Foreign policy debate on the occasion of Sweden's membership in Nato

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! Since March 7, Sweden has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Nato - the western democracies' defense community. It is an epoch-making event for our country and entails a profound and immediate change in Sweden's foreign and security policy. Therefore, it is important for the government to present an extra foreign policy declaration to the Riksdag today.

On April 4, it is 75 years since Nato was founded in Washington DC. Ever since then, the alliance has been an indispensable foundation for peace and freedom in our part of the world, and to meet the authoritarian forces that have threatened it.

Sweden now joins with pride as the 32nd ally to this community, whose importance for international security has never been greater.

Mr. Speaker! Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is an irrevocable turning point for Swedish, European, and global security. Sweden's NATO membership is a direct consequence of this illegal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war of aggression. Russia's goal with the war is to recreate an empire and by force overthrow the European security order. Ukraine is therefore also defending our security and our freedom.

In December 2021, Russia set ultimate demands on new agreements regarding Europe's security. On decisive points, they intended to restrict even Sweden's self-determination and security.

Russia has used military violence to achieve its political goals - already in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine since 2014, in Syria since 2015 and through warfare with the Wagner Group as a proxy in a number of countries on several continents.

Russia has further lowered its threshold for the use of even massive military force. The country is prepared to take very large risks - larger than we have previously seen - and accept very large losses, not least in human lives, both among its own citizens and others.

Russia has step by step evaded the limitations of arms control. In the recent past, it has suspended its participation in the new START Treaty, withdrawn its ratification of the test ban treaty, and finally left the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. The Russian threats of nuclear weapons use are deeply irresponsible.

The external aggression goes hand in hand with a hardening internal repression in Russia. The limited space that previously existed for opposition forces, independent media, and civil society has been virtually erased. The Russian state leadership bears responsibility for the death of the Russian opposition leader Aleksej Navalnyj.

Russia's actions have severely and for a long time to come worsened the security situation in Europe and in Sweden's immediate vicinity. Russia has chosen a confrontational approach towards the EU and Nato. That confrontation must and needs to be met.

Sweden must, together with its partners and allies, pursue a unified, long-term and strategic policy to counter Russia's power expansion and opportunities to cause harm. Strong, predictable and sustained support for Ukraine is not only morally right; it is also our best opportunity to influence Russian actions. It is clear that Russia will not voluntarily stop its aggression.

How far Russia might go in its actions is not only a question for Moscow. The answer depends largely on whether we who share fundamental democratic values stand firm, strong and united.

In these fearful times, Sweden's and Finland's Nato membership makes the situation in our part of Europe more predictable. It raises the threshold for an armed conflict in our immediate vicinity. It increases security and stability both for us and for our allies. Therefore, Sweden becomes a member of Nato.

Our application was submitted by one government, and the process is now being completed under another. We are thus exercising – with broad support in the Swedish Riksdag – the invaluable right that is at the core of the European security order: every state's right to freely make its own security policy choices.

The Government also wishes to thank here in the Riksdag all the countries that have welcomed Sweden as a full member of Nato and that have given us support on the way there. We look forward to deepened cooperation with all of the alliance's members.

Mr. Speaker! Few political decisions have so fundamentally shaped Sweden's modern history and identity as the policy of neutrality and non-alignment that King Karl XIV Johan laid the foundation for in 1812. Since then, our foreign and security policy has had its roots in this choice.

The history of the neutrality policy is not linear. Sweden's position has often, but not always, been tested in times of upheaval and when conditions have changed. There have been reasons to question the policy pursued during several historical events.

Sweden chose after the First World War to seek collective security within the League of Nations. When the clouds of war gathered again, a joint defense of Åland with Finland was considered. And during the Finnish Winter War, Finland was given extensive military support.

In the initial stage of the Second World War, the coalition government made concessions to Germany. In its final stage, Danish and Norwegian units were trained in Sweden. In the first case, Sweden considered itself forced to go outside the rules of neutrality law. In the second case, we wanted to do so.

When the Cold War tightened its grip on Europe, the idea of a Scandinavian defense union was tested. But Norway and Denmark chose – with their geographical positions and with their historical experiences – to join Nato. Sweden chose – with our geographical position and with our historical experiences – non-alignment in peace, aiming for neutrality in war. Consideration for Finland weighed heavily, then as later.

Simultaneously, preparations were made in silence so that Sweden could receive military support from Western powers if the neutrality policy were to fail. This was based on experiences from World War II.

The fall of the Soviet Union meant a fundamentally changed situation for Sweden. The development of Swedish security policy for a new era began. We engaged early to strengthen the security and sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Sweden joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became a member of the European Union in 1995. In the same year, a Swedish troop was deployed under NATO command for the first time.

Since then, we have continued to continuously deepen our security policy cooperation: with Nato, within the EU, and with our Nordic and Baltic neighbors.

When Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members of the EU and NATO 20 years ago, both their security and our security were strengthened, just as when Finland became a NATO member in April last year. Step by step, cooperation and solidarity have been reinforced as pillars of our security policy.

Sweden's membership in Nato therefore constitutes the final point of a long farewell to the policy of neutrality and non-alignment. Sweden has now joined the Western defense community which has been a fundamental prerequisite even for our security and freedom during the last 75 years. We have come home.

Mr. Speaker! There is a strong and broad political consensus on the fundamentals of Sweden's security policy as a NATO member. It is a great strength for our country.

The vital national security interest for us in Sweden is to assert our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are prepared to - ultimately with the use of force - defend our country, our population, our democracy, our freedom and our community of values.

Sweden shall continue to build security together with others as a solidary member of Nato and the EU. We in Sweden shall pursue a solidary alliance policy aimed at strengthening security and stability in our immediate vicinity as well as in the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

Sweden has entered into agreements on binding mutual defense guarantees in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The collective defense commitment in Nato constitutes a central part of Swedish security and defense policy. As an ally, Sweden shall maintain a strong national defense capability in order to contribute both to the national defense and to the collective defense in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Sweden has a responsibility towards the EU's member states and is covered by the solidarity that EU membership entails. The Treaty of Lisbon, including Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union and the solidarity clause in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, implies that the member states have committed to a joint responsibility for Europe's security.

Sweden's security policy presupposes an active, broad and responsible international action. Challenges and threats to our security shall, as far as possible, be met in cooperation with other countries and organizations. Sweden's foreign and security policy is based on the cohesion in the EU and Nato as well as on cooperation in the Nordic and Baltic Sea region and cooperation within the UN and OSCE.

Cooperation with strategic allies such as our Nordic and Baltic neighbors, the USA and the United Kingdom is of particular importance for our security. A strong transatlantic link is indispensable for Europe's security.

Sweden shall continue to promote fundamental values in its foreign and security policy. Within Nato, as well as in the EU, UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, Sweden shall safeguard the rules-based world order, the European security order, democracy, freedom, human rights and equality.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden's and Finland's membership in Nato is one of the biggest geopolitical changes in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our choice of path strengthens the European security architecture. With Sweden, Nato becomes stronger. The development in our immediate vicinity also becomes more predictable and our neighboring countries safer.

NATO is an intergovernmental organization where decisions are made unanimously. NATO is the primary forum for transatlantic security policy consultations. Sweden's security is benefited by the fact that Sweden now has a seat and a voice when NATO makes decisions on Europe's security. It is a new opportunity for Swedish diplomacy.

Sweden shall act to ensure that international law and the principles in the Helsinki Accords and the Charter of Paris are upheld.

The decisive starting point for the government's security policy is the assessment that Russia will, for the foreseeable future, pose a serious threat to the security of Sweden and Europe. Sweden shall therefore consistently work for a clear-sighted, realistic and long-term Russia policy that limits Russia's opportunities for aggression, destabilization and power expansion. In relation to Russia, our security must be safeguarded from a position of strength - politically, economically and militarily.

Our contribution to Nato's deterrence and defense is an important part in limiting Russia's options and is of significant benefit to the alliance as a whole. Sweden's geographical location and ability to support other allies are crucial for Nato to be able to operate in this part of Europe. Sweden takes this responsibility. We fully embrace our opportunities to significantly facilitate the collective defense also of our neighboring countries.

Mr. Speaker! Nato is a defensive alliance, and Sweden's solidarity-based alliance policy is stabilizing. We will engage in all of Nato's core tasks: deterrence and collective defense, crisis management, and security cooperation. To safeguard the cohesion within Nato is to safeguard the alliance's strength. This is a Swedish core interest as a member. Sweden shall contribute to Nato's overall security in accordance with the alliance's 360-degree approach and will act decisively and in solidarity in the fight against terrorism.

Sweden shall stand for a fair distribution of the burden within Nato. Sweden's defense expenditures exceed 2 percent of GDP this year, and this shall be seen as a floor. We Europeans should take a greater responsibility in the transatlantic connections and in this way create a stronger Europe in Nato. We shall actively contribute to Nato's incident readiness and its forward defense, not least in our own immediate vicinity.

The conditions for allowing conscripts to serve within the framework of Nato are being analyzed within the Government Offices and will also be addressed in the Defence Committee. The Government strives for broad political consensus on the issue.

Technological cutting-edge expertise is a foundation for our security. Swedish innovation and Swedish technical know-how will strengthen Nato. Our defense industry is an important asset.

Sweden stands behind NATO's strategic deterrence and shall continue to be a strong voice for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Sweden's work to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used shall be strengthened in a time of strong tensions.

Sweden applied with broad support in the Riksdag for membership in Nato without reservations. This position remains firm, but in the same way as in other Nordic countries, there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory in peacetime.

With Sweden as a NATO member, it is important that the Riksdag's need for oversight and influence is met. The Government has taken the initiative for talks with the Speaker and the parliamentary parties on this. The Government will inform the Riksdag before NATO's formal ministerial and summit meetings and present an annual report on NATO.

Mr. Speaker! As a NATO member, Sweden will continue to work for close cooperation between the EU and NATO. The support for Ukraine shows how well the organizations can complement and reinforce each other.

Sweden is firmly committed to contributing to a strong and united EU with the great capacity for action required in a time of security policy upheaval. The EU's expansion is a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, security, stability, and prosperity. It goes hand in hand with NATO's support for partner countries such as Moldova, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Military, political and economic support for Ukraine is Sweden's primary foreign policy task during the coming years. Ukraine's cause is ours. NATO's role in the long-term support for Ukraine should be strengthened. Sweden stands behind the Vilnius communiqué, which establishes that Ukraine's future is in NATO.

China's authoritarian rule, combined with its growing power ambitions and deepened cooperation with Russia, challenges both regional security and the rules-based world order.

From a security perspective, the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are more intertwined than ever before. Therefore, Sweden welcomes the deepening of NATO's cooperation with partner countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership at the same time. That Sweden's accession is now also completed means that all countries around the Baltic Sea, except Russia, are members of both the EU and NATO and that seven of the eight Arctic states are NATO countries. It is a historical moment for the Nordic-Baltic region as a whole. As free and democratic allies, we defend each other and together strengthen our resilience.

Our Nordic neighbors have experience of war. Our Baltic neighbors still have fresh memories of occupation and oppression. They know that one cannot compromise with authoritarian darkness. Now, everyone is united in an alliance whose stated purpose is to preserve peace and freedom. We welcome this new chapter in the Nordic-Baltic relations.

When the security policy pattern in our part of the world changes, new opportunities arise for deepened cooperation between like-minded neighbors in the Nordic and in the Baltic Sea region. Sweden shall participate in developing this during the coming year. We do this as chair of the Nordic and the Nordic-Baltic foreign policy cooperation. Sweden and Finland have also proposed a security policy dialogue in connection with the next ministerial meeting of the Baltic Sea States Council. Germany and Poland, which are close cooperation partners, are also included there. A strong Baltic Sea region, firmly anchored in Nato and the EU, lies in Sweden's security policy interest.

Mr. Speaker! This summer marks 80 years since Allied forces landed in Normandy. Today's NATO is the heir to this coalition and is the primary expression of the transatlantic link. It is indispensable for Swedish and European security but must never be taken for granted. It is fundamental that Sweden maintains and deepens its relations with the USA. Canada is an important partner.

The DCA agreement on defense cooperation is a cornerstone in the relationship with the USA. It strengthens both Swedish and American security. It constitutes a very important contribution to the stability in our immediate area. It is a strength that our Nordic and Baltic neighboring countries have similar bilateral cooperation agreements with the USA. It signals our security policy alignment, strengthens security in Northern Europe and supports NATO's joint planning.

The defense cooperation Joint Expeditionary Force contributes to strengthening security in the surrounding area and is an expression of the United Kingdom's importance as a partner. Also, France's clear engagement in Northern Europe is of importance for our security.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden has made a historic choice. Our entry into Nato signifies a new identity for Swedish foreign and security policy. Sweden's solidarity alliance policy has a broad political and popular anchoring, and we stand ready to fulfill all our obligations according to the North Atlantic Treaty. Now, that which belongs together security-politically in the Nordic region, around the Baltic Sea, in Europe, and transatlantically can grow together. This represents a historic opportunity to develop these different dimensions of Sweden's security in harmony with one another.

We stand firmly together with our allies for peace and freedom. One for all, all for one.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm, John E Weinerhall, Mattias Karlsson in Luleå, Stefan Olsson and Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (all M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! The Swedish government already wrote, before the Nato agreement was finalized, under an agreement that gives the US military access to 17 bases in Sweden, from north to south, east to west. It is called the DCA agreement. But it is difficult to see in the agreement what have been the Swedish demands in the negotiations, especially when it concerns nuclear weapons.

In the Norwegian DCA agreement with the USA, it is clear that Norway does not want to see American nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. In the Danish DCA agreement, it is stated that nothing in the agreement changes Denmark's position on nuclear weapons, and in the Finnish DCA agreement, reference is made to Finnish law, which has for a long time prohibited the introduction of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory.

The Swedish government has repeatedly shown itself to be a poor negotiator with other states. Sweden backed down in the NATO process, first for Turkey and then for Hungary. Now the government is backing down for the USA. This creates concern about what it means for Swedish citizens to cede territory to another state – a state notorious for its crimes against human rights around the world. This creates concern in both the small and the large – concern about what it could mean in an international crisis situation but also in everyday life. Will the favorite forest be cordoned off this year when the mushroom season kicks off? The road along the lake where dog owners usually walk the dog and children fish, can we use it? How is the soldier judged if my daughter is subjected to abuse on a wet night out at the local pub? What happens when American law is to take precedence over Swedish law?

The Minister for Foreign Affairs! I wonder why there are no provisions in the DCA agreement that prohibit the USA from bringing nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! Håkan Svenneling speaks as a representative of one of the two parties that are not for Sweden joining Nato, so it is natural that he places the emphasis on these issues.

He does, however, forget two things. When it comes to the enumeration of Denmark, Norway, and Finland, there is, particularly in the cases of Denmark and Norway, an experience to fall back on, which Sweden also does. There are no formal reservations from these two states' sides, just as there were no reservations from Sweden's side. No ally has any reservations in its Nato membership. The Riksdag has approved the government's proposition on Sweden's membership with broad support, and it is stated there that Sweden's application to Nato has been submitted without reservations but that, in the same way as in the other Nordic countries, there are no reasons to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime.

Sweden has also for decades taken a clear position of not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought by visiting armed forces. This position is considered well-known, and it has been respected by other states. Other states are legally obligated under international law to follow the conditions Sweden sets for activities and operations on its territory. This follows, among other things, from the principle of sovereignty.

Regarding the DCA agreement, it provides good conditions for us to receive support when we need it. The DCA agreement itself primarily creates conditions for us to quickly and clearly receive effective American military support in a deteriorated situation, both bilaterally and within the framework of Nato. It is conflict-deterring and stabilizing. Therefore, it is good that we have this agreement in place, and it will not lead to the restrictions Håkan Svenneling is trying to make regarding.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! We could have heard the Foreign Minister clarify that Sweden shall not have nuclear weapons on its territory. But unfortunately, he continues to mumble. He never binds other states to follow Sweden's line of not having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

It is obvious that the government does not take people's anxiety seriously and does not see the risks with nuclear weapons. The Swedish government, led by the Moderaterna, is blinded in its love for Nato. One is too blind to see what risks this could mean for Sweden and for Swedish citizens in a deteriorated security situation. This would have been an opportunity in the DCA agreement, but the government could also have presented a legislative proposal that would have prohibited nuclear weapons on Swedish territory. But the government never takes the chance. It is more important to repeatedly assert that Sweden joins Nato without reservations. This means that there are no formal obstacles for another state to break with the Swedish line and bring nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! Let the words fly, the thought stands still, they say. That really fits when one listens to Håkan Svenneling.

NATO does not own any nuclear weapons of its own. Individual allies do. The USA, the United Kingdom, and France do. Any deployments therefore occur following national decisions and in agreement with individual allies. It is a sovereign national decision. It is a decision for an allied country's government and parliament whether it allows the deployment of or storage of nuclear weapons on its territory. Do not try to claim that the facts are otherwise, Håkan Svenneling, because you will not succeed!

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Centre Party largely agrees with the Minister for Foreign Affairs' entire speech.

There are, however, reasons to return to the foreign policy debate on February 14 when I raised the question of long-term, predictable support for Ukraine. We have proposed 1 percent of GDP from Sweden in a special Ukraine fund. The Foreign Minister is clear that Ukraine defends our security and our freedom, and if this is the case, we agree. But if Ukraine is to be able to defend our security and our freedom, one must have the military and economic possibility to do so. Today we see how this is failing. It is with a blush of shame that I see that today we are to make a decision on 2.4 billion in support to Ukraine, no more. Greater resources are required collectively. Now that Sweden is a member of Nato, we have another table at which to present these views.

How does the Minister for Foreign Affairs want to ensure that we scale up? If we mean business regarding the fact that Russia might go far in its actions if we are not clear and stand firm, strong and united, we must show that we do more here and now and not far in the future, because then it could be too late for our security and our freedom.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Kerstin Lundgren for the kind words regarding the foreign policy declaration. They are appreciated.

No question is as central as ensuring strong and long-term international support for Ukraine. On that point, Kerstin Lundgren and I are in complete agreement. Although the US Congress has not yet been able to agree on the next support package, we see how a number of important processes are proceeding. One of these processes is our own, to discuss the forms of support together with the Ukrainian government. It is a task that is currently ongoing within the various departments of the Government Offices.

I can guarantee that the question of ensuring support, just as I said in the declaration, will be the primary foreign policy priority for the government. But it must happen hand in hand with Ukraine, and we must listen to what kind of support Ukraine needs.

In the European Union, we also continue to work forward. In February, the EU was able to agree on the so-called Ukraine Facility, which covers 50 billion euro. Sweden has been an actively driving member state in that work.

On March 18, the EU member states agreed to establish a special Ukraine envelope, a so-called Ukraine Assistance Fund, within the European Peace Facility. At the same time, a number of bilateral security commitments have been established with Ukraine. This is also work that we are undertaking.

On all these points, the work is moving forward. We are not at the finish line yet, and we will not reach it until we have completed the deliberations with Ukraine.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! It is step by step, package by package. But while we stand here, there are people at the eastern front in Ukraine who do not have weapons to defend their freedom and thus our security and freedom. We are not managing to deliver enough here and now to give the Ukrainian population hope, to give the Ukrainian defense the ability to defend itself in the air, on land, and in the water. It is not enough. We must manage to do more here and now.

I hear Lithuania's Foreign Minister speaking about how Europe needs a Pearl Harbor to wake up. Surely we must have woken up now, Mr. Speaker.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! I fully share Kerstin Lundgren's commitment to the issues. I also know Gabrielius Landsbergis, my Lithuanian colleague, very well. I understand and share his commitment to the issues.

The keyword here is long-term perspective. Kerstin Lundgren is right; we are working with individual packages all the time. It is precisely to establish principles and processes that ensure the conditions for Ukraine to receive support economically, politically, and militarily that the government is working on these issues at this moment. But it must also happen hand in hand with Ukraine. It is Ukraine that knows what Ukraine needs militarily, politically, and economically.

We have in the past – it was noted especially when the invasion began – from the European side not either always been sufficiently responsive to the needs that actually exist. We need to be now, and that is the principle that the government will work according to.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I thank you for this foreign policy declaration.

Miljöpartiet and Moderaterna have had different views on NATO membership, but we share the picture of the serious security policy situation. It is a situation where threats of the use of nuclear weapons are uttered by Russia at more or less regular intervals.

Nuclear weapons are terrible weapons of mass destruction. If they are ever used, it will have unimaginable consequences.

NATO's deterrence is largely based on the USA's nuclear sharing, the so-called nuclear umbrella. But, in the name of honesty, no umbrella in the world can protect against the devastating force of a nuclear detonation.

Sweden is now a member of a nuclear weapons alliance. Consequently, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons also becomes a part of Sweden's defense. Sweden has for a long time worked in foreign policy for disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Sweden's work to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used shall be strengthened in a time of strong tensions. That is good. But how has the Minister for Foreign Affairs intended for this strengthening of this work to take place when the nuclear doctrine is at the same time such an essential part of what is Nato?

Today, Nato reserves the right to be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons. That is not reasonable. Is the Foreign Minister prepared to comply with the Miljöpartiets demand to work for a no first use policy as a way to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used? It is a policy that means that Nato shall not be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! As a member of the alliance, Sweden is part of the alliance's collective deterrence and defense, of which nuclear weapons are a part.

It would have been good if the world had not had nuclear weapons at all. But if the dictatorships have nuclear weapons, the democracies must also have nuclear weapons. The principle that Emma Berginger wants to establish, which says no first use, would be an effective way to create fantastic tools for the authoritarian states to blackmail the democracies. Therefore, it cannot be formulated in that way.

As I said in my speech, Sweden should instead be a clear voice for arms control, for non-proliferation and for disarmament even as a NATO member. I am proud that Sweden is already today an active and relevant actor in these issues with internationally recognized expertise. That is what we intend to continue to be.

Sweden also leads, together with Germany, the Stockholm Initiative for Non-Proliferation. Sweden will – in this spring, the spring we are currently in – host an international meeting with the participation of both nuclear-weapon states and other countries, with the aim of strengthening the work to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. It is important in these tense times.

One thing I want to say to Emma Berginger and everyone else in the debate. We must never forget that it is Russia that is the problem. It is Russia that has systematically evaded the limitations of arms control. It is Russia that brandishes nuclear weapons and issues threats that are irresponsible and unacceptable. The purpose of NATO's nuclear policy is to preserve peace, prevent the blackmail that I just spoke about, and also deter aggression. It is necessary in light of Russian capabilities and Russian threats. Sweden therefore stands behind the alliance's nuclear policy.

(Applause)

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm (M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! So the Foreign Minister is prepared to let Nato be the party that initiates a nuclear war?

As we know, nuclear weapons themselves can constitute a target for nuclear attacks. Therefore, Miljöpartiet wants to see legislation that prohibits the import of nuclear weapons onto Swedish territory both in peacetime and during wartime.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs says that there is no reason to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime. Why then does the Minister for Foreign Affairs not support legislation in this part? Why does the Minister for Foreign Affairs want to open up for having nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in wartime, when the risks for an escalation and use of nuclear weapons are even greater than in peacetime?

Is the Foreign Minister really prepared to face the consequences if nuclear weapons were to be fired from Swedish territory, or, God forbid, if Sweden were to be subjected to a nuclear attack because we would have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in wartime?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Utrikesministern Tobias Billström (M)

Mr. Speaker! I have already in my response to Håkan Svenneling spoken about what is the government's position in that regard. It is not the case that any country can be forced to have nuclear weapons on its own territory against its will. This is always a national sovereign decision. Nato does not own any nuclear weapons, Emma Berginger. It is important to remember this. When one listened to the contribution, one could be misled to believe that it is otherwise.

NATO has over the years been very clear that a nuclear war must never be allowed to be fought. It is something that NATO has stated repeatedly. On the other hand, other parties, especially the former Warsaw Pact, have never ever had that line in that regard. At the time when Russia joined the pact, they had a completely different and more confrontational line when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons. That is not what NATO has had.

I can conclude by stating that Sweden is part of the alliance and part of its deterrence concept. We do not see a need for any prohibition, which on the contrary could lead to the credibility of Article 5 being questioned regarding our case.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden has since last Thursday of last week, March 7, been a member of the defense alliance Nato. It is a success for Sweden, and we Social Democrats welcome that the process which started in the spring of 2022 has now been completed.

Thus, a new chapter in Swedish history begins. Neutrality served Sweden well for more than 200 years, and 200 years of neutrality became 200 years of peace. It took us through all the wars on the continent during the turbulent 19th century, it took us through two world wars, and it took us through the Cold War.

We should not be ashamed of this, on the contrary. After all, that is what security policy is about – to ensure that the Swedish population can live in peace and freedom. We Social Democrats have never engaged in adventure politics, but the most important thing for us has always been the security of the Swedish people.

So it was also in the spring of 2022 when we saw how Russia's attack on Ukraine tore apart the European security order and Finland thus began the reassessment of its security policy line. Then it became natural that we in Sweden also did so.

After consultations with all parliamentary parties, after close contacts with Finland, and after consultations and many discussions with our other neighboring countries, the government under the leadership of then Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson was able to submit Sweden's application for NATO membership on May 18, 2022. It was able to do so with broad support both among the Swedish people and in this chamber. This was to take responsibility for Sweden in a dangerous time.

Mr. Speaker! Swedish NATO membership makes Sweden safer and NATO stronger. The security assurances we received from a number of countries already in the spring of 2022 are now reinforced by the defense guarantees that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty entails. This in itself makes Sweden safer; during NATO's 75-year history, no country has dared to attack a NATO country.

Also, Nato is becoming stronger. Sweden can enter the defense alliance with its head held high and good self-confidence regarding defense capability. Our defense has been significantly strengthened over the last ten years. The Social Democratic government increased defense investments heavily from 2015 onwards. We reintroduced conscription.

Sweden is now becoming one of the few Nato countries that actually reaches Nato's recommendation on military expenditures of at least 2 percent of GDP. Furthermore, we significantly deepened the cooperation with Finland, which will come in handy now that we can, within the framework of Nato, take responsibility for defending our part of the world together.

Sweden contributes well-trained officers and soldiers. We have submarines and combat aircraft of absolute world-class. We have unique capabilities when it comes to fighting in subarctic environments. We are one of the few Nato countries of our size that has its own strong defense industry. Sweden becomes, I dare say, a great asset for Nato in the joint defense planning, and we should be proud of this.

Mr. Speaker! It is natural that there are many questions about what the NATO membership will mean. Many of the answers will have to be given gradually, but I want to make a few points already now.

Firstly, regarding nuclear weapons and permanent NATO bases in Sweden, Magdalena Andersson was very clear when we applied for NATO membership in the spring of 2022: Sweden shall have the same policy that Norway and Denmark have had since the 50s. We do not intend to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory or the establishment of permanent NATO bases in peacetime.

This was acknowledged by the then opposition leader Ulf Kristersson, and I now heard the Foreign Minister confirm it. This is good, and we welcome it. We have previously seen how some government representatives have expressed themselves vacillatingly on this issue, but now it seems clarified, which is good. I want to add that this must, of course, also apply after a DCA agreement. Nor shall we have any nuclear weapons in Sweden then. If there are uncertainties regarding this, we must clarify them in the parliamentary process of the agreement.

For us Social Democrats, nuclear weapons are a strong moral issue. Nuclear weapons are weapons that in practice are entirely aimed at killing civilians. Nuclear weapons do not only cause harm in the moment but far into the future, and a large-scale nuclear war could mean the end of humanity, at least with the living conditions that we can imagine. Nuclear weapons are a type of weapon that should never have been invented.

Our goal is always a world free of nuclear weapons, and therefore we have been clear from the beginning that Sweden's accession to Nato must under no circumstances entail a risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, neither now nor in the future.

Mr. Speaker! Secondly, there are those who believe, and perhaps also those who hope, that Nato membership will mean that Sweden falls silent in foreign policy. I also want to strongly mark my opposition to this. Nato is a defense and security policy cooperation, not a foreign policy one.

There is no common foreign policy for the NATO countries, even though one naturally strives for as much consensus as possible. That the 32 different countries can have completely different views on international issues can be seen by anyone who follows the international debate.

For us Social Democrats, it is obvious that NATO membership must not mean that Sweden falls silent in foreign policy. Sweden shall continue to stand up for everything that we have stood up for for decades. We shall be a strong voice for the rule of law. We shall be a strong voice for human rights. We shall be a strong voice for international solidarity, and the one percent goal in aid shall be reintroduced. We shall be a strong voice for the rights of women and girls. We shall be a strong voice for peacebuilding and conflict prevention work. We shall be a strong voice for mutual nuclear disarmament.

This is important. When a country violates human rights, undermines the rule of law, breaches international law and jeopardizes peace, Sweden must be able to criticize it, even if it concerns another Nato country. Membership in Nato does not mean that a country gives up its voice in foreign policy, and it should not do so for Sweden's part either.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden is becoming safer now, and Nato is becoming stronger. The accession process is over, but now the real work begins. Sweden shall be an active and constructive member of the defense alliance. Now the extensive work of being integrated into the Nato structure begins, and we Social Democrats look forward to a broad, cross-bloc cooperation regarding this.

Sweden shall, together with other countries in our immediate vicinity, such as the Nordics and the Baltics, deepen our defense cooperation so that it becomes almost seamless - a common defense for northern Europe that becomes so strong that no aggressor can even consider attacking us. So, Mr. Speaker, we best secure Sweden's peace, freedom, and independence in a new era.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! The Sweden Democrats have, since their entry into the Riksdag, pursued a strong and defense-friendly policy with the aim that Sweden shall have a strong national defense. Without a strong defense, diplomacy and detente ultimately play little role, which we have also seen recently.

The world has interpreted the Western world's disarmament and trade diplomacy as a weakness and an opportunity to build up and challenge over time. This has been a profound misjudgment, just as for the defense decisions of 1925 and 1935.

The Social Democrats have held government power for the lion's share of the last 100 years, including the last decades. At the beginning of the 2000s, we could see that not only large parts of the military defense were being dismantled, but also the civil defense, which has resulted in a shortage of virtually everything – preparedness stocks, routines, and processes for how society should cope in the event of war. War exists and has never ceased to exist, even if we have not been involved in it for 200 years, as Morgan Johansson mentioned in his speech.

My question to Member Johansson and the Social Democrats is therefore: What lessons do the Social Democrats draw from the realities of the world? And placed in relation to the disarmament and downscaling policy that you have de facto been primarily responsible for during the last decades, I wonder: What do you take with you into the future?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Aron Emilsson must have missed the last ten years of debate and discussion regarding defense.

When we took office in 2014, we shifted the defense policy, partly in the context of Russia's occupation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. During the ten-year period 2014-2024, Sweden has almost doubled its defense expenditures. That development began, as mentioned, immediately with the defense decision of 2015, which was taken under the leadership of the then defense minister Peter Hultqvist.

I do not intend to take any criticism whatsoever regarding the fact that we did not draw any conclusions from the deteriorated security policy situation. If there was anything we did immediately after our appointment, it was precisely that.

Now we are discussing how the development should continue. Sweden is, as said, one of the few countries that now reaches a level of having military expenditures at 2 percent of GDP, in the way that Nato defines those expenditures. We may well need to allocate additional resources to the defense. We discuss that in the Defence Preparedness Committee. There are many ideas on how it should be strengthened in different ways. And we know that it will cost quite a lot of money.

A problem in the discussions in the Defence Preparation Board is that some parties, including the Sweden Democrats, refuse to discuss all types of financing of the expenditures. It is not sufficient to just order more and more defence materiel but not at the same time be prepared to finance it, Mr. Speaker.

My counter-question to Aron Emilsson is therefore whether he is prepared to enter into a discussion on how we can finance the increased defense expenditures, so that it does not have to come at the expense of healthcare, schools, and other important areas of public activity.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! The short answer is, of course: Yes! I know that at least one of our men in the Defence Preparation Board, Lars Wistedt, who is a leader there and has long experience from the Armed Forces, has for many years been pushing for us to strengthen the Armed Forces and ensure that one has all the resources that are required and that one needs. He has been pushing together with the now unfortunately deceased party colleague Sven-Olof Sällström, who sat in the Defence Committee and was previously its vice chairman.

If we recall how the proposals and debates in this chamber and the Riksdag have looked in recent years, it is clear that the Sverigedemokraterna, since their entry into the Riksdag, have been the strongest advocates for increased defense appropriations. If we let the facts demonstrate the circumstances, the Socialdemokraterna's and also other parties' budget proposals have on a number of occasions stood at significantly lower figures when we have wanted to strengthen the defense. One still needs to take that into account. I think it is worth learning from history and seeing how it stands in reality.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I dare to assert that no government has upgraded the Swedish defense as much as the two Social Democratic governments we had between 2014 and 2022. It was, as said, almost a doubling of the defense expenditures - new regiments, new materiel, new equipment and reintroduced conscription. It was an enormous expansion of resources. We are proud of that. It was, of course, a deliberate policy from our side.

Aron Emilsson says here that he is prepared to discuss funding. These are new announcements. Every time we raise the question of funding in the Defence Preparation Board, we receive the same answer from the right-wing parties: We do not want to talk about that.

If we ask young people to perform military service for one year, I think we can ask that the wealthiest in society, those who live in Danderyd, on Lidingö, in Täby, or wherever one lives, are prepared to pay some more crowns in tax, in the form of a readiness tax, to carry out the large increase in expenditure that we have ahead of us. But the Sverigedemokraterna are, unfortunately, completely against it.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Morgan Johansson and I fundamentally agree on the issue of not having nuclear weapons or foreign bases on Swedish territory and that Sweden should continue to be a strong foreign policy voice.

As part of reaching an agreement with the right-wing government on the bill regarding Sweden's NATO membership, the Social Democrats negotiated additions to the report on NATO last year. They did not fall directly off their chairs because the formulations were razor-sharp, but according to the Social Democrats, they have implied that there will be neither nuclear weapons nor foreign bases on Swedish territory.

Since the Social Democrats and the government reached an agreement last year, one might say that it has gone so-so. Already in the subsequent debate on NATO membership, the Liberals stood up and said that even though they had signed, they probably thought that foreign bases should be allowed on Swedish territory.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, the Social Democrats have asserted that the Swedish government should now, now that membership is secured, express that Sweden is a nuclear-weapon-free state. But the Moderate government has rejected that. It is argued that it has been clear anyway; it is a bit unclear in what way. Nor in today's declaration do we get any greater clarity from the Foreign Minister. It is roughly the same mumbling as before.

The question is whether the Social Democrats are satisfied with the negotiation and the agreement. Can that handshake with the Moderaterna really be trusted when they time and again show that they take what has been agreed upon very lightly? Does Member of Parliament Johansson consider that the government parties and the Sverigedemokraterna have honored your agreement in the report on the Nato proposal that we will not have any nuclear weapons or foreign bases on Swedish territory?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I have, of course, also followed the debate. The Liberals must answer for themselves. One cannot always rely on information from that direction.

But what I hear from the Foreign Minister on this point today, I think is clarifying. Directly after the election and the new government's inauguration, we heard a number of statements on that point which we perceived as wavering. But just as I have said in my post now, I mean that this is now being clarified. We shall have neither permanent bases nor any nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

Thus, we have exactly the same position as Norway and Denmark have had since the 50s. This has also been clarified there through statements from parliaments and from the government.

I am satisfied with this. I think it is sufficient in this context.

But it is clear that if any of the government parties or a right-wing government in the future were to begin to waver on the issue and concretely start to raise the issue, they can expect a fight over it. That is, we do not intend to agree to it. It is that simple, Mr. Speaker.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I agree with Morgan Johansson's description regarding the risk that one might start to waver again. That is what worries me: that we do not more clearly confirm that Sweden shall not have nuclear weapons or foreign bases on our territory.

If one wants to achieve what the Social Democrats say, that is to say the same policy that Denmark and Norway have, there are provisions in the DCA agreement stating that one does not want nuclear weapons on its territory. But that is not in the proposal that the right-wing government has negotiated. Now Johansson says that it should be taken up in the parliamentary process. But it would have been significantly stronger if it had been included in the agreement that the right-wing government has negotiated.

Morgan Johansson and I often have interesting discussions about the changed global situation. The conditions look a certain way now, but at the same time as the government flew over to the USA and got the Nato application approved, Orbán also flew there and met Trump. Just one such thing shows how quickly Nato perhaps can also change in a foreign policy perspective.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! Absolutely - nothing is certain in this world. It is clear that a negative development in the USA would also be enormously negative for Europe in this situation.

Regarding the DCA agreement, we have not even seen the bill yet. It will arrive at the beginning of May, and then a parliamentary process will follow. If there are uncertainties regarding these issues, we will then have to clarify them in that process.

I want to say two things about the DCA agreement. The purpose of it is not for permanent bases or nuclear weapons to be established here, but the purpose is that Sweden should be able to quickly receive help in the event of an attack. And if there was something we learned when we were in Ukraine together a year ago, it was that such an attack can happen incredibly fast and that it can be extremely important to quickly gain access to the equipment and the personnel needed to be able to strike back against an attacker.

That is why the DCA agreement means that American materiel can be stored here, so that one can quickly come in and help Sweden defend itself if we were to be attacked. That agreement is therefore an important step for our security.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! The government that applied for NATO membership did so without reservation, and in that government sat Morgan Johansson. That is the fact. When I listen to Morgan Johansson, it still sounds as if there was something special regarding the nuclear weapons issues. But fundamentally, with NATO membership, Sweden has also joined NATO's nuclear strategy. It is part of the deterrence that we must see and that we stand behind.

In this situation, it is naturally Russia's nuclear weapons that we must pay attention to. It is Putin and the Kremlin who are flexing their nuclear weapons and practicing, who threaten and have threatened Ukraine with the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, one is actually also threatening us. What is it that makes us so cautious when it comes to the support for Ukraine? It has been no, no, and then a little yes. It is so that it does not escalate, as it is so beautifully called, because Russia threatens with nuclear weapons. We adapt and are cautious.

We cannot end up in a situation where we have to adapt to the Russian nuclear weapons. When Ukraine defends our freedom and security, we must be prepared to step up. Are the Social Democrats prepared to allocate 1 percent of our GDP to give Ukraine the support they need to manage to fight Russia?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I object to the image that Sweden would in any way have hesitated when it comes to the support for Ukraine. It is rather the opposite. Four days after the invasion took place in Ukraine, the Swedish government decided to allocate military materiel to Ukraine.

I myself was responsible for the arms exports at that time. 5,000 armored shells were what we decided on in the first decision. It was the first time since 1939 that Sweden decided to send weapons to another country at war so that it could defend itself. In 1939, we did it to Finland.

It was not at all the case that Sweden hesitated. On the contrary, it rather surprised many that Sweden was so quick to contribute with military means. We saw when we were in Ukraine a year ago that people were surprised that just Sweden was so fast with contributing so much. This has since been supplemented with additional military materiel under both the previous government and this government.

No, I do not agree at all that we would have hesitated in any way. On the contrary, Sweden has been one of the countries that has most clearly signaled support for Ukraine. We have also, in material terms, provided Ukraine with a very large amount of equipment.

The question then is how this shall continue. My view is that the rest of the world simply must continue to support Ukraine for as long as it is needed, so that they can win the war. Sweden cannot take on that entire part, but we must do it together with other countries. We must simultaneously also look at what we can spare of our own military capabilities.

We Social Democrats have, for example, said that we should now also send the Jas-plan to Ukraine to help there. Now that Sweden is a member of Nato, I assume that such a process can be completed quite quickly, so that Ukraine can get this reinforcement capability in place.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! The first package was good, and it was good that one still chose to begin contributing. But we must look at ourselves in the mirror. We have proceeded slowly and cautiously so that it would not escalate, and we have listened and weighed options. Otherwise, the situation would not be as it is right now, that is to say that Ukraine does not have enough resources to be able to defend itself at the eastern front. We would have contributed with more and more powerful weapons that Ukraine could have utilized.

We have had a long discussion about Archer and various systems, including Jas, which we have spoken about for quite a long time from our side. But we have been afraid that it should escalate. I hope that together we can step up to become more effective in the defense of Ukraine.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I do not agree at all that a factor has existed that one has been afraid of escalation. Not in any of the discussions that I have participated in has that been weighed in.

What it has been about is what we ourselves can spare and what Ukraine needs. Just the anti-tank weapons were precisely what Ukraine needed at that point in time. Furthermore, we had them in our warehouses and could send them. It has since been supplemented further with Stridsfordon 90 and a number of other weapon systems that have come to Ukraine. Sweden has been one of the countries that has contributed the most, and I am very proud of that.

Another factor is, of course, how much one manages to produce, which perhaps is the major problem when it comes to, among other things, ammunition. But we have from a Social Democratic side put forward another proposal, namely that the proceeds from the Russian frozen assets that exist in, among other places, Europe could be used for, for example, the purchase of ammunition for Ukraine. It is another concrete proposal on the table.

We will continue to support Ukraine for as long as it is needed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! An American ambassador once said that it is considerably easier to join Nato before the war has broken out than when the war has broken out. I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that he was right. In fact, Dante already said in the Middle Ages that hell is reserved for those who are neutral in times of moral crises. He was also right.

Nevertheless, the Social Democrats stubbornly and categorically refused to even open the door a little for NATO membership until Russia fully invaded Ukraine two years ago. They waited until the war broke out. This has severely hindered, complicated, and delayed Sweden's entry into NATO.

Of course, Mr. Speaker, it is positive that the Social Democrats pivoted and took a stand for NATO membership. But if the Social Democrats had updated their world situation analysis already in the 90s, in the 00s, or at least in the 10s, this journey would have been significantly easier and our preparedness significantly better.

It is 30 years of sluggishness, ideological blockages and a backdrop of double-dealing. The Social Democrats have a very large responsibility for this. Why did you not act differently, Morgan Johansson?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I can only state that neutrality had great support also deep within the bourgeois camp during a large part of the post-war period. This was due, among other things, to the situation we found ourselves in during the Cold War.

As I said earlier, for us Social Democrats, it has always been the security of the Swedish people that has been most important. It is clear that a very strong argument for neutrality has been two hundred years of neutrality, two hundred years of peace.

It is a big step to take to change a security policy line. We have not wanted to do that if it could jeopardize the security of the Swedish people. That discussion has been had, and it is the background to our position.

We are not some kind of ideological NATO supporters in the way that Fredrik Malm seems to be, that we are to change our security policy line depending on some kind of ideology. For us, it is simply about the security of the Swedish people.

When Russia attacked Ukraine, the European security order was shattered. This also triggered a situation where Finland began to reassess its security policy line. It then became natural for us in Sweden to do so as well. Fredrik Malm completely forgets that a strong argument for neutrality in Sweden has also been about exactly Finland's situation. That was why we chose this line shortly after the war.

Fredrik Malm also has some other things he would need to answer for when it comes to security and defense policy. While the Liberals phased out conscription and cut back on defense, Russia was rearming. Therefore, the first thing we had to do when we took office in 2014 was to reintroduce conscription and also to increase our defense expenditures.

My counter-question to Fredrik Malm can then be whether he now regrets the major disarmament that his alliance government carried out during the years when Fredrik Reinfeldt was Prime Minister.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Morgan Johansson is speaking here about the period of the Cold War. What I am speaking about is the period after the Cold War. I am speaking about the 90s, the 00s, and the 10s. It is 30 years with very clear signs of an increasingly destructive Russia and clear signs of the necessity of NATO cooperation.

The Balkan wars with Bosnia and Kosovo clearly showed the necessity of Nato in the 90s. After that, Sweden participated in the ISAF force in Afghanistan. The annexation of Crimea, Russia's attack on Georgia, the ever-worsening repression internally in Russia, the vulnerability of the Baltics and so on - the Social Democrats took none of this seriously. The defense decisions in 2000 and in the 90s were pure death blows to Swedish preparedness and Swedish defense. How does Morgan Johansson view the Social Democrats' own responsibility in this?

In this speech, Ann-Sofie Alm and Stefan Olsson (both M) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Morgan Johansson (S)

Mr. Speaker! I can only state that after the Second World War, we made the assessment that what was best for both Sweden and Finland, when the entire idea of a Nordic defense cooperation fell through, was to be non-aligned.

Fredrik Malm once again completely ignores Finland's situation. A NATO membership for Sweden's part would have put Finland in a much more difficult position. This was actually the case even after the Soviet Union fell in 1991. This discussion has of course been conducted, but what changed the situation was when the European security order was undermined. It was completely undermined in 2022 with the attack. The second argument is that Finland reassessed its position. If we had stubbornly started making decisions to change the security policy line before these situations arose, it would have been the wrong way to go for Sweden, I believe.

In this speech, Ida Karkiainen (S) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! It is practically a year since the foreign policy debate that dealt with our Nato application and the path that led to the historic decision to apply for membership. We have since stepped in as the 32nd member of the defense alliance. This implies a series of changes for all of Sweden - not just for the Armed Forces, even if it naturally takes up much space in the debate. The new security policy situation since February 24, 2022, is not in any final phase but is the new normal that we must adapt to.

Sweden's security and foreign policy identity will need to be developed and placed in a larger context. It is a context where member states and other friendly states clearly mark themselves against authoritarian regimes' ambitions to assert the right of the strongest. That being said, I want to make a reflection on the right of the strongest and Sweden's previous position regarding non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in war. The American president Theodore Roosevelt said over a hundred years ago: Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far. This means that we must be clear that deterrence is built on military capability.

It is true that diplomacy, negotiation, trade agreements, and foreign policy balancing can contribute to relaxation and balance, but not least in the world we live in, the ability to inflict such great losses on a potential attacker that they refrain from leaving the negotiating table and transitioning to a military attack is also needed. Therefore, I want to emphasize the difference between today's still underfunded, scaled-back, and limited defense and the defense that could mobilize approximately 800,000 soldiers and had nearly 1,000 combat aircraft and 1,500 combat vehicles. From that perspective, NATO membership and the ability of our allies to contribute both conventional and non-conventional deterrence is decisive in today's security policy situation.

Nothing could have increased the war-deterring capability as quickly as a NATO membership actually has. Russia's war against Ukraine shows two important lessons: first, that a great power in our immediate vicinity is undoubtedly prepared to utilize ruthless military power against its neighboring countries to achieve political goals, and second, that alone is not strong. These insights are absolutely crucial for the ongoing debate and the understanding of why we find ourselves in the position we do. No matter how much we want to project our desire for a better world without war and destruction, there is a world out there that pays little account to that kind of wishful thinking. These are insights we should have acquired from history.

Mr. Speaker! History has also taught us that it is when good forces unite that one can defeat authoritarian regimes. A clear example of this is World War II. It was a war that began when a dictatorship, just as today, tested its limits to see how far it could go before the rest of the world reacted. It is an important lesson but also an argument that is often forgotten in the debate.

Great focus is often placed on detailed, admittedly important and hot issues such as, for example, nuclear weapons, American bases, the Armed Forces' operations in other countries, and how individual member states conduct their domestic policy. But few discuss the importance of the fact that the lion's share of the countries that are members of the defense alliance Nato are democracies with a high standard of living, freedom of speech, and a completely different democratic platform than the great powers that today challenge our way of life.

We Sweden Democrats know better than anyone that everything is not perfect and that much remains to be done in Sweden and many other European countries, but it is not anywhere near the oppression that, for example, China and Russia subject their citizens to. It is about secret police, prison colonies, restricted internet, and one-party states. One of the countries has then been bombing a neighboring country and alleged compatriots for two years. These are important distinctions in a discussion that often deals with individual deviations, ideology, or pure disinformation instead of the existential question of our future.

Mr. Speaker! As I mentioned in last year's speech, the Sweden Democrats would have gladly seen a more extensive investigation and debate regarding Nato if the world situation had allowed. We already stood in December 2020 behind the idea that Sweden should introduce a so-called Nato option according to the Finnish model. Had it been introduced by the government at that time according to the Riksdag's announcement, Sweden would have been better prepared, just as Finland was in many respects.

The rapidly deteriorating security situation has meant that we have had to adapt to the world's, at the very least, brutal reality. With the support for Swedish NATO membership, the Sweden Democrats abandoned in the spring of 2022 the party's previous ambition and long-term goal in the form of a defense alliance with Finland. We can simultaneously note that both Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership enables deepened defense and security cooperation at more levels than was previously possible.

With and including NATO membership, we have the opportunity to deepen defense cooperation across the entire Nordic region and, in the long term and already now, with the Baltic states in a completely different position than before. It creates a fundamental security and a long-term capability to, in an eventually deteriorated security situation, protect and help each other in a protracted conflict. It also creates good opportunities to link our different total defense concepts, and in the long term, it naturally in turn creates a regional security for us as individual member states and a collective capability on NATO's northern flank.

It is from this that we have previously been building upon our bilateral cooperation with the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland, which are important for both military and civil defense, specifically regarding supply readiness and trade flows. NATO membership will also give us opportunities to deepen cooperation with the USA, which, in addition to military defense, is important for our defense industry, which is an integrated part of our total defense. Sweden enters as a technological and strong nation with much to offer within research, development and defense industry.

Mr. Speaker! To emphasize the importance of the seriousness of the situation, I would like to make a brief summary. Sweden did not take the step into the defense alliance Nato because it was pursued for some blindly ideological reasons, but because the House's two largest parties, including my own, made the assessment that membership, given the serious global situation, is a security and defense policy necessity and strength. Thus, the majority situation in the Riksdag shifted in support of a Swedish Nato membership.

Finland's choice of path was a strong contribution, as was the possibility of deepened Nordic defense cooperation. Through membership, Sweden will for the first time in history stand side by side with our siblings Finland, Norway and Denmark in this way.

We contribute to the entire alliance with unique experience and technical capability that strengthens the defense alliance as a whole. We also show Russia and other great powers that it is up to Sweden to design its own security and foreign policy choices, where letters of extortion and various types of influence attempts do not have an effect. Within the defense alliance, Sweden will be a credible actor that steps in with large resources and a defense industry that benefits the entire alliance.

We have also been clear about our position on nuclear weapons. Within the framework of various collaborations, the USA has taken into account the Swedish requirements for consent and trust between the countries. The same position applies to other countries and their visiting combat forces. They are obligated to follow the conditions that Sweden as a country sets for activities and operations on our territory, and this is binding under international law.

We are well aware that the right path is often not the easy path, but we will always put Sweden's security first. When the security policy landscape changes, the map must be updated, and that is what we have now done.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! We live in an uneasy world and in uneasy times. It places high demands on us politicians to be able to navigate a complex reality with several crises that need to be tackled in parallel.

That climate policy is security policy should be common knowledge by this point. We are facing a world that risks being powerfully changed due to climate change and the biodiversity crisis. It is something that does not only affect countries far away but also, to the highest degree, affects us here in Sweden. The world is interconnected, and when crises and conflicts increase in our surrounding world, it has consequences for us as well.

Climate change leads to an increased risk of conflicts and exacerbates already existing conflicts. When water and food become scarce and when people are forced to flee, we know that tensions arise. When societies are hit by crises, we also know that antagonists can take the opportunity to exploit weaknesses.

Miljöpartiet argues therefore that we must do everything in our power to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and simultaneously adapt society so that it can withstand the pressures from a changed climate. But the Sverigedemokraterna want instead to scrap the EU's targets in the climate area. Do the Sverigedemokraterna not see that the climate crisis risks leading to increased conflicts and a significantly worse security situation, with both nature-related crises such as drought, heatwaves and floods as well as increased tensions that will affect us?

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Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Emma Berginger for the question. It is very true that we have an uneasy world for several different reasons, not least, of course, because there is full-scale war in Europe. Obviously, certain forms of climate change also drive people to flee. We also see that authoritarian states such as China, Russia, and Iran exploit this in their axis of power, not least when they place many African countries in a position of dependency. Geopolitics is then combined with climate policy and security policy interests. One uses arms dealing and weapons power, but one also locks individual sovereign nation-states into agreements that disadvantage many of them, not least on the African continent. They want to use them as a foreign policy lever against the West, not least against our way of trading and cooperating with other states on other continents.

Of course, these questions need to be addressed jointly. This does not mean that we perform the same analysis or draw the same conclusions as Miljöpartiet regarding climate policy. It is quite correct that we have expressed that we believe much of the EU's climate policy goals and work need to be evaluated and renegotiated, also in order not to put a spoke in the wheel of some of the security and defense arrangements that we need to undertake. When environmental or climate policy is used in a naive way that is not effective and purposeful, it can naturally also interfere with defense and security work. We have seen this with environmental permits at the national level that have hindered the Armed Forces in part of its development. We cannot let Miljöpartiet's view on climate policy globally lie like a wet blanket over the defense and security collaborations and tools that we need to use to strengthen security and defense in our country and in our surroundings.

In this speech, Ulf Rexefjord (SD) agreed.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! The security policy situation in the world is serious and risks becoming even worse with climate change. When we are hit by parallel crises, they risk reinforcing each other. But the Sweden Democrats work in all contexts to dismantle climate policy, both in Sweden, at the EU level, and globally. The Sweden Democrats, however, have no answer for what they want to do instead, Mr. Speaker. In a world where almost everyone has understood that the climate crisis is a major threat and has begun to work so that we can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Sweden Democrats are driving a policy in the opposite direction.

Even NATO is engaging in the climate issue. NATO adopted the 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan, but Sweden Democrats do not have any such plan. I would like to know what the Sweden Democrats want to do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Emma Berginger for the follow-up question. We in the Sverigedemokraterna have from the beginning been careful to express that we enter the NATO cooperation with a 360-degree perspective. We are in the alliance to contribute but also to receive the support and contributions we need as members. This naturally also means that we shall fully participate in NATO's political work, where we have many areas of work: climate policy, as mentioned, economy, political development, other areas concerning committees, as well as general strengthening of our common defense and our common security. It is clear that we shall be fully involved in that work.

But the very best thing we can do is to ensure that we are not dependent on, for example, Russian energy, re-establish the energy policy that was dismantled by previous red-green governments, and strengthen nuclear power's possibilities to export clean energy. Here we have very clear cooperation agreements with the government, and the Tidö parties are in agreement.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Almost exactly one year ago, the Swedish Parliament made a different security policy choice than any other parliament before had made for more than two hundred years. We joined a military alliance with other states. We joined Nato.

Vänsterpartiet proposed a referendum to strengthen the popular anchoring of the decision. We were clear in the debate a year ago that we believed the Riksdag should have voted no to the government's proposal for a Swedish Nato membership. Sweden should not be in Nato. But despite our good arguments, a majority in the Riksdag chose another path.

The messy accession process, which we have just finished, shows that the opposition's voice is more important than ever. It was we in the opposition who pointed out the risks of entering into a military alliance with Turkey and Hungary. I said it before Erdogan and Orbán had even opened their mouths. Had the majority listened to the opposition, we would not have had to experience the foreign policy failure that we have now seen.

That is why the opposition is needed. When we in security policy manage to listen to each other's arguments and state where we agree and where we disagree, Sweden's security becomes stronger. That is my firm conviction.

Swedish NATO membership raises new questions - questions that require debate and new decisions. We, Sweden, must continue to be an active voice for peace and disarmament. NATO membership makes the Swedish voice weaker. But just because we are members, we cannot throw all principles overboard. A world without nuclear weapons is still a more secure world to live in than a world with nuclear weapons that can destroy everything and all of us.

I do not believe that anyone in today's chamber thinks that Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons now. But at present, there are no obstacles to changing that line if new politicians in the future decide otherwise.

It is to protect our country that there is a value in deciding that Sweden shall be a nuclear-weapon-free state. It means that we decide that Sweden shall adopt a national legislation that prohibits the import and transit of nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in both peacetime and wartime. Sweden, regardless of a Swedish membership in Nato, shall reserve the right to join the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as well as have the right not to stand behind Nato's statements criticizing the convention.

We must push for the demands regarding no first use, i.e., that Nato or any of the three Nato countries that have nuclear weapons exclude that they shall use nuclear weapons first in an eventual conflict. If this principle were introduced, Nato would appear risk-reducing.

In its yearbook for 2023, the peace research institute Sipri notes that the number of operational nuclear warheads is increasing again. The nine nuclear-weapon states continue to modernize their nuclear weapons. The organization and recipient of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, Ican, warns that all countries participating in NATO's nuclear sharing will receive new nuclear weapons. Russia and the USA together possess 90 percent of all nuclear weapons, and France and Great Britain have announced modernizations.

Sweden should be a country that is not part of NATO's nuclear weapons exercise activities. We must be clear that we do not intend to participate in nuclear sharing and do not want to see nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

Mr. Speaker! With Sweden's Nato membership also comes the question of how closely Sweden should align with American foreign and security policy, given that the USA is the largest and strongest actor in Nato and the organization would never do anything that is not in line with USA's policy.

Already now, this spring, two issues will be decided that will show how close the American administration the government and other NATO advocates want to bring Sweden.

The first is the participation in the military operation in the Red Sea. In the Red Sea, Houthi rebels are now attacking civil shipping on its way through one of the world's most important shipping routes, the Suez Canal. The Houthis have been clear about their motive: Israel's war in Gaza. If peace is achieved in Gaza, the Houthis will stop attacking civil shipping, they say.

The rebels bear the responsibility for the situation. But it is obvious that there are two ways to resolve the situation, either through diplomatic efforts or through a military solution. It is obvious in our contemporary time that there is too much trust in military solutions. It is high, but it often turns out to be ineffective.

In the case of the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the USA, the UK and a group of other countries have, without any diplomatic efforts, had full focus on bombing the already heavily tested Yemen, which has already experienced far too many years of war. They have absolutely succeeded in reducing the Houthi rebels' capability. But civil shipping is still being attacked, and previously captured sailors are still not free.

A diplomatic solution, both in the Red Sea and in Gaza, is a long-term solution to ensure transport for civil shipping. Sweden shall therefore not, as the government expresses dreams about, participate in military operations in the Red Sea.

The second question being decided in ours is the so-called DCA agreement with the USA. Swedish politicians seem to be on the way to once again step into a defense cooperation without even reflecting or holding any debate at all. The government is expected to submit a proposition to the Riksdag on May 8, and in the Riksdag, we are to have debate and a decision on June 18.

Vänsterpartiet says no to the DCA agreement with the USA. The DCA agreement with the USA would mean that the American military gets access to 17 Swedish military bases from north to south to store equipment and have their own American area on the bases without Swedish access. It is a fundamentally very far-reaching step seen from a historical perspective.

The risks with the DCA agreement are several. There is a risk that Swedish citizens will be left without legal recourse when American soldiers are to be judged for rape by American military personnel in American military courts, and not in the Swedish justice system, by Swedish judges and according to Swedish law. In that case, it will be very difficult to assert that there is any consent legislation.

There is a risk that nuclear weapons are transported on Swedish territory. Mere suspicion from the Russian side that this is happening makes Sweden, according to them, a legitimate target and can create a devastating nuclear war. Unlike Norway, Denmark, and Finland, Sweden has not included any exceptions whatsoever for nuclear weapons in the DCA agreement with the USA.

The agreement with the USA could have been an opportunity to clarify that Sweden is a nuclear-weapon-free state. It is an opportunity that the right-wing government and the Nato supporters are missing, and thereby increasing the risks in our near area.

We know that Donald Trump in less than a year - ten months - can be president in the USA again. We know that Orbán has gone there and met him and that the extreme right-wing parties all around in the NATO cooperation are preparing. It is time to wake up from the bubble parties and see the realities and risks in the Swedish NATO membership.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! The Sweden Democrats consider that the current security situation calls for a NATO membership without reservation. As I mentioned in last year's debate, the lack of a no first use policy, which Svenneling also addressed in his speech, seems, contrary to what Svenneling believes, to be deterrent against a hostile attack.

The West's disarmament has been interpreted by many as a sign of weakness, including by Russia and China, who are now challenging the USA and Europe. We therefore need to have a clear-sighted and fact-based attitude towards nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

There is nothing today that indicates that the USA, France or the United Kingdom would see a need to place nuclear weapons in Sweden. Nuclear weapons remain a national resource, as the Foreign Minister pointed out earlier. I am confounded when the Left Party loses its way in the mess regarding nuclear deterrence.

What is actually Svenneling's and the Left Party's alternative? The risk with the narrative that is being advocated here in the chamber is that one risks falling into the trap that the authoritarian states want, when it comes to the free Western world not having a deterrent against the most life-threatening weapon, which otherwise is in the hands of only the authoritarian states. What is the Left Party's realpolitik alternative to the order that currently prevails?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I believe one should be very clear that since we joined Nato on March 7, deterrence is something relatively new in Swedish foreign and security policy. Previously, we have spoken about having a strong defense in order to be able to defend Sweden in the event of an attack. Now we are part of a nuclear umbrella.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is clear that we are also a part of the deterrence, of intimidating other countries. It is a completely new perspective. I still think that Swedish politicians have not quite grasped what it entails. For me, it means that we raise the tone in our immediate vicinity instead of considering which measures are risk-reducing and how we can reduce tensions in our immediate vicinity.

We have spoken about the Arctic as a low-tension area. With Sweden's and Finland's membership, and above all Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is difficult to speak of the Arctic as a low-tension area any longer.

We also have, as we have touched upon, the policy proposal on no first use. It is about the fact that, from the perspective of the nuclear-armed countries, they do not say it.

We take the case of Ukraine and Russia. If Ukraine had had nuclear weapons and responded to the conventional attack from Russia with nuclear weapons, it would have escalated the situation in that way. It would have meant that Russia had not used nuclear weapons against Ukraine. It means that a war between Nato and Russia in this situation where Russia is rattling nuclear weapons, as many have pointed out, could quickly lead to an escalation.

What is our alternative? It is clarity that we have a law on Swedish territory that would prohibit nuclear weapons from being brought in, coming here and being transported through. It would be a policy of no first use so that one is not part of using nuclear weapons first. It would be clarity in the work in Nato that one does not participate in the NPG group and in exercise activities linked to Nato's nuclear activities.

Then one also becomes clear that Sweden does not believe that nuclear weapons' deterrent capability is something that contributes to reducing tensions in our immediate area.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Aron Emilsson (SD)

Mr. Speaker! I still do not quite understand the Left Party's reasoning. Speaking of clarity: one thing that has been clear is that Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders do not respect laws and rules. We can enact whatever laws and rules we want in here, and we do so daily, of more or less great importance. In this case, however, it is obvious that diplomacy and détente towards Russia in the way that Håkan Svenneling describes would not work today. It is obvious that the only countries that benefit from détente, disarmament, and peaceful diplomacy in these times are the aggressors, not least Russia, which is waging a large-scale, imperialist war in our neighborhood.

Russia issued a demand letter regarding security guarantees to several European countries at the end of December 2021. They demanded that we not make our own choices. I am concerned that this type of argumentation from the Left Party is only in the interest of authoritarian states.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I believe that Aron Emilsson has two errors in his reasoning. The first is that he fails to distinguish between the Kremlin, Putin, and the political regime in Russia on one hand and the Russian people on the other. I am convinced that the Russian people want to live in peace and freedom, in proximity to the Swedish people who also want to live in peace and freedom.

The second thing is that he says this would not work today. The point with a NATO membership is that it is a historical turning point. This is a line that is to apply for a long time to come. If we already today, when we step into NATO, had declared that we do not intend to be a nuclear-weapon state, we would also have been clear in a completely different way towards our surrounding world: There is no reason for Russia to invest in and modernize nuclear weapons. We see that they rattle and threaten, but we intend to act to reduce risk. We will continue to put forward political proposals on risk-reducing measures that Russia will probably reject during this period, but perhaps there will come another time with another leadership in the Kremlin, hopefully, who can also imagine acting to reduce risk.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! After listening to the latest exchange of remarks, I can almost see Håkan Svenneling sitting at Putin's long table to find relaxation and to persuade Putin and the Kremlin to disarm their nuclear weapons. It is exciting to wonder what trust Håkan Svenneling actually places in Putin's compliance with Swedish law - a fascinating thought.

Actually, however, that was not why I requested a reply to Håkan Svenneling. These were more points that came up during the previous exchange of replies.

I have a short question: Do Håkan Svenneling and Vänsterpartiet consider that Sweden would have remained alone outside of Nato and that only Finland would have submitted a membership application on May 18, 2022?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Vänsterpartiet has no such connections to Putin as Aron Emilsson's party Sverigedemokraterna has via Le Pen in France. I cannot even imagine that any Swedish diplomat would sit at Putin's long table right now. We have incredibly little trust in Putin, and we have also broken all political contacts with Russia. I think it is the right choice. However, it does not mean that we should not have a cooperation with the Russian people going forward and be clear with Russia when it comes to politics.

Security policy choices are made by oneself as a state in one's own context. Then there can be relations with other states that make it so that one coordinates or discusses. For me, the Swedish Nato membership is a Swedish Nato membership and not a Finnish Nato membership. It also became very clear when we had the Finnish delegation here a year ago. Then Finland decided to join Nato before Sweden, despite it having been said that we would join together, precisely because they adopted a Finnish perspective.

This stressed Swedish politician. Tobias Billström sat late into the night writing his foreign policy declaration, and then we received a message that we were to have a NATO debate in the Riksdag where we approved Sweden's NATO membership.

Just as I stated in that debate, nothing happened afterwards. The only thing we did was to give the power back to Orbán and Erdogan, so that they could decide when Sweden would join Nato. It took another year, and then we joined.

It has been my belief all along, since we made the security policy choice, that Sweden would one day become a NATO member because there was a majority for this in Sweden's Riksdag. But it is a new choice and no choice that Sweden has made previously.

For my part, it is a Swedish choice of path. The Left Party in Sweden has been clear that we do not want to join Nato. In Finland, their left-wing party chose to vote both for and against Nato membership, so it was a considerably less clear position. However, these are national choices we make.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I believe that Håkan Svenneling may possibly need to do a small review of the dates when it comes to which government did what, but I still perceive the answer as the Left Party considering that Sweden would be the only country in the Nordic region outside of Nato. We would not have chosen to join Nato. Alone would be strong. Alone would be outside.

Has the Left heard any other neighbors – besides Putin and Lavrov, of course – say that our non-alignment has served peace and security? Who else claims this?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Vänsterpartiet has been clear that the territorial defense of Sweden is central. Our land, our water, and our airspace shall not be violated by other states.

We have kept Sweden militarily non-aligned and preserved our military self-determination precisely for such security policy situations where we need to be able to make independent security policy choices to create safety and security in Sweden. As has been shown in this debate, this has also historically served Sweden well.

Now you are making another choice of path. Now you are hanging our foreign and security policy on Nato, on the USA and on other states' wars and conflicts. We are concerned about what it means - whether it will mean that we have two hundred years of peace ahead of us, or whether we will be drawn into wars and conflicts. I naturally do not hope that the latter will be the case, but Sweden is being deprived of its national self-determination. We are breaking with a historical tradition that we previously had and which has shown good results in order to make a different security policy choice. I am concerned about where it leads us, but Kerstin Lundgren is for that choice of path.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! During the last century, Sweden faced actually four decisive formative events: when democracy was finally introduced, World War II, the Cold War, and our membership in the European Union. At all these four decisive events, the Left Party and its predecessors succeeded in placing themselves on the wrong side to then change their minds.

When we introduced universal and equal suffrage, the Left Party's predecessors wanted to introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat. During the Second World War, the party took Stalin's side. They even supported the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In both of these cases, the party later changed its opinion during the de-Stalinization in the 50s. During the Cold War, they took the Soviet Union's side and did not change until the beginning of the 90s. Only then did they also remove the k:et from the party name. Regarding EU membership, they voted no and wanted an exit until quite recently.

Now, Mr. Speaker, comes the fifth formative event in our history: our membership in Nato. Once again, the Left Party takes the wrong side and says no. If we are to follow the materialistic and Marxist dialectic, it means that the Left Party will change its mind here as well. My question to Håkan Svenneling is: When will the Left Party change its mind regarding Nato membership?

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I think Fredrik Malm is distorting history a bit. He forgets the pension reform of 1958 when a single liberal in this chamber changed his mind and voted through the ATP reform, which meant that wage earners received real pensions to live on after retirement. He forgets the EMU vote in 2003 when the Swedish people voted no to the euro, an economic decision that has benefited Swedish industry, strengthened Swedish exports, and shown that we as a country are economically stronger in this way. We chose independence and autonomy over joining everyone else in the flock. On both of these occasions, a majority of all liberals were completely wrong.

One can always look at Swedish politics in different ways from a historical perspective. I am convinced that we in the opposition have contributed to an increased understanding and knowledge of what it means to join Nato through the debate that we have conducted. I am completely convinced that it is good that all Swedish citizens' different voices and opinions are represented and come to expression in Sweden's Riksdag - the primary foundation of our democracy.

Even now that Sweden is a member of Nato, I believe that the opposition will be needed, precisely because we managed to see what Orbán and Erdogan did when they tried to argue that Sweden should make concessions in different ways to be allowed into Nato. In that way, opposition and majority always fulfill a function through our history.

We can discuss what happened a hundred years ago, but now we stand here. Now we make the choice that the Liberals have desired for so damn long - ever since Fredrik Malm was in the youth organization. We will see where this leads, Mr. Malm. I don't know. I am not entirely convinced that Nato is the best way.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you very much for the answer, Håkan Svenneling! I note three words: "I do not know." That was possibly the answer to my question, so Håkan Svenneling still keeps a small cat flap ajar.

I did not mention the euro and the pension system, Mr. Speaker; instead, I mentioned some events that are very closely associated with the debate we are having now, namely that of our security. It was about World War II, the Cold War, and the introduction of democracy. The latter meant in practice that Gustaf V ultimately accepted Sweden's democratization, this so that Sweden would not experience a violent social upheaval.

I also note that the Left Party speaks of different voices in opposition and majority. It is obviously so, and I welcome that debate. But the historical brushstrokes are still not completely irrelevant, and my question therefore remains: Where will the Left Party stand in five to ten years? Can one trust the Left Party's Natomotstånd, Håkan Svenneling?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden did not become a member of Nato until March 7 this year. That means that Vänsterpartiet has not in substance taken a position on Swedish Nato membership. Our congress shall do so at the beginning of May.

I am quite convinced that Vänsterpartiet is rather steadfast in its opposition to NATO. Even though we see that many Swedes are now in favor of NATO membership, which is quite understandable given that we have joined, we see that Vänsterpartiet voters are very clear that another path would have been better. That is why Vänsterpartiet has been so clear in the relatively small debate that we have had about the Swedish NATO membership.

I believe that we will continue to be quite staunch opponents of Nato, but there is also a reality. Sweden is now becoming a member of Nato. We need to be clear about which questions are asked, otherwise the right will rush in and sign DCA agreements with the USA, join military operations that the USA points to, and refrain from asking questions about nuclear weapons and working with disarmament.

Today, the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that he is calling a meeting. I think that is a fairly good step in the right direction.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! It is ten years since Russia illegally annexed Crimea. At that time, the West responded barely audibly and thus reinforced the response to the occupation of Georgia in 2008. Putin was encouraged to continue realizing his imperial dreams.

In light of this, Sweden should have realized what our neighbors in the Baltics and the former Soviet Union had already realized, namely that alone is not strong. Sweden should have listened to their warnings, acted clearly against Russia, and realized that we should seek membership in Nato. Now, this did not happen until Putin launched his full-scale, violation of international law invasion of Ukraine in order to change states' borders and states' right to choose their own path by military means: the European and global security order.

Ukraine had promises on paper but lacked all guarantees. When Russia went to war, the EU and NATO countries chose to condemn, impose sanctions, and slowly start weapon deliveries. We have today an armed conflict in our immediate vicinity. Ukraine is not only defending its freedom but, as we say, also our security and freedom. But then we must also realize that this defense requires much more from us to be successful. We must show that we mean business and make it clear to the ruler in the Kremlin.

The brutal aggression against Ukraine, which Putin started on 24 February 2022, opened the eyes of Finland. It soon became apparent that Sweden could stand alone outside Nato if we did not act directly. The Kremlin wanted to move back Nato's positions and make us Russia's buffer states.

Sweden and Finland were nevertheless able to submit their membership applications to Nato on May 18, 2022. In the debate we had in the Riksdag on June 10, we devoted a lot of space to the history, while six of the eight parties stood behind the application. I noted then that it could take time before we became members. It took time, and there were episodes that others may want to rewrite and evaluate.

Whether it was easier with a new government is something others can judge. Now, one and a half years after the new government took over and nearly a year after Finland's entry, we are finally members. Thanks to everyone who made it possible and to those who have given us security in the meantime!

Sweden's membership in Nato strengthens our security, our Nordic neighbors' security, and the Baltics' security. We join to receive support from and give support to our allies with the insight that together we make Nato stronger and more capable of protecting our citizens, our freedom, and our democracy. We seek no special treatment. We see that Sweden has a path to go to be able to defend ourselves according to Article 3.

Against that background, the Center Party has proposed to the Defense Committee a military buildup to 3 percent of GDP until 2030 and a buildup of our total defense with 100 billion kronor during the same period. 3 percent may sound like a lot, but it can be compared with Russia, which invests 50 percent of its budget in the war.

Sweden has a new security policy line as an ally. We are Nato. We always see the EU as our most important foreign and security policy arena. Now we are to cooperate for our collective security and our collective defense but also to uphold the multilateral, rules-based world order. We stand up for the UN, which admittedly needs renovating but which is the global structure that gives every state a voice - large states as well as small ones. If the conditions exist, we are prepared to contribute to the UN's peacekeeping operations.

We stand up for human rights and the principles of the rule of law against autocracies and dictators. We see great opportunities now that the Nordic countries are together in Nato. Here, with our historical cooperation, we have the opportunity to blur new boundaries for common benefit. We can also, as small states in the north, strengthen and contribute new perspectives and values both in Nato and globally.

Sweden's voice shall be no less silenced than, for example, Norway's voice. We shall continue to stand up for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation in order to seek solutions to global threats such as the climate.

Sweden shall, as a member of Nato, in like manner with the other Nordic countries, declare that we shall not have a permanent foreign troop on our territory in peacetime, nor shall we have nuclear weapons. There is a long history and a broad consensus in society and in the Riksdag here.

Mr. Speaker! Nato strengthens our security and our defense and deters Russia from military attacks, but it does not mean that we are not attacked in other ways. We must be aware of that. For Ukraine, we EU countries, Nato countries and democracies are their lifeline. Without our military support, they cannot defend their country, whether on land, on water or in the air, and thus not neither our freedom.

Today we will decide on another package. It is good that we and the EU make those decisions, but it is far from enough for Ukraine to win peace and secure its freedom and its territory.

Sweden and Europe must show that we mean business when we say that we stand behind Ukraine whatever it takes. Putin hears the words but also sees our lack of ability to turn this into action. It is taking too long.

The Center Party has proposed that Sweden should allocate 1 percent of GDP to a Ukraine fund to provide 65 billion kronor by 2026. We have been clear that if Ukraine asks us for Jas Gripen, we will train and ensure that the Gripen can defend their airspace - not at some point in the future, but in the present. These are serious times now, but they could become even more serious if we do not manage to scale up and give Ukraine what is required - whatever is required.

Mr. Speaker! Sweden has now made a historical choice. We left political non-alignment when we became EU members, and now we have also left military non-alignment. These are our choices to clarify and make the solidarity-based security policy credible. But they are also our allies' choices. We have shown that NATO's door stands open, and we shall, as members, work to ensure that the door stands open for others, including for Ukraine.

We will, of course, take our full responsibility for our part and for the entirety of the defense of every inch of NATO's territory. Russia has chosen confrontation, the path of military violence, and we see that we will need to meet that threat in the foreseeable future. Sweden shall stand up for freedom, for democracy, for human rights for all, and for the principles of the rule of law. We threaten no one, but we do not hesitate to defend our values.

As a small state, we see the importance of cooperation, not least in the Nordic and Baltic countries. The transatlantic link is central, but we must strengthen the European pillar in Nato.

Mr. Speaker! The world concerns us, and Sweden's voice shall not hesitate to be proactive. Together with like-minded people, we shall make a difference for peace and freedom, for human rights and for the climate. With that, I otherwise refer to my speech from the foreign policy debate on February 14.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! It is a strange time we live in, where the world feels like a dark place. Russia's brutal attack on Ukraine has not only crushed the Russian nation's dignity but also ignited a flame of fear and uncertainty across our entire planet. China, with its threatening actions towards Taiwan, creates a sense of constant tension and dread. At the same time, Iran's regime spreads terror among its own citizens and draws itself and other countries into a vortex of violence and conflicts, from the Middle East to all corners of the world, including Sweden.

These events are not isolated. They are linked by a thread of lust for power and authoritarian aggression. These countries do not strive for peace or cooperation but instead seek to dominate their neighbors and break down the fundamental order of the world - from law and justice in favor of the right of the strong over the weak. This struggle goes beyond traditional military threats and affects every aspect of our existence. From the safety in our homes to the food we eat and the infrastructure we rely on - nothing is secure.

Sweden faces a test of epic proportions. Our preparedness must be strengthened to meet these threats, for our survival and for our future. Since March 7, 2024, however, we are safer.

Mr. Speaker! When Sweden's security policy history over the last centuries is viewed, a series of changes and strategic shifts that have come to shape our nation are clearly visible. One of the most decisive events is undoubtedly Sweden's NATO membership.

Sweden has long been known for its flexibility and opportunism when it comes to staying out of conflicts and wars. During the 20th century, we balanced between remaining neutral and cooperating with other countries to maintain our security. Even though we officially proclaimed ourselves neutral during the Cold War, we were in fact involved in a secret defense cooperation with the USA, which demonstrates the duality that has often characterized the Swedish line.

History has clearly shown that neutrality does not necessarily protect against adversaries who have imperialist ambitions. During World War II, Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union, while Norway, Denmark, and Belgium were occupied by Germany. These countries' neutrality and non-alignment helped little. In recent decades, we see the same pattern playing out in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine.

The traditional perception of military non-alignment has changed over time, and our approach toward Nato has been gradual and well-considered. Already in 1994, Sweden entered into a partnership for peace with Nato, and we have actively worked for mutual support and solidarity but without being covered by the Atlantic Pact's security guarantees.

Becoming a member of Nato is a natural continuation of the line we have already followed. It is a historical and logical step, especially considering the deterrent effect and security that the defense alliance has offered member countries throughout history. No Nato member has ever been attacked on a large scale by another state, which demonstrates the alliance's strength and effectiveness.

It is important to acknowledge that Nato is not only the world's strongest defense alliance but also one of the most successful peace organizations in the world. Had countries like Georgia and Ukraine been members of Nato, they would probably have avoided large-scale armed aggression from external powers. In the same way, Estonia and Latvia, with a similar geopolitical background in relation to Russia, would have been extremely vulnerable without Nato's deterrent capability.

Sweden has made a wise, logical and strategic decision to join Nato and take advantage of its strength and protection. It is a natural step towards a more stable and secure future for our nation and for the entire region.

Mr. Speaker! The military non-alignment has long passed its best-before date. Non-alignment has for a long time characterized our military capability and kept Sweden and our neighboring countries in a vulnerable position. Sweden contributed to creating a security policy vacuum in the Baltic Sea area. Therefore, the Christian Democrats made the decision to stand behind a Swedish NATO membership after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and Donbass.

Difficult balancing acts between different great power interests and concessions to the same can explain why Sweden has managed to stay out of war for over 200 years - not the non-alignment. Likewise, the lack of this insight among the parties that previously opposed a Swedish NATO membership has been the root cause of the protracted membership process. We should naturally have applied earlier.

Mr. Speaker! In Sweden, we condemn Putin's war of aggression and salute the Ukrainian resistance. Russia is violating international law and must be held accountable. Putin's ambitions threaten not only Ukraine but also Europe and, not least, us here in the north. Sweden's NATO membership will therefore increase security and facilitate support for Ukraine. We must continue to support Ukraine, especially with the uncertainty from elsewhere. It is heartening to see the unity in the Riksdag and among the Swedish people.

In our time, the victory for Ukraine and the defeat for Russia is not just a military conflict but a central issue of European freedom and democracy. It is a struggle for our fundamental values and for the world we want to leave over to our children.

Sweden's foreign policy mission during the coming years is to stand by Ukraine with everything we can offer: military support, political commitment, and economic aid. Ukraine's struggle is our struggle, and it is a matter of right and wrong to stand against evil and support the good.

We must act quickly and powerfully to increase our support for Ukraine. It is not only a moral obligation, but it is also in our national security interest to ensure that Ukraine wins the war. Through our membership in Nato, we now have an opportunity to push to channel the alliance's support to Ukraine as well as support Ukraine's wishes for membership in Nato.

The people of Ukraine have sacrificed enormously much to defend freedom and democracy. Their struggle deserves respect and recognition.

We must also ensure that we support the good forces in Russia who oppose the war and the repressive regime. By strengthening the resistance from within Russia, we can undermine the support for the war and contribute to a Ukrainian victory. It is not just a question of geopolitics but also a moral responsibility towards people who are suffering and fighting for their freedom.

Mr. Speaker! Through Nato membership, Sweden is now abandoning the uncertain stance on neutrality in favor of an open acknowledgment of where we belong: together with the free democracies in the West. I would like to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the declaration, which we Christian Democrats agree with, and all others who have helped so that Sweden is now finally a member of Nato.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Magnus Berntsson for a good speech. But I became a little curious, because it was mentioned by the member that the people of Ukraine are worthy of recognition.

Mr. Speaker! From my point of view, much more than a recognition of the efforts Ukraine makes for our peace, our security, and our freedom on this continent moving forward is required. Increased resources, both military and economic, are needed to ensure that Ukraine can win peace. Then we must be more powerful than we have been so far. We will decide on 2.4 billion today, but it is not enough.

We have from Centerpartiet proposed 1 percent of Sweden's GDP to a fund to ensure that Ukraine until 2026 has 65 billion and that they can acquire the weapons and the resources they need. Are the Kristdemokraterna prepared to step up on this – to give more than a recognition, to give the military support that is required for Ukraine to win peace?

The second question naturally becomes this: Are the Christian Democrats also ready, if Ukraine so demands, to ensure that one gets Jas in the near future and not in the future?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! I thank Kerstin Lundgren for the warm words, first and foremost, but also for the questions.

I want to start by emphasizing that I said more than that Ukraine needs a recognition. I highlighted quite a few things about Ukraine, and I believe we stand very close to each other in the support for Ukraine. We actually do so in unity here in the chamber so far. It is very pleasing.

Now, the Centerpartiet is raising a technical solution with a fund. I think there are many more different ways to look at this before deciding how to construct such things. Above all, we need to continue the dialogue with our allies in the other countries, both in the EU and in Nato, so that we can achieve a continuity in support in a well-functioning way for Ukraine's part. For my part, there is nothing that is off the table, but it must be organized in a way that works for both Ukraine's and our allies' part and for ourselves.

That we have strong support from the Swedish side will not change in any way. We will continue to be strong in the decisions we make on our own but also a strong voice when we speak with our allies, not least regarding what needs to be done now on the other side of the Atlantic to ensure that we get long-term perspective in the American support package as we have now managed to get in the European support package.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Kerstin Lundgren (C)

Mr. Speaker! We in the Center Party are perhaps more impatient, and above all, the Ukrainians are perhaps more impatient. Those who do not have weapons or ammunition to be able to defend themselves at the eastern front do not feel that they have time to wait. They need support here and now.

There are allies who have taken the step in line with what the Center Party proposes. Look at our Baltic neighbors! Look at Norway! Look at Denmark! A technical solution with 65 billion in a special Ukraine fund in order to be able to provide funds in that way is not entirely different from what the EU has landed on when it comes to creating a special fund, so why do we need to wait? Why can we not act independently and act here and now to ensure that there is sustainable and predictable support for Ukraine's fight for its freedom and democracy and for us?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! I wish we could have had this discussion in another situation – that we had been members of Nato for significantly longer. Now we have been members since March 7, in barely two weeks.

It is clear that it takes some time to conduct the dialogue with our new allies, and we must also conduct the dialogue with Ukraine and all involved to achieve long-term perspective in the packages so that one gets everything one needs at the right time. But I am completely convinced that we share the ambition and that it is just as strong among both the Kristdemokraterna and Centerpartiet and among the other parties here in the chamber.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! There is a world outside our immediate vicinity and outside the EU, and if we are to build long-term security and peace in the world, military buildup is not enough. We also need to work with diplomacy and good relations and work on conflict prevention.

I therefore view with great concern how the Christian Democrats and the government are dismantling our international development work. It will have far-reaching consequences for local communities and democratic development and the global work for girls' and women's rights.

This government's policy means fewer trained midwives in Zambia, it means poorer conditions for democracy movements in Latin America, and it means less poverty reduction. It means less of everything that builds our security and long-term peace.

Swedish aid has for decades reached those who need it most and been an example for others. Unfortunately, that image is peeling away.

How does this square with the Christian Democrats' election promises to safeguard aid and this government's talk about our need to build security in the world?

Shall we really withdraw from the global arena and give a walkover to Russia and China, who in a neo-colonialist manner acquire influence, for example, on the African continent? Russia does it by engaging the state-linked military organization Wagner Group, and China does it through its strategic investments that put countries into debt and economic dependence.

My question to the Christian Democrats is therefore how we are to build peace and security in the world when the government is simultaneously cutting back on aid.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! It has not been a secret that during the negotiations regarding the Tidö Agreement, a discussion was held about what level the aid would land at. From the Christian Democrat side and from the Liberal side, we stood firm on the one percent goal while the other parties wanted a different level.

We ended up at a level that has remained at 56 billion during this parliamentary term. That is a high sum. It is 0.88 percent of GDP, which is quite close to the one percent goal.

But the most important thing is actually how the money is used, and that is where we Christian Democrats have really made a difference compared to how the aid policy has been conducted previously.

We have ensured that we are now moving resources from core support to civil society organizations. We have ensured that the focus is actually on efficiency instead of just spending money where it has felt like one is trying to fill a box in a matrix for goal fulfillment. There have been 120 different goals within the aid policy.

The National Audit Office presented a report as recently as yesterday on how effective the aid has been, and it is unfortunately a sad read. One cannot really point to the effectiveness.

For us Christian Democrats, it is very important that the aid has an effect. We truly believe in everything that Emma Berginger raised: that we need to help people out of poverty and ensure that young women get the opportunity for a good future in order to be a strong counterforce to authoritarian states like Russia and China.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Efficiency can hardly compensate for cutting aid and abandoning the one percent goal.

The core support, which the member says has been reduced in favor of investing in individual countries, is crucial for the UN's organization and function. The UN needs to stand strong in the restless time and world we find ourselves in if we are to succeed in building long-term peace, stability, and security in the world, even outside our immediate vicinity and the EU.

We need to continue to engage in the world outside our immediate vicinity and the EU, but this government, in which the Christian Democrats are an active part, is doing exactly the opposite. The policy is focused on the immediate vicinity, aid is being cut, and the one percent goal is being abandoned. This has consequences that do not benefit peace and security in the world.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Magnus Berntsson (KD)

Mr. Speaker! That we have a war in the surrounding area cannot have escaped anyone. That more aid is needed for Ukraine than before, it cannot be difficult to agree on. This naturally has consequences.

But for us Christian Democrats, it is not about, as Berginger said, working on putting more money into individual countries, but rather about ensuring that the money goes to civil society actors, who we know succeed in reaching out where people live and live - in Africa and Latin America - and where the aid can have a completely different effect than if one just pumps money into large organizations, even if they are UN organizations.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! Sweden is finally in Nato after almost two agonizing years in which foreign policy has revolved around making authoritarian leaders like Erdogan and Orbán happy and pleased. It is good that the limbo is finally over.

Sweden needs to have an independent and strong voice in Nato, a voice that can stand up for democracy, human rights and the principles of the rule of law, both outside and inside Nato. During the Nato application process, the government has rather shown that it is prepared to bend and yield as far as possible to appease other member states. This is quite frankly unworthy for us as a country. But now that Sweden is a Nato member, the government must regain its ability to speak on issues that are important for Sweden.

The Green Party has chosen to respect the decision that a broad majority in Sweden's Riksdag has made that Sweden shall be a member of Nato. Now we focus forward on what role Sweden shall take as a Nato member. Sweden's government should now work to ensure that a democracy requirement is introduced in Nato, that the principle of no first use is introduced, and that nuclear weapons are not brought onto Swedish territory under any circumstances.

Miljöpartiet wants Sweden to drive the issue of a democracy requirement in Nato. We are concerned about the democratic regression that we see in the world today, even in several countries that are members of Nato. We now see Nato countries where fundamental human rights are challenged more and more often and where journalists are imprisoned, media and universities are controlled and the principles of the rule of law are questioned. These are worrying trends that must be broken.

Mr. Speaker! In point 2 of NATO's strategic concept, it is asserted that NATO is bound together by democratic values. It should therefore be in NATO's interest to safeguard and develop these values. Sweden's voice for democracy, human rights, and the principles of the rule of law must be strong and clear in all foreign policy arenas, including in NATO.

Mr. Speaker! We in Miljöpartiet also believe that Sweden should push for a no first use policy regarding nuclear weapons within Nato. Today, Nato reserves the right to be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons.

If nuclear weapons were used, it would have devastating consequences and cause indescribable, enormous humanitarian suffering, both directly in connection with a detonation and for a long time afterwards due to radioactive radiation. Furthermore, the escalation that the use of a single nuclear weapon entails risks resulting in more nuclear weapons being fired. Therefore, we must do everything in our power to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used.

If countries clearly state that they will not be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear weapons being used is reduced. Therefore, we want Sweden to drive the issue of a no first use policy in Nato.

Sweden has historically been an important voice in disarmament issues and should also actively participate in the parts of NATO's activities concerning arms control and disarmament. The issue of mutual nuclear disarmament must continue to be kept alive. That is how we can build a safer world in the long term.

Mr. Speaker! Miljöpartiet also wants to ensure that nuclear weapons are not brought onto Swedish territory. Sweden should therefore legislate on this immediately. For our part, it is not enough that the government says that no one is interested in having nuclear weapons here. That may be the case at the moment, but legislation would create guarantees both here and now and for the future. It would make Sweden's position clear both for our allies and for the Swedish people. Furthermore, it is perfectly reasonable that it is the Riksdag that makes the decision in this fundamentally important issue.

All our Nordic neighboring countries have clear policies regarding nuclear weapons, and Finland has a law that prohibits the import of nuclear weapons. In order to reduce the risk of the Nordic region becoming a target for others' nuclear weapons, the Nordic region should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Therefore, Sweden also needs clear legislation that prohibits the import of nuclear weapons both in peacetime and during wartime.

Mr. Speaker! Europe is in a serious security policy situation following Russia's brutal, illegal and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the ongoing war. Miljöpartiet supports that Sweden continues to help Ukraine with both weapons and humanitarian aid as well as civil and financial support. We have stood behind all support packages to Ukraine that the government has presented. And we now wish that the government presents a plan for how Sweden can support Ukraine in the long term.

That we help Ukraine defend itself against the aggressor Putin is important for the entire Swedish security, democracy, and freedom. It also has a decisive significance for the view on international law if Putin's crimes are allowed to pay off, something that risks affecting many conflicts around the world. Therefore, the government must continue to work to ensure that the EU stays united in its support for Ukraine and put pressure on the USA to continue contributing.

Mr. Speaker! For a number of years, Miljöpartiet has supported a faster and more comprehensive reconstruction of both the military and the civil defense. Of course, diplomatic solutions and conflict prevention work are always the first choice. But when abuses and crimes against the rules-based world order, based on international law, are committed, when democracy and human rights are violated, and when the diplomatic tools are exhausted, we must have a total defense, both military and civil, that acts as a deterrent to war and that, in the worst case, can defend our country, our population, and our democracy in war. Having a good preparedness is a deterrent to war and promotes peace.

Miljöpartiet therefore stands behind the 2022 agreement on 2 percent in appropriations for the military defense. But we also see a need to invest significantly more resources in civil defense and crisis preparedness to achieve a balanced total defense. We therefore act actively and constructively in the Defense Committee to reach a broad agreement that includes the entire total defense.

Mr. Speaker! As a NATO member, Sweden shall defend itself in cooperation with our allies. This means that Sweden's defense also includes the defense of allies.

The Green Party wants Sweden to cooperate more with our Nordic and Baltic neighbors to use our common defense capabilities in the best possible way. The Green Party emphasized Nordic defense cooperation even before the Nato issue became relevant in Sweden. A positive thing with Nato membership is precisely that this cooperation is simplified. At the same time, cooperation with others does not mean that Sweden should give up the ability to defend itself.

Miljöpartiet emphasizes the importance of having a broad view of security. The threat landscape today is both broad and complex. Both military and non-military and hybrid threats exist in parallel. We need to have a preparedness to meet both the military threats and other threats such as climate change, natural disasters, pandemics and cyberattacks. We need to have a preparedness to withstand both crises and war, in the worst case at the same time. Nato is not a miracle solution for handling all security problems.

At the same time as the total defense is being upgraded, Sweden must work for peace and freedom in the world; this work must be strengthened. We must safeguard our international development work and continue to place women's and girls' rights high on the international agenda. Where women's human freedoms and rights are met, the conditions for peace are increased.

We face a world that risks being profoundly changed due to climate change and the biodiversity crisis, something that not only affects countries far away but also, to a very high degree, affects us in Sweden. Therefore, Sweden must be a clear voice within Nato when it comes to taking the climate threat seriously.

Mr. Speaker! To prevent war and to promote and preserve peace must be overarching goals for foreign policy, as must the courage to build peace after war. At the same time, we must acknowledge that the path to peace is often far from simple. For a peace to be sustainable, many important prerequisites need to be fulfilled.

Miljöpartiet will continue to work to ensure that Sweden, even as a NATO member, remains a strong voice for peace, democracy, human rights, and the principles of the rule of law.

(Applause)

In this speech, Jan Riise and Jacob Risberg (both MP) concurred.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! I am listening to Miljöpartiet and trying to understand where the party stands regarding security in Europe. I must say that one has once again been struck by a kind of enormous naivety and almost boundless goodwill.

So, one does not want us in Sweden to be a member of Nato and have defense guarantees if we are attacked or help other Nato countries if they are attacked. One also wants to deny the democratic Nato members that have nuclear weapons the opportunity to protect Europe through deterrence. Instead, one speaks of some kind of theory-building that only seems to exist in the Green Party's own reasoning that the great risk would be that some Nato country would use nuclear weapons. But it is only Russia that is threatening with nuclear weapons!

The threat we are now facing is a massive threat with conventional weapons. Miljöpartiet speaks of some kind of theory that Nato could place nuclear weapons on Swedish territory at some point. Yes, place them then! But what is Russia doing? We must see the realities we have here and now. An invasion war is ongoing in the heart of Europe with the aim that Ukraine should become a historical parenthesis and cease to exist as an independent state. Russia wants to crush their infrastructure, their state, their government, their culture, and their history. One denies Ukraine its existence and simultaneously threatens other countries: Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and so on.

My question to Miljöpartiet is against the background of all this: How does Miljöpartiet view how we can defend Europe against Russia's continued militarization and war of aggression? How is that going to happen? You want to divest yourselves of all the tools at our disposal, for the most part.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! We in Miljöpartiet are very well aware of the serious security situation in Europe. We see Russia as an authoritarian and aggressive power that tries to violate other countries, invades its neighboring countries, and oppresses its own population. Against this, we must, of course, defend ourselves.

But there are different ways to build defense and security. Miljöpartiet has always pushed for cooperation with like-minded countries. We want to increase cooperation with the Nordic and Baltic countries. We see advantages in cooperating with countries such as the United Kingdom and also the USA. Now Sweden is a member of Nato, and we respect that. Then we shall also build a strong defense together with our Nordic and Baltic neighboring countries within the framework of the alliance.

The no first use principle is about ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used. If nuclear weapons are used, it will have dreadful consequences. We believe that a nuclear deterrence also works if one has a no first use policy, because you still say that you have nuclear weapons. I also think at the same time that it is important to emphasize that it is important that there are countries like Sweden that do not have nuclear weapons and can stand up and mediate.

In the long run, we want to reach a world where we have no nuclear weapons and where we can move towards a mutual disarmament of nuclear weapons. Fredrik Malm and the government, however, seem to be prepared to assert that Nato shall be the party that initiates a nuclear war, which to me is completely alien. We must truly stand up for that nuclear weapons should never, ever be used.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Now I am even more concerned.

We can see this with nuclear weapons in a broader context. It is primarily three states that are undermining the non-proliferation treaty, NPT, and want to throw the entire restrictive doctrine overboard. These are North Korea, Iran, and Russia. North Korea and Iran want to develop nuclear weapons, and Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons. Does the Green Party think they will listen to what the Green Party in Sweden's Riksdag says about restrictions? They do not.

This means that the entire theoretical framework that the Green Party's security policy and nuclear weapons policy is built on ultimately implies that it is the democratic countries - USA, France and the United Kingdom - that should not be able to protect Europe with a nuclear umbrella, while Russia can practically do whatever they want. It doesn't hold together!

How are we to defend ourselves if the war becomes regionalized and becomes even larger and also affects us? How is that going to happen, Miljöpartiet?

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! As said: Miljöpartiet stands behind the fact that we should have a strong total defense in Sweden. Now that we are members of Nato, we shall build security together with other countries within the alliance.

This work on mutual nuclear disarmament is a very long-term task. When things look serious and uneasy in the world, it is difficult to imagine how it can look in the future, where one can dampen tension levels and build up mutual and common trust. It has been done before. Agreements have been established, for example the non-proliferation treaty that was mentioned here. There, efforts have actually been initiated to control proliferation and reduce the number of warheads.

This work is currently put on pause or practically dismantled. That is obvious. But we must still have a long-term perspective and see what builds security in the world in the long term. Not least, we must hold fast to the fact that we shall not have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! With Sweden's membership in Nato, the final settlement occurs with a 200-year-old security policy doctrine, which over time became a lie, which in turn became a backdrop for double-dealing. It has been a long time since Sweden was actually a truly neutral country.

During World War II, we were not neutral: First, we let German forces use the telegraph lines and the railway network, and subsequently supported the Allies when it became clear that they would win. During the Cold War, the doctrine of alliance-free in peace was coined, aiming for neutrality in war, but in reality, we were deeply embedded in NATO's defense planning while the Soviet Union's nuclear arms race was ongoing on the other side of the Baltic Sea. We did, however, lack defense guarantees, and others did not know whether we would help defend them.

The Social Democrats served the Swedes the lie about our moral superiority and our elevated status as an impartial mediator with eyes turned toward the third world. Our neutrality has served us well, went the proverb. The Soviet Union knew about the double game all along, of course, just as the USA did.

Mr. Speaker! The Liberals have worked for Swedish NATO membership long before other parties. We worked against the wind for a long time but never gave up. We welcome that this work has now borne fruit and that Sweden is finally a full member of NATO. One by one, more parties joined our line. Russia's invasion of Ukraine showed in a flash the difference between belonging to a defense alliance and standing outside.

We are no longer in the spectator stands being influenced by other countries' decisions without having anything to say. Now we are part of the planning. The Liberals have been the drop that eroded the stone.

The enemies of democracy cooperate militarily, economically, and in the hybrid arena. They want to see the democratic rule of law fall. The Kremlin wants a world where dictators can do whatever they want. We must be able to meet the threats posed to us, and we do that best together with other countries.

Mr. Speaker! I appreciate the descriptions of the historical events in the government's declaration. But there are two more dimensions that need to be highlighted. The first is that Sweden, after the loss of Finland in 1809, eventually came to the realization that we could no longer balance Russia in the Baltic region. That token should have fallen down already after the Peace of Nystad 90 years earlier, one might think, but that is how it was anyway.

A consequence of the doctrine that followed Karl XIV Johan's accession to the throne was that someone else had to balance Russia. This was first the British and subsequently Imperial Germany. After the Second World War, it became Nato. But now Sweden has finally, Mr. Speaker, drawn the conclusion that we too shall participate in the alliance as a member, not just a partner, in order to contribute to security in our region.

The second dimension, Mr. Speaker, concerns Russia. During the second half of the 1800s, when Western Europe was gradually democratized, Russia moved in the opposite direction. There, instead, autocracy was strengthened. Russian imperialism was a way to hold the tsarist system together but also an expansive, chauvinistic ideology that Russia can take it upon itself to occupy and dominate its neighbors. A good example of this is the Russification policy in the Grand Duchy of Finland during the late 1800s and early 1900s.

But at the end of the First World War, Lenin and his accomplices in the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in a coup d'état. The first thing they did then was to make peace with Germany in the spring of 1918. They did that because the Eastern Front was bleeding and crumbling and because the German forces were moving eastward at a rapid pace.

The consequence was, Mr. Speaker, that Russia relinquished very large land areas in the peace of Brest-Litovsk. A number of new states, or new-old states, suddenly saw the light of day - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But just over half a year after this, Germany capitulated and the First World War ended. Then there was no longer any counterparty in terms of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. The treaty no longer existed. The first thing Lenin and the Bolsheviks did then was to attack precisely these areas again.

One had previously sided with the red side in the Finnish Civil War. Now, red units were deployed in the Baltics. One attacked Poland in 1920. One re-occupied Ukraine. The Red Army's tanks rolled into Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi in 1920, and they were incorporated together with Ukraine into the new Soviet Union.

A few years after the First World War, the Bolsheviks had retaken large parts of the areas that had been ceded, but not Finland, the Baltics, and Poland, which had managed to resist.

What did the Soviet Union do then? Well, they waited until the next world war. They attacked Finland in the Winter War. They occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and incorporated them into the Soviet Union. And they partitioned Poland in a pact with Hitler's Germany.

45 years later, Mr. Speaker, the Soviet Union collapsed. Then all these countries became free again - the Baltics, Ukraine, the Caucasus and so on. But then Vladimir Putin came to power, and he is now starting the same process again through the attack against Georgia, through the annexation of Crimea, through the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and through the threats against the Baltics.

It does not matter, Mr. Speaker, whether it is the Tsar, Lenin or Putin who rules in Russia as long as the country is dominated by this imperialist idea of Russian hegemony over its neighbors. With the deep repression that takes place every day and which torments millions of Russians within the Russian Federation, there is no positive change in sight.

The only remedy against this is a liberal international legal order backed by a democratic defense alliance.

It is with these historical experiences, present-day realities and risks that we must look at our own security and our responsibility for our democratic neighbors. Sweden needs Nato, and Nato needs Sweden.

(Applause)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! It is possibly the Speaker who could compete with Fredrik Malm in being the most historically interested in this assembly of 349 members plus a Speaker. It is an interesting historical perspective you provide, Fredrik.

I intended to speak about a completely different part of the world than the one you mentioned. I intended, in fact, to speak about the situation for the Kurds and especially for the Kurds in Turkey. We all know what a long commitment you have had for the Kurds and for the Kurds' rights. I know that just during the last week you have participated in a number of memorial services to remember the victims of Halabja - the victims of the horrific chemical attack that Saddam Hussein carried out there in 1988.

I myself have shaken hands with you and agreed to stop the arms exports to Turkey in October 2019. We got the entire Riksdag on board with that decision. It is one of the decisions that has now been overturned through the Natoprocess we have gone through, when Ann Linde declared that one would resume the arms exports to Turkey.

Part of the Natoprocess has also involved signing a memorandum with Turkey. It is very clear that one of Turkey's goals has been to hunt opposition Kurds in Sweden. We see how Säpo has been invited to Turkey and that they have had joint meetings. In some texts and things that Säpo says in interrogations, one discovers that it almost feels as if the Turkish security service, MIT, is back in Sweden. There is talk that it is over 40 Kurds who risk deportation to other countries but, in the long run, to Turkey.

It is a very worrying development, I think, that oppositionists to Erdogan's regime in Ankara are being persecuted in Sweden in this way as a consequence of Sweden's NATO membership and, above all, the memorandum that the previous government signed with Turkey.

One of the liberal positions is precisely that Sweden should join Nato and at the same time that Turkey should be kicked out of Nato. After two weeks of membership, I wonder: How is it going for the Liberals with kicking Turkey out of Nato?

(TALMANNEN: Thank you for the kind words about my interest in history! I point out meticulously this with titles and first names in the chamber.)

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Thank you very much, Håkan Svenneling, for the kind words initially! I believe there are many of us, significantly more than the Speaker and myself, who have an interest in history.

For me and us in the Liberals, NATO membership is immensely important because it concerns security in our immediate vicinity and in the Baltic Sea region and what we can do. Then we have a number of views on other countries. We may have views on democratic states, and we obviously have specific views on authoritarian and undemocratic states. We have many tools to advance views. I envision that Sweden, as an active member of NATO, can also discuss issues there, if it concerns NATO in that way.

Otherwise, we have our foreign policy, our diplomacy, our MR-work and so on. If there is ground to criticize Turkey, which I think there is in many issues, we shall of course continue to do so. This applies not only to the question of the Kurds but also to a number of other issues.

The speech at riksdagen.se, in Swedish (opens in a new tab)

Håkan Svenneling (V)

Mr. Speaker! I apologize for the incorrect handling of words in the chamber.

It is a very interesting question how we should work towards the authoritarian states that exist within Nato. The Foreign Minister spoke about the alliance of Western democracies. I am not convinced that that is exactly what we are seeing right now.

It also becomes clear that Nato is about two things. It is about our immediate area, the protection of Europe, as Malm pointed out. But in Nato, it is also very clearly about the fight against terrorism. The problem with entering into a military alliance with a state like Turkey is that they classify everyone as terrorists, especially those of Kurdish origin.

This means that Sweden must consider how to approach the Turkish security service's wishes regarding cooperating more with the Swedish security service. One must consider what Turkey wants NATO to engage in and what Sweden wants NATO to engage in. These are two quite different things.

We need to find a strategy, partly all parties together, for how we should act so that it does not become Turkey's agenda.

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Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! Of course, it is as Håkan Svenneling describes it. At the same time, Turkey, despite its shortcomings, is a partner in other contexts for Sweden. We need Turkey so that, for example, Swedish gang criminals can be brought to justice there. We need contacts with many countries in the world, also in terms of intelligence, because terrorism today, especially jihadist terrorism, is global in various ways.

But when it comes to the legal certainty for Swedes, it is obvious that Sweden is a rule of law state.

Mr. Speaker! In conclusion, I want to say that the Left Party is now directing criticism towards the Liberals regarding Turkey and the NATO process. Some criticism can also be directed towards the Left Party, which explicitly used the Kurdish issue to sabotage our NATO membership by waving flags and other things, which created major problems for Sweden in the dialogue to be able to become a member.

(Applause)

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Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I also thank you for the history lessons.

During the two years that have passed since Sweden applied for membership in Nato, we have all too often seen what it means to compromise with countries with deficient democracy. The government's dancing and contorting to satisfy Erdogan and Orbán has left a bad taste in the mouth.

Mr. Speaker! To be honest, words like "shameful" and "cringe" come to mind when one has seen this process. But these words do not at all reflect the gravity of the situation when Sweden's criticism falls silent regarding states that violate human rights, imprison journalists, and control media, universities, and courts.

In the Defense Committee's report *Allvarstid i våras*, the Liberals and other parties from the government could not stand behind writings that we had all agreed upon in a previous Defense Committee regarding Turkey's democratic deficiencies, this despite the fact that the democratic situation in Turkey has hardly improved since 2019 when the previous Defense Committee agreed, among other things, that the rule of law and respect for human rights have been significantly weakened in Turkey.

Miljöpartiet has pointed out that we believe Sweden should push for a democracy requirement in Nato. Nato nevertheless claims to be bound by democratic values. It should therefore be in the alliance's interest that all member states live up to these values.

Will the Liberals and the Swedish government push for increased democratic development in NATO's member countries and push for a democracy requirement to be introduced in NATO?

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Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! First and foremost, I want to say that I feel very secure with the declaration that the Foreign Minister read out earlier today. There are clear provisions there, and we still have a number of tools in our toolbox at our disposal for our dialogue and also, when required, criticism of other states. We have our membership in the UN, we have our membership in the European Union, we have our foreign policy, we have our diplomatic apparatus, we have free media where issues can be addressed and so on. Miljöpartiet makes it sound as if it is precisely Nato that is the specific body for addressing this type of issues.

What is important with the NATO membership is the security in our immediate vicinity. It is the protection for Sweden and the protection for the Baltic states, which only have 1, 2 and 3 million inhabitants respectively, if they are attacked by the entire Russian war machine.

I think it is unfortunate that these questions are being pitted against each other. We need NATO membership for our safety and for our security.

Then it is not just about Turkey and Hungary. There may also be other countries where Sweden sees that there are deficiencies. In those cases, we have established channels and mechanisms for that. We have the entire foreign policy. Sometimes the aid or trade policy is used.

Miljöpartiet themselves speak of the fact that one must look cross-sectorally and more broadly at these concepts. In this part, I agree with this.

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Emma Berginger (MP)

Mr. Speaker! I believe very much in democracy and in that the world becomes safer the more countries become democratic and become more democratic.

However, a democracy requirement is missing in the Foreign Minister's declaration. NATO is, after all, a foreign policy arena where Sweden has an opportunity to meet other countries, engage in dialogue, and push for democratic development if we so wish.

Mr. Speaker! The Liberals have previously nevertheless pushed the issue of a democracy requirement. In a party motion from 2018, signed by among others Jan Björklund, you wanted Sweden to advocate for a democracy requirement in Nato and actually also for Turkey to be excluded from the alliance.

My question is: Have you dropped these demands and now fallen silent on the question of democracy?

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Fredrik Malm (L)

Mr. Speaker! I have not seen any dictatorship that wants to become a member of Nato. Turkey has been a Nato member since the 1950s. I have not seen any great interest from undemocratic states to become members of Nato. What I have seen interest in over the recent years is that Sweden and Finland become members of Nato. I hold to a somewhat old-fashioned view, one might think when following the Swedish public debate sometimes, that Sweden actually is still a democracy. It is something I am convinced that Emma Berginger also agrees with.

I therefore do not see that the risk is particularly great that a lot of dictators will suddenly be admitted into the NATO family.

(Applause)

The foreign policy debate was hereby concluded.

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