiel.

We find ourselves in a new security policy situation - for Sweden, for the EU, for Nato, and for our Europe. It is clear that it will have an impact. A good deal of the export control and export legislation has, for a number of years after the fall of the wall, also been about being able to ensure the Swedish defense industry's opportunities to deliver based on the demand that Swedish defense has had. In that situation, it has been necessary to also be able to export to other countries.

We now find ourselves in a new situation where Sweden, the EU, NATO countries, and Ukraine are requesting defense materiel on a large scale. We see that the order books are full for many years ahead. The discussion is about how we can scale up and long-term secure the conditions to receive delivery of the war materiel that we ourselves request for Swedish defense, for the EU, for NATO, and for Ukraine. This must affect and will affect how we handle the export of war materiel going forward.

I also believe that we will see, just as we did regarding both donations and sales to Ukraine, a reinterpretation of how we handle this with countries at war. There, it was clear that it was about, which many said was important, defending one's own territory—yes. But a completely central issue is also that which actually breaks through the entire legislation: If something is crucial for Swedish security and Swedish defense, it is also absolutely crucial for deliveries of war materiel to other countries.

That we donate and sell to Ukraine has a very clear security policy and defense policy interest for Sweden. We say, not just today but since February 24, 2022, that Ukraine's cause is our own. They defend us, our values, and our right to choose for ourselves, and they do so in the war by standing up to and resisting brutal Russian attacks in all forms. In that situation, it is obvious that we should sell and donate weapons to Ukraine. It clearly has an impact.

I sometimes hear in the debate that nothing has happened since the new legislation came. But how do you know that, I was about to say. Not everything is statistics. Do not forget what was new when the legislation arrived! At that time, in many places, people were very cautious and thought: This will send signals, so we do not dare to sell either here or there. That has been an important part, because it is obvious that the defense industry realizes that one will not be given the opportunity to sell in certain countries. Then one adapts to what one judges is feasible. That is part of the signaling values that the new legislation has had, and you must not overlook that. It has been important, and it is important.

The political signals are heard, sometimes in regulations, sometimes by noting them. Perhaps one or another has also made contact to investigate before entering and perhaps receives a no. Perhaps one does not want a no. So do not forget the signal value when you look at this!

The Swedish defense industry has, as previously stated, great importance for our security. It is an important competence in technological development and an important contribution to our ability to also be an actor in other contexts in our security policy surroundings. This will also be very important for Sweden as a NATO member. It is an asset that we shall safeguard and secure the development of.

In the regulations, we agreed – and it is naturally something I hope we stand by – that if there are serious and extensive violations of human rights or grave deficiencies in the democratic status, it constitutes an obstacle to granting permits. But it is not conditional; rather, it shall be assessed in its context. This also applies to follow-on deliveries. Both new and old, even though the old ones have a presumption of being approved, must be assessed in their context. It is important.

In these cases, one must naturally take into account that everything concerning defense materiel and investments - we know this in Sweden, and other countries know it too - is not something that one just goes and buys off the shelf. It is a long-term investment. It is a system investment. It affects us and it affects others, and that must be taken into account when looking at and examining each individual case in each individual context.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I move for approval of the committee's proposal.

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Torsten Elofsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! Today we are debating the government's referral on strategic export control 2022. It concerns the export of war materiel and products with dual-use, so-called PDA.

It is no exaggeration to assert that decisions regarding the export of war materiel and dual-use products are a sensitive and complex task that requires careful consideration, not least because Sweden is one of the leading countries in the development and production of war materiel and dual-use products.

We can see that the costs for research and development are increasing in line with the ever-growing demand for advanced products, which in turn increases the requirements for and the need for international cooperation. It is therefore in Sweden's security policy interest to have a long-term and continuous cooperation with a number of partner countries. It is also based on our need to be able to both export and import war materiel.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden has a good regulatory framework for export control in this area. It rests on three pillars, which have been mentioned here earlier. We have the government, which has the overall responsibility for policy and practice in the area. Then we have the Inspectorate for Strategic Products, ISP, which independently examines applications for permits according to the respective regulations. Last but not least, we have the Export Control Council, which ensures parliamentary participation and a broad political anchoring.

In addition to this, there is also the EU's common position, which contains eight criteria regarding, among other things, international obligations on humanitarian law, the internal situation in the receiving country as a result of tensions and armed conflicts, as well as the preservation of peace, security, and stability.

Mr. Speaker! The criteria are both conditional and unconditional. In cases where a decision on an arms embargo has been issued by the UN, EU, or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, export or other international cooperation is excluded. In the presence of conditional obstacles, a holistic assessment shall be made and weighed against security and defense policy interests. It is here that the important trade-offs come in that must be made before a decision is made to grant export of the equipment. A factor of great importance is the recipient country's respect for human rights and democratic rules of the game. But of course, there are a number of other criteria that must also be weighed in the decision.

The regulatory framework is updated regularly. The latest update of the regulatory framework at the EU level is from 2021 regarding dual-use products. A regulation was reworked with a view towards stricter requirements for cyber products, which we also have to take a position on. At the national level, an amendment came in August 2022 with stricter and expanded requirements to notify ISPs in case of suspicion of certain end-use.

Systematic follow-up controls, so-called verification visits, have also been introduced, Mr. Speaker, which constitute a good opportunity for follow-up. They have not been in force for very long, but there are good experiences so far, so to speak.

If one looks ahead, it can be seen that membership in Nato will impose new requirements on Sweden, and it will certainly be important to review parts of the regulatory framework when Sweden finally becomes a member of Nato.

The question of ISP's competence has been touched upon here. I can state that, in addition to its own competence, there is a well-developed cooperation with the defense research institute, Försvarets radioanstalt, the military intelligence service Must, the Security Service, and other experts. ISP has also received increased appropriations to meet the requirements for more complex and expanded tasks.

Mr. Speaker! We find ourselves in a changing world. We have a full-scale war in our immediate vicinity, Ukraine. All speakers before me have developed and mentioned this, so I will not go into it further. Of course, we stand fully and in solidarity behind Ukraine's struggle for its freedom, and we turn against Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its population and against the crimes against humanity that we witness, for the most part, on a daily basis.

Apart from the war in Ukraine, there are other conflicts in our neighboring region that can quickly flare up. The situation is tense in many places, most recently in the Balkans where there is a bit of bubbling between Kosovo and Serbia. We have the African continent, with war in Sudan and other conflicts that are constantly ongoing.

The geopolitical and security policy situation is constantly changing, so we must be vigilant and closely follow the developments, which can affect the assessment regarding our arms exports. As has been mentioned here, the regulations are possible to change. We can, so to speak, be flexible in that part.

But, as said, the report that we are now debating shows that we have a good regulatory framework for this and that there is an awareness of the requirement that export may only take place if there are security and defense policy reasons concerning the Swedish defense's need for materiel or expertise or other security policy interest and that it also does not conflict with Sweden's international obligations or foreign policy otherwise.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I move for approval of the committee's proposal that the letter be added to the records and that all motion proposals be rejected.

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Jan Riise (MP)

Mr. Speaker! First, I must say that my party colleague, our foreign policy spokesperson, Jacob Risberg, was prevented from attending. Therefore, I, who possess significantly less expertise in the area, stand here instead. I shall try to do justice to what has been intended.

Since 2018, we have had a so-called democracy criterion for Swedish arms exports, something that we in Miljöpartiet fought to get in place and which means that the recipient country's democratic status shall be considered in the permit review. It is a step in the right direction, but much more must be done at the EU level to tighten the control of arms exports.

For the Green Party, it is important that arms exports do not undermine our foreign policy work for peace, democratization, and human rights. We must immediately stop arms exports to dictatorships and warring states. Today's possibilities for exceptions for such exports are restricted very significantly or, even better, abolished also to countries with serious and extensive violations of human rights.

The Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna) also want to tighten the rules for so-called follow-on deliveries, so that decisions regarding a previous version of a weapons system cannot be used for the delivery of a newer system. This should, of course, not prevent Sweden from providing solidarity assistance to a country that is being attacked with weapons.

Mr. Speaker! That Swedish exports to non-democratic states are increasing shows that the regulatory framework has not been entirely purposeful when it comes to putting a stop to exports to dictatorships and other countries with extensive democratic deficiencies.

Among the recipient countries in 2022, there were a number of such states, for example the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Thailand, Pakistan and Qatar. During the years 2020-2022, more than one third, 36 percent, of Swedish exports went to non-democracies, that is, countries with major democratic deficiencies in one or more areas - this according to Svenska freds calculations, where the degree of democracy is based on the calculations and rankings that Freedom House makes.

Sweden needs to take a stand for democratic values in the world and end the export of weapons to non-democracies. The democracy criterion, as I mentioned initially, is so vaguely formulated that it is easy to bypass. Something that is at least speaking for this is that the dictatorship United Arab Emirates was Sweden's largest customer in 2020 and 2021 and that the Inspectorate for Strategic Products envisions upcoming large deliveries to the country. Sweden's values are reflected in the countries we sell weapons to, and this export legitimizes oppression and dictatorship.

Miljöpartiet stands firm that Sweden and the EU should not export weapons to Turkey. As recently as 2019, all parties in the EU Committee were in agreement that Sweden, at the EU level, should push for the introduction of an arms embargo.

Mr. Speaker! The report we are dealing with today concerns the fourth statistical compilation which accounts for a full year with the new regulations from 2018, which contain the changed guidelines. It includes the democratic status, human rights, the export's impact on a fair and sustainable development in the receiving state, follow-up deliveries and international cooperation. The receiving state's democratic status shall be the most important change.

The report gives us an opportunity to once again see what effect the new regulatory framework has had. It is positive that the basis contains more information than in previous years, as it increases transparency and openness regarding arms exports.

Mr. Speaker! The existing regulatory framework has, above all, two deficiencies. The first concerns the fact that it only applies to permits for new transactions entered into after April 15, 2018. All transactions considered to have a connection to transactions that were granted before the democracy condition came into force can be classified as so-called follow-on deliveries and thus avoid the new permit review.

Follow-up deliveries can involve spare parts, ammunition or entirely new systems of the same type as those previously delivered. Follow-up deliveries have no time limit and can continue for as long as desired. For example, follow-up deliveries are ongoing to systems that, according to ISP, were originally delivered from Sweden 30-40 years ago. Follow-up deliveries have long been a loophole in the Swedish arms export regulations and mean that exports can continue even though no new deals are actually permitted.

Legislation that does not include follow-on deliveries becomes ineffective if the purpose is to stop exporting weapons to warring and non-democratic states. For example, the permits for follow-on deliveries to Israel that ISP granted during 2022 can be mentioned.

The second flaw in the regulatory framework that we see is that this does not imply a stop for exports to non-democratic states. Deficiencies in the democratic status should only affect the assessment and constitute so-called obstacles for export. If it is considered that there are significant national defense or security policy interests, export can still be granted.

The position of not supporting and legitimizing 40 undemocratic and oppressive regimes can thus be set aside if other interests are considered to carry more weight in the assessment. A clear example is how Sweden's application for NATO membership has influenced arms exports to Turkey, which, for example, is classified as authoritarian in V-Dem's annual ranking. For the first time since exports were stopped in 2019, permits for exports to the country have now been granted again.

Mr. Speaker! It is important to have high standards for so-called other war materiel and products with both civil and military applications. Civil technology such as artificial intelligence and telecommunications can be used for military purposes or to suppress a population. Therefore, equipment for mass surveillance should not be exported to countries that suppress their own population or where it can be expected that the equipment may be used to persecute political opposition in the country.

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Joar Forssell (L)

Mr. Speaker! If a few years ago you were at a party or a mingle and met different people and asked what they were called, how they fit in there, what they worked with - common questions that one asks each other at a party - and if someone worked in the defense or weapons industry, they always started to fidget a little, Mr. Speaker. They thought it was a bit uncomfortable and awkward, and at first perhaps they said they worked in the business sector, industry, or something else.

That has changed, Mr. Speaker. If you are at a party or a mingle these days, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and meet someone who works at Saab or something else, you do not need to ask a single question before they get going and brag and talk and tell about how important their work in the defense industry is.

I have thought about that, and I believe it testifies to a shift in the view on the ethics of arms exports, arms deliveries and the arms industry. I think it is a good shift, Mr. Speaker, because it is truly so that the one who is for democracy, human rights and freedom must also be for a very strong and vibrant arms industry and arms exports from Sweden. It is not possible to defend democracy if one is not for this.

Mr. Speaker! It is obvious to me that when we go to parties and mixers in the future – to those of you listening, I can state that even politicians actually do so, even if we are sometimes perhaps perceived as a bit dry and boring – people will want to talk about this. It is because it is such an incredibly important industry for Sweden, but above all, it is an important industry for democracy in the world.

Mr. Speaker! The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is an attack not only on Ukraine and the European security order but also on us. I think it is important to establish that Russia really must lose the war on all levels – militarily, economically, culturally and, of course, also politically. It is without doubt Russia that stands behind the latest large-scale terrorist attack, the explosion of the dam in Ukraine which has become very well-known to us in a very short time.

It is clear that if Ukraine is to be able to defend itself, we need to ensure that even more advanced weapons are exported from Sweden to Ukraine. I think that as a Swede, one should be proud of what is described in this report regarding the weapons that have been exported to Ukraine. But we need to do more. More needs to come, and it needs to be more advanced weapons, because it is about defending freedom and democracy - defending both ourselves and Ukraine.

Mr. Speaker! From the Liberals' side, we draw some conclusions from the war in Ukraine. One such conclusion is that the democracy principle, i.e., the principle that we shall heavily weigh how democratic a country is when we export, must be strengthened in such a way that the starting point shall always be that we export if a country is a democracy. It shall therefore not only weigh against if a country is not a democracy, but if a country is a democracy, we shall always want to export.

We democracies, we who believe in freedom and human rights in the world, we must stick together and help each other. It is about exporting weapons, it is about forging closer political ties, and it is about developing our industrial and technological cooperation on the weapons side. For this, exports are required, and therefore we need to strengthen that principle by making it easier to export weapons to precisely democracies.

Taiwan is an example of a country that Sweden should export weapons to. It is a more well-functioning democracy than many European democracies if one looks at various democracy indices. It is also a country that has a high-tech industry, and Sweden would benefit from deepened cooperation.

Israel, the Middle East's only democracy, is another country that Sweden must, of course, ensure it develops deepened defense industrial cooperation with. We must be able to export more weapons to Israel to ensure that the country can protect itself and its population. It is not just every country's right to protect itself against attackers, Mr. Speaker, but it is actually every country's duty to protect itself and its citizens.

Mr. Speaker! One cannot seriously advocate for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict if one does not simultaneously ensure that Israel has the means to defend itself and strike back against Hamas and other terrorists who threaten the entire idea of a two-state solution, that is, that there should be two states.

I was in Israel when Israel celebrated its 75th anniversary at the end of April. At that time, the Israel Defense Forces held air shows with helicopters and combat aircraft that flew over the entire country. I was on the beach in Tel Aviv and watched this. It thunders and roars; you can feel how the windows rattle and hear how the planes arrive. Some perform pirouettes, and others turn up drastically and show what can be done with modern combat aircraft. It is fantastic to hear the rumble that reminds one of the struggle for freedom and of how important it is to defend democracy. As a Swede, one really feels: Wouldn't it be good if we could see to it that they also had Jas Gripen so that even Swedish aircraft at least partly constituted Israel's defense!

Mr. Speaker! The report also concerns products with dual-use. That is a bit funny, because it concerns products that one can use, for example, militarily but also for other things. It could, for example, involve some industrial item that one uses in weapons manufacturing but which can also be used in the manufacturing of civilian products.

To be completely honest, however, almost everything has double uses. There is an old episode of Mordkommissionen, Mr. Speaker, where a murderer kills a poor soul with a frozen salmon. Then they eat the salmon, and that is the mystery: Where is the murder weapon? It is clear that one can claim that the salmon has a double use, but that is not what this is about.

What is important to remember, Mr. Speaker, is that if the person receiving a product is sufficiently malicious, almost anything can be used against us. Then almost anything can have a dual use. From the Liberals' side, we argue that we need to become even stricter than we are today regarding what we export to countries such as China, because almost anything can be used against us.

Mr. Speaker! It is not the economic value of the arms exports from Sweden that makes these questions important, but it is the value of defending democracy, protecting human lives and defending freedom all over the world, with weapons in hand when necessary, that makes this so important.

I vote in favor of the committee's proposal in the report.

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(Decisions were made under § 6.)

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