Response to interpellation 2023/24:466 on crisis management within the Ministry of Rural Affairs and Infrastructure
Translated from Swedish by AI; the translation may contain errors. The Swedish text is the original.
Summary AI, written in advance
The debate concerned the crisis management during the incident on E22 on January 3, which was described as a failure 1 2. KD stated that the government sees deficiencies in the management that need to be addressed. KD emphasized the principle of responsibility where authorities have an independent mandate to act and explained that the department's official obtained information from Trafikverket without requesting directives. KD pointed out that extensive evaluations are ongoing 1 2. S argued that the coordination failed completely and no one took leadership responsibility. S requested which questions the political leadership asked and proposed a preparedness general with overall responsibility as well as a plan B 3 4.
Written by AI in advance and may contain errors. The numbers lead to the speech a statement builds on; check against the text below.
Statsrådet Andreas Carlson (KD)
Madam Speaker! Gunilla Svantorp has asked me whether the crisis management function within the Ministry of Rural Affairs and Infrastructure was activated during the incident on E22 on January 3, and what this, if so, entailed regarding, for example, coordination between the authorities involved in the ongoing crisis.
Let me first state that it can be described as nothing other than a failure that over 1,000 vehicles with passengers were stranded for over a day on a Swedish European road as a result of a severe but still limited snowstorm. As Minister Bohlin has already stated in an interpellation debate on January 30, 2024, the government sees that during the current incident, deficiencies arose in the handling that need to be addressed by the relevant public actors to ensure that a similar situation does not arise again.
In Sweden, the society's crisis preparedness is based, among other things, on the so-called principle of responsibility. It means that the person who has responsibility for an activity under normal conditions also has corresponding responsibility during crisis situations. The responsibility includes taking the measures required for the activity to be able to function during a crisis.
As Minister Bohlin noted in the interpellations debate I mentioned earlier, it is required that authorities and others whose areas of responsibility are affected by a peacetime crisis situation act actively within their mandate during this type of events.
The Swedish administrative model implies that the authorities have an independent position and extensive powers to decide how their own tasks shall be resolved. Through this freedom of action, the foundation is laid so that the authorities can manage their daily operations in an independent manner in an efficient and legally secure way. This is particularly important in societal crisis situations, where the authorities can often take extensive measures within the framework of the law without awaiting government decisions.
To ensure effective crisis management, the government has delegated large parts of the operational activities during a crisis to the authorities. This is evident, among other things, from the ordinance (2022:524) on state authorities' preparedness and each authority's instructions.
The government's tasks in crisis management primarily concern strategic issues. In the event of a crisis, the government is tasked, among other things, with ensuring effective crisis management at an overall national level.
In light of the events on the E22 at the beginning of January, the government can state that in the continued upgrading of civil defense, it is important that there are no ambiguities regarding roles and responsibilities. Society must be able to handle complex situations with many involved actors under difficult conditions. The government does not rule out that measures may need to be taken if such a need arises.
The Rural Affairs and Infrastructure Department's crisis management organization was activated in such a way that the department's officials on standby repeatedly obtained information from Trafikverket. The information obtained concerned the situation in the area, measures taken and planned, Trafikverket's cooperation with other public actors, planning of communication with the media, as well as forecasts on when the road could be opened for traffic. The information was further forwarded within the department, among other things to me, but also to other parts of the Government Offices, including the office for crisis management in the Government Offices. At none of the contacts with Trafikverket did the authority request directives from the government or that the government should act in any other way.
Gunilla Svantorp (S)
Madam Speaker! What happened during those days in January when a thousand cars got stuck in the snow chaos has engaged very many. It was, just as the Minister says, a huge failure.
The Committee on Transport has tried to have this issue discussed several times but has not succeeded. I am nevertheless pleased that the Minister is now here and has given a good answer that is something to work further with. It was good that the Minister began by saying that it was a catastrophic failure, because it clearly was.
The next question is, of course, what is learned from this and what conclusions are drawn. The Minister also gave an answer to one of the questions we had early on, namely how the department was involved in the matter. It took until this answer before we found out that there was an official on call. It was stated by Trafikverket at a committee meeting that it was so, but we have not found out until today that there were contacts between the relevant authorities and the political leadership at the department. It is important that we know that.
What the Minister of State says about the government's task being to handle strategic issues is, of course, correct. But the situation was complex, which is usually the case in a crisis situation, and many were involved - in this case, also many different agencies. The coordination failed completely. In fact, no one took the lead. No one took the responsibility that a leadership mandate should mean that one takes. There are a thousand questions to ask, for example, why they didn't cut down fences so that people could move.
Who is responsible, when responsibility can be demanded, and what lessons we can draw are very important questions to address further. But what I want to ask, and which was the reason I submitted the interpellation to the Minister responsible for the infrastructure area, is why one did not ask what measures were taken when it was so obviously reported that something was happening. Some measures, one could not have been informed about because nothing happened. People were trapped for well over a day, and a thousand cars were stuck with many people in each car. One can answer as the Minister did, that the authorities did not request directives from the government during any of the contacts with Trafikverket. But on the contrary, then? What questions were asked from the department's side regarding the missing activities?
I believe that everyone who has ever held leadership positions naturally demands activity when there is a lack of it. I believe that very many among us wonder what questions the political leadership asked. One can, of course, refer to the fact that we have the order we have, but that is not enough.
Statsrådet Andreas Carlson (KD)
Madam Speaker! Let me begin by addressing the question that this could have been discussed several times in the Committee on Transport. I naturally have no views on which decisions the committee makes. I will, of course, come to the Riksdag and answer questions regarding my area of responsibility. I referred to another interpellation debate where Carl-Oskar Bohlin answered the members' questions. They were formulated in such a way that one wondered how the government intends to handle the experiences and conclusions of what has happened. That fell under Carl-Oskar Bohlin's area of responsibility.
It is, of course, in everyone's interest to learn from this. I want to remind the member that an extensive evaluation process is underway regarding the situation, which cannot be described as anything other than a failure.
The Government decided on 22 February 2024 to task the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency with evaluating the management of the societal disruptions caused by the landslide in Stenungsund, the grounding of the ferry Marco Polo, and the traffic situation on the E22. The assignment is to be reported in August.
The County Administrative Board of Skåne announced in the middle of January 2024 that it intended to hire an independent investigator whose assignment consists of three parts: clarifying the sequence of events, analyzing what went well and what was lacking, and providing suggestions for areas of development and any needs for further investigation.
Trafikverket is conducting its own evaluation of what occurred.
The Committee on the Constitution has initiated an inquiry initiated by the interpellor. The Government Offices have responded in the matter regarding the official on call in the Committee on the Constitution in the Riksdag on 29 February. In addition to that, Madam Speaker, I would like to refer to my previous answer that several different evaluations are ongoing, including in the Committee on the Constitution. I welcome an inquiry into the operational and also look forward to the Committee on the Constitution's handling of the inquiry in the matter.
Gunilla Svantorp (S)
Madam Speaker! I note that I did not receive any answer to my question regarding which questions were posed to the authority concerning what happened. It is very good that extensive evaluation work is underway, but during the process we have also said that this happened at the beginning of January and could have been repeated in February or March given the winter weather and the great maintenance needs regarding the roads in our country. It could very well have happened again quite soon afterwards. Would the answer also then have been that one is awaiting the evaluation, or did one draw any conclusions that could have been used if something similar had happened in February or March?
Given that this affected several agencies - not only within the responsibility area of the Council of State - it would have been very important to have a general readiness officer, i.e., a person within the Council of State Secretariat who is actually responsible, as we proposed. If one has officials on call across several different departments, it is of course also important how they interact. One would have needed to have a person with overall responsibility.
There is a cabinet group called GSS. Was it involved during this period or not?
It is important to remember that sometimes one cannot wait for investigations and must have a plan B. What did plan B look like from the government's side?
Statsrådet Andreas Carlson (KD)
Madam Speaker! Today's layout in the Government Offices' crisis management organization is based on the experiences that followed the tsunami on 26 December 2004. It is, of course, important that information that exists in a department is passed on to other parts of the Government Offices. Just as I said in my interpellation answer, Madam Speaker, the gathered information was conveyed both within the department and to other parts of the Government Offices, including to the office for crisis management in the Cabinet Office.
Madam Speaker! In the communication previously submitted to the Committee on the Constitution, an account has been given of the questions that were asked and the information that was obtained. To mention some of the questions asked by the department to Trafikverket, they concerned what measures were taken, cooperation with other actors, the handling of persons who could not leave their vehicles, and Trafikverket's communication work. Trafikverket described the recovery work, what damages to the road infrastructure had occurred – the median strip was cut open – and how the damages would be rectified. We also asked for a forecast for when traffic could be resumed.
It is very important to state that this cannot be described in any other way than as a failure. That is why the very extensive evaluations that are now being conducted must continue. The work is being carried out at a high pace now during the spring and will also continue during the summer in certain parts where the government and the County Administrative Board have made decisions. Trafikverket has initiated its own evaluation. It is of course important to consider the conclusions that come from the evaluations that are ongoing.
Gunilla Svantorp (S)
Madam Speaker! It can only be stated that lessons need to be drawn for the future, so that we do not end up in the same situation again. Everyone knows that we were very lucky that nothing more serious happened during that day, even though the anxiety among those who were trapped in their cars and among their relatives, so to speak, was enough for all of Sweden. No one knew what was happening, and the information was not what it should have been. We should have had a plan B, which I touched upon. We will have to wait for the answers from the Committee on the Constitution's review.
Given that this happened right after New Year, the risk was great that it would happen again. The risk is still great that something similar will happen within the transport sector, but it does not have to be on the road. For example, the railway can be affected by undermining rain or something else that has a strong impact.
We must have a plan B even while waiting for the evaluations that are ongoing. It is very good that many evaluations are taking place, but we really need to be prepared given that the climate is doing something to our entire country right now. Plan B is therefore important.
Statsrådet Andreas Carlson (KD)
Madam Speaker! I referred to the principle of responsibility in the response to the interpellation. I assume, of course, that different public actors and authorities take measures and draw lessons. I assume that they do not merely wait for evaluations but also act for a higher state of readiness and that they ensure coordination between the authorities. It is part of the mandate.
Let us see what the evaluators come to! I will, of course, follow this very closely and, as said, do not rule out that the government may consider taking measures and making decisions if it should be necessary. That is something the government is always ready to do.
Source: The Swedish Parliament. The speeches come from the open data of the Riksdag, translated into English by AI, which may contain errors.