Sweden's foreign intelligence service

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden's security is our most important responsibility in this chamber. Sweden's security is further determined not only by how many soldiers we have, how many ships we have in the fleet or how many Jas Gripen we have in the sky. All of this is central, but Sweden's security is also determined by simpler questions:

Do we know what is happening beneath the surface? Can we detect the threats before they reach our borders? Can we identify them within our borders? Can we understand an adversary's intentions before they are put into action? Can we make the right decisions at the right time?

Without knowledge, the second force becomes blind. Without information, power becomes paralyzed. Without intelligence, even the strongest defense risks arriving too late. Without reconnaissance, no clue – it is an old motto that bears reminding.

History gives us many lessons. From Pearl Harbor in 1941 to more recent intelligence failures and terrorist attacks, we have repeatedly seen the consequences when warning signs are not captured, not analyzed, or do not reach decision-makers in time. In connection with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Swedish intelligence made a somewhat different assessment than the allies. And as recently as the other day, Säpo revealed Russian intelligence gathering which, on the other hand, they have followed closely and acted against.

Today, the Foreign Affairs Committee's final report for the parliamentary term is being addressed. It is also one of the most important, given that it lays the foundation for the largest change of the Swedish intelligence service in modern times.

I initially wish to express my approval of the committee's proposal in its entirety.

Intelligence activities are about the influence of foreign powers and violations of Swedish territory, our country and our way of life. Ultimately, it is about being able to warn the Swedish people and the state's central governance when threats arise against our country and, preferably, to avert them beforehand.

It is a broad and complex task. Therefore, it is also not self-evident how a modern intelligence service should best be organized. Among most of our Nato allies, there is a specific foreign intelligence agency with its own mandate and its own structure. Sweden has until now chosen a different path. Now, a change is proposed.

Mr. Speaker! The Committee shares the Government's assessment that the security policy situation justifies an enhanced intelligence capability for Sweden.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed Europe's security order in a way that will likely affect our continent for a very long time to come. At the same time, the intelligence activities of foreign powers have become more extensive. Hybrid influence has become more sophisticated, and cyberattacks have become more aggressive. Experiences from Ukraine also show something very important: information superiority saves lives. The ability to quickly gather, analyze, and translate intelligence into practical action can be just as decisive as advanced weapons systems. Therefore, Sweden must strengthen its ability to monitor, analyze, and understand global developments.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden's membership in Nato also entails new conditions. As an ally, Sweden is expected to contribute to and benefit from qualified intelligence sharing. This requires both capacity and credibility. It also requires the ability to deliver high-quality analyses to our partners while simultaneously strengthening the basis for the Riksdag and the government. A stronger and more specialized foreign intelligence capability is therefore an important part of Sweden's overall security.

From the Sverigedemokraterna side, we have over time seen the need to strengthen intelligence activities in general. Against the background of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Must's assessments in connection with this, we proposed an investigation with a mandate to review the intelligence service's dimensioning and future direction already in the spring of 2023 – three years ago. We see the need to analyze how it is best organized. We see the need to adapt the state's institutions to a new reality.

Europe is under heavy pressure. Sweden is a part of the defense alliance Nato and a forward player in the resilience in the Baltic Sea area and the Arctic. Russia is conducting a full-scale war in our immediate vicinity. The demands on Swedish intelligence capabilities have increased. That is where we stand.

At the same time, we must be honest that there are question marks surrounding the implementation of the reform. For example, identifying an intelligence failure does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the best solution is to create a new agency. In Sweden, there is sometimes an over-reliance on organizational changes, as if new agency boundaries would automatically create better results. It is rarely that simple. It is the people, the competence, the culture, and the leadership that ultimately determine success.

Mr. Speaker! It is important to be open about the fact that this reform is not without challenges. Several referral bodies have raised significant objections. The Armed Forces have pointed out risks of loss of competence, increased bureaucracy, and challenges in the coordination between the new agency and other parts of the intelligence system. From an academic standpoint, criticism has also been voiced that the analysis behind the organizational change has not fully shown why exactly a new agency would be the most effective solution to the problems that have been identified. The narrow timeframe has also been addressed.

Even in the public debate, similar questions have recurred: Will a new agency really strengthen intelligence capabilities, or do we risk creating more organizational boundaries? Does the reform risk temporarily weakening Swedish intelligence capabilities during a transition period?

They are all legitimate questions. It would be wrong to dismiss them. On the contrary, these are questions that must be asked when the state carries out one of the biggest changes to the intelligence structure in modern times.

Mr. Speaker! From the Sverigedemokraterna side, we have also aired concerns in several of these respects. We have expressed doubts. In the Committee on Defence, we have chosen to follow up on our positions regarding this proposition with a separate statement. We have done so because we believe that such extensive reforms must be scrutinized carefully and that any potential risks must be reported openly.

But politics cannot only be about identifying problems. Politics must also be about weighing facts, new information, and changed circumstances.

During the preparation, we have had continued dialogue with the Armed Forces and received the government's answers to the questions raised during the spring. The government has also chosen not to proceed with certain more far-reaching proposals, for example, the idea of a national intelligence chief. In our opinion, this is a sign that criticism has been listened to and that the process has been adjusted where there have been reasons to do so. One calibrates. Therefore, we have adopted a pragmatic stance. To be pragmatic is not to be uncritical. It is to be prepared to calibrate the balance point and weigh interests.

Our conclusion is that the security situation is so serious that Sweden cannot afford to refrain from strengthening intelligence capabilities. Therefore, we support the reform. We will also follow it very closely.

Mr. Speaker! The objection that a new organization in itself does not create better intelligence is legitimate, but a well-designed organization can create better conditions for these resources to be used in the best possible way. It can create clearer responsibilities, strengthen our international contact points, and achieve closer connection and relevance for decision-making. The question, therefore, is not whether the organization plays a role. The question is whether the new organization is capable of delivering better results. That remains to be proven. Therefore, the committee points out the importance of follow-up and evaluation over time.

Mr. Speaker! The Sweden Democrats' support for the establishment of the new authority and the legislative changes in support of that which is treated in the report is, of course, associated with high expectations. These are expectations that the operational capacity is maintained and that competence is realized. These are expectations that cooperation functions. These are expectations of clear lines of responsibility, a well-functioning exchange of information, and a long-term supply of competence.

So there is an expectation that the government, of course, will continuously follow up on the reform and be prepared to correct what does not work – regardless of which government we see after the election.

Mr. Speaker! The revelations of recent years regarding extremism, antisemitism, and terror-romanticizing expressions among representatives of a party that simultaneously constitutes part of the Social Democrats' government base are worrying. When such currents, regardless of sender and receiver, gain a foothold close to political power, the need for strong security institutions and qualified intelligence capabilities becomes even more apparent. When the world around us becomes more dangerous, Sweden must become wiser. When the state carries out major reforms, we must both dare to implement them and be prepared to evaluate them.

I would therefore conclude by pointing out the committee's opinion on closely following the implementation of the reform, where we assume a continued close dialogue with the government and relevant authorities and emphasize the need for adequate parliamentary anchoring, legal certainty, and control mechanisms.

With these words, I support the bill and oppose the motions. I also want to take this opportunity to thank the committee members for the parliamentary session and the mandate period, which has been exceptional for the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I also want to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the cooperation during the mandate period and for her presence at the debate here today.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I will return to our view in its entirety on the bill and the proposals, but I will begin by asking questions to Aron Emilsson on how he views the criticism regarding the timeline for this reform.

The criticism has been quite extensive and has also come recently. I have in mind an article in Aftonbladet from June with the headline "Must Chief's warning about new 'Swedish CIA': 'Risk of losing effectiveness'". There, Thomas Nilsson, head of the military intelligence service, Must, says as follows: "When the Armed Forces commented on the investigation, we pointed out some risks. One of those risks is if the change is carried out very hastily and quickly, and that is indeed the government's direction. Then we see that making those types of changes under the current security situation, so we have pointed out that it is a risk."

So that is what the head of the military intelligence service says. He is also asked if, in that case, the effective date should not be moved forward. Then he says: ”I have no views on that. I usually say that I have it so simple that I do not need to evaluate the government's decisions, I just carry them out in the best way.”

One can read between the lines what this is about. So he returns to "it is a risk, we are discussing it and we will try to handle it in the best possible way."

In the quotes in the article, I believe he uses the word "risk" five times. This is, therefore, once again, the head of the military intelligence service.

What distinguishes Aron Emilsson and me is that the Sverigedemokraterna are in the Government Offices and have followed this process from the beginning. You have given the green light to the process, the timeline, and the timing. You are therefore aware of the objections that have existed against implementing such a large change in such a short time.

How does Aron Emilsson respond to the criticism of the process that is underway from one of the very heaviest actors within the intelligence service?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! To begin with, both I, Morgan Johansson, and the committee as a whole have listened to the presentations that the head of Must has given to the committee and have continuously taken part of the information that has been in the public debate also during the time that the issue has been relevant before today's decision and the upcoming establishment in January 2027. We have noted this, and therefore I also pointed out in my speech that this is an issue that both we, the Social Democrats, and many others have addressed, but that one must also weigh interests together.

In the other balance, there lies the fact that there are actually no clear forecasts regarding the best time window to carry out such a reform. We see how extensive the Russian influence operations are and how the intelligence gathering and the threat pictures against Sweden have functioned and accelerated during the mandate period. Now there is an opportunity to carry out this before the situation risks becoming even more serious in our country, which we see examples of daily and constantly.

I have also noted that the head of Must has calibrated his position during the process and has come with somewhat different expressions both in the public debate and in information to the committee. One has nevertheless been clear about envisioning that one will be able to carry out the decisions we make, and that is also the perception that the Armed Forces have expressed when I have spoken with them. Therefore, I feel secure with that, but this is also the reason why I pointed out that it will be important both for the committee and for the government to follow the process closely moving forward and be prepared to calibrate and adjust the reform as it progresses.

It is not the first time in history that we need to carry out important reforms in a short period of time; it has also happened during the Social Democrats' time in government.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! ”Calibrated its stance” – this article is therefore from June 25th this year. It is therefore the military intelligence service's stance today that we are talking about, that is to say, they see the risks with this rapid development.

I believe it is being done against the background that the change is being implemented at the same time as we have a general election, when the threat situation against Sweden regarding influence operations but also concerning pure violence, of course, is increasing, but also because there is an ongoing war in Ukraine. It is the difficult security policy global situation that makes the military intelligence service issue these warnings and say that this is associated with great risks.

It is not just them. In the Security Service's referral response, one can read: "Furthermore, the desire to quickly implement changes must not come at the expense of the vital activities conducted by the intelligence and security services today. Given the global situation, the currently well-functioning agency cooperation that exists between the intelligence and security services must not be risked with a too rapid pace of change."

The Security Service is also very clear regarding this.

This is to be completed in a few months, on January 1st. The reform has already begun, the recruitment has already started, and it is difficult today to send the signal that everything must now be cancelled. I do not believe that would be wise.

My question to Aron Emilsson is: When you approved the process and the timeline in the Government Offices, did you take into account the concerns held by our central security actors and agencies? Why did you give the green light to this timeline?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! What is risk-free? In my speech, I pointed out a number of the risks and concerns that Morgan Johansson now mentions, precisely because it is something we have had with us in the preparation in the committee and ventilated from different sides.

What is risk-free? Is it more risk-free to remain stationary for a while, wait and see when this reform could be implemented forward? Or is it to dare to take a stand, dare to take the step and move when we see that there is still a possibility to do this before the threat picture potentially becomes even more serious against our country? We know in which direction it has gone during the last mandate period.

There is a lot of criticism regarding the process. I perceive that the Social Democrats are the most vocal in their criticism of the process itself, both in the report and in the public criticism. They have, in some respects, accepted the reform, but they are critical of the process and the timeline. In that respect, it is not the first time we have had this type of process – there have been similar processes for the establishment of the Swedish Payments Authority, the Environmental Assessment Authority, and other agencies. It is not unique, it is not the first time, but it has occurred previously.

It is sometimes said that politics is the art of the possible and that politics is about priorities. Here, it is about balancing interests. There are advantages, and there are needs that point to the importance of establishing this reform. There are risks and fears, but if one never dares to take risks, then neither politics nor our responsibility for Sweden's security and for our citizens can move forward. We have seen this many times throughout history.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Following today's debate, the Riksdag is to adopt legislation regarding a new foreign intelligence agency, Und. The idea of a new intelligence agency is fundamentally that of the former Foreign and Prime Minister Carl Bildt. It is his investigation that forms the basis for today's proposal.

The proposal has, as we heard in the exchange of remarks earlier, received massive criticism from a number of sides due to the risks it entails of changing how the intelligence service functions in Sweden. In practice, the proposal means that there will be two agencies instead of one: the military intelligence service Must and the new agency Und.

The decision regarding the agency's legislation will be unanimous, even though there probably isn't actually a majority for the proposal in this form. It is for the simple reason that the government has already pushed through the proposal and started the implementation of the agency precisely at the end of this mandate period.

Let us state that it would have been good if the government had had a different process regarding the establishment of this agency. This applies in relation both to the opposition in the Riksdag and to all other agencies that exist today – especially the Armed Forces and Must. There are many good reasons to listen to the military profession in this matter. The work being done risks creating more problems than it solves.

Vänsterpartiet is strongly critical of the process that preceded the government's establishment of a new intelligence agency and of the result of the process. Now, there will still be a new agency, but for the sake of history, we mark it with a number of clear reservations. I will now go through these.

The process that has led to the establishment of the new agency has been carried out at express speed. Less than half a year after the investigation was completed, work began on a new agency. The government's anchoring of the issue with the parties in the Riksdag has been extremely limited. Despite both the ongoing defense preparation and an otherwise good cooperation between the government and the Riksdag during this mandate period in defense and security policy issues, these large and extensive changes in Swedish intelligence activities have not been discussed between the government and the parties in the Riksdag to any particularly great extent.

It is associated with significant risks to carry out a comprehensive reorganization in such a security-politically serious time as Sweden finds itself in right now. We need a well-functioning and effective intelligence service more than ever.

Instead of tying up the authorities in an organizational change process, the government should focus on strengthening the existing work required to meet an ever broader and more complex threat landscape. Building a new agency simply takes time. During that period, there is a significant risk that the operations will lose both strength and momentum. It is a risk we should not take when the global situation places high demands on Sweden's security and intelligence capabilities.

Several referral bodies have pointed out the risk of duplication of work once the new agency is in place. The personnel and the tasks that are proposed to be moved from the current military intelligence service Must will, according to the referral responses, also continue to be needed within the military defense. This risks leading to overlapping activities, inefficient use of resources, and increased competition for qualified personnel. This applies to a so-called tight sector with relatively few individuals who possess the right competence and who are suitable to be employed at agencies that work with intelligence and analysis.

In addition, there are significant costs resulting from establishing a new agency with its own management, staff, premises, and security organization. The oversight body Siun will also not receive any resource reinforcements, even though they are now to monitor and audit the activities of an additional agency.

Had the government chosen a slower process, several of these challenges and risks could have been handled in a better way, I believe.

In its referral statement to the commission, the Swedish Armed Forces proposes that a specific task regarding purposeful mutual support between the authorities be included in the respective authority's instructions. Vänsterpartiet assumes that the continued work will largely be based on that point of view and the experiences that several authorities have conveyed. It is crucial if this reorganization is to be successful and lead to a stronger and more effective intelligence operation in this context when the operations are distributed between two authorities in the future. We agree with the Swedish Armed Forces' proposal that it would be good to have clarity regarding mutual support between the authorities. Also towards the Swedish Security Service Säpo and the FRA, UNDS's role needs to be clarified.

Mr. Speaker! International intelligence cooperation is both important and necessary for Sweden's security. The threats we face often know no national borders. Therefore, the exchange of information with other countries must function well. At the same time, it is particularly sensitive when foreign intelligence and security services are given direct access to Swedish systems and data.

Direct access differs from ordinary disclosure of information by the fact that the recipient can themselves search among the data within the framework of the technical access that has been granted. This means that the requirements for security, control, and legal certainty must be very high. It must always be possible to review in retrospect who has had access to which data, for what purposes, and on what grounds the access was granted. Such traceability is crucial for maintaining public trust and for ensuring that the regulatory framework is followed.

Vänsterpartiet argues that the government must ensure that direct access for foreign intelligence and security services is surrounded by particularly strict protective measures, clear control mechanisms, and a real possibility to immediately limit or terminate the access if deficiencies or security flaws arise. Sweden's security and the protection of sensitive information must always be the primary focus.

A question that I believe deserves significantly greater attention in this discussion is the democratic control of intelligence activities. The intelligence service's work must, for natural reasons, be carried out largely under secrecy. For that very reason, it is also crucial that there are strong, well-functioning, and democratically anchored systems for control and oversight. It is a prerequisite for maintaining the public's trust in the operations.

Unfortunately, our and other parties' motions were not treated as sharp motions in connection with today's decision, but we still want to bring in our perspective and our proposals.

In the investigation conducted by Carl Bildt, A reformed intelligence activity, it was noted that the Swedish intelligence system, compared to several other countries, has relatively weak elements of parliamentary anchoring. The investigation also highlights the possibility of strengthening oversight by giving sitting members of Parliament a greater opportunity to review and monitor the activities, similar to the former Defense Intelligence Committee. I believe there are strong reasons to take that discussion further. This applies in particular against the background of historical experiences that show the importance of both clear and independent control of intelligence activities, especially when a new agency structure is being built up.

The oversight that is currently exercised by the Swedish Defence Intelligence Inspectorate, Siun, is important, but it needs to be supplemented with stronger parliamentary oversight. A clearer connection is needed between the intelligence activities and the elected parliament, the Riksdag. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, because in several comparable democracies such as Finland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, there are specific parliamentary bodies responsible for auditing intelligence activities. The Finnish Intelligence Oversight Committee visited here earlier this year and was a very interesting example. There, the parliament has a clear and established role in the control of both civil and military intelligence activities, while the legality and appropriateness of the activities are audited continuously.

I believe that the Swedish Parliament should consider establishing a special intelligence committee to strengthen democratic and parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services' work.

Mr. Speaker! I also believe that the government should investigate the possibility of a special intelligence ombudsman. Such a function could constitute an independent body to which employees can turn if they notice irregularities or other serious problems within the operations. An intelligence ombudsman could also contribute to increasing trust and transparency within the organization. In situations where staff do not perceive existing control functions or trade union channels to be sufficient, an independent ombudsman could fill an important mediating and trust-building role. If such a function is given strong integrity and a clear mandate, it could also contribute to ensuring that important issues and problems are raised to the government and other responsible decision-makers before they grow larger.

Based on all the risks I have now raised, we in Vänsterpartiet have landed on supporting a Center Party motion for a review of the new agency during the next parliamentary term.

Mr. Speaker! Vänsterpartiet has four reservations and one special statement, but I choose to move for approval only of reservation 3 regarding coordination between Sweden's intelligence agencies.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I would like to say initially that our basic position is that Sweden has a high-quality intelligence service. We received further confirmation of this the other day. Swedish intelligence was then ranked in sixth place among all European countries' services.

The ranking had been made by newly retired intelligence officers from 25 countries. They should know what they are talking about. As newly retired, they are also a bit more free to say roughly what they have experienced during their working lives. Swedish signals intelligence is particularly highlighted, which for decades has given us unique information about what is happening in our global environment, how security threats develop, and what they look like.

It is no coincidence that we have a fundamentally high-quality intelligence service. Swedish intelligence was built up during the post-war period, during the Cold War, when the superpowers USA and the Soviet Union stood against each other. It was vital for Sweden then, as a small, non-aligned country, geographically between the superpowers, to have its own high-quality intelligence capability.

Of course we had an exchange of information with other services in the West, but we could not rely on always receiving complete or even correct information. We needed our own capability, and that was created by Social Democratic governments during the decades after the war, not least under the leadership of Prime Minister Tage Erlander, who knew what he was doing. As State Secretary, he had been responsible for large parts of the civil intelligence service during the Second World War.

There are, therefore, historical reasons why Sweden has prioritized intelligence activities in such a way that we can now claim to be among the best in Europe. We must maintain and develop that capability. Even though we are now members of Nato, it is in many ways even more important now. The security threats today look different than they did during the Cold War.

In many ways, we find ourselves in the most serious security policy situation since World War II. A war has been raging in Europe for over four years now following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. With it, the European security order also collapsed. Sweden and many other countries are assisting Ukraine with resources and weapons, but nothing indicates that the war is about to end.

We have seen a number of examples of Russian influence operations and disruptions also against countries other than Ukraine: drones entering NATO airspace, political influence ahead of elections in EU countries, cyberattacks – to name just a few.

The latest influence operation is probably the one where Russia systematically used the migrant crisis in Ceuta in Africa to divide the EU. Unfortunately, a number of EU countries, including Sweden, fell into the trap and attacked Spain instead of showing solidarity and offering support. Thus, they played into Russia's hands.

We therefore have a very difficult security situation as a result of the war in Ukraine and Russian aggression on almost all fronts. But we also have a terror threat that is more serious than it has been in a long time. This terror threat comes primarily from two sides: from the Islamist side and from the far-right side.

We see an increased antisemitism and a worsened threat against Jews in Sweden and in the rest of Europe. The violence and harassment against Jews can come from both Islamists and from the far-right. We must do everything we can to combat that antisemitism and the hatred against Jews.

We also see increased hate propaganda against Muslims, not least online. Here we even see political parties across Western Europe, including Sweden, building their entire politics on inciting against Muslims and thereby increasing the risks of terror and violence against Muslims and mosques.

Here in Sweden, we have also seen how the so-called activity clubs, that is to say groups of young far-right men who are close to violence, are growing.

This hate propaganda is dangerous. For those who want to know how it can turn out when one incites against Jews year after year, they can read about the Holocaust. And for those who want to know how it can turn out if one incites against Muslims year after year, they can read about the genocide in Srebrenica just over 30 years ago.

There are a number of toxic environments where violence thrives – among Islamists and right-wing extremists – but we have also seen the so-called incel environment, that is to say young men who cultivate misogyny. They too can be extremely prone to violence and commit acts of terrorism.

In this world today, it is, in short, extremely important that there is a good intelligence service and that Säkerhetspolisen, the military intelligence service Must, and FRA cooperate closely and have the tools needed to monitor and analyze what is happening and intervene when necessary.

After I have worked with these authorities in different capacities for a number of years, my assessment is that this has functioned well.

The government has now taken the initiative for a comprehensive reorganization of the Swedish intelligence service. It is described as the largest reorganization ever. A new agency, Sweden's Foreign Intelligence Service, Und, is to be formed, in part by breaking out certain parts of the Armed Forces.

It is one's full right to do so. The authorities are subject to the government, not to the Riksdag. Our basic position is the one expressed in the Instrument of Government: the authorities are the government's tools for governing the realm. The government thus has great freedom to design the authority organization in the way it deems appropriate. It is an important principle for us Social Democrats to maintain, because when we are in a position of government, we naturally also want to be able to carry out organizational changes without the Riksdag blocking them.

At the same time, we see that this reorganization has already begun. The recruitment processes have been ongoing since this spring. To now attempt to cancel everything, even if one has criticism regarding the implementation, the process, and the timing, would not be prudent. Therefore, we have no reservations in this report.

However, it does not mean that we do not have any opinions about what the government is currently doing and about the dangers associated with it. We have expressed these opinions at every opportunity we have met government representatives regarding this issue during the past year. There have been a number of such meetings where we have met UD's officials, asked questions about the process, but also expressed our views. At every opportunity, we have said: Do not rush this! Wait at least until after the election! Give it more time!

We have seen the Swedish Armed Forces' referral response, where the timeline is questioned. We know that some capabilities are being moved from the Swedish Armed Forces to the new agency, and it is unclear how the Swedish Armed Forces will be compensated for that. And just a few months ago, the head of the military intelligence service, Must, Thomas Nilsson said the same thing: "One of the risks is if the change is carried out very hastily and quickly, and that is the government's direction."

We have exactly the same concern as the Armed Forces and Must regarding the timeline. This is to be completed in four months. That is an incredibly short period for such a large reorganization.

In his reply to me, Aron Emilsson just said roughly that if you don't want to take risks, you get nothing done. But one can choose which risks to take. One can choose the timing. One can choose how far such a process should go. One can minimize the risks, and that must surely be what we strive for.

We have a concern regarding the timing. This is being done now when we are facing a general election with a concomitant increased threat of both violence and foreign influence. In that case, our question is: Is it really wise to carry this out now?

The Chief of Defence said in an interview with him that there is a risk that one goes too far down in efficiency. During the period when one reorganizes, one risks a deterioration of the intelligence work. That risk is taken now when there is an election. Can there be a worse time?

I can think that the government should be more cautious, not least against the background of all the mess with the national security coordinator, which indeed became a ridiculous spin-off. We cannot make any more mistakes now.

We have conveyed all of this to the government during the conversations we have had, obviously to deaf ears. It was apparently so important to push this through quickly that one did not even care about the Riksdag's rules regarding the proposal deadline, but instead submitted its proposal three months after the deadline and then demanded that it be rushed through now during the summer. That is why we stand here now.

We express all of this in our special statement. There we also write about the issue that Håkan Svenneling raised, regarding parliamentary oversight and control over the new agency. It is an aspect that the government does not seem to have considered at all. It must, of course, be addressed and dealt with.

Now we enter the election campaign. We will see what the government looks like after the election. If there is a change of government, it will be an important task for the new government to see what needs to be done to strengthen and develop the Swedish intelligence service so that it can also continue to be at the European forefront.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I can largely agree with what Morgan Johansson has put forward regarding the concern for the timing and the handling.

What I am considering, Mr. Speaker, is the following: If there is, as we hope, a new government after September 13, would it not then be wise to give that government the mandate to make decisions on the appropriate time for these laws to enter into force after January 1, 2027? It could be that additional efforts are required so that our intelligence capability does not decrease if we are not ready when these laws are to enter into force. This is a question we have asked ourselves. We want an openness so that a government can be given a mandate to establish the entry into force date precisely to, as far as possible in this situation, ensure that Swedish intelligence capability does not decrease.

I ask myself how the Social Democrats intend to handle that part. It cannot be reasonable that a new government, seeing that this is not fully functioning by January 1, must go to the Riksdag to move the date for the legislation's entry into force.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! It is a relevant question that we will, of course, have to look at after the election. But I am not prepared to commit to anything now.

After a potential change of government, we will both have access to more classified information and have the opportunity to exchange information in a more open way and discuss with the heads of the agencies concerned how this process stands at that time. Then we will see how the process can be taken further. I am therefore not prepared to commit to anything.

Now Kerstin Lundgren is, in some ways, trying to save the government from itself. This government has locked itself into January 1st and is binding itself to that mast. This must be the responsibility of the sitting government.

If there is a change of government, we will have to look at the issue again. But then we really have to dive deep into what the process looks like at that time. What recruitments have been made? How reasonable is it that this can be achieved by January 1, 2027? If it is needed, one must return to the Riksdag. But I am not prepared to lock myself into any timeline right now. We do not have the information that we would need.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! We also do not see that we can lock ourselves into any exact timetable. January 1, 2027, yes – but we also want to create an openness and not bind a government by the Riksdag so that the laws shall enter into force exactly then.

It is not the first time this happens. We are now going to deal with several issues where the entry into force of the legislation is a matter for the government. That is what we think is right and important: that when one is given the opportunity for the deeper dialogue and insight and to consider the suitability and how far the process has progressed, one also actually has the mandate and the possibility to adjust the entry into force date to ensure that Swedish intelligence capability, civil and military, does not decrease. This is our starting point, Mr. Speaker.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Actually, these are two issues. This bill concerns what changes must be made in a long series of laws when one, so to speak, writes in the foreign intelligence service into those laws. It is not actually about the decision to start the agency itself, but it is the government itself that decides on that issue. That is perhaps the question one has to reflect on if there is a change of government: what information we have then and how the process stands. But for such an agency to be able to operate, there must be laws that have already entered into force when it finally becomes functional. It is, therefore, actually two issues.

Unfortunately, we have too little information today to be able to say whether this can be fully implemented by January 1, that is, with the authority in full function. In a government position, we will need to look at whether more time is needed for the transition itself and what risks we run if the current government's timetable is followed. But, as said, given the warning signals that have come from the various authorities, we see that there is very much to get into.

But again: The legislation we are dealing with today is not actually about starting this authority. It concerns consequential changes in the laws so that a new authority can be put in place.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! The assignment to Carl Bildt to review the intelligence activities for Sweden's foreign, security, and defense policy came in the autumn of 2023. Three years later, this activity is to be essentially completed through these legislative changes, which shall also change the conditions for the intelligence authorities' work. The laws provide the basis from which the authorities shall operate.

We can see historically that the Swedish intelligence service has had an anchoring in the government and in the military defense's need for both warning and preparation in order to be able to meet an armed attack against our country; it has been central. Therefore, the home base with the Armed Forces has been natural.

But as the threat landscape has changed in recent times, it is clear that it spills over into internal security. Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine changed the security situation in Europe and Sweden. Power takes precedence globally, and international law falters. In the balance between the purely military and the broader threat landscape, it becomes central to look at how one positions oneself and makes assessments, militarily and also from the sharper security policy situation that we find ourselves in.

Internal security is Säpo's responsibility. Säpo has been an independent agency since 2015, when it was separated from the Police Authority. We have FRA, with an expanded mandate and legislation that was very much debated here in the Riksdag and in Sweden at large, but which has served us well, let us say.

Must have been responsible for the overall assessment.

Here we had many reasons to ask questions during the autumn of 2021: What was it that was about to happen? Russia's war of aggression was being prepared, but it was not assessed as likely by our security services.

The full-scale aggression that Russia initiated in February 2022 has affected how we have viewed Swedish intelligence and security services. The Swedish military's assessment was perceived as well-founded, but the political assessment failed. This is also evident from Carl Bildt's investigation.

Then one can wonder if the political judgment is improved by a new agency. I perceived that much in the discussion that preceded, at least in our closed rooms at that time, was about the will to see and the will to actually be able to think the thought. It perhaps also was about consideration for different positions that existed at that time – the OSCE chairmanship and various other things. There are therefore many underlying questions that one can wonder if a new agency really is the solution to.

It is clear that we have increased international cooperation with Nato. Here, the Armed Forces have an immensely important task. One must cooperate, and one is cooperating ever more closely. But this also increases the need for military intelligence and military intelligence capability.

From our side, we note that Carl Bildt's investigation viewed the issue of a civil foreign intelligence service as part of a larger reform. One must therefore also review other parts.

Now the government is coming with a proposal that moves parts of the military intelligence capability into a new agency. Resources have been transferred financially, and further transfers have been announced. From our side, we believe that this is a strange way to build something new – to tear down parts of what has functioned well instead of starting from what has functioned well and building something new on top of it.

This is what one does when we find ourselves in a very serious security policy situation. It is not peace, but it is also not war in the classical sense – it is something else. To then make a partial solution that risks worsening the military intelligence capability, which ultimately is to ensure that we can withstand and defend Sweden against an armed attack, is not the wisest thing one can do.

We have also, like others, been critical of the government's handling of this. It must really be crystal clear that Sweden's ability to militarily assess and obtain intelligence is not weakened or disrupted in this situation. We perceive no guarantees in that part, but the risks – which also appeared earlier with reference to Mustchefen – are obvious. It is for that reason that we, on our part, have said that we do not want to be bound to the new legislation having to apply from 1 January 2027 if the agency structure is not in place. We do not want any agencies to have to act illegally, but it must be possible to fine-tune this.

It is with great care for Sweden's intelligence capability that we have viewed this bill. It is therefore not that we oppose the proposition and the bill itself, but it is primarily the timing of the entry into force that we say no to. We do, however, say that the government in power must ensure – this must be crystal clear – that we do not get a situation where the intelligence capability decreases. That is why we want this small valve.

We do not oppose the bill for the reason that the work has come so far. If we were to create uncertainty here, it could also contribute to weakening our intelligence capability. We do not want that to happen. Therefore, our reservation does not oppose the legislative proposals, but our reservation concerns the timing and aims to create a safety valve.

Alongside this, we have also highlighted the importance of follow-up regarding what happens in the new authority. There are also reasons to see if additional efforts need to be made regarding intelligence capabilities and security services. We also think it is important that the Riksdag's oversight of the authority's work is strengthened or, more accurately said, formalized.

We have looked at Finland's experience and have heard about their intelligence oversight committee. There are also other examples. But we believe there are reasons to look at this as a model that we in Sweden could also use to strengthen legitimacy and build an increased security culture.

With this, Mr. Speaker, I would like to move for approval of reservation 1.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jacob Risberg (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden is in a very serious security policy situation. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, increased cyber threats, sabotage against critical infrastructure, disinformation, and foreign powers' influence operations place ever higher demands on our ability to understand the world around us. In order to be able to make wise political decisions, we need good knowledge of the threats and risks that exist outside our borders. Therefore, foreign intelligence activity is an important tool for Sweden's security.

Miljöpartiet shares the government's assessment that Sweden needs a strong, modern and purposeful foreign intelligence capability. We do not oppose that the activity is developed. We also do not oppose that the state organizes the activity in the way that is judged to be most effective.

But just because intelligence activities are so important, changes must be implemented with great care, with sound analyses and with respect for the democratic control mechanisms that are crucial in a rule of law. It is here that Miljöpartiet sees significant deficiencies.

Mr. Speaker! The bill we are now considering concerns the legal conditions for Sweden's new foreign intelligence service, Und. But the Riksdag has never been given the opportunity to take a collective position on the entire reform. The questions regarding organization, economy, competence supply, security consequences, and distribution of responsibility have been handled in different stages. Even the financing of the new agency was addressed before the Riksdag had received a complete basis regarding the legal framework of the operations.

It is, according to the Green Party's view, a perverse order. When the state carries out one of the largest changes to intelligence activities in a very long time, the Riksdag should first be allowed to take a position on the overall consequences of the reform and thereafter decide on the financing.

Instead, the government has chosen to drive the process under strong time pressure. This raises questions. Are the consequences sufficiently analyzed? Are the risks sufficiently scrutinized? And is this really the right time to carry out such an extensive reorganization of Swedish intelligence activities?

Mr. Speaker! A central issue concerns the distribution of responsibility and competence. When the new agency is formed, tasks, experiences, and likely also personnel will be moved from the Armed Forces and Must. At the same time, the Armed Forces shall also continue to be responsible for military-strategic, operational, tactical, and military-technical intelligence activities.

It means that several activities that today exist within the same organization will be divided between different agencies. It does not have to be wrong, but it involves risks. There is a risk of a capability gap. There is a risk that valuable competence is lost. There is a risk that boundaries of responsibility become unclear. There is also a risk that important information does not reach the right recipient in the right time.

The government emphasizes the importance of cooperation between Und, the Armed Forces, FRA, and the Security Service. We welcome that. But cooperation does not arise by itself. It must be organized, it must be followed up, and it must work in practice and not just on paper. Therefore, the Green Party believes that the government should ensure a clear distribution of responsibility, a functioning coordination, and sufficient resources between the relevant authorities.

Mr. Speaker! A specific question concerns the Defence Signals Intelligence Agency, FRA. It is proposed that FRA shall be granted the right to direct signal intelligence in the same way as other authorized authorities. This means that an additional actor will place demands on FRA's capacity.

The Government assesses that the displacement effects will be limited, and we naturally hope that assessment is correct. But if it is not, the consequences can become serious. Insufficient resources at FRA can lead to important intelligence needs not being met. This can affect Sweden's security, but it can also affect legal certainty and privacy protection if the agency is forced to prioritize more strictly between different missions. The resource situation therefore needs to be monitored closely.

Mr. Speaker! When the state is given greater opportunities to collect, analyze, and manage sensitive information, the oversight must also be strengthened. This is a fundamental democratic principle. Intelligence activities must, for natural reasons, be conducted with high secrecy. But precisely the fact that the activity takes place behind closed doors makes independent oversight even more important. We cannot be content with saying that the oversight works; we must ensure that the oversight actually has the conditions to work.

The Swedish Inspectorate for Foreign Intelligence Activities, Siun, has itself pointed out that the new tasks justify increased resources. Despite this, the government chooses not to provide the resources the authority requests. It is difficult to understand the logic in this. If a new authority is added, with new registers, new information flows, and new forms of personal data processing, the need for supervision also increases. Miljöpartiet therefore argues that the government should ensure that both Siun and the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection have sufficient resources and appropriate powers for their work.

Mr. Speaker! Democratic control is not just about formal oversight; it is also about legitimacy. It is about the citizens' trust, and it is about the fact that difficult trade-offs between security, privacy, and human rights must be able to be discussed and scrutinized. Therefore, Miljöpartiet believes that the government should consider the possibility of establishing an oversight board or some equivalent arrangement for Und.

We are fully aware that the operations will be covered by extensive confidentiality. A transparency council can therefore not function as an open oversight function, but it could contribute something else. It could create additional democratic anchoring, and it could contribute to ethical and principled discussions. It could also strengthen public trust in the operations. This would not replace Siun, the Authority for Privacy Protection, or the Riksdag's control functions, but it would be a complement.

Mr. Speaker! I also want to raise the issue of international intelligence cooperation. In an uncertain world, cooperation with other countries is often necessary. Sweden cannot alone create a complete picture of the threats to our security. Information exchange between democracies is therefore important.

Every expanded cooperation must, however, be weighed against the requirements for legal certainty and privacy. Particularly sensitive is the possibility of direct access that the bill opens up for.

Direct access differs from a standard disclosure of information. When information is disclosed, it normally occurs after an assessment of which pieces of information are to be handed over. With direct access, the receiving actor is instead given the opportunity to search the information themselves within the frameworks that have been permitted. This places very high demands on security, and there must be clear authorization levels. All use must be documented, logging must occur systematically, and auditing must be possible in retrospect. Sweden must have the ability to immediately terminate the access if the conditions are not met.

This is not a question of mistrust towards international partners, but it is a question of responsibility. Miljöpartiet therefore considers that the government should ensure particularly strict protective measures regarding direct access for foreign intelligence or security services.

Mr. Speaker! Miljöpartiet wants a Sweden that is safe, secure and resilient. To achieve this, we need strong intelligence authorities, but we also need clear lines of responsibility. We need good coordination, we need strong oversight and we need democratic transparency. We also need robust protection for personal privacy.

Security and democracy are not opposites, but on the contrary. When the state strengthens its ability to see and understand the world around it, the Riksdag must simultaneously ensure that transparency, oversight, and protection of privacy follow. Security without democracy does not make us stronger. A strong Sweden is a Sweden that safeguards both.

Mr. Speaker! With this, I move for approval of the Miljöpartiet's reservation 6 and take the opportunity to wish all my colleagues a continued pleasant summer.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! One of the state's most fundamental tasks is to protect people and safeguard our country's freedom, security, and independence.

In order to be able to do that, we must understand the threats directed at us. We must know which actors have the capacity to harm Sweden, what intentions they have, and how they attempt to translate these intentions into action. That is fundamentally what this debate is about. Sweden needs more and better intelligence.

The security policy situation has changed fundamentally. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shown that large-scale war is once again a reality in Europe. At the same time, Sweden and our allies face a significantly broader threat picture than the purely military one. Foreign powers use cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, sabotage, technology theft, and undue influence. Critical infrastructure can be subjected to attacks. Strategic investments can be used to create dependencies. Organized crime can be exploited by foreign powers. Terrorist organizations operate across national borders. New technology creates new vulnerabilities but also new opportunities for those who wish to harm our societies.

The line between peace, crisis, and war has become less clear. It also means that the line between military and civilian security threats has become less clear. Sweden needs a highly qualified military intelligence service. It needs to be strong. It needs to continue to develop.

Sweden's need for intelligence is, however, greater than the purely military. We need to strengthen our ability to gather, process, and analyze information about foreign conditions. We need better strategic intelligence that can provide the government and other decision-makers with a better basis before decisions are made. Intelligence is ultimately about reducing uncertainty. In security policy, reduced uncertainty can be the difference between acting in time and acting too late.

Mr. Speaker! There is also another dimension that has become more important: Sweden is a member of Nato. We are no longer only responsible for our own security, but we are also part of a collective defense where our security depends on our allies and where their security is also our responsibility.

It changes the perspective. Swedish intelligence capability is not only a Swedish asset but also an asset for the entire alliance. Sweden has geographical, technical, and political conditions that enable us to contribute valuable intelligence. Our location in northern Europe and the Baltic Sea area and the proximity to the Arctic give us special opportunities and a special responsibility. But a functioning intelligence cooperation is based on reciprocity. Those who want to receive qualified information must also contribute qualified information.

The intelligence service's perhaps most important successes are the events that never occur. It is about attacks that can be prevented, sabotage that can be stopped, and influence operations that are exposed. It is about the security-threatening investment that is identified and the strategic surprise that never becomes a surprise. It is difficult to measure the value of things that do not happen, but for that very reason, we must not underestimate the importance of knowledge that allows us to act before a threat has become a crisis.

Mr. Speaker! For us Christian Democrats, there is also a principled starting point here. The state should not do everything, but certain tasks can only be carried out with the state bearing the ultimate responsibility. Defending the country, upholding the rule of law, and protecting people's lives and freedom belong to these core tasks. A state that is unable to protect its citizens will eventually also be unable to protect their freedom.

At the same time, a strong intelligence operation must always be reconciled with respect for human dignity, the rule of law, and personal privacy. There is no contradiction in this. It is precisely because intelligence operations are granted access to powerful tools and sensitive information that the legislation must be clear. Powers must have proper support, and there must be control and oversight.

Rule of law must, however, not be equated with paralysis. We cannot build a regulatory framework for intelligence activities based on the notion that the world around us is less dangerous than it actually is. Our adversaries will not refrain from collecting information about Sweden just because we refrain from collecting information about them. They will not refrain from cyberattacks, influence, sabotage, or espionage just because we choose to know less. Ignorance is not a security strategy.

Mr. Speaker! The modern defense of Sweden begins long before a military attack. It begins with information and intelligence which, through analysis, becomes knowledge. It is about knowledge of political decisions being prepared in other countries, knowledge of military movements, knowledge of economic and technical dependencies, knowledge of cyber threats, terrorism and foreign powers' attempts to influence our societies, and knowledge of what intentions our opponents have before these intentions are put into action.

That is why Sweden needs both a strong military intelligence service in Must and a strong civil intelligence service. These shall complement each other. Together with FRA, the Security Service and other relevant actors, they shall contribute to a stronger Swedish intelligence capability. The goal is not to collect information for information's sake, but the goal is for Sweden to know more, understand earlier and be able to make better decisions.

For every strategic surprise that we can avoid, our security increases. For every threat we can identify earlier, our freedom of action increases. For every decision that can be made on a better knowledge base, the risk that Swedish men and women one day need to pay the price because we knew too little and understood too late is reduced.

Sweden must be difficult to surprise, difficult to influence and difficult to attack. It requires a strong defense, strong alliances and a strong intelligence capability – both military and civil. Therefore, Kristdemokraterna welcomes that Sweden is now strengthening its foreign intelligence service. It will make Sweden stronger and contribute to making our allies safer.

I vote in favor of the committee's proposal in its entirety.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Today we are to debate and tomorrow to vote on a new agency: Sweden's foreign intelligence service, with the abbreviation Und. It is an independent civil foreign intelligence service, and it shall begin its work on 1 January 2027, that is, within barely half a year. We received the bill in the Riksdag in June and have processed it in the Committee on Foreign Affairs during the summer.

The background is, just as has been stated by all speakers before me, the severely deteriorated security situation. Russia's actions, cyberattacks, terrorism, disinformation, the wars in the Middle East and so on involve a complex international situation and threat picture, where Sweden needs to increase its ability to both obtain and analyze information that we receive from abroad.

Just as Magnus Berntsson pointed out in the speech before mine, the line between civilian and military threats and between what constitutes peace, crisis, and war becomes less clear as the international situation becomes more and more complex.

We also need to strengthen our specialization and coordination between the intelligence activities at Must, the Armed Forces, FRA and Säpo.

Mr. Speaker! I would like to vote in favor of the committee report and against the motions.

This is my last debate in the Riksdag. I have served as a member for Folkpartiet and thereafter Liberalerna during five parliamentary terms. It is a bit emotional, it must be admitted, but nothing lasts forever. Life is long, but not that long.

I am immensely grateful and honored to have had the opportunity to be a part of the public and elected power in Sweden for a period of 20 years. During my time in the Riksdag, I have served in a number of committees, but my commitment has primarily concerned international affairs.

There are some reflections that can be made which relate to the subject of this debate. I felt it was important to include this disclaimer so that one does not receive criticism from the Speaker afterwards.

Mr. Speaker! When I began to engage politically in the mid-1990s, the situation in Europe and the world was completely different than it is now. It was a time of optimism. The Cold War had ended, the Soviet Union had collapsed, the Maastricht Treaty had been adopted, which meant that the EC became the EU and Sweden became a member just a few months after I had started to engage politically, and the apartheid system disappeared.

During the 1980s, large parts of Latin America – practically the entire continent – were democratized and peace was established between right-wing juntas and socialist guerrillas. The only exception was Cuba, which was the only totalitarian dictatorship remaining in the Western Hemisphere. East Asia weathered a major banking crash in the early 90s, and India's democracy survived the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

Taiwan emerged as the first Chinese democracy. A number of African countries held peaceful elections where ousted governments accepted the election results. Israel and the Palestinians concluded the Oslo Accords, and the Palestinian Authority was built up as a step towards a two-state solution. The Iran–Iraq War was over, and the Kurds had received autonomy in Iraq.

In the USA, Bill Clinton was in power when I entered politics, Mr. Speaker, and the free trade agreement Nafta was concluded with Mexico and Canada.

Terrible tragedies were also taking place. Bosnia was burning with the siege of Sarajevo, the genocide in Srebrenica and concentration camps in Prijedor and Trnopolje. War was taking place in the Caucasus in three places simultaneously: Abkhazia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Not least, the genocide in Rwanda was also taking place, where over half a million people were killed in a hundred days.

But there was a completely different atmosphere in the world in the mid-1990s when I began to get involved. It was the time of Václav Havel and Lech Wałęsa. Liberal democracy had triumphed forever, it was claimed.

Today we know that it did not turn out that way.

The situation our world finds itself in today is difficult to describe. Living standards and technological development have seen enormous progress, but politically, democracy is in decline. The international institutions and regulatory frameworks that were built up during the Cold War are being subjected to both threats and undermining. But they also suffer from internal stagnation. They are unable to implement necessary reforms – this applies particularly to many UN organizations.

In recent decades, we have seen new wars, not least in the Middle East, and an exodus of almost all Christians from the Middle East region and the areas where the first churches were built. We have seen IS atrocities against defenseless civilians, not least Yazidis.

When I now leave the Riksdag, Mr. Speaker, I will follow the politics from the outside. I will continue my work especially for Ukraine. The unity that Sweden and the Riksdag have shown regarding the support for Ukraine still gives me quite a lot of hope – despite all the crimes, boot-trampling and tragedies, despite the Russian threat and what we see Ukraine suffering under right now. The Russians fired 160 ballistic missiles, drones and other things the other day, and Ukraine could only shoot down 29 of them because they do not have any air defense against ballistic missiles.

But there is a consensus in Sweden's Riksdag. There is a completely different understanding of Russian imperialism and Russian ambitions than there has been previously. We in Sweden are no longer as naive. We are strengthening our military and civil preparedness, and we have so far provided 22 support packages to Ukraine totaling almost 160 billion Swedish kronor.

Civil society's support for Ukraine through donations, aid deliveries, and not least volunteers who help Ukraine and are enlisted militarily in various units in Ukraine is the largest mobilization of ordinary people for people in need in another country since Stalin invaded Finland in November 1939.

The Russian threat is not the only threat to Sweden and Europe. But it is the greatest, not least towards us, because it is a military threat with nuclear capacity only minutes away by combat aircraft from our country. In the longer perspective, however, the challenge from China is at least as great, Mr. Speaker.

During the Soviet era, people in the West laughed at Russian technology. The TV sets were poor, and no one wanted to buy Russian cars. That is not how we view Chinese technology today. On the contrary, China is investing enormously in becoming a world leader in practically all areas concerning innovation, not least artificial intelligence.

That challenge and what relations we are to have with China will perhaps become the greatest challenge for future generations of politicians in free states – provided that no radical change occurs in China, of course, but we have seen no sign of that under Xi Jinping's leadership.

These are some of the reflections I take with me after my time in the Riksdag.

I want to thank all my colleagues. I want to thank all the civil servants in the Riksdag Administration, the Parliamentary Library, the speakers – Kenneth G Forslund in particular – and especially all the enormously competent staff at the committee offices where I have served.

I would like to extend a special thanks to Martin Brothén, who has skillfully managed the Foreign Affairs Committee's office during all the years I have sat here. He has also put up with me during all these years. A warm thanks also to Maria Malmer Stenergard for good cooperation and to our former Foreign Ministers, who have worked so hard to safeguard Sweden's interests in the world. Thank you very much!

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! Now Mr. Malm wonders why the Chairman is requesting a reply to this good speech.

It is like this: I began my speech in today's debate by thanking all members for this parliamentary session and for the entire mandate period. It has been an exceptional one. But I also naturally want to extend a special thanks to Fredrik Malm, who has made this mandate period and not least this parliamentary session, but also the chamber and the Riksdag as a whole, even more exceptional. He has added a golden touch to many of our meetings and travels and much of our work in the service of democracy, both in the chamber and in the committees, not least through his burning commitment to Ukraine which we all know and which was expressed through the Monday Movement and much work related to that.

We have traveled together through fates and adventures. Fredrik Malm has – here I believe I can speak on behalf of everyone – gilded not only the work here in the stronghold of power and the realm's highest decision-making body but also our journeys on trains in Ukraine and elsewhere around the world. In the midst of all the seriousness and all the debates of a serious character, it is completely evident that Member Malm has an ability to add a golden edge and humor to the most serious matters when it is most important of all.

It is an honor, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs during this mandate period, to thank Fredrik Malm both for this time and for all 20 years in the service of the Riksdag and democracy.

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Many thanks for all these kind words, Aron Emilsson! Many thanks also for the way Aron has managed the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as as delegation leader on our trips and so on.

The questions we have to deal with in foreign policy are somewhat special. On the one hand, we all stand behind Sweden's interests and shall defend them, and on the other hand, we have different ideologies and so on. That makes the Committee on Foreign Affairs always a somewhat different committee. It is a bit less about legislation and a bit more about political craftsmanship. To that comes the whole special aspect of us having a Ministry for Foreign Affairs where half of the employees are stationed abroad and where there is a lot of secrecy. The relationship between the Riksdag and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is also a bit different than it can be between other committees and their respective ministries.

This requires a special craft and way of handling the issues. As someone said: If you do not stand for something, you fall for anything. We must have our principles. On the other hand, it is the ability to change one's mind that distinguishes the wise from the stubborn. One must somehow combine this in the political craft, which makes foreign policy issues a bit special.

But a big and warm thank you! It has also been very fun – or fun might be the wrong word, but it has been important with the trips that the Committee on Foreign Affairs has made and that I have participated in. It is always fun if one can also contribute to lightening the mood every now and then. Thank you so much, Aron!

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I want to thank Fredrik Malm! I hope that Fredrik Malm can embellish the rest of the world and our surroundings with the issuance of historical anecdotes, which he has done with brilliance in the chamber. We have seen proof of that now, not least in the speech. I continue to wish him warm success. Thank you very much!

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I am a generation younger than the political generation to which Fredrik Malm belongs. When I joined the youth organization and later entered party politics, Fredrik Malm was already a well-known name, partly as chairman of the Liberal Youth Organization, partly as a newly elected Member of Parliament from 2006 onwards. Time has passed since he, in a bold way together with other names from that time – Annie Johansson, later Annie Lööf, and Birgitta Ohlsson, who has both managed to leave and now wants to make a comeback – actively discussed the FRA law, which was mentioned earlier in the debate. In a bold way, they challenged governments and parties that held power at the time, and they showed that they were part of a new wave of young Members of Parliament who entered the Riksdag at that time.

Fredrik Malm has also made other important decisions that have shaped his political career, which he himself has not mentioned. I am thinking of the recognition of the genocide against Armenians, Syrians, Chaldeans and Pontic Greeks, often called Seyfo, which occurred in connection with the formation of Turkey in the early 1900s. Furthermore, there are the Monday meetings linked to Ukraine, which Fredrik Malm mentioned.

For me, it is like what Fredrik Malm and I did in the autumn of 2019, when we, with the help of a unanimous Riksdag, stopped the arms exports to Turkey, that is important. Then we sat in a café late one evening and wrote a Left Party-liberal proposal which received full support the next day, after a few rounds when the first deputy speaker himself was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

For many, Fredrik Malm is also known as the author of the book Naftasyndikatet, which is about his grandfather Einar Kruse, who belonged to my party long ago in history. I have given a promise earlier, but it is worth repeating as a gift, namely that when Fredrik Malm now ends his political career here in the Riksdag, he shall receive a guided tour of the property that was purchased with the money from the sale of Naftasyndikatet, that is, the Vänsterpartiet party office.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you very much, Håkan!

Sweden was about to provide export credits to a company here in Sweden that manufactured turbines, which Aleksandr Lukashenko and his regime would use in production for military purposes. There was a major debate about this.

Håkan Svenneling is quite right in stating that we worked together in the EU Committee to try to drive a clear position that would lead to so much pressure that the export credit would be revoked. And that is what happened. I believe, however, that this occurred during the time when there was a paragraph in the January agreement that was partly directed against Håkan Svenneling's party. But we resolved this in the Riksdag anyway.

When it comes to the guided tour, I am happy to step up. I have never been inside the premises. It was indeed my great-grandfather who ensured that the then Swedish Communist Party could acquire the premises in the autumn of 1937. I once snuck in behind a pizza delivery, and therefore I have only seen the courtyard where there was a stable at that time. I would very much like to tread the same stairs as the 30s communists did. Many thanks, Håkan!

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! Fredrik Malm has undoubtedly been a profile in the Riksdag for a long time.

We have cooperated during different periods – sometimes in an alliance, sometimes in other constellations. We have negotiated and sought to find solutions.

It has surely not escaped anyone in the chamber that Fredrik Malm has a burning interest in foreign policy. It is therefore not strange that when Fredrik Malm decided to leave the Riksdag, he landed in the work of the Committee on Foreign Affairs again.

Many of us have been pleased to listen to Fredrik's various contributions. Fredrik also has a strong commitment to Ukraine. Many of us have that, but Fredrik does and will also continue to have it in the future. It was also naturally good that we were able to make a trip to Ukraine under the auspices of the Committee on Foreign Affairs together.

I remember many conversations about how we can strengthen democracy and democrats. No democracy without democrats. On this, we have been in agreement.

We have also met in the liberal family at the European level. We will have to see if Fredrik returns to that family. Who knows? Who knows if Fredrik also returns to the Riksdag. It might happen again.

Mr. Speaker! I hope that Fredrik's interest in history – in political history, in the history of the Riksdag, in the history of parties – and also his ability to tell stories will become something for everyone to share. New books, perhaps! Naftasyndikat was mentioned.

Many of us have experienced Fredrik's storytelling. One or another of us has thought about a new career – perhaps even as stand-up comedians. For those of you who have not met Fredrik in that capacity, I can say that there is much to be happy about here.

Many thanks, Fredrik, for your work in the service of democracy, for the Riksdag and for the liberal values over so many years. Thank you!

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Many thanks to Kerstin Lundgren for the kind words!

Kerstin has sat in the Riksdag longer than I have, and has served in the Committee on Foreign Affairs even longer than I have. She has enormous institutional knowledge, which follows from the fact that Kerstin has a detailed knowledge of reforms and processes, in a way that I have never managed to build up during all my terms in the Riksdag.

This might sound a bit bureaucratic, but it really isn't. It is in all the details that we shape policy. All the reports prepared in the committee are about weighing words and balancing between different perspectives. The committee's positions, as they appear in the documents we handle in the chamber, then become the Riksdag's decisions. Those positions then form the basis for much of what the government does.

I have many times had an enormous help from Kerstin, to the extent that Kerstin has always had a slight advantage in the discussions. In another way, she has read all the details and gone through all things, which one might have missed a bit because one was out giving a lecture or doing something else. You have made enormous contributions in the Riksdag, Kerstin, and I am glad to have been a colleague with you. I have also enjoyed the trips we have made and when we have met in other contexts. Truly a big thank you!

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I also want to thank you, Fredrik Malm, for all your years here in the Riksdag. But I think you are finishing too early. You are still just a child, not even 50, and you have sat here since 2006. You could have sat for another large number of years. I can say that as someone who has sat here since 1998. I will miss you very much in this chamber and in the committee.

It may be surprising for many, but we have probably agreed on almost everything. There are things that we have not agreed on, such as the Israel–Palestine issue, perhaps. But I feel now, when I hear how you in your speech refer to the Oslo Accords and a two-state solution, and even when we have discussed the issue, that we probably do not stand so far apart there either. We want to return to such a process again so that a peaceful order can be established there.

In the other major issues, we have had a common commitment, and there has been much agreement. I will especially remember your deep and long-standing commitment to the cause of the Kurds. Regardless of whether it has been about Syria, Iran, Turkey or Iraq, the cause of the Kurds has been very close to your heart. You have pushed that issue hard.

The same applies to Ukraine. Several here have witnessed how strong Fredrik Malm's commitment has been. I have heard Fredrik Malm speak at a number of public meetings about Ukraine, and I can say that it is not easy to follow Fredrik Malm. At the public meetings, one feels Fredrik Malm's energy and commitment in what he advocates for.

Fredrik Malm is also, as some have pointed out, fantastically funny. I could recount many jokes and anecdotes that he has shared over a cup of coffee or sometimes perhaps a beer during our travels, but I feel that there are other contexts where they can be retold. He is fantastically funny.

He has very broad knowledge and a very great commitment and is a very good speaker and debater.

We will miss you, Fredrik. A big thank you for all your years here in the Riksdag and all the best for the future!

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Once again, warm thanks for all the kind words, now from Morgan Johansson!

When I entered the Riksdag, Morgan had very much already completed two terms, and if I remember correctly, he had managed to be Minister for Social Insurance in Göran Persson's government. Our jobs have run in parallel. Morgan Johansson and I had some things to handle together when Morgan was responsible for migration issues and I sat in the Social Insurance Committee here in the Riksdag. And now we have sat in the Foreign Affairs Committee together.

Mr. Speaker! I can acknowledge that we fundamentally have much in common in the major issues and also in the Middle East issues, I believe. Actually, it does not differ that much there, even if it may differ in tonality, rhetoric and so on. But fundamentally, we all strive to find a solution to the conflicts that involves people getting peace and quiet, being able to build normal societies and have rich lives. And extremists in all different places must be restricted.

I do not know if I am finishing too early or what I should do next. But, Mr. Speaker, I can quote a Social Democratic politician, Göran Persson, and say: I am leaving a set table behind, but Morgan and some of the rest of you have to do the dishes.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Jacob Risberg (MP)

Mr. Speaker! This is a bit like when there are party leader debates and someone is to stop. Then one hands over gifts and so on. The primary gift I can hand over to Fredrik Malm is perhaps to continue fighting to save this planet, for both your children and my children. Some party leader I believe you will never aspire to become; that possibility simply will not exist.

I also want to express my thanks. I am green in this context, in a double sense. This is my first term. With that, I want to take the opportunity to say that I am annoyed. I am a bit annoyed that it took such a long time before you returned to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I had seen you from a distance earlier and understood that you are someone one wants to debate a lot with.

We have not had that many debates. But you have, admittedly, joined the debates in the Committee on Foreign Affairs at times and requested a reply from me, which I have found refreshing. Therefore, it has been nice to have gotten to know you a bit better, at least over the last half year, especially during the joint trip we made with the committee to Ukraine. That is when I heard the humor that has been mentioned here earlier and which is not always visible in the public debates but that one can experience in a train compartment or over a beer or so.

I will miss this. I will miss your knowledge. We burn for many of the same things, even if the analyses, just as Morgan said, perhaps do not always align when it comes to the Israel–Palestine conflict specifically. But I believe that even there we could find common paths forward and, fundamentally, also a common view on the issues.

I will never be able to sit in the Riksdag as long as you have. In Miljöpartiet, we have a rotation principle. That is perhaps good. But at the same time, I notice that it is a pity that some people leave. I agree that you probably could have sat for at least a few more terms, so that we could have debated here in the future, provided that I am re-elected, of course.

I am therefore hoping for a possible future comeback. Otherwise, I look forward to discussing things with you in other contexts, perhaps over a beer. I also look forward to reading your upcoming books.

With that, I would like to extend a big thank you to Fredrik.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you, dear Jacob Risberg, for the kind words!

Wonderful is short. We have not been able to have so many meetings next to each other in the Foreign Affairs Committee since I led the Education Committee as chairman until February this year. But we will certainly be able to see each other in different contexts moving forward. I was appointed by the government during the spring to become chairman of the Swedish Unesco Council. That is very much linked to the issues that the Foreign Affairs Committee works with, also when it comes to cultural heritage. We see in Ukraine, in Lebanon, and so on, that cultural heritage is threatened by the conflicts taking place there.

Since it is Jacob Risberg's first term, I can say that it has been somewhat problematic over the years to handle Miljöpartiet. During the first term, the party had already had many somewhat odd positions that one could constantly repeat and jump on Miljöpartiet about.

The Green Party were against the EU, but then they became for the EU. They were against defense, and then they became for defense. That was as much as the Green Party were against and that one could, so to speak, smash between these speakers' chairs. But it has gradually become significantly harder, because the Green Party have become a bit more liberal and have changed in such a way that the exchanges of remarks have become more difficult.

In conclusion: No, I have no aspirations to become party leader. I have seen the existence of five party leaders, I believe it is, in my own party, and I know what life is like for many other party leaders. I did, however, get to participate in a party leader debate, and then I became even more convinced that it is not the job for me.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Mr. Speaker! Fredrik! We have been colleagues for twelve years, especially during the last two parliamentary terms, and worked together a lot in the Committee on Social Insurance and now also in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It has truly been a real honor for me to work with you. Few possess such deep knowledge in the field of foreign policy as you do, and few have an ability to lift their gaze in the way you do. I have learned incredibly much from you. I truly want to thank you for that.

You have also shown an enormous commitment. Sometimes one can wonder if politicians are in politics for their own sake or to make the world better. But when it comes to you, Fredrik, there is never any doubt whatsoever – your commitment comes from the heart. I know that it has also taken a great toll. I know that you have spent an incredible amount of time on Måndagsrörelsen, which is only one part, but an important one, when it comes to demonstrating the strong commitment that exists in Sweden, not just here but also in civil society. A big thank you for that as well!

You have always had many irons in the fire, perhaps a few too many. I remember one time when you called me when I was chairman of the Social Insurance Committee. You sounded very stressed and said: You know how it is in small parties. One has to be everywhere and keep track of everything. It is a bit hectic. You and I almost always think alike, and when we don't, you still have a handle on what I think. You can surely flag if there is something I should think that you don't think? That, Fredrik, was a fine proof of trust, I felt.

Life is long, you said. Yes, it is, hopefully, but it does not last forever. But above all, life is very much more than politics. One might think that you should stay longer in politics. It is like Göran Holm, the old Moderate municipal councilor in Vellinge, said to a taxi driver: Take me anywhere, because I am needed everywhere! So it is with you too. But I think you are right. I do not think one should be in politics for their whole life. I believe that you will discover a world out there that is at least as exciting, where you have at least as much to contribute, and where you perhaps can also make up for a bit of all that you have sacrificed for democracy. Thank you very much, Fredrik!

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Warm thanks to Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard for the kind words! It is very true – we had many years together here in the Riksdag and sat in somewhat different committees. We sat together in the Social Insurance Committee and also in the migration committee that produced the new Aliens Act. It was after the year 2015, Mr. Speaker, with the large migrant crisis, which led to the government at the time with Morgan Johansson producing the temporary Asylum Act. Then we were to replace it with long-term legislation, a new Aliens Act. For that, the Migration Committee was appointed. There we learned a lot. We had a very good cooperation in that committee, I think.

Mr. Speaker! I am not envious of the Foreign Minister for her workload, all the travels and the challenges that Sweden faces and where the Foreign Minister in the end is the one who has to take the heat for everything and make the tough decisions, of course together with the Prime Minister. I can also imagine that there will be a number of tough telephone calls with other foreign ministers around the world.

Not least, I am very impressed by the Foreign Minister's work regarding Ukraine, as well as how the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish government administration have handled these issues both on the defense side and on the foreign side since the full-scale invasion, even during the last years of the previous government. It is not an easy situation we find ourselves in, but we are truly doing everything we can from Sweden's side, I think. Warm thanks for all the good cooperation!

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) concurred.

(FIRST DEPUTY SPEAKER: Now we have stretched the rules significantly for both forms of address and speaking times. The Speaker should normally not interfere in the debate, but I just want to concur with everyone's appreciation and say that I look forward with excitement to Fredrik Malm's future. I believe it will be very exciting to follow what Fredrik Malm takes on in the future as well.)

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Mr. Speaker! As many have pointed out earlier, we find ourselves in the most serious security policy situation since the Second World War. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has made it clear that information superiority and the possibility of rapid, innovative, and continuous adaptation of technical systems are at least as crucial as qualified weapons systems. Every day we face a broad and complex threat picture that places new and increased demands on both civil and military intelligence services. This does not fit within the current structures. We also face new demands and expectations of us as Nato allies.

That is why Sweden needs a forward-looking intelligence service that is at the technological frontline. Against this background, the government has initiated a reforming of the Swedish intelligence system. It is urgent to raise the Swedish intelligence system's collective capability. A central part of that work is the establishment of a civil foreign intelligence service. A similar model to the one we are now getting also exists among several of our allies, including the Netherlands, Estonia, and the United Kingdom. This will therefore facilitate cooperation with them.

The responsibility for the governance and organization of Sweden's authorities and the distribution of responsibility between them rests with the government, as has been emphasized. But as a result of the formation of the authority, a number of legislative changes are becoming relevant. It is those we are debating today.

The Government has proposed a new law on the processing of personal data at Sweden's foreign intelligence service. The proposal is based on the legal regulations that apply to the Armed Forces today. The bill also contains proposals for 22 other legislative amendments. It is proposed that the expression "defense intelligence activities" be replaced with "foreign intelligence activities" and that the Defense Intelligence Court be renamed to the Intelligence Court. The legislative amendments also mean that Sweden's foreign intelligence service will receive a legal framework that allows the agency to conduct foreign intelligence activities in a manner comparable to what the Armed Forces does today. This involves changes in, for example, the Act on Qualified Security Identities, the Act on Signal Intelligence in Defense Intelligence Activities, the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act, and the Protection Act. It is proposed that the legislative amendments enter into force at the same time the agency is intended to commence its operations, i.e., on 1 January 2027.

The proposals have been reviewed by the Council on Legislation, which only had a few linguistic and constitutional technical comments. The Government has adjusted the law in accordance with the Council on Legislation's comments. I want, by reason of previous remarks, to be clear that the Council on Legislation has not at all had any comments on the preparation. Contrary to what the Green Party has claimed, the financing must be handled before a bill is submitted. We have therefore followed the order that applies and should apply.

In addition to the proposals in this bill, the reform will also require new ordinances and amendments to ordinances, including an ordinance with instructions for the new authority, where the authority's tasks and responsibilities are specified. It will naturally be central that it is mandated to cooperate with other relevant authorities.

Questions have been asked repeatedly as to whether it is the right time to carry out this reform now. I would say that the question is rather why it has not been carried out earlier, since the establishment of a civil foreign intelligence service has been discussed for decades.

There have also been objections that the process would have gone too fast. I must say that those are peculiar objections. Already in 2023, the government appointed an inquiry, which two years later submitted the proposal that the new agency should be established. After that, an organizational committee has worked on preparing the formation of the new agency. The idea, as said, is that it should be in place on January 1, 2027. From the autumn of 2023 to January 2027 – one could say that it is too fast, but I believe most Swedes would say that it is quite slow and in any case not too fast. It is definitely longer than the time it took for Sweden to go from neutrality to becoming a full member of Nato, which I dare say is a bigger change.

This government may not work like other governments. We do not postpone until tomorrow what we should do today.

We find ourselves in a situation where an increase of Sweden's collective intelligence capability cannot be postponed any further. The consequences of a lack of investment are that capabilities corresponding to the needs that Sweden has are not developed.

It also cannot be ruled out, as the Chief of Defence has also pointed out, that we will face an even more serious situation. This is also stated by the Defence Committee in its updated security policy analysis. In that case, we will be very grateful that we did not postpone the reorganization.

This reform will lead to Sweden being better equipped to manage intelligence provision across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peace to war. We are now doing what is required to ensure that Sweden has the intelligence capability needed in the serious times we live in.

(Applause)

In this speech, Fredrik Ahlstedt, Ann-Sofie Alm, Caroline Högström and Viktor Wärnick (all M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Madam Speaker! I shall ask the same question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I asked the Sweden Democrat Aron Emilsson. It concerns how she views the concerns that both Must and the Security Service have highlighted.

The Foreign Minister said it was a peculiar objection to claim that there is an error in timing and that the timeline is too tight. I cannot interpret that in any other way than that she is thereby making a completely different assessment than both Säpo and Must do.

In my previous exchange with Aron Emilsson, I referred to the article from June this year. There, Mustchefen Thomas Nilsson says that there is a risk that we are now decreasing in effectiveness. That is the headline of the article itself.

He says as follows: ”When the Armed Forces commented on the investigation, we pointed out some risks. One of those risks is if the change is implemented very hastily and quickly, and that is indeed the government's direction. We see that making those types of changes under the current security situation, so we have pointed out that it is a risk.”

He was asked if he wanted the date to be pushed forward. He answered: "I have no views on that. I usually say that I have it so easy that I do not need to evaluate the government's decisions, I just implement them in the best possible way. But it is a risk, we are discussing it and we will try to handle it in the best possible way."

In the short quotes that I am reading out here, the head of the military intelligence service uses the word risk no fewer than five times. The risk is precisely, when we find ourselves in this situation, to do this with this speed both in the middle of an election campaign and with the ongoing war in Ukraine and with the risks in the security policy situation.

My question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs is actually two questions: Why have you chosen to push this through so quickly, despite the authorities' warnings? Can the Minister guarantee that efficiency will not decrease now that the reorganization is being implemented?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Madam Speaker! As I said in my opening remarks, one can always discuss what is the right timing. But there are also very great dangers in postponing a reform that is truly needed to broaden our intelligence competence.

We also know that currently Russia is occupied with large resources and capabilities linked to the invasion of Ukraine. It is not certain that Russia will be [so] for a certain period forward. Therefore, it is time to do it now, even though I do not say that it will be easy.

I welcome the views that have come from the referral bodies. That is precisely the point of having a preparatory procedure where the views of the referral bodies are solicited. We then have the opportunity to take into account the risks they see, ensure that there is close cooperation between the implementation committee, which will work out the structures for the new agency, and the other relevant agencies, not least the Armed Forces and Must. From what I have heard also from the highest levels, the cooperation is working very well.

It is clear that one quotes what suits one's purposes. I want to quote the same Thomas Nilsson, head of Must. He said in DN that we first need to broaden the intelligence service. Regarding the timing, he said: ”I think it is difficult to find an ideal time. The threat situation is serious, but it could become even worse. I think one must accept carrying out changes even in a serious situation.” Thus, he welcomed the reform.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Madam Speaker! The article I referred to is less than two months old. It is Mustchef's assessment right now that we are talking about. He points out that there is a risk that one is now going down in effectiveness.

We all know the background. We are currently in an election campaign. We know from experience that it is precisely during election campaigns that the risk of both violence and influence operations from foreign powers increases.

It is about the fact that this large reorganization is being pushed through right now. I think that the government is taking, again in the words of Mustchefen, a risk that it did not have to take.

Every time we have had an exchange of views on this, and we have now had five meetings with officials from UD, we have from our side highlighted the same thing: Do not rush this through! Take it after the election, and give it more time! But we have unfortunately spoken to deaf ears, it seems.

I can also state that Must is not alone in his view. We can read in the Security Service's referral response. Säpo writes: "Furthermore, the desire to quickly implement changes must not come at the expense of the vital activities currently conducted by the intelligence and security services. Given the global situation, the currently well-functioning inter-agency cooperation that exists between the intelligence and security services must not be risked by a change rate that is too rapid." Those are the Security Service's words.

Now it is up to the government and the authorities. The authorities are the government's tools for governing the realm. You are now carrying out the reorganization, and you have heard about the fears and the risks that exist. It is now the government's responsibility if it does not turn out well. We simply have to see how it turns out with that matter.

In the event of a change of government during the autumn, we on our side will need to go through the issue again to ensure that a high quality of intelligence services can also be maintained moving forward. The government is taking a very large risk with this procedure.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Madam Speaker! This is a reform that has been discussed since the 90s. I can only regret that previous Social Democratic-led governments have not been able to address this and ensured that we expanded our capacity much earlier. Then we might have been even better equipped today, even though I really, like previous speakers, want to emphasize that we have a very good intelligence capability in Sweden.

Election campaigns were mentioned earlier. I don't really know what that has to do with the matter. We work right up to the wire. We don't stop being a government and start conducting an election campaign; instead, we do what we are supposed to until our mandate period is over. We work right up to the wire. Then I have noted that the Social Democrats are not happy about coming to the Riksdag during the holiday period, but we would like to work.

I also heard a sneer regarding the government's "answer key" when it comes to security policy. In that case, I can take the opportunity to summarize the answer key from the Social Democrats. It was difficult from party leader Magdalena Andersson's side to call Russia's invasion as exactly an invasion when the full-scale invasion occurred.

It was said that NATO membership would destabilize Europe. When S turned in the question of NATO membership, it was because the party secretary thought it would disturb the door-knocking if that question lived on all the way until the election, regarding the election campaign.

We can remind that during the previous parliamentary term, large parts of the security policy were sold out to a political wild card, a former Left Party member, which complicated our very Nato application and thus jeopardized our security.

Finally, we have the entire debacle surrounding the nuclear weapons dialogue with France, where it is probably still no one who knows where Magdalena Andersson stands. Had I been Morgan Johansson, I would have been a bit more cautious in this debate.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm and Viktor Wärnick (both M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I think the Foreign Minister is misleading those listening to this debate a bit by trying to refer to the fact that it should have been already in 2023, when the government adopted the directives for Carl Bildt's investigation, when it was clear that it would be this decision we would make today.

Carl Bildt took a good amount of time before he submitted his investigation and his report to Defense Minister Pål Jonson on June 13, 2025. It has been 14 months. Then the government sent this out for consultation until September 17. By then it would have been summer, and people might not have had much time to delve into all the details. Many agencies still responded to the consultation, but then it took five weeks from that. On October 23, the government announced that there would be a new agency.

I believe that was when many were surprised. People had sat in various agencies and written massive criticism against the investigation's proposals and pointed out different types of risks, and then the government came forward with that it should be done this very quickly. In that case, it is not at all a process that has been ongoing since 2023, but rather we are talking about a process from October 2025 until today. I understand that many do not think it is a fast process, but in political contexts, it is a fast process. That is what I really want to assert.

I also want to assert that what stands out here is that the investigation was given to a defense minister. But then you, as foreign minister, took it over. It becomes an agency under you, and that is what stands out – that and that we get two intelligence agencies. Everyone wonders how it will turn out.

Given where we stand today, would the Minister for Foreign Affairs have done anything differently in the process of establishing the new intelligence agency?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Madam Speaker! There are many interesting claims in this.

We do not only have two intelligence agencies. I assume that Håkan Svenneling is referring to Must and the new civil intelligence agency. But we also have FRA and Säpo, which are also intelligence agencies.

It is entirely natural that I take responsibility when it concerns the establishment of precisely a civil intelligence agency because it is not a defense intelligence agency.

When it comes to the timeline, we have therefore had two years for an investigation and one year for a government bill. I would say that it is standard, perhaps even a bit on the longer side nowadays, in the Swedish legislative process. And what is important to emphasize here is that the Council on Legislation, which has the task of reviewing whether the process has followed the requirements for preparation set out in the Instrument of Government, has had nothing to object to at all in that part – unlike, for example, when it concerned the Upper Secondary School Act, where they pointed out that the limit had been reached. There, ladies and gentlemen and Madam Speaker, it really went fast! Everything is relative.

I am, as I have said, grateful for the comments that have been received during the referral process. This is not a simple matter. The government is not trying to claim otherwise either. But we have, through that, also had the opportunity to address many of those comments. Work is now being carried out very closely between the relevant authorities and the implementation committee tasked with establishing the new agency, and since the new agency is being implemented in stages, I am convinced that they will ensure that there is no gap in competence during the interim. That is, of course, absolutely crucial.

Finally, I also believe that the viewers can become confused, because it sounds like this is a discussion about whether this authority should be established or not. However, no one has reserved themselves against these legislative proposals, so we are fundamentally in agreement. But that is how it tends to be in Swedish politics, especially during the election campaign.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Madam Speaker! I note that the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not exercise much self-criticism regarding this process.

I think it is important to point out that the Council on Legislation consists of professional lawyers who assist us in the legislative work itself. Here, the criticism has come from the military profession. That is what we are returning to, and that is where the discussions have become so large.

It is about exactly what the Foreign Minister himself is getting at: We have the agency Must, the military intelligence service. Now it becomes a civil intelligence service. There is a risk of double work. There is a risk of competition for competence between these agencies. Furthermore, we have the agencies FRA and Säpo, which are within the same segment but have slightly different missions.

We all naturally wonder: Where does this authority fit into the administrative structure, when the others already exist? I am not so surprised that the Council on Legislation has no criticism against it, but I am still very concerned about the views of the military profession.

I still think that we from the opposition side have landed very reasonably. The government is in the process of establishing this authority. You want legislation that allows this authority to operate. In that case, it is reasonable that we point out what the shortcomings are but still say yes to the legislative proposal. That is what we are landing on now.

I still do not think it has been a good process. I hope, just like Morgan Johansson, that the next government looks at this issue, discusses it with these authorities and listens to what can be done now that the authority is about to be established so that it becomes correct, above all, between these four authorities we are talking about. There are also a number of other authorities around in this sphere that we need to take into account to ensure Swedish security and achieve the intentions that I nevertheless understand and believe the Foreign Minister has.

I feel a certain anxiety in my stomach but am nevertheless confident that we will do our best for Swedish security.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Madam Speaker! To begin with the risk of duplication: duplication is significantly better than a capability gap, so I can see an advantage in if the competencies of the different intelligence agencies partially overlap. It can mean that we get different assessments regarding different situations and threats. It is also something that I have highlighted continuously.

Then Håkan Svenneling asks where this authority fits in. This ensures that we get a structure that fits much better into the structure that exists among our allies, for example the Netherlands, Estonia and the United Kingdom, with whom we cooperate closely. It will facilitate communication and exchange between them that there are corresponding roles and authorities. It may sound like we are inventing something completely new, but it is rather the opposite. We are now doing what very many of our closest allies have already done, and I see that as a great advantage.

When it comes to the criticism, it is, as Håkan Svenneling points out, in two parts.

Håkan Svenneling claims that it has gone too fast. That is why I think it is relevant to look at the Council on Legislation's views. They are to examine precisely the preparatory process, and they have no views on that.

Håkan Svenneling then refers to the criticism that has come from referral bodies. As said, I truly welcome these referral statements. But I also note that Thomas Nilsson, head of Must, has welcomed this reform. He has said that it is difficult to find the ideal timing, that the threat situation is indeed serious now but that it can become even more serious and that one must accept that changes must be implemented even in a serious situation.

I feel secure with this reform, then. But it requires hard work, and much of that hard work is already being done – also in close cooperation with the relevant authorities.

(Applause)

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! An increase in intelligence capability is naturally welcome, but it must not mean that the transition leads to the gaps that the Foreign Minister also mentioned, such that one loses capability. That is our question mark in this discussion.

I wonder if the Minister for Foreign Affairs sees crystal clear that Swedish intelligence capability is not being weakened, that there will not be a capability gap, by setting the date to January 1, 2027. If everything is not in place, if it turns out that there could be a gap, would the Minister for Foreign Affairs – if the Minister for Foreign Affairs is still in office – then return to the Riksdag and request an amendment? Or would one accept a capability gap in intelligence activities? In that case, I am thinking particularly of the military capability.

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Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Madam Speaker! To begin with, the Armed Forces will, through this change, be given an opportunity to reorganize its intelligence service, which is something that the Supreme Commander has welcomed. I really want to emphasize that we do not accept any gaps in capability, but this reform will take place in stages precisely to ensure that there are no such gaps. I believe rather that there may come to be some overlap of capability, and that I welcome. I believe, in fact, that it can lead to a broader assessment of different threats and situations.

I want to once again emphasize the close cooperation that already exists between the relevant authorities and which functions very well. This must continue to exist, and that is also why we in the instructions to the new authority clearly write in requirements for cooperation.

When it finally comes to the timing, I am completely convinced that we cannot wait, and this is exactly what the head of Must has also said. We are in a serious situation, but it could become even more serious. We are in a situation where Russia is currently tied up with many resources in Ukraine. It may not be so forever, and then we need to have a better capability when we face the new reality.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

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Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Madam Speaker! As was noted in Carl Bildt's investigation and as many of us have noted, it was not the military intelligence capability that failed in the autumn of 2021, but the assessment of the political situation.

When we now assess Russia's current capability, we must not end up in a situation where the political assessment and the desire to see a different reality than the one that prevails causes the political assessment to fail once again.

I believe that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is involved in an ongoing discussion regarding an upcoming budget, which is being prepared in the Government Offices. I naturally wonder whether the Armed Forces, in the work you are currently undertaking, will receive resources to be able to ensure that the military intelligence capability is strengthened and not weakened, for that is one of the risks. What we have heard is that the military capability is decreasing because resources are being transferred from the Armed Forces to precisely the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the new agency.

This is, of course, one of the things we see as serious. It would be interesting to hear what the working government's commitment to ensuring that no power vacuum arises actually looks like. A little information to the chamber would be beneficial in this situation, Madam Speaker.

I also want to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the past parliamentary term.

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Utrikesministern Maria Malmer Stenergard (M)

Madam Speaker! Here Kerstin Lundgren is doing a little mental somersault, because it is true that it was not the military assessment that failed, but precisely the assessment of the political will. It was therefore the more civilian assessments that were made. In the United Kingdom, for example, they managed to identify this risk, which was subsequently realized. In the United Kingdom, they had a different structure, which resembles the one we are going to have.

I am not saying that we would have guaranteed been able to see it then, but it was not the military decisions that were misunderstood, but rather the political decisions. I believe therefore that we are much better equipped to make these assessments if we also have a civil intelligence service, just as Great Britain has, among others.

Regarding the budget issue, the appropriation for the new authority is estimated to amount to 2.8 billion for 2027, of which 2.2 billion kronor corresponds to the relocation of activities that the government also announces, and 600 million kronor are supplements for additional costs and increased ambitions that the government announced in VÄB.

When it comes to resources, these will simply be moved if the task is moved, and the overlap needed for the Armed Forces to be able to order, receive and analyze information from the new agency has been assessed to fit within the Armed Forces' financial framework. I have also accounted for this previously.

I really want to emphasize how important this is for us to be able to meet the new era with an entirely new technology, with Sweden as an ally in Nato and with a much greater need to acquire knowledge from open sources, where the majority of the intelligence actually can be found. We will, therefore, be better equipped with this reform.

Naturally, I also want to thank Kerstin Lundgren and the rest of the committee for the good cooperation during the parliamentary term.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The deliberation was hereby concluded.

(A decision was to be taken on 13 August.)

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